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Abstract 
The immense changes to have taken place in UK food retailing during the second half of the 20th 
ccntury are detailed, explained and analysed, with constant référence to théories of retail change. The 
resuit is not just a history of UK food retail change post-1950, but a comprehensive évaluation and 
extension of retail change theory, with new driving forces and ideas elaborated, and a forecast of 
likely key developments to 2010. 
The thesis is based largely on the testimonies of key industry actors of the period, including past and 
présent executives of leading food retali organisations, and followed an un-structured interview 
approach, allowing stories to be told without unnecessary constraint. The development of the 
industry is detailed and explained, drawing heavily on thèse testìmonies, and this change is explained 
with référence to major factors with a direct hearing on the industry, such as government policy and 
socio-economie change. 
Because of the emphasis on witness accounts, the théories of retail change are analysed with a heavy 
focus on the people driving change, a refreshing change in a field where the historical nature of the 
subject tends to drive research towards secondary sources of data. The thesis contributes a better 
understanding of the forces driving the théories of retail change, and proposes an extension to the 
domain of application. 
The relevant éléments of the théories of retail change are implemented to forecast likely 
developments in the UK food retail industry to 2010, which is complemented by an 'expert' Delphi 
forecast and a projection of current socio-economie trends. 
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Chapter 1 
2 
Introduction, Airas and Objectives 
1.1 Introduction to change, retail change and general background 
"One aspect that distinguishes the second half of the 20th century from its first half is the 
speed of change in the political, economical, social and technological arenas. During the 
first half of the century, things had changed and developed fairly slowly and steadily; 
yesterday was like tomorrow. In the second half of this century, however, a number of 
events have taken place unexpectedly and trends have shifted in dramatic fashion. " 
[Ono and Wedemeyer, 1994] 
It is widely accepted that the second half of the twentieth century has been a period of relentless and 
unprecedented change [Drucker, 1977, 1986; Ono and Wedemeyer, 1994; Peters, 1989]. Not since 
the industrial revolution has such dramatic and widespread change taken place [Drucker, 1977]. 
The rate of change slowed between the world wars of 1914 and 1939, the inter-war years being a 
period when existing technologies and industries were built upon rather than disappearing into the 
shadow of innovation [Drucker, 1977]. A factor attributed to the slowing of the rate of change during 
this period was the lack of industrialisation taking place around the world [Drucker, 1977]. It is 
argued that this drought in the invention of new technologies and industries resulted from the fact 
that no new countries became industrialised during the period; the previously industrialised nations 
had achieved a convenient 'status quo' where any change would rock the boat and was therefore 
undesirable. The industrialisation of countries such as Japan after the second world war disrupted any 
status quo that may have been, and reintroduced change as a way of corporate life. 
Western economies and enterprises had become used to stability. In the 1970s, change gathered pace 
as the world was hit by the oil crisis, and western economies were forced to face up to growing 
competition from the Japanese and other emerging economies [Kanter, 1985]. The business 
environment of today is far removed from that of the 1960s, yet adaptation to the changes that have 
taken place has been slow, hampered by inertia, multiple layers of management, bureaucracy, and 
lack of innovative spirit [Kanter, 1985; Loonis, 1993]. Businesses that are coming to terms with 
rapid change, however, remain in danger from successive waves of change that sweep the world. It is 
not enough to keep the corporate ship afloat, corporations and executives need to constantly re-invent 
themselves so as to keep ahead and benefit from the unprecedented opportunities presented by the 
new global society of change [Johnson, 1995]. 
Change has had important implications for businesses since its pace quickened in the 1950s and 
1960s. The work force, patterns of world trade, technology and political sensibilities have been 
identified as the major catalysts in the process of change [Kanter, 1985; Ono and Wedemeyer, 1994]. 
Movement in any of these fields can stimulate change. Organisations that cope successfully with 
change, are prepared, flexible and fast-acting, and are expected to prosper enormously [Kanter, 1985] 
from future change, which will create unprecedented opportunity [Johnson, 1995]. 
Those organisations that expect the rate of change to slow and everything to 'return to normal' will 
suffer. Change is here to stay, or rather, nothing is here to stay except constant change. 
"no-one is holding out any hope that the world is going to stop reshaping itself. Everyone 
has to understand that a fundamental metamorphosis is going on " 
[Johnson, 1995] 
The ability to adapt to change is therefore a critical factor in an organisation's fight for survival. 
Change will continue to shape the world, so the correct attitude towards it is imperative. The past 
holds valuable lessons for the future [Johnson, 1995] - in the case of change, the lesson to be learnt is 
that some of the world's largest companies, such as IBM, General Motors and Sears Roebuck, have 
been hit so hard by their failure to adapt to change that they fell down to being comparatively minor 
players in the global marketplace [Loonis 1993]. 
Retail Change 
The fall from glory of US retailer Sears Roebuck serves as a pointed reminder to UK retailers that 
they must always face up to new threats before it is too late; stay one step ahead of the competition. 
There is no place for complacency in the changing world [Johnson, 1995; Kanter, 1985; Loonis, 
1993]. 
"One reason Sears fell so far off the pace is that they wouldn't admit for the longest time 
that Wal-Mart and Kmart were their real competition. They ignored both of us, and we both 
blew right by them. " 
[Walton and Huey, 1992] 
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The UK food retai! industry is no exception to the change that has swept the corporate world. A 
comparison of grocery shopping today with that of 1950 illustrâtes the extent of change that the 
industry has been through. 
In 1950, the food retail industry was dominated by the independent grocer; the customer, normally 
known to the grocer by name, would présent a shopping list at the grocer1 s counter. The grocer 
would cut, weigh and prepare the customer's merchandise, often delivering the goods to their home. 
Contemporary food retailing is dominated by the supermarket and superstore, operated by a handful 
of companies. The early supermarket of the 1950s and early 1960s was defined as having a sales area 
of at ieast 2000 square feet1, although this was soon made to look like a relatively small store [see 
Boswell, 1969], and a superstore of between 25000 and 50000 square feet 2 . The average sales area 
of outlets operated by Asda, Sainsbury and Teseo are 40443, 26304 and 24356 square feet 
respectively \ demonstrating that size is important in food retailing. 
In 1994, the leading fìve multiple food retailers accounted for 42.4% of the LTK grocery market share, 
rising to 49.9% in 1999 3 . The grocery market share of independent grocery retailers declined from 
17.1% in 1986 to only 8.4% in 1996 \ and in the period from 1980 to 1992, the number of 
independent grocery outlets feil from 48000 to 20500 5 . 
The small grocery retailer, thus, is in decline. Fewer and fewer opérations are chasing a declining 
market share. The powerful food retail multiples are gaining more and more power, a trend that 
started soon after World War II. Currently, supermarkets and superstores are commonplace, and the 
shopping expérience differs considerably from that of 1950 described above. 
In the modem shopping expérience, the customer need not come into contact with a member of staff 
unti! they arrive at the checkout. Customers are free to select their own goods, encouraging 'impulse 
buys'. Giant banks of refrigerators and freezers line many of the aisles. The smeli of freshly baked 
1
 Self-service and Supermarket Annua! Survey and Directoiy, 1967\ referred to in the Census of Distribution, 1966, 
p.2/109. 
" source: A to Z of Retailing, 1989, London, Euromonitor . 
1
 source: IGD. 
" source: Nielsen Marke t Research 
~ source: Retailing in Europe - United Kingdom, 1995, London, Corporate Intel l igence Unit . 
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bread 'escapes' from the bakery department. At the checkout, purchases are scanned by infra-red 
devices, eliminating the need for the assistant to punch price after price into the tili. Loyalty cards 
can be swiped, downloading the customer's profile for use by the store, generating discounts and free 
gifts for use by the customer. 
In summary, the small independent counter-service grocery trade has been largely wiped out. In its 
place are fewer, larger, state-of-the-art stores, controlied by a small number of players. Whereas in 
1950 it was customary to see grocery shops on almost every Street, the food retail landscape of the 
new millennium is dominated by giant warehouses containing around 25000 Unes. 
The manifest changes that have occurred in retailing have been likened to the industriai revolution 
[Dawson and Kirby, 1980], Unlike the industriai revolution, the retail revolution that has taken place 
has received little attention. The last major chronicle of change ends in 1950 [Jefferys, 1954], just as 
the présent period of constant change began to gather momentum [Ono and Wedemeyer, 1994]. 
1.2 Introduction to thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to evaluate and develop théories of retail change through an 
investigation of UK food retail change post-1950. Secondary aims are to detail and explain the 
changes that have taken place in UK food retailing since 1950, and to forecast the main likely 
developments to 2010. To achieve thèse objectives the thesis can be considered to have 5 parts, 
which are detailed below. The key methodoîogical procédures employed are considered fully in 3J_ 
(p.69-82), but in brief are unstructured interviews, the analysis of thèse using a technique based on 
grounded theory, and Delphi forecasting. 
The unstructured interviews were with the major drivers of UK food retail change of the period, and 
were focused on senior retail executives active during the second half of the 20th Century. Their 
views were used to fumisti the explanations in chapters 5 and 6 (see below). In chapter 6, their 
explanations are analysed using a technique based on grounded theory (see 3.1.Ü) to assess the 
relevance of existing retail change theory, to generate new explanations for existing theory, and to 
suggest new theory, grounded specifically in UK food retail change 1950-2000. 
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The Delphi forecast, the results of which appear in appendix 1, uses a panel of 'experts ' to make a 
forecast in a given area, and the panel of experts are asked to respond to successive rounds of 
questionnaires, normally by post (appendix 5). It aims to get a consensus of opinion over the course 
of the exercise, or movement tovvards this. The panel approached were senior food retati executives, 
analysts, académies and retail consultants, and ali were active in the industry at the time of the 
forecast. By approaching those in positions to drive change, a reasonably accurate result was 
anticipated, and the customary four rounds were Condensed into two to reflect the time demands of 
Ihose participating. 
Introductory section: 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject of change, outlines the significance of change in UK food retailing, 
explains the structure of the thesis, identifies the main issues in UK food retailing, and sets out the 
aims and objectives of the study. 
Chapter 2 explains the main théories of retail change, and critically reviews the published literature 
on thèse and on UK food retail development post-1950, while chapter 3 outlines the methods chosen 
to pursue the objectives of the thesis. 
Findings fpast events) 
Chapter 4 identifies the five key changes to UK food retailing post-1950, identifìed mainly from 
secondary sources. The aim of this chapter is to chart the changes, rather than to explain why they 
occurred. The five key trends considered are the changing market shares of multiple, independent and 
co-operative grocery retailers, the concentration of power in the industry, évolution of the retail 
format, retailers' geographical and product diversification, and the changing emphasis on price and 
sei-vice. Chapter 5 introduces the major factors shaping the industry over the second half of the 20th 
Century, and is arranged by government policy, socio-economie change, technological change, and 
retailer change. Chapter 6 identifies the endogenous and exogenous forces driving the five key 
changes identified in chapter 4, explains why the changes occurred, and areas of relevance to theoiy 
are identified, grounded in the findings. Findings are derived from both primary and secondary 
sources, with the key emphasis being on the use of primary 'interview' data. Primary sources are the 
results of qualitative in-depth interviews with the major players of the period, or those who could teli 
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about them (3.1.Ü). Secondary sources include published literature, Journals, newspapers and 
professional reports (3.1.i). 
Relevance of the body of theory 
Chapter 7 uses the findings from chapter 4, 5 and 6 to critically evaluate the applicability of the 
théories of retail change explained (2.1) to UK food retailing post-1950, following a technique based 
on the ideas of the 'grounded theory' process (3.1 .ii. p.74-75). The théories most suited to the 
explanation of UK food retail change post-1950 are used to make a forecast of likely developments 
in UK food retailing to 2010 (section 7.3). This provides an alternative to the Delphi forecast results, 
presented in appendix l and summarised in section 8.1. By using theory in addition to a forecasting 
technique, a control is introduced, and the risk of serious error is, theoretically at least, lowered. 
Forecasts 
The likely impact of future socio-economic changes are analysed in appendix 10, as thèse must be 
considered for the application of theory to be successfuk The results of the application of the theory 
are presented in section 7.4, and section 7.5 assesses the implications of the application of theory, 
and provides recommendations based on the results. 
Chapter 8 introduces the results of the Delphi forecast, as explained in chapter 3 and appendix 5. This 
forecasting technique is used to obtain a forecast from a group of industry experts, the results of 
which are summarised in appendix 1 and section 8.1. Section 8.2 deals with implications and 
recommendations derived from the Delphi forecast, and section 8.3 summarises the key éléments of 
both the theory-based and expert-based forecasts. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion, chapter 9, brings together chapters 7 and 8, both of which have produced forecasts of 
likely developments in UK food retailing to 2010. Once again, the implications are assessed, and 
action is suggested. 
Findings are related to the existing body of knowledge in section 9.2, enabling the identification of 
the areas in which this work is unique, and a criticai évaluation of the validity of the existing body of 
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theory appears in section 9.4. Section 9.5 evaluates the study, outlines weaknesses and limitations, 
and section 9.6 suggests areas suitable for further research. 
This study includes a major forecast of developments likely to affect UK food retailing to 2010. As 
highlighted in section 1.1, an appropriate corporate reaction to change is of paramount importance to 
the success of all organisations, and ultimately has a significant effect on profits, or even survival. 
All organisations affected by the UK food retail industry may benefit from the forecasts, implications 
and recommendations generated by this work. This includes obvious players such as the food 
retailers themselves, in addition, however, organisations and individuals suffering 'knock-on' effects 
should also pay attention to the results. These may include manufacturers, suppliers and importers, as 
well as building developers, financial institutions and distributors. Government and local government 
play a key role in many developments, they too can benefit from a close look at this study. Trade 
unions, food retailers of other European countries and those from further afield, and the developers of 
new technology also stand to gain from this study. 
Tn summary, a large section of the economy is affected by UK food retailing. Any changes in the 
industry can be felt by many seemingly remote institutions. It is therefore important for anyone 
potentially affected by changes in UK food retailing to act on the results, implications and 
recommendations of this study. Failure to adapt to change can be catastrophic, as highlighted in 
section 1.1. 
1.3 Identification of the main issues 
The last major chronicle of British food retail development [Jeffreys, 1954] covered the period from 
1850 to 1950. UK food retail development since 1950 has changed the UK retail landscape almost 
beyond recognition, yet there is no major chronicle of this development, and a key aim of this thesis 
is to fill this gap. 
The theories of retail change, particularly the Wheel of Retailing, have been reasonably widely 
evaluated (2.1. p. 11-66), but only on rare occasions are these evaluations related to the UK or the 
food retail sector, with the main exception to this being the polarisation principle (2.1.3. p.39-42). 
The Wheel of Retailing has received the lion's share of academic attention, while other theories of 
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retai! change have been somewhat neglected in comparison, cespite their apparent relevance in many 
areas. This study aims to redress this balance by concentrated on several théories of retail change, 
including the Wheel of Retailing, and evaluating them specifically, using a technique derived from 
grounded theory (3.1.ri. p.74-75), for relevance to UK food retail development post-1950. 
Retail change theory, having been evaluated for relevance to UK food retail change post-1950, 
provides the basis of a forecast of likeiy developments to 2010 (chapter 7). In this way, past change 
is providing insight into possible future developments in the industry, and such explanation is a 
valuable characteristic and purpose of theory. Appendix 6 attempts to define theory, which shows 
that it can be interpreted either loosely, as Einstein did when he labelled théories free créations of 
the minci* [Harvey, 1969; p.87], or in a stricter sensé, as 'the general laws, principles, or causes of 
something known or observea" [Oxford Dictionary Online]. It concludes that argument over whether 
the 'théories of retail change' technically qualify to be termed théories is pointless, and that they do 
fit some définitions of the term, and will therefore continue to be referred to as théories, as the 
académie press has done for several décades. 
There have been three major studies of UK food retailing using Delphi forecasting (3.1 .iii). Thèse are 
by Walters [1976], the Distributive Industry Training Board [1980], and Treadgold and Reynolds 
[1989], who between them identified trends including the increasing pénétration of private label, 
diversification of offering, increasing store sizes, adoption of bar codes and scanning, increasing 
pressure on manufacturer, the disappearance of first generation supermarkets and the likelihood of 
saturation in the UK food retail market O.l.iii. p.81-82). This project also uses the Delphi forecasting 
technique, with the number of rounds was reduced to two in order to increase likeiy participation 
levels (3-1 -'ii- P-78). 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The aims and objectives of the thesis are to: 
• evaluate the relevance of existing théories of retail change to UK food retail change post-1950. 
• chronicie the development of UK food retailing during the second half of the 20th century. 
• explain the forces driving this development, based on the testimonies of key actors driving these 
changes, and those who can teli about them, obtained via a séries of unstructured interviews. 
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• generate new theory grounded specifically in UK food retail change post-1950, and produce new 
explanations for existing théories. 
• forecast likely developments to 2010, based on the most relevant theoretical explanations 
grounded in UK food retail change post-1950. 
• derive a second forecast of likely developments to 2010, based on the opinion of 'experts ' in the 
field, using the Delphi technique. 
• create a third forecast of likely developments based on the extension of socio-economie and 
technological trends, and to combine ali three forecasts to create an overall summary of likely 
developments to 2010, vvith implications and recommendations for the UK food retail industry. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Chapter 2 introduces the théories of retail change and the literature pertaining to them (2JJ, and 
critically reviews the body of existing literature on UK food retailing (2.2). 
2.1 An Explanation of the Main Theories of Retail Change, and Review of the Literature 
pertaining to them. 
This section explains each of the main théories of retail change, outlines their strengths and 
weakuesses, and identifies the key hypothèses from which the théories have been developed. The 
identification of the key hypothèses serves as a tool to help identify the changes in UK food retailing 
to which théories of retail change may be suitably applied. 
Retail change théories can be identified according to their approach - this may be broadly cyclical, 
environmental or conflict-based. Cyclical théories, whereby change takes place in an oscillatory 
fashion characterised by the récurrence of earlier pattems, include the Wheel of Retailing, the Retail 
Accordion, the Polarisation Principle, the Multi-Polarisation Model and the Retail Life Cycle (2.1.1-
2.1.5). Environmental théories, namely the Darwinian approach (2.1.6). see change as a function of 
developments in an institution's operational milieu. Conflict-based théories, such as Dialectic retail 
évolution (2.1.7). focus attention on the inter-institutional strife occurring when a novel retail 
institution appears [Brown, 1987a; Brown, 1988a]. In reality, however, the théories possess éléments 
of each approach [Brown, 1987b], but a broad catégorisation is useful nonetheless. 
Cyclical Approach 
2.1.1 The Wheel of Retailing 
Sevcnty years ago, McNair [1931] suggested that retail formats tend to begin !ife as low-overhead, 
low-status, low-price Operators, before trading-up the quality of merchandise and increasing the 
level of services, leaving them vulnerable to the next generation of low-cost entrants, basing his 
findings on US department stores of the period. He later extended thèse principles [McNair, 1958], 
contending that US department stores, originally having appeared as low-cost competitors to smaller 
reiailers, had 'traded-up 1 and become vulnerable to new, low-overhead, low-status, low-price 
competitors such as discount houses and supermarkets. From this point, the 'Wheel of Retailing', as 
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the hypothesis became known, began to gather momentum, attracting significant protracted 
académie attention, far in excess of that given to alternative théories of retail change: 
Figure 2.1.1. The Wheel of Retailing: 
An inévitable resuit of académie attention is réfutai and criticism, and the Wheel's universality 
began to be questioned, as did its accuracy in describing overall US retail development. It is often 
criticised for failing to address the compétitive response of established operators, concentrating 
instead on the innovator [Izraeli, 1973; Swan, 1974; Goldman, 1975; Kaynak, 1979], inferring lack 
of compétitive reaction to low-cost entrants, which is clearly not automatically the case. US 
supermarkets, for example, reacted fiercely to the threat of discount department stores [Brand, 1963], 
and to the entrance of European discount supermarkets in the mid-1970s [Patton and DeLozier, 
1983], while UK and Scandinavian voluntary groups represent the response of the grocery trade to 
the rise of supermarkets and multiple organisations [Kaynak, 1979], although this sort of organised 
response is seen as the exception to the rule [ibid.]. 
Vulnerability phase 
Trading-up phase [Source: Lewison, 1997, p.640] 
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More positively, much académie research supports the Wheel theory, particularly US retail change, 
although this does not necessarily imply greater adhérence, rather that the bulk of research has been 
executed in the USA. The évolution of the following US retail institutions has been found to support 
the Wheel of Retailing: Department stores [Hollander, i960, 1980; Regan, 1964; Duncan, 1965; 
Gist, 1968, 1971; Bucklin, 1972, 1983; Goldman, 1975, 1978; James et al., 1981; Kaynak, 1988], 
mail-order fions [Hollander, 1960; Regan, 1964; Duncan, 1965; Gist, 1971; Kaynak, 1979], variety 
stores (five and ten (cents) stores) [Hollander, 1960; Gist, 1968; Bucklin, 1972], variety chains [Gist, 
1971; Kaynak, 1979]. iewellers [Hollander, 1960; Gist, 1971], clothing chains [Hollander, 1980] 
appliance dealers [Hollander, i960], discount houses [Hollander, 1960; Regan, 1964; Duncan, 1965; 
Bucklin, 1972; James et al., 1981; Cundiff, 1988], discount stores [Gist, 1971; Goldman, 1978; 
Kaynak, 1979; Korgaonkar, 1981], closed-membership discounters [Bucklin, 1972], warehouse 
membership clubs [Sampson and Tigert, 1994], discount opérations [Gist, 1968], discount 
department stores [Brand, 1963; Hollander, 1980], outlet/off-price retailing [Lord, 1984; Kaikati, 
1985], petrol retailing [Hollander, i960], self-service petrol retailing [Dickinson, 1983], chains in 
general [Bucklin, 1972; Goldman, 1978; Cundiff, 1988], grocery chains [Kaynak, 1979], self-service 
grocery retailing [Goldman, 1974], supermarkets [Brand, 1963; Doody, 1963; Regan, 1964; Duncan, 
1965; Gist, 1971; Bucklin, 1972; James et al., 1981; Kaynak, 1979], convenience stores [Dickinson, 
1983; Kotier, 1988], drugstores [Hollander, 1960], discount catalogue showrooms [Sewall and 
Goldstein. 1979; Korgaonkar, 1981; Dickinson, 1983], greeting card shops [Dickinson, 1983], home 
improvement centres [Dickinson, 1983] leisure outlets [McNair and May, 1978; McGoldrick, 1990], 
fast food outlets [Dickinson, 1983], McDonald's fast food restaurants [Teeple, 1979], motels 
[Dickinson, 1983] and New York street vendors [Greenberg et al., 1980]. 
Soft goods of comparable quality are cheaper in US discount stores than department stores [Dardis 
and Skow, 1969], supporting the Wheel of retailing hypothesis, although US catalogue showroom 
price discounts may not be as large as some Operators claim [Sewall and Goldstein, 1979]. US 
department stores, limited price variety stores, supermarkets and hard discounters' gross margins 
increascd due to trading-up [Dreesmann, 1968], and overall US retail margins increased from 20% to 
30% between 1840 and 1950 [ibid.], suggesting that this may have been an induslry wide 
phenomenon. 
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The 1955 ending of US giant Safeway's aggressive price-cutting era, and the company's subséquent 
quest for higher margins facilitated the growth of low-price-oriented Operators, providing an 
umbrella to nurture their growth [Dickinson, 1981, 1988]. 
Support of the Wheel outside the USA is more limited. British department stores upgraded 
considerably [Jefferys, 1954], particularly their food offerings [Hollander, 1960], allowing the 
entrance of chain stores, cut-price cash and carry, and then supermarkets [ibid.]. In the second half of 
the 19 t h centuiy, English grocery retailers' slow turnover and extended credit facilities necessitated 
high margins and prices, in response to which many English co-operative societies emerged with 
fewer services, better quality goods, and lower prices (via the repayment of profits in dividcnds) 
[Pennance and Yamey, 1955]. By the late 19 l h Century, co-operative price leadership faltered due to 
an influx of co-operative compétition drìving up their retailing costs [ibid.], and grocery multiples 
began to undercut co-operatives, able to offer lower prices by cutting costs through initiatives such 
as bulk-buying, stocking limited lines, and accepting cash-only payments [ibid.]. Trading-up of 
multiple grocers, who began to offer more services, facilitated the entry of cut-price grocery shops in 
the 1930s, which lowered costs by limiting both service and merchandise range [ibid.] 
Also in the UK, mail-order firms initially appealed to low-income consumers who were attracted by 
credit facilities, before movìng on to appeal to the suburban population [Dawson, 1979]. UK retail 
warehouses, particularly in DIY, entered as low-status Operators before becoming more 
sophisticated, improving the store image by moving to purpose-built warehouses and ìmproving 
service levels, which drove up operating costs, as did intense compétition for sites which inflated 
land values [Gibbs, 1987; Brown, 1990b]. 
Peruvian supermarkets entered the market trading at a 10-15% discount to traditional retailers 
[Lockley et al., 1966], trading-up has occurred in Danish retailing in general [Agergard et. a l , 1970], 
and Spanish department stores' concentration on the higher segments of the market, driven by 
intratype compétition, created a gap at the lower end, which was filled by variety stores [Cruz and 
Mugica, 1988]. The first French and Belgian department stores, opened in 1852 and 1897 
respectively, promised lower prices through innovative operating techniques, which were so 
fundamental to early department store retailing that the first Brüssels department store took the name 
Innovation [Michel and Vander Eycken, 1974]. 
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Extensive growth of Belgian multiple organisations, supermarkets and hypermarkets between 1968 
and 1972 was accompanied by falling retail margins and costs, suggesting that emerging retail 
techniques enjoyed lower costs and margins than their predecessors [ibid.]. Belgian hypermarkets 
began 7e trading-iip* by the early-1970s [ibid.], Belgian department stores and variety stores 
evolved followed the Wheel pattern [Knee and Walters, 1985], and German book publishers failed to 
respond to late 19 t h Century demand for low-price, popularised, 'pulp fiction', leaving aggressive 
entrepreneurs to do so, using new technology in the process [Fullerton, 1987], 
Finally, Canadian chain stores, department stores, supermarkets and catalogue stores all entered the 
market on a lower-cost, lower-price basis, compared to the established retail hierarchy [Shaffer, 
1973]. 
The many cases of retail évolution supporting the Wheel are countered by cases of non-conformity. 
Hollander [1960] was the first to outline thèse for the USA, suggesting that vending machines, 
department-sto re branches, and planned shopping centres all entered the market as high-cost, high-
margin opérations, in direct contradiction to the Wheel principles. Bucklin [1972] found that 
confectionery and cigarettes sold through vending machines had higher margins than those sold by 
competing retail types, primarily because vending opérations must cover their higher costs, which 
arise from higher staff costs as a percentage of sales, the costs of buying and maintaining the 
machines, and high site rentals costs. 
Convenience stores and boutiques were added to the list of high-service, high-price positioned 
entrants [Izraeli, 1973; Kaynak, 1979], although if convenience stores are viewed as a reintroduction 
of the 'country' general store of the 19 l h Century, they have indeed traded up from low-status 
foundations [May, 1989]. The US superette, Superstore, boutique, and 'novelty' and 'speciality' mail 
order companies failed to conform to the Wheel hypothesis [Goldman, 1978]. 
There are further examples of non-conformity outside of the USA. European supermarkets failed to 
conform to the Wheel hypothesis, according to Goldman [1974, 1978], although seems to be an 
overly-universal claim. More specifically, movement of the gross margins of French supermarkets 
and hypermarkets between 1972 and 1982 failed to support the Wheel hypothesis [Filser, 1984], 
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Japanese départaient stores' priée compétition of the early 20 Century was in direct contradiction of 
the wheel hypothesis [Hollander, 1960], as was the necessity to introduce resale price maintenance to 
the UK in order to prevent price cutting by established merchants in the late 19 t h Century [ibid.]. 
By far the bulk of non-conforrning cases, however, centre on the Wheel of Retailing's failure to 
explain retail évolution in countries with low-level économies. This was first suggested by Hollander 
[1960], although he acknowledges a degree of ignorance of non-US retail history. Persia, Venezuela, 
Brazil, Puerto Rico [Hollander, 1960], 'some parts of Latin America', Asia (ex. Japan) [Bucklin, 
1977], Turkey [Kaynak, 1979], Israel [Goldman, 1982], Saudi Arabia [Alawi, 1986; Yavas and 
Tuncalp, 1984], Guatemala [Ortiz-Buonofma, 1987], Hong Kong [Ho and Lau, 1988], China [Mun, 
1988] and Malaysia [Zain and Rejab, 1989] are developing countries where retail institutions have 
entered the market at a level calering to small middle and upper income groups, rather than to low 
income groups, directly contradicting the Wheel of Retailing hypothesis. 
Supermarkets in Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong and Singapore, and Singaporean department stores 
initially aimed at high-income minority segments, before extending their reach to lower-income 
consumers over time [Alawi, 1986; Yavas and Tuncalp, 1984; Ho and Lau, 1988; Lau and Lee, 
1988; Tan and Teoh, 1988] 
Peruvian supermarkets, however, entered the market on price appeal, undercutting the established 
retail hierarchy [Lockley et al., 1966], and there is limited évidence of supermarket entrants 
undercutting established food retailers in Brazil [Bucklin, 1977]. Venezuelan supermarkets initially 
undercut the established retail hierarchy of small stores by 8 to 10% [Kacker, 1988b], although there 
was a relatively fierce competitive reaction as small stores converted to self-service, and introduced 
pre-packaging, better displays, modem store fronts, and offered credit, in an attempt to neutralise the 
threat [Kacker, 1988b]. 
Despite a handful of cases where it is applicable, the Wheel of Retailing undoubtedly has a tendency 
to deflate when applied to less developed countries, a tendency so pronounced that Kaynak [1988] 
goes as far as saying that ali supermarkets in developing countries are located in high-income areas 
which are populated by westemised consumers who have some familiarity with this type of store, 
perhaps an exaggeration but true in large measure at least.. 
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Explanations of the Wheel of Retailing's inability to describe retail évolution in LDC's are based on 
either consumer char acter ist ics and the economie level of the LDC Cdemand side), or the cost 
structure of the retail innovation differing between LDC's and developed économies (supply side), 
forces which are explained fìilly in appendix 7. 
Causes of trading-up 
Cases of application and non-application have their place, and are useful in assessing the validity of 
théories, but, arguably, fostering understanding of the causes driving change is of more validity. The 
causes of trading up are widely documented, a process which started with six 'tentative explanations 
of the WheeV, based on existmg literature [Hollander, I960]: 
• Retail personalities relax their vigilance over costs as they acquire age and wealth, and 
managerial détérioration causes movement along the wheel. 
• Retail trade Journals, implausibly, coax merchants into adding overly elaborate facilities using 
glossy advertising. However, there is no subséquent research supporting this. 
• Fear of direct price compétition drives retailers to favour service compétition instead. 
• Excess retail capacity drives trading-up. 
• Adjustment of the retail offering to a changing and generally wealthier market. 
• Scrambled merchandising means that overall margins increase, although the margins of originai 
lines remains unchanged. 
Five of Hollander's [1960] tentative explanations are supported by subséquent research, considered 
below, in tum, before alternative causes of trading-up are investigated. 
Ageing of management 
Reduced vigilance over costs as a cause of trading up is supported by Doody [1963], who contends 
that management do fail to control costs as they age and the company develops inertia, which Gist 
[1968] expanded, suggesting the existence of a managerial tendency to appoint inferior successors, in 
order to make the outgoing management appear more prolific. Management often become risk averse 
as they become accustomed to the 'comfort of success', management conservatism sets in and 
expenses gradually rise, according to Gist [1971]. 
17 
Gable Se Topol's [1988] investigation into machiavellianism (the degree to which a person is 
manipulative and unethical) among US department store executives supports the ageing of 
management hypothesis, ñnding that older, sénior executives adopt a less aggressive approach than 
when they were younger, suggesting that costs and margins may be allowed to creep up. Similarly, 
Lord et al. [1988] found that Kwik Save founder Albert Gubay's 'competitive edge' eroded over 
time, and was a factor contributing to his failed US ventures. 
Fear of direct price competition 
Fear of direct price competition, or rather that it can be ruinous because it is so easily replicated, 
leads to non-price competition being favoured, as it is less easily neutralised [Gist, 1968; Entenberg, 
1964], in particular when margins have become uncomfortably low [Hall et al., 1961]. Non-price 
competition, however, must be demanded by consumers to be successful [Bucklin, 1972] - trading 
stamps, for example, were quickly dropped when incremental sales gains began to fall away 
[Bucklin, 1972]. Non-price competition is frequently effective, however, for example French 
supermarkets faced with the opening of a nearby hypermarket were found to be most likely to 
survive if they improved customer services, extended opening hours, adjusted the product mix, and 
generally focused on non-price competition [Dawson, 1979], strategies that are common throughout 
Europe and the USA in similar situations [ibid.]. 
Fear of direct price competition is consistent with behaviour under oligopolistic competition 
conditions, as there comes a point on the demand curve where an increase in price would iead to a 
rapid loss of customers to other businesses, and a reduction in price would quickly be replicated by 
competitors, with the originator attaining only a small sales increase [Bucklin, 1972]. Under such 
conditions, non-price competition is induced, and a spiral of additional services and facilities begins, 
with the only brake on this being 'intertype' competition [ibid.], supporting the Wheel of Retailing 
hypothesis. 
Competition increases. as do costs as 'pulling power' declines 
Doody's [1963] study of Macy's department store, New York, between 1888 atid 1919, found that it 
had initially been able to pulí in customers from long distances due to its uniqueness, but as 
competitors appeared around 1900, copying Macy's advantages, its original appeal was neutralised 
somewhat as it lost its 'pulling power', and its costs gradually had to rise due to the slow erosión of 
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its market. The degree to which a successful innovation can be copied is immense, for example, 
Piggy Wiggly, the forerunner of the US supermarket established in 1916, attracted imitators 
including Jitney Jungle, Handy Andy, Savy-Wavy, Helpy-Selfy and Hoggly Woggly [Hollander and 
Omura, 1989]. 
Similarly, Bucklin [1972] contends that early innovators have near-exclusivity in any given 
marketplace, and can therefore draw in customers from a wider area. As more competitors move in, 
the géographie 'pulling power' of the innovator diminishes, and the initial low margins must rise to 
compensate. In effect, the geographical spread of an innovation appears to diminish the initial cost 
advantages [ibid.]. Productivity per square foot and per employée hour are high in the early stages of 
an innovation, but inevitably fall as imitators are attracted and the market becomes diluted 
[Hollander, 1980], when additional amenities must be offered to attract consumers [ibid.], kick-
starting the trading-up process. 
Dickinson [1983, 1988] also suggests that initially, low-price innovations generate free word of 
mouth advertising, but over time this decreases as compétition from similar facilities increases, and 
the price-advantage is lost as 'intertype' compétition becomes secondary to 'intratype'. Competing 
with thèse inevitably pushes up costs and margins, and trading-up tends to occur to compensate 
[Dickinson, 1988]. This process is largely inévitable and provides a permanent umbrella for the 
nurturing of price-orientated innovations, argues Dickinson [1983]. 
The first steps in Dutch low-cost, low-price institutions tend to be taken by a few innovative 
independent Operators, and if successful thèse attract the attention of large-scale businesses, who 
follow, often through takeover [Nooteboom, 1984]. As a concept gains popularity and its success 
becomes clearer, remaining independents are almost forced to follow suit, but by then the formula 
has become obsolete [ibid.], suggesting that over-capacity drives up the originai retailing costs of the 
format, making it less effective. Margins of UK DIY retail warehouses increased because of 
compétition for sites inflating land values, particularly when established retailers entered the field 
[Gibbs, 1987]. In effect, the Toss of pulling power' effect is compounded by increased overhead 
costs. 
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Excess retail capacity as a cause of trading up is supported by English grocery co-operatives' late 
19 l h Century failure to maintain theirprice leadership due to extensive expansion of the co-operative 
movement, which ironically brought increased compétition and higher retailing costs [Pennance and 
Yamey, 1955]. Trading-up occurred in Derunark because low-cost, low-price retail innovations 
which have been well received by consumers have quickly attracted the attention of established 
retailers, who begin to invest in similar facilities [Agergard et al., 1970]. In time, investment drives 
over-supply, compétition intensifies as a resuit, and tends to be demonstrated in non-price 
compétition - assortments are expanded, shop sizes rise, service levéis rise, and costs increase [ibid.]. 
Financial returns on US supermarkets fell from impressive levéis in the early-1950s because of 
intense intra-type compétition, which, by the mid-1950s, forced stores to advertise more extensively, 
add services, open for longer hours, and give away trading stamps and game cards, driving up 
margins [AUvine, 1968]. By the mid-1960s such stratégies had created a gap in the market for low-
cost food, which was filled by discount stores, which eliminated the costs accumulated by 
supermarkets, and benefited from efficiencies of opération [ibid.]. 
By the early-1990s. North American warehouse membership clubs were faced with static like-for-
like sales, 'overstoring' (over-supply of stores), and declining return on investment [Sampson and 
Tigert, 1994], in response to which they adjusted their inventories to push more profitable Unes, and 
increased service levéis [ibid.], suggesting that scrambled merchandising and increased service 
levéis, in this case, were deliberate stratégies actioned as stores began to lose 'pulling power' due to 
excessive expansion of the format. 
Secular trends 
Business orientâtes itself to the perceived demand of consumers, according to Regan [1964], who 
adds that the émergence of a large middle class should logically lead to a reorientation of the retail 
offering and services to suit. Further support is lent by Gist [1968, 1971], and the secular trends 
effect has been amplified by the boom in consumer credit, particularly in the USA [Duncan, 1965]. 
US department stores' trading-up process was driven by a combination of retailers jockeying for 
position to attract maximum numbers of customers, and increasing standards of living over time 
[Goldman, 1975], eventually resulting in a reduced differential between Operators [ibid.]. Expanding 
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on this, Goldman [1978] suggests that an increase in thc standard of iiving is felt most acutely by 
low-price, low-status Operators, making them most likely to begin the trading-up process, which 
becomes a chain reaction as the next retailer up the price-service scale also trades-up in an attempi to 
maintain sales. Similarly, Tinsley et al. [1978] argue that trading-up is the resuit of retailers' 
attempts to improve profit margins by deliberately positioning themselves to take maximum 
advantage of opportunities available to them. 
Modem consumers' définition of value has evolved to encompass not simply the merchandise, but 
also the purchase expérience itself, the level of service, and the time and effort involved in acquiring 
the merchandise [May, 1989], driving trading up of the retail environment and services provided by 
retailers. 
Finally, secular trends are supported, longue in check at least, by Greenberg et al.'s [1980] 
investigation of New York Street vendors, which found that in selected neighbourhoods with high-
income shoppers, Street vendors had begun to accept retumed goods, take pre-Cliristmas orders and 
accept cheques. 
Secular trends paradoxically increases demand for discounting 
While retailers' trading-up occurs in response to secular trends [Duncan, 1965], consumers' strong 
desire to improve their standard of living tends to exceed their growth in income, oddly creating a 
market in which discount opérations thrive [ibid.]. This is a stränge phenomenon that has allowed 
discounting to develop in wealthy countries, adds Dreesmann [1980], because consumers fulfil older 
needs at discount outlets, in order to reserve purchasing power for new, more aspirational needs. 
Scrambled merchandising créâtes the illusion of trading-up 
US supermarkets' costs increased as stores became more luxurious and compétition increased, 
driving down profits [Brand, 1963]. In response, supermarkets 'activated thc expansion cycle', and 
began to 'cream' the best-selling producís of other retail fields, such as pharmacies, hardware and 
variety stores. Scrambled merchandising was therefore a response to rising costs brought on by 
intense compétition, as higher margins were required to cover the higher costs. 
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Bucklin's [1983] study of US department store margins from 1962 to 1980 found that scrambled 
merchandising was a deliberate action aiming to produce higher margins to cover rising personnel 
costs (see relative decline in efficiency, above). in addition, bargain basements were eliminated from 
the stores during this period, as they were suffering from the impact of discounters, compounding the 
scrambled merchandising effect [Bucklin, 1983]. 
Relative decline in efficiency 
Rising US retail margins between 1840 and 1950 were due to productivity gains in retailing lagging 
behind other industries, manufacturing in particular [Dreesmann, 1968]. Bucklin [1972] later 
supported this, adding that in order for wages to remain competitive, increases had to corne from 
higher gross margins to make up for relative poor productivity gains. Michel and Vander Eycken 
[1974] also supported the relative decline in retail efficiency hypothesis, based on an anaiysis of 
Belgian retail margins, although they found that accelerating retail institutional évolution in the late-
1960s had begun to close the gap. 
Bucklin's [1983] study of US department store évolution from 1962 to 1980 showed that rising 
labour costs, due to wage inflation, were not offset entirely by productivity gains. As wage inflation 
was exceeding priée inflation, higher margins were required to fund the payroll, an effect that was 
compounded by the rising costs of fringe benefits provided for staff, such as pensions and médical 
services [ibid.], and department stores deliberately adjusted the merchandise mix to higher margin 
products in an attempi to cover such rising costs (see scrambled merchandising, above). 
Undercapitalisation hypothesis 
The spartan nature of embryonic retail institutions is due to a lack of funds, contended Berens 
[1980], advancing what became known as the 'undercapitalisation hypothesis'. Capital markets, 
bankers and other investors are generally wary of the institutional innovator, leaving them short of 
investment capital and forcing them to sell at low-prices from low-status establishments. By 
undercutting competitors, goods can be sold before suppliers are paid, generating positive cashflow 
which funds positioning of the business where it would have been initially if access to capital had 
not been an issue. In effect, Berens [1980] argues that, in certain circumstances, low prices can be 
merely an interim strategy designed to generate expansion capital. 
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Other causes of trading up 
Dreesmann [1968], contends that trading-up is caused by numerous other factors, including the 
unprofitable nature of 'trading-down', which can quickly be copied by competitors, and low sales 
and 
profits growth potential from lowering priées. 
Trading up not resultine from service additions 
Goldman [1975, 1978] argues that service réduction is only one of many methods used to reduce 
innovators' overheads (see criticisms. below), which is supported by Cundiff s [1988] findings that 
chain stores lowered costs by standardising operating methods, developing large-scale buying, and 
achieving high turnover, as well as service réduction. However, it is arguable that the method of cost 
réduction is not important to the Wheel of Retailing, rather, the fact that innovating institutions tend 
to eut costs and use this advantage to offer lower priées is of primary importance, and studies that 
take into account only service réduction are unnecessarily blinkered to other developments 
Overview of causes of trading-up 
Trading-up is caused by an amalgam of environmental trends and institutional antagonism, argues 
Brown [1988a]. Techno logie al, economie, legislative and démographie trends, among others, create 
commercial opportunities which are recognised by perceptive individuals, but any innovation or 
competitive move is quickly adopted, adapted or avoided by other firms, and the balance of power is 
re-established until the next upset. This section has demonstrated that the causes of trading-up are 
indeed complex, and no one single explanation is sufficient to explain trading-up in ail 
circumstances. Explanations advanced include lack of attention to costs, fear of direct price 
compétition, excess retail capacity, adjustment of the retail expérience and merchandise mix to 
secular trends, scrambled merchandising into higher-margin Unes, declining retail efficiency relative 
to other fields, undercapitalisation at inception, and little potential profit from trading down 
Forces preventing trading-up 
US discount department stores, national chain department stores and traditional department stores 
compete over only a limited sélection of their total merchandise offering, and each has areas of 
'natural dominance' [Hirschman, 1978]. This makes trading-up difficult because needs in product 
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areas are often met better by other institutions [ibid.], although Cort et al. [1980] dispute this, finding 
that there is significant cross-over of shopping between the three store types. 
Methods used by innovators to lower-costs 
Off-price retailers in the USA achieved their lower costs, relative to the established retail hierarchy, 
through a combination of methods, încluding having double the sales per square foot of conventional 
retailers, suggesting a certain degree of 'pulling power', almost treble their rate of inventory turn, 
cheap buying (without insisting on perks such as promotional allowances, markdown money and 
extended crédit), buying excess, bankrupt and end-of-season stock, returns, and over-runs, basic 
facilities, little or no service and advertising, and using cheap sites [Kaikati, 1985]. Similarly, from-
home shopping has a cost advantage over store-based retailing, as 'looking' is a service that the latter 
must provide, while from-home shopping cuts this out and even drives consumers to separate 
looking and purchasing processes [May and Greyser, 1989]. Most innovations take advantage of new 
technology, argues Gist [1971], and take advantage of économies of scale in areas such as 
organisational scale or outlet size, or new techniques such as self-service. 
Compétitive reaction to low-overhead. low-price entrants is to take on their advantages: 
The entrance of innovative, low-price retailers frequently drives established retailers to adopt 
seiected characteristics of the new institution, while new institutions tend to trade up, adopting the 
characteristics of established institutions, a tendency that is addressed fully in appendix 8. In 
summary, the threatened and attacking institutions tend to become more similar through either 
graduai assimilation of practices, a more radical shift in retail strategy, or through established 
operators' acquisition of fledgling operators (appendix 8). 
Criticisms of the Wheel of Retailing 
The Wheel is criticised most frequently for failing to explain ail retail évolution ail économies. Tt is 
largely useless in explaining retail évolution in low-level économies, has major failures even in the 
setting of developed économies, pays little attention to the compétitive reaction of established 
institutions, and addresses only the price-quality relationship, ignoring equally dynamic dimensions 
such as merchandise assortment and store size [Brown, 1990a]. McNair's choice of the Wheel as the 
24 
metaphor has been questioned [Gist, 1968; Deiderick and Dodge, 1983], and the 'wave' proposed as 
more appropriate [Deiderick and Dodge, 1983]. 
The Wheel rejects the possibility tliat existing institutional fonns may adjust to new conditions, 
contends Bucklin [1983], citing the rejuvenation of department stores as 'proof that the Wheel is in 
error. McNair, however, used the Wheel as a warning system rather than for prédiction [Hollander, 
1980], suggesting that its creator did not consider mature institutions to be inevitably vulnerable after 
ali. 
Because it 'assumes the same low-cost, trading-up pattern applies to every retailing institution in 
every socio-economie setting', and 'is predicated on the actions of conscious, free-thinking, self-
determining, individuai human beings', Brown [1995a] concludes that the Wheel is 'universalist'. 
The Wheel is weak because not all trading-up or trading-down is a direct result of the addition or 
réduction of services, claim Goldman [1975] and Kaynak [1979], numerous other methods of 
overhead réduction have been successful, such as increasing the scale of opération, eliminating 
marginal items, improving methods of opération and organisation, reducing product quality, 
purchasing odd lots and distress merchandise, increasing bargaining power over suppliers and 
cutting out middlemen [Goldman, 1975, 1978], although it is arguable that some of thèse techniques 
do involve reducing the level of service, and certainly involve reducing quality. 
The Wheel implies that retailers control their environment, which is widely seen as unwise and even 
impossible [Deiderick and Dodge, 1983], and that geographical expansion is a service, which is 
inappropriate as branches are generally tailored to generate high margins [ibid.]. Similarly, 
merchandise array is not strictly a service, as increasing the array can improve an institution's 
profitability, and pricing stance can be market, rather than cost, driven [ibid.]. 
Literature on the Wheel of Retailing tends to be descriptive rather than analytical [Brown, 1990a], to 
généralise to an excessive degree, while the bulk of it is focused on the department store over a 
relatively short period of time [Savitt, 1989]. Supporting 'évidence' is often little more than casual 
observation or idle spéculation [Brown, 1990a], and critics of the Wheel 'feel uncom fortab le with 
the idea that a theory so well known and widely cited has so many flaws' [d'Amico, 1983].There 
have been calls for research to cover a longer period [Savitt, 1989], and some widely cited 
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réfutations are based upon decidedly unstable foundations [Brown, 1990a]. Most commentators, 
however, concur that McNair's hypothesis is valid, if not universally applicable [Brown, 1988a], 
accepting that 'the évolution of some of the most prominent retail institutions adhères, in large 
measure, to the wheel pattern' [Brown, 1990a]. In fact, 'its very lack of universality... acts as a 
stimulus to subséquent research activity' [Brown, 1990a], 
Extensions to the Wheel of Retailing and Combinations with other théories 
Arguably the most conceptually clear extension to the Wheel is Gist's [1968] combination of it with 
Dialectic évolution. Every maturing institution represents the thesis, and every challenging 
institution the antithesis. Because the maturing institution tends to 'emulate the attacker' by shedding 
encumbrances of ali types, including services and organisational frills, bolh the attacker and the 
attacked move together, resulting in an intermediate or moderate form, representing either partial or 
full synthesis. The tendency of established institutions to take on advantages of the retail forms 
attackìng them is addressed fully in appendix 8. 
Because trading-up is linked to increases in the standard of living, which rises relatively consistently, 
Agergard et. al. [1970] contest that low-cost, low-price entry to retailing and trading-up are not 
accurately represented by a circular movement, as this implies that the standard of living stabilised. 
Proposìng a spirai movement instead, where trading-up is a conlinuous process and the originai state 
can never be regained, Agergard et al's [1970] extension was labelled as 'undoubtedly the most 
important conceptual advance since McNair's original hypothesis' [Brown, 1987b; p.25]. The spiral 
concept is modified by Brown [1987b], who proposes a coiled spring analogy instead, able to 
accommodate constraints upon the evolutionary process, such as anti-chain store législation or 
restrictions on hypermarket construction - once the regulatory shackles of the institutional spiral are 
relaxed, a sudden surge of development can be expected, as was the case when UK superstore 
planning restrictions were relaxed in the Iate-I970s. 
Izraeli [1973] proposes the 'Three Wheels of Retailing', a system of three inter-connected wheels, in 
which low-end entrants tend to trade-up on wheel #1, high-end entrants tend to trade-down on wheel 
#2, and established institutions trade-up or down on wheel #3, which is situated between and driven 
by movement of the other two wheels. An equilibrium point is reached, resulting in reduced 
differential between innovating and established firms, as innovators' différences diminish and they 
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become part of the establishment. A second wave of new entrants upset this equilibrium once again, 
and trading-up or down eventually produces a new equilibrium. Izraeli's [1973] extension is strong 
in that it can account for high-level entry to retailing, and the competitive reaction to new entrants, 
while having a wider domain of application than the Wheel of Retailing, albeit with considerably 
less conceptual clarity. 
The interaction between small discount outlets and department stores, which opened 'bargain 
basements' as discount outlets traded-up, supports Israeli's [1973] 'Three Wheels' hypothesis, as the 
differential between the two types diminished. Similarly, Aldi's 1976 entrance into the US discount 
grocery market drove established operators to open "stripped down" stores of their own, introduce 
low-cost generic private label, reduce selected services and narrow their merchandise range [Patton 
and DeLozier, 1983], effectively trading-down. The introduction of the retail warehouse to the USA 
also provoked conventional retailers into imitating the format, Wal-Mart and Kroger in particular 
[Kaikati, 1987]. 
The Wheel 'rotates and moves', propose Deiderick and Dodge [1983], in an extension that bears 
little resemblance to the original, bar the retention of some wheels. Geographical expansion, breadth 
of product line, pricing stance and the changing consumer are each represented by a wheel, and the 
four wheels are inter-related and inter-dependent. Their concept, however, is rather hazy, with no 
clear metaphor, and although it succeeds in overcoming some of the Wheel's shortcomings, it has 
failed to catalyse further academic debate. 
A crescent theory of non-store retail evolution is advanced by Thomas et al. [1986], where evolution 
results from adapting behaviour, similar to that of ecological organisms, which develop into their 
strongest form and habitat for survival. This extension argues that new non-store retail structures 
tend to enter the market as low-status, high-margin operations with mass appeal, then move upward 
along the crescent to higher-margin, higher-status positions with a narrower appeal. Other retailers 
may fill in the voids behind, but not necessarily take the form of the non-store retailing structures 
already evolved, which then attempt to find a kind of ecological niche, but the concept is 
conceptually unclear in its attempt to combine the strong points of the Wheel and Darwinian 
evolution, and has also failed to generate academic attention. 
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Although not specifically extending the Wheel hypothesis, Wickström [1983] identified three types 
of innovators, lone-wolf, routine and defensive. Lone-wolf innovators, corresponding roughly to 
low-cost retail entrants, tend to be smali scale retailers, who come up with a good idea, and can 
rapidly grow from this. Routine innovators, akin to retailers in the trading-up phase, are generally 
large scale, multiple retailers, who frequently introduce différent innovations copied from elsewhere 
in the world. Defensive innovators, who correspond to retailers in the mature phase, will only adopt 
new ideas when forced to by initiatives of competitore leading to falling sales, and are typical 
adapters. Lord et al. [1988] suggest that the founder of UK food discounter Kwik Save, took ideas 
from Aldi (W.Germany) and 'baby shark' discounting in the US, combining them with his own ideas 
to form Kwik Save, representing an example of a lone-wolf innovator. 
The key éléments of the Wheel, Accordion and Retaiï Life Cycle hypothèses are combined by 
Brown [1988b], who argues that this combination resembles Porter's renowned model of 
competitive strategy. This 'strategie life cycle', which bas exceptions and should not be taken too 
literally or applied in a deterministic fashion [ibid.], suggests that retail institutions tend to begin 
'with a narrow range of discounted goods, which gradually expands to incorporate a more diverse 
mix of merchandise. A period of trading up then transpires and this eventually gives way to a 
narrower focus, due to the defensive rationalisation of lines threatened by émergent eut price 
specialista', which does not necessarily signal demise. The full turn has been completed by UK 
retailers Teseo and Boots, argues Brown [1988b], while the UK retail warehouse has undergone a 
partial turn, trading-up largely because of moves into purpose-built warehouses following their 
beginnings in converted properties [ibid.]. 
Criticising théories of retail institutional évolution for failing to explain évolution of the US 
wholesale membership club (WMC), Sampson and Tigert [1994] combine environmental 
(Darwinian) theory with a variation on the retail life cycle and conflict (Dialectic) theory, with the 
three éléments of the model being uiterdependent. The model is based on the évolution of WMC's, 
and stresses the importance of the consumer as the catalyst for change, although the model is 
'descriptive rather than prédictive' [ibid.], 
The attempts of Gist [1968] and Izraeli [1973] to extend the Wheel of Retailing to cover all 
institutional innovations miss the point that the great majority of new retail types in the US economy 
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have entered at the low end of the spectra [Hollander, 1980], while the original conceptual clarity has 
been immersed [ibid.], comments that can equally be applied to the bulk of subséquent extensions to 
the Wheel. In general, such extensions, although useful and providing some insight, have failed to 
generate wider académie debatę, and suffer from muddied explanatory power due to their necessary 
déviation from vivid metaphor. This is common to theoretical extensions in ail académie disciplines, 
and led to overly-complex extensions being labelled as 'explanatory impotent' [Hunt, 1983]. 
Although the metaphor aids understanding in terms of our subjective expérience with other concepts 
[Rosenberg, 1984], a single metaphor can only shed light on selected aspects of a phenomenon, and 
emphasises some aspects of a concept while de-emphasising and hiding others [ibid.], The single 
metaphor, however, retains the conceptual clarity necessary to aid understanding, as does the Wheel 
of Retaiiing, while extensions to it plainly do not. 
Although d'Amico [1983] argues that McNair's greatest fame has corne from commentaries on his 
work rather than from the work itself, such 'commentaries' have labelled the Wheel of Retaiiing a 
singularly vivid metaphor [Brown, 1990a], a prime example of metaphorical thinking [Brown, 
1995a], one of the most frequently cited concepts in marketing thought [Brown, 1995a], a milestone 
in retaiiing thought [Brown, 1995b], and one of the oldest, most celebrated and energetically debated 
concepts in retail marketings theoretical canon [Brown, 1995b]. 
A variety of forces are causing the Wheel to slow, aecording to Tinsley et al. [1978], including high 
shopping centre rents slowing the growth of discounters, although it is arguable that this hands 
discounters the opportunity to increase their cost advantage by locating elsewhere. The development 
of conglomérâtes, retailers owning several chains of stores with distinct images and différent 
positionings, is a further retarding force, because companies will not allow their différent chains to 
enter into compétition with one another, contend Tinsley et al. [1978], which again is over-
simplistic, as innovation and trading-up can still occur within these chains, and différent institutions 
can still vary in importance within the organisation. Conversely, Bucklin [1983] believes that the 
pace of retail évolution had increased by the late 1960s and 1970s, and Dawson [1979] considers the 
Wheel of Retaiiing to be turning at an ever faster pace, leaving less time for adaptation and 
assimilation, and increasing the future potential for inter-institutional conflict in retaiiing. In the 20 
years to 1980, the European hypermarket exceeded the floorspace accumulated by the European 
department store in over 120 years [Knee and Walters, 1985], and the development of the 
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supermarket occurred even faster. May [1989] considers that the Wheel of Retailing accelerated in 
the second half of the 20 t h Century. 
Strangely, the Wheel of Retailing theory itself is considered to have followed the pattern that it 
stipulâtes for retail institutional change, leading to Brown's [1988a] conclusion that a Wheel of the 
Wheel of Retailing is in existence. The concept began as a short and simple hypothesis, attracting 
adopters who took on the discussion and popularised the concept, before académie debate became 
more heated and this and other théories were extended and modified in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
which Brown [1988a] likens to the trading-up process. The concept entered maturity in the late 
1970s, and became vulnerable to a séries of vigorous réfutations and alternative approaches from the 
early-1980s, obscuring the concept and driving a return to académie basics [ibid.]. 
2.1.2 The Retail Accordion 
The Retail Accordion hypothesis was advanced by Hollander [1966], who stated that 'the history of 
retail development seems to demonstrate an accordion pattern. Domination by general line, wide-
assortment retailers alternâtes with domination by specialised, narrow-line merchants', adding that 
the lack of historical statistics on merchandise assortment makes the pattern impossible to prove. 
Drawing on past research that stopped short of the élaboration of a hypothesis, but had noted cyclical 
trends in the merchandise dimension of retailing [Hower, 1943; Brand, 1963], and retailers' tendency 
to 'poach' profitable lines of specialist Operators [Hall et al., 1961; p.78-79]: 
Figure 2.1.2. The Retail Accordion: 
Wide variety retailers (many merchandise lines) 
Limited variety retailers (few merchandise lines) 
[Source: adapted from Lewison, 1997, p.642] 
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Advanced at a time of considerable expansion of the US retail offering, the Retail Accordion was 
intended to explain the evolution of the entire US retail system, but has often been applied to specific 
retail institutions [Brown, 1990b]. Hollander's [1966] findings rely heavily on secondary sources due 
to the long time-span involved, quoting for example Gold's [1963] assertion that 'retailing is smack 
in the middle of a merchandise scramble, the likes of which it has never before experienced... In 
short, everyone's in the act, and there's no end in sight.' [Gold, 1963, pp.40-41]. 
The Retail Accordion describes a clearly discernible, if difficult to prove, 'rhythmic pattern of 
development, dominated alternately by shops selling a wide variety of wares and retailers 
specialising in a narrow range of goods' [Brown, 1988b; 1990b], and hypothesises 'perpetual 
alternation between generalist and specialist outlets' [Brown, 1995b]. Canadian retailing also 
developed along the lines of a general-specific-general cycle [Shaffer, 1973]. 
The Retail Accordion describes the relationship between retail outlets focusing on 'merchandise line 
width', provided by general retailers, and 'merchandise line depth', provided by specialists [Gist, 
1971]. Kellerman [1988] identified four stages of US retail evolution: (1) In the 19 t h century, US 
retailing was dominated by general stores serving local communities, a by-product of the sparse 
population, according to Mason and Mayer [1990]. (2) The early 20 t h century was characterised by 
the evolution of traditional speciality stores, normally in Central Business District (CBD) locations, 
a change made possible by rising incomes and transportation changes. The improved assortment of 
goods more than offset the consumer inconvenience of shopping at several stores [Stevens, 1975] (3) 
The mid-20 t h century witnessed the mass introduction of general department stores and 
supermarkets, normally located in US suburban shopping centres, catering to families and offering 
mass-shopping facilities to meet the needs of the post-World War II baby boom generation, changes 
again made possible by transportation changes, this time the motor car. (4) Most recently, in the last 
quarter of the 20 t h century, speciality retailing flourished again, as boutiques, speciality food outlets, 
stylistic houseware stores and their like developed, driven by smaller, more affluent households 
[Kellerman, 1988]. 
Kellerman's [1988] fourth stage is supported by McGoldrick [1989] who contends that the 
introduction of concessionaires to UK department stores in the late 20 t h century aimed to provide 
specialisation within the diverse, overall framework of the department store, although such 
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concessions had begun to decline slightly by the 1980s [ibid.]. Similarly, superstore operators such 
as Asda grew with many concession arrangements, in travel agency, opticians, hairdressing, dry-
cleaning and in-store pharmacies [ibid.], providing a certain degree of specialisation within a diverse 
overall offering, although it is arguable that adding concessions represents expansion of the product 
offering, particularly if the space for it is created through store expansion or more efficient use of the 
store, rather than the elimination of other lines. 
Forces driving expansion of the Retail Accordion 
Hollander [1966] considered expansion of the Retail Accordion to be a natural process, driven by 
retailers' efforts to improve profitability by adding profitable lines from other fields, and consumer 
demand for 'one-stop 1, rather than fragmented, shopping [ibid.]. 
Further forces driving expansion of the Retail Accordion were subsequently advanced: 
• Joining complementary lines, such as meat, grocery and produce [Gist, 1968]. 
• 'Creaming'- taking the low-risk, largely pre-sold, high-turnover, low-margin merchandise from 
other outlets [Brand, 1963; Gist, 1968; Dawson, 1979]. For example, from the Iate-I950s US 
grocery outlets added faster-moving merchandise lines, including small appliances, convenience-
food items, and paper products, often at a discount to traditional retailers of the products [Mason 
and Mayer, 1990], and US pharmacists 'creamed' other retailers' products [Brand, 1963]. 
Increasing costs and falling profits can drive retailers to 'cream' products [ibid.]. 
• 'Scrambling', taking the low-turnover, high-margin merchandise from other outlets [Gist, 1968; 
Dawson, 1979], has occurred in supermarkets, as merchandise becomes increasingly exotic and 
unusual [May, 1989], and as non-foods such as pharmaceuticals and cosmetics have been added 
[Mason and Mayer, 1990], in discount stores, which moved into soft goods [ibid.], and in variety 
chains, which adopted big ticket items such as televisions and household products [Mason and 
Mayer, 1990]. Scrambling led to the creation of the US department store, as some retailers 
adopted the lines of high-margin specialist retailers, slowly increasing the size of the store, and 
delegating responsibility for each 'department' [Bucklin, 1972]. 
• Creaming and scrambling are often major factors contributing to the closure of specialist outlets 
[Dawson, 1979], effectively driving further expansion of the Retail Accordion through the 
elimination of 'contracted' retailers. For example, US supermarkets' creaming of cigarettes was a 
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factor hastening to the démise of small tobacconists [Oxenfeldt, 1961], made possible by the 
rapid development of cigarette brands [ibid.]. 
• Expansion of range can use idle or under-utilised capacity more efficiently, reducing costs as a 
percentage of sales, aìthough it can also have the reverse effect, driving up costs through less 
efficient use of stock [Hollander, 1966]. 
• The growlh of shopping centres drives expansion of the retail accordion, according to Gist 
[1968]. although it could be argued that shopping centres allow greater spécialisation. 
• The post-World War II baby boom generation required mass shopping facilities catering to 
families, in suburban locations [Kelterman, 1988], driving expansion of the retail accordion. 
• The legai and politicai environment, in the guise of town planning, affects the expansion of the 
retail accordion. For example the late 1970s relaxation of British planning controls led to more 
players opening large retail warehouses, driving expansion of the accordion [Brown, 1990b]. In 
China, the number of lines carried by a Chinese department store increased by 42% following 
economie reforms allowing stores to purchase direct from manufacturers and multiple sources, 
suggesting that légal restrictions tend to force compression of the retail accordion in communist 
countries. 
Forces driving contraction of the Retail Accordion 
Contraction of the Retail Accordion is driven by numerous factors: 
• Early US general stores were a responso to an economy characterised by pioneer agriculture, 
industry in the handicraft and domestic stages of production, small markets, slow transportation 
and communication facilities, and a relatively undeveloped monetary system; as progress was 
made in each of thèse éléments, specialised retailing became more feasible [Jones, 1936]. 
• Specialist retailers were made necessary by the inability of US general stores to physically stock 
more products, at a time when industrialisation was creating a surge in the supply of consumer 
goods [Gist, 1968]. 
• Urbanisation of the US population made specialist retailing more feasible, itself driven by 
industrialisation, creating large consumer markets which permitted profitable market 
segmentation through spécialisation [Jones, 1957; Gist, 1968; Mason and Mayer, 1990]. Rising 
incomes and improved transportation drove demand for specialised retailing in the early 20 , h 
century [Kellerman, 1988]. 
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Amid growing population density, specialist shopkeepers became attractive to consumers 
increasingly favouring the personal touch, and spread rapidly [Brand, 1963; Gist, 1968]. 
Specialist shops tend to be distinguished by the provision of consumption advice [Davidson, 
1970], suggesting that changing consumer demand for this is a factor driving or constraining the 
Retail Accordion. 
Non-economie factors can drive spécialisation. For example, many small furriers, florists and 
booksellers consider themselves to be craftsmen and artists, rather than growtïvminded 
businessmen, although this explains supply of specialists, rather than consumer demand for them 
[Hollander, 1966]. Spécialisation may also be driven by necessity - early US butchers, for 
example, had to be true specialists, in slaughtering, butchering and manufacturing, as well as 
retailing [Gist, 1968]. 
Tmplicit voluntary restraint' can discourage retailers frotn raiding the lines of other traders, for 
fear of competitive retaliation [Hollander, 1966], although this explanation is more suited to 
small communities than an era of multiple retailing. Similarly, legal restraints can stop retailers 
from selling certain types of products, requiring them to be licensed, for example [ibid.]. 
The failure of many merchandise mixes leads to merchandise being withdrawn [Hollander, 
1966], representing contraction of the retail accordion. 
Established retailers tend to drop conventional lines when confronted with heavy compétition 
from discounters [Hollander, 1966], driving contraction of the retail accordion. More typically, 
conventional retailers continue to stock the line, but an increasing share of the business goes to 
emerging specialists [ibid.]. 
When established retailers fail, they tend to be replaced by new Operators with 'compressed 
accordions' [Hollander, 1966]. 
Lack of funding for stock and fixtures can force new entrants and continuing firms to concentrate 
on a limited number of lines [Hollander, 1966]. 
Although expansion of range can use idle or under-utilised capacity more efficiently, reducing 
costs as a percentage of sales, it can also have the reverse effect, and drive up costs through less 
efficient use of stock [Hollander, 1966]. 
Some consumers prefer to shop in specialised stores for certain purchases, while others report 
becoming confused and overwhelmed by the crowds and sheer size of large stores, and can resent 
the time necessary spent searching for products in large establishments [Hollander, 1966]. 
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• In the US, the development of department stores as shopping centre anchors necessitated 
compromise in terms of space, range and services, bringing weaknesses that were exploited by 
specialist clothing retailers locating in the centres [Spalding, 1978]. 
• Declining household sizes and rising household incomes drove demand for specialisation in the 
last quarter of the 20 t h century [Kellerman, 1988]. Editing merchandise selections is a means of 
attracting 'time-poor' consumers, particularly as alternatives such as home shopping grow in 
importance [May, 1989]. 
• Late 20 t h century specialisation tends to be in the wealthiest communities, carrying 'luxury' 
items, suggesting that rising incomes drive contraction of the retail accordion [Kaynak, 1988]. 
In effect, the degree of specialisation in a retail system is a function of 'environmental economies', 
because stores emerge or adapt in response to a given set of circumstances, which are constantly 
changing over time [Bucklin, 1972]. 
Evidence of accordion-like movement 
The US retail pharmaceutical trade became more specialised prior to the American Civil War, as 
specialist pharmacies emerged and took trade from dispensing physicians and general 'druggists' 
[Hollander, 1966]. These specialist pharmacies, however, began to add non-core lines from the late 
19 l h century, diluting their specialism, driving expansion of the retail accordion. After World War II, 
however, specialism returned as the pharmaceutical trade splintered into traditional pharmacists, 
limited-line pharmacists, and 'professional' and 'ethical' outlets, concentrating on prescription and 
therapeutic items respectively [ibid.]. 
A continuum of general store - mail-order house — speciality retailing was noted by Brand [1963], 
while Davies [1976] notes that consumers of the 19 t h century were served predominantly by general 
stores, primarily by speciality stores in the first half of the 20 t h century, then increasingly by general 
stores again. 
The 1960s development of the US food emporium and combination store represented expansion of 
the retail accordion, compared to the supermarket that dominated at the time [Allvine, 1968], while 
the simultaneous development of the convenience store and its larger counterpart the superette 
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represented contraction [ibid.]. Similarly, Dawson [1983] noted the development of both super-
regional and speciality shopping centres, 
Specialisation: 
By the early-19 t h century, Boston (US) boasted shops specialising in bakery, books and stationery, 
boots and shoes, china and glassware, pharmaceuticals, dry goods, groceries, hardware* jewellery, 
millinery, chandelry, tobacco, working-men's clothing, confectionery, flour and feed, fruit, alcohol 
and musical supplies [Jones, 1936]. 
In the second half of the 19 t h century, contraction of the retail accordion took place in the USA as 
specialists made inroads into high-margin lines sold by grocers, resulting in dairy, tea, coffee and 
spice establishments being founded [Hollander, 1966]. US grocers' elimination of certain 
departments around the dawn of the 20 l h century represented contraction [ibid.], as did the 
abandonment of groceries by mail-order firms and department stores soon afterwards [ibid.]. 
Convenience stores represent specialisation of a different type, limiting stock to high turnover items 
generally bought without advance planning [ibid,]. 
Specialisation occurred as the US market for cycle, car, motor accessory and petrol retailing grew in 
size [Hollander, 1966], and some of these specialists later attempted to diversify their product 
offerings. The US field of booksellers has splintered, as the retail pharmacy trade did, into specialist 
paperback retailers, business booksellers, technological booksellers, and textbook and religious 
works specialists, again representing contraction of the Retail Accordion [ibid.]. In the mid-1960s, 
trends towards specialisation were also evident in fur and furniture retailing as well as catering 
[ibid.]. 
The 'general-specific-general cycle', as the Retail Accordion is sometimes labelled, was found to be 
relevant to US retail evolution by Gist [1968]. The earliest form of North American retailing, the 
rural general store, which, in a rough sense, rolled today's supermarket, department store, hardware 
outlet, auto agency, pub, stable and post office into one unit [Gist, 1968; 1971], was well suited to 
the self-sufficient, agricultural economy of the period. As industrialisation drove concentration of the 
population and the US consumer market grew, general stores gave way to more specialist traders -
an era in which the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker were literally the norm [Gist, 
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1971]- before these in turn gave way to more general retailers, such as supermarkets [Gist, 1968], 
superstores [Brown, 1988b], hypermarkets [Brown, 1988b] and shopping centres [Gist, 1968], 
although the inclusion of the latter is questionable, as it could equally be labelled a collection of 
specialists. There is little doubt that the 19 t h century was a period of US retail specialisation - there 
were only 20 types of retail specialist at the start of the 19 t h century, and over 100 by the end [Jones', 
1936, 1957]. 
In early 1950s USA, bookstores, phonograph record stores, garden supply stores and pharmacies 
emerged [Mason and Mayer, 1990], suggesting that a period of specialisation had begun. A 
reduction in the number of department stores occurred in the 1970s, while the number of specialists 
increased, particularly in clothing [Spalding, 1978]. The late-1970s were characterised, in the USA 
and Europe, by the emergence of very specialised retail outlets [Filser, 1984], in 1980 an upsurge of 
American speciality clothing chains was noted by Hollander [1980], and the 1980s saw 
specialisation in outlets selling ski equipment, computers, ties, socks, fine wines and gourmet foods 
[Brown, 1988a, 1990]. 
In short, analysis of literature suggests that the 19 , h century and the second half of the 20 t h century 
were periods of US retail specialisation, although there are examples of specialisation outside these 
periods, and of generalisation within them. 
Generalisation: 
Most American department stores began life as specialist establishments, adding more merchandise 
lines as the 19 t h century progressed [Brown, 1988a]. Since the beginning of the 20 t h century, 
however, a large number of departments have been discarded, and modern department stores are said 
to have become more like 'high fashion specialists' than the 'universal providers of yore' [Brown, 
1988a; 1990]. It certainly remains a fact, however, that the department store is a general rather than a 
specialist retailer. 
By the mid to late-20 f l 1 century, expansion of the accordion had occurred in the field of automotive 
supplies, with about one quarter of US retail establishments being involved in retailing tyres, 
batteries, or other automotive parts [Davidson, 1970], and 40% of US grocery stores selling motor 
oil [Dawson, 1979]. Similarly, 87% of UK grocery stores were found to sell tights, and 77% 
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lightbulbs, neither of which is a traditional grocery ítem [Dawson, 1979], and the percentage of UK 
múltiple grocers selling meat increased from 11% to 36% between 1961 and 1971, a period during 
which the comparable figure for cosmetics rose from 6% to 36% [Dawson, 1979]. In 1971 Britain, 
records were on sale in 13%o of múltiple tobacconists, 60% of múltiple grocers were selling chocolate 
and sugar confectionery, 30%> of greengrocers sold frozen meat, and 30% of butchers offered frozen 
fruit and vegetables [Dawson, 1979], suggesting that the I960s were a period of considerable 
expansión of the UK Retail Accordion, and that creaming and scrambling by UK grocers was a 
major factor in the decreasing number of specialist shops [Dawson, 1979]. 
'Arrays of food in supermarkets continué to expand, offcring consumers the opportunities to 
experiment with items that formerly were perceived to be exotic or unusuaF [May, 1989], suggesting 
that scrambling is a major factor driving expansión of the Food Retail Accordion. Likewise, the 
range of goods sold through UK retail warehouses has broadened [Brown, 1990b], 
The evolution of US supermarkets and pharmacies is characterised by expansión into non-core 
products [Filser, 1984], suggesting that expansión of the Retail Accordion within these formats is 
also driven by creaming and scrambling. 
Food retail chains in developing countries have grown by creaming Unes from competing outlets, 
initially into simple Unes like canned goods, minimising capital investment for fear of failure 
[Goldman, 1974]. In an environment characterised by frequent, fragmented food shopping cióse to 
the home, this is one of the only viable means of growth, as it is unrealistic to expect immobile 
consumers to travel long distances to seek out better shopping facilities [Goldman, 1974]. 
The literature therefore suggests that the second half of the 20 t h century brought significant 
generalisation in both US and UK retailing, a strange phenomenon as it also brought much 
specialisation (p.35-3 7, above). 
Weaknesses 
The Retail Accordion is 'essentially devoid of explanation' [Gist, 1971], fails to explicitly identify 
the causes of cyclical change [ibid.], is 'essentially descriptive' [ibid.], has fragüe conceptual 
foundations [Filser, 1984], and has limited predictive valué because it is impossible to work out 
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whether spécialisation or généralisation will occur, or around which groups of products this will be 
[ibid.]. Gist [1971] contends that Hollander's [1966] five forces promoting contraction (see below) 
promote expansion in equal measure, which in fact is true of many such forces put forward since. 
The model is developed with regard only for North American retailing, and, like the Wheel, fails to 
address the situation in developing countries, where specialists continue to dominate [Brown, 
1990b]. In addition, it addresses only a single dimension of institutional change - merchandise range 
[ibid.]. 
Although difficult to validate due to the lack of merchandise assortment statistics [Filser, 1984], the 
Retail Accordion accurately describes the past évolution of retail formats [ibid.], a general-specific-
general cycle is discernible in the retail structure of many developed économies [Roth and Klein, 
1993], and spécialisation has continued, despite many prédictions to the contrary [ibid.]. 
To conclude, there is ample évidence of cyclical trends towards both spécialisation and 
généralisation in retail merchandise assortments, trends driven primarily by changing consumer 
characteristics. The Retail Accordion is limited as a theory of retail change, however, because it 
bases retail évolution on just one variable, but more importantly because it is centred primarily on 
the USA, and on the retail industry as a whole, rather than on retail formats or even fields, although 
its transposition to thèse has met with some success, certainly offering a more promising and 
meaningful future for the theory. 
2.1.3 The Polarisation Principle 
Although Gist [1968] and Davidson [1970] noted tendencies towards polarisation in retailing, the 
'polarisation principle' was elaborated by Kirby [1976a, 1976b] to explain the growth of the 
American convenience store, which occurred against a background of increasing store sizes and 
declining store numbers, an apparently stränge phenomenon. 
The polarisation principle [Kirby, 1976a, 1976b] contends that the trend towards larger, fewer, and 
less spatially concentrated supermarkets drives increased consumer demand for small stores 
lconveniently located close to the consumer's place of residence'. Comparing the category sales and 
till-rings of US convenience stores and supermarkets led Kirby [1976a, 1976b] to suggest that US 
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consumers use the convenience store to augment shopping, either for 'emergencies' or the purchase 
of perishables and fresh food items, presenting the format as complementary to the supermarket, 
explaining why its growth is directly correlated to that of large scale supermarkets. 
The polarisation principle is intended to apply only to 'high level economies', and contends that the 
retail systems of most such economies will polarise [Kirby, 1986]. At one end of the spectrum, the 
large retail operation will dominate the market, satisfying the majority consumer segments that are 
highly mobile, and able and prepared to shop in bulk. At the other extreme will be the small, 
efficient retail operation which satisfies the majority shopping needs of a consumer minority (those 
unable or unwilling to buy in bulk), plus the minority needs of the consumer majority (top-up and 
emergency shopping, and for forgotten and out-of-stock items) [Kirby, 1986], 
Evidence of retail polarisation: 
Kirby's [1976a, 1976b] polarisation thesis was based on the growth of US convenience stores at a 
time the US food retail industry was contracting into fewer, larger, more spatially displaced stores. 
The simultaneous US growth of small, high-margin convenience stores and large, low-margin food 
emporiums/combination stores was previously noted by Allvine [1968], who explained this as 
catering to shoppers requiring * fill-in' purchases at conveniently located stores. Rogers [1984] 
preferred to explain the growth of US convenience stores as being specifically to Tit' between the 
increasing numbers of large stores, while Kaynak and Cavusgil [1982] contend that polarisation into 
mass merchandising operations using supermarketing techniques, on the one hand, and highly 
specialised food stores carrying a deep assortment of a very specialised food line of food products, 
on the other, is a characteristic of food retail evolution in developed countries. 
In Japan, both large food stores and convenience stores expanded rapidly in the late-1970s and early-
1980s [Dawson, 1985]. There is further evidence of polarisation, this time in French food retailing: 
When under attack from low-cost hypermarkets, French supermarkets tended to either focus on non-
price competition, namely service, or die [Dawson, 1979]. The development of the French 
convenience sector pre-dates that of Britain by several years, which may be due to the earlier 
development of hypermarkets and out-of-town retailing in France [Kirby, 1986]. 
40 
In the decade to 1986, retail polarisation was a feature of most western-style économies [Kirby, 
1986]. In the UK this is illustrated by the early 1980s development of convenience stores such as 7-
Eîeven, Spar Eìght Till Late, and VG's Late Shop. 
Forces drivinp retail polarisation: 
The large UK food store lias little effect on the trade of small shops in areas where supermarkets are 
already well established, because it was the first generation of supermarkets that was harmful to 
small shops, while superstore developments impact primarily upon these first generation 
supermarkets rather than small stores [Kirby, 1976a, 1976b]. 
More positively, larger food retail outlets require a larger market, or a larger catchment area, forcing 
them to be more geographica!ly dispersed [Brown, 1987b], increasing the possibilities for small, 
more versatile units, hence the émergence of the convenience store and superette [Kaynak and 
Cavusgil, 1982]. In short, the rejuvenation of small stores is encouraged by factors such as a spatìally 
and structurally concentrated retail system, the capacity to develop an efficient small store sector, 
and lack of restraint on small store trading hours, although restraint on large store trading can 
facilitate small store development [Kirby, 1986], 
Uses: 
When outlining the polarisation principle, Kirby [1976a, 1976b] applied it to forecast a need for 
small, well-located, well-stocked, efficiently managed and serviced shops, to complément 
superstores and hypermarkets, which at that lime were in a phase of accelerating growth. The 
principle was later employed to rather accurately forecast the further development of CTN and 
forecourt-based convenience stores, including joint ventures between oil companies and food 
retailers for the latter [Kirby, 1986]. 
Weaknesses: 
Useful as it is, the polarisation principle describes but a single facet of the changing retail scene, 
namely the relationship between large and small institutions, contends Brown [1987b], proposing its 
extension to include other relationships, creating the multi-polarisation model (see below), 
effectively overcoming this drawback. 
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Extensions: 
Filser [1986] investigateci 'perceived polarity', in terms of price, quality, fashion and value, 
researching consumers' perceptions of différent French retail fashion chains for each of these 
criterìa. Perceived polarity could be of use in aiding the competitive positioning of chains, in the 
development of a portfolio of retail chains (for conglomérâtes), and in ascertaining the relative 
positions of cornpeting firms [Filser, 1986]. By far the most significant and conceptually clear 
extension to the polarisation principle, however, is Brown's [1987a, 1987b] multi-polarisation model 
(2AA): 
2.1.4 The Multi-Polarisation Model 
While the polar extremes of Iow-margin/high-turnover outlets on the one hand, and high-
margin/low-turnover outlets on the other, had been identifìed and represented graphically [Gist, 
1968], and the polarisation principle had been advanced [Kirby, 1976a, 1976b], such formulations 
concentrate on a single aspect of institutional change, noted Brown [1987a], Retailing, however, 
appears to evolve along several dimensions simultaneously [ibid.], meaning that changing store sizes 
have implications for merchandise assortment, for example. 
To counter the key weakness common to the retail accordion, the wheel of retailing and the 
polarisation principle, namely that they address only one aspect of retail change, when in fact the 
three are closely inter-related themselves, Brown [1987a] advances the multi-polarisation model, 
contenting that inventory diversification inspires spécialisation, large outlets beget small, and a high 
level of service gives rise to no-frills retail opérations, with each of these dimensions being linked 
and interdependent: 
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Figure 2.1.4. The multi-Polarisation Model: 
Small Establishment 
Priée 
Orientated 
Broad 
Inventory 
Narrow 
Inventory 
Service 
Orientated 
Large Establishment 
[Source: Brown, 1987b, p. 159] 
Evidence 
Evidence of movement along each dimension of Brown's [1987a] model is presented under the 
Wheel of Retailing, the Retail Accordion and the Polarisation Principle, above. The multi-
polarisation model also contends, however, that movement along one dimension provokes movement 
along another, and Brown [1987a] cites several examples of retail évolution involving such 
interdependent relationships: 
Brown [1987a, 1987b] provides several examples of polarisation in one dimension affecting other 
dimensions, in the UK and other advanced nations. These include large outlets Specialising in a 
relatively limited range of goods, discount electrical and carpet warehouses for example, small 
outlets handling a surprisingly wide variety of merchandise, such as modem convenience stores, 
price-cutting opérations occupying sizeable premises, like hypermarkets, and small stores with a 
service-orientated sales philosophy, boutiques and specialists for instance. 
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Arguing that retailing polarises simultaneously along each of the price, assortment and size 
dimensions, Brown [1987a] lists examples of retail institutions that have polarised to one extrême in 
ail three dimensions: 
Marchandise Sales Policv Establ ishment Institutional T v p e E x a m p l e s 
Assor tment Size 
Broad Price Large Superstore , Asda , Teseo . 
Hypermarke t 
Broad Price Small Ca ta logue Argos , Li t t lewoods 
S h o w r o o m Cata logue Shop . 
Broad Service Large Depar tment Store John Lewis , 
D e b e n h a m s . 
Broad Service Small Convenience Store 7 - n , C u l l e n s . 
Narrow Price Large Retail Warehouse Toys R ' Us , 
Texstyle World . 
Narrow Price Small Limited Line K w i k Save, Victor 
Discount Store Value . 
Nar row Service Large Super Specialist Ul t imate , 
Hamleys . 
Nar row Service Small Specialist Next , T i c Rack. 
Source: Brown [1987a] 
Uses and weaknesses 
The multi-polarisation model underlines the fact that the appearance of an innovatory institutional 
form combining several polarised dimensions can create opportunities along each of the assortment, 
sales policy and size dimensions [Brown, 1987a]. The évolution of formats, involving movement 
along any of the three dimensions créâtes opportunity for neweomers as the food superstore did by 
upgrading from its cut-price origins [Brown, 1987a]. 
The main weakness of the multi-polarisation model is that it has failed to catalyse further research, 
meaning that it effectively remains untested [Brown, 1987b]. Brown's [1987a] initial article was 
intended to be exploratory, a first tentative step in the direction of integration of the retail change 
théories, and a theoretical basis for future discussion, but, sadly, its aims remain unfulfilled. The 
subjectivity inhérent in the définitions of large and small retail establishments, wide and narrow 
ranges of goods, and price or service-based sales stratégies, represent further weakness, wams Brown 
[ 1987a], because the real world is rather more complicated than the conceptualisation intimâtes. 
Polarisation tendencies are discemible in changes in retail organisation and location, leading Brown 
[i987a] to speculate on thepossible extension of the multi-polarisation model. 
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2.1.5 The Retail Life Cvcle 
Figure 2.1.5. The Retail Life Cycle: 
Market sharc 
Profitabilily 
Early growth 
Accelerated 
deve lopment 
Maturi ty Decl ine 
Note : T h e durat ion of the stages (horizontal stages) is variable, depend ing o n many c i rcumstances . 
The four s tages are por t rayed equally on the t ime scale for schemat ic purposes only. 
[Source: adapted from Davidson , Batcs and Bass , 1976, p .91] 
The Retail Life Cycle is described as a natural evolutionary process that is impossible to stop 
[Davidson, Bates and Bass, 1976], implying that anticipation of change and adaptation of the 
organisation to its changing environment is of paramount importance [ibid.]. Anticipation of likely 
change is an important means of maintaining adequate profits, although this may prove difficult, 
particularly as competitors in the innovation phase are difficult to identify due to their small size 
[ibid.]. 
In the innovation phase, a new, usually entrepreneurial, retail institution émerges, representing a 
sharp departure from existing retail approaches [Davidson et al., 1976]. This tends to enjoy a 
significant advantage over established institutions, arising from a low cost structure, a distinctive 
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The Retail or Institutional Life Cycle, advanced by Davidson, Bates and Bass [1976], builds on 
previous suggestions that retail institutions, like products, go through life cycles [Davidson, 1970; 
McCammon, 1975]. Expanding thèse vvorks, and identifying four stages of innovation, accelerated 
development, maturity and decline, Davidson et al.'s [1976] concept aimed to counter key 
vveaknesses of the Wheel of Retailing, namely its failure to include a time trame, and its ignorance of 
non-cost based retail évolution [James et al., 1981; Markin and Duncan, 1981]: 
merchandise offering, easier shopping, locational advantages, or different advertising and 
promotional methods [ibid.]. High consumer acceptance drives sharp rises in sales, although profits 
may lag because of operating problems, lack of economies of scale, or high start-up costs, before 
they catch up towards the end of the phase as initial problems are overcome [ibid.]. The innovation 
phase is around 3 to 5 years long, with few, if any, direct competitors emerging [Mason and Mayer, 
1990; McGoldrick, 1990]. The innovator's competitive advantage usually arises from a 
technological, operational or marketing innovation [Lewison, 1997], and is often demonstrated 
through low prices [James et al., 1981]. 
The accelerated development phase brings rapid rates of growth in both sales and profits [Davidson 
et al., 1976; McGoldrick, 1990]. Innovators of the format engage in geographic expansion, other 
companies are attracted to enter the field, and its market share increases steadily as interest in it 
surges [Davidson et al., 1976]. Sales and profits rise quickly in the early part of the phase, but market 
share and profitability tend to peak towards the end of the phase because of scale-related costs, such 
as the need for a larger staff, complex internal systems and increased management controls [ibid.]. 
The stage typically lasts 5 to 6 years [James et al., 1981] and is characterised by range extension 
[Mason and Mayer, 1990], upgrading of merchandise, investment in new stores, refurbishment of 
existing stores, and improved service and management controls [Lewison, 1997]. 
Maturity is characterised by retailers1 loss of earlier vitality, stabilising sales and market share, and 
plummeting profitability [Davidson et al., 1976]. The quality of operations tends to slip because 
entrepreneurial managers do not necessarily direct large organisations in stable markets effectively 
[ibid.]. New firms are still entering the field [James et al., 1981], and over-expansion results in over­
capacity, driving down the profitability per square foot of the format [Davidson et al, 1976], a 
situation which persists until a shakeout occurs. The maturity phase is characterised by a high 
likelihood of challenge from new retail forms, brutal price competition, efforts to improve efficiency, 
and declining marketing expenditure [Davidson et al., 1976; Mason and Mayer, 1990; McGoldrick, 
1990]. 
The final decline era of the life cycle process is often avoided or greatly postponed by repositioning 
[Davidson et al., 1976]. Modified marketing concepts can prolong the maturity phase, but this is by 
no means guaranteed [ibid.]. The decline stage is typified by major losses of market share, falling 
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sales, marginal profits at best, a fatal inability to compete in the market, little or no investment, 
closure of obsolescent imits, even among industry leaders, and increasing conflict with innovative 
forms [McCammon, 1975; Davidson et al., 1976; James et al., 1981; Mason and Mayer, 1990; 
Lewison, 1997]. 
Evidence of retail life cycles 
Retail life cycles have been identified in the évolution of the US downtown department store, variety 
store, supermarket [Davidson, 1970], discount department store, home improvement centre 
[Davidson et al., 1976], rural gênerai store [Mason and Mayer, 1990], supermarket, régional discount 
chain [Lewison, 1997], and warehouse membership club [Sampson and Tigert, 1994]. Dawson 
[1979] noted their existence in the évolution of the department store, supermarket and discount 
house, and May and Greyser [1989] found that door-to-door and 'party plan' selling had been driven 
into the décline phase of the Retail Life Cycle by a combination of démographie and social changes, 
and inter- and intra-institutional conflict. 
The market shares of French retail institutions suggest that inter-related life cycles are in existence 
[Filser, 1984], and a continuum of counter-service - self-service - supermarket - superstore -
hypennarket occurred in Europe [Knee and Walters, 1985]. Concessions within UK department 
stores also followed a life cycle, reaching maturity in the 1980s [McGoldrick, 1989]. 
The initial success of US discount department stores attracted established retailers to the field, 
including Kresge, Woolworth, Federated, and Dayton-Hudson, pushing the format into the 
accelerated development phase [Davidson et al., 1976], Over-capacity drove the onset of the US 
discount department store's décline phase from the late-1960s, which continued until shakeout 
occurred [ibid.], and American central city variety stores are said to have entered the décline phase 
[ibid.]. 
Forces driving the Retail Life Cycle 
• An innovating retail institution normally enjoys significant compétitive advantage over existing 
operators, enabling it to achieve public acceptability, causing sales to rise rapidly [Bâtes, 1979; 
Rosenbloom, 1981; Brown, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1990b] 
47 
Geographic expansion drives transit of an institution from the innovation phase to the accelerated 
development phase [Davidson et al., 1976; Dawson, 1979]. 
Success breeds imitation and the technique proliferates [Bates, 1979; Brown, 1987b, 1988a, 
1988b, 1990b], largely through established retailers' adoption of the format [Davidson et al., 
1976; Dawson, 1979], again driving transition to the accelerated development phase. US 
discount department stores, for example, were initially pioneered as entrepreneurial, single-unit 
entities, but established chains metamorphasised into or acquired discount chains following 
World War II [Hollander and Omura, 1989]. 
Conflict between new concepts and established, maturing techniques ends with the new concepts 
replacing the established ones, before the process starts again [Dawson, 1979], meaning that the 
concept of conflict is central to the Retail Life Cycle [ibid.]. Conflict between US convenience 
stores and supermarkets, for example, drove forward the life cycles of both formats [Kirby, 
1976a], and department stores' failure to compete with the array and help offered by true 
specialists hastened their decline [Pennington, 1980]. 
Over-capacity resulting from over-expansion of what was a profitable format can drive a retail 
format into maturity, as profitability declines [Davidson et al., 1976; Rosenbloom, 1981], 
Profitability can decline because of the costs involved in managing a complex, large 
organisation, causing the onset of maturity [Davidson et al., 1976; James et a l , 1981], although 
some find it difficult to accept the presumption that large scale multi-unit organisations must 
have diseconomies of scale, and that entrepreneurial managers responsible for the birth of a retail 
form are incapable of sustaining their retail methods [Markin and Duncan, 1981]. The 
department store's maturity stage, for example, can be extended by an adept management that 
penetrates new markets and leverages their inherent strengths in the areas of assortment 
dominance, price assortment, fashion leadership, locational dominance, scale of unit, and store 
card penetration [Pennington, 1980]. 
Demographic trends affect the Retail Life Cycles of formats. For example, the ageing, more 
wealthy population prolongs Ihe maturity phase of the department store [Pennington, 1980]. 
Decline is not automatic, argue Davidson et al. [1976] and James et al. [1981], it occurs because 
of an inability to compete with innovating institutions, which tend to challenge formats in the 
maturity stage [Brown, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1990b]. Decline, however, can be a profitable stage 
in the life cycle, provided that enough competitors 'abandon ship' in the shakeout that is typical 
of the stage [Davidson and Smallwood, 1980]. 
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Acceleration of the Retail Life Cycle 
The Retail Life Cycle is accelerating, or shortening, a phenomenon addressed fully in appendix 9. 
Witnessed in numerous retail fields, this is driven by a combination of many factors (appendix 9), 
with profound implications for retail management - diffusion of innovations will occur more rapidly, 
leaving a shortened response time, and the physical life span of retail structures is likely to be longer 
than their economic life span. 
Uses 
Analysis of the Retail Life Cycle at individual store level facilitates the identification of basic market 
forces, enabling timely, effective management responses, including the planning, execution and 
evaluation of business activities [Holmes and Hoskins, 1977], keeping management alert to the need 
to open new stores to replace outlets that must eventually close [ibid.]. Such use of the Retail Life 
Cycle, on a micro, rather than macro, basis, infers that the Retail Life Cycle is at least partly 
manageable and only partly deterministic [Davidson and Smallwood, 1980]. Thinking in terms of an 
organisation's life cycle allows management to improve its strategic and tactical management 
[Davidson and Smallwood, 1980], although there is a danger of becoming over-reliant on the 
concept, ignoring the possibility of temporary setbacks, for example. 
The Retail Life Cycle has aplace in the formulation of growth, renewal and repositioning strategies, 
in market analysis, sales forecasting, capital allocation, store location decisions, consumer 
communications, and in all elements of the retail marketing mix [Davidson and Smallwood, 1980]. 
At each stage of the Retail Life Cycle, retailers must be willing to adapt their merchandising efforts 
and operating methods to meet the environmental circumstances of that stage [Lewison, 1997]. 
Retail Life Cycle concepts were used to forecast maturity in US discount department stores and fast 
food outlets by the mid-1970s, and US home improvement centres, furniture warehouse showrooms 
and catalogue showrooms by the early-1980s. 
By operating in many retail fields, conglomerates are attempting to strategically avoid the impact of 
the decline phase [Davidson, 1970], an approach that also reduces vulnerability to economic 
downturns or changing consumer tastes [Pennington, 1980; Davidson and Johnson, 1981], while 
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allowing consisíent growth. The importance of the store portfolio is illustrated by the UK food retail 
industry - the co-operative movement has too many stores in decline, compared to múltiple 
competitors [McGoldrick, 1990], largely because of múltiples' success in 'rejuvenating and 
rationalising' their stock of outlets. 
The Retail Life Cycle highlights the fact that long-term retail planning requires planned succession 
of retail packages in order to meet changing customer needs and competitive challenge [Knee and 
Walters, 1985], and that management must focus on strategic renewal - developing new networks for 
the future, while maximising returns from existing networks [McCammon, 1975]. 
The Retail Life Cycle is used by the stock market, albeit rather unwittingly [Kerin and Varaiya, 
1985] - negative retum on investment is tolerated early in the life cycle of a new firm or retail 
concept, in the expectation that this will be reversed as maturity approaches. Shortening life cycles 
(appendix 9) suggest that long-term investments must be viewed with caution [McGoldrick, 1990], 
as satisfactory return on investment must be made within a short timescale. 
Weaknesses 
The Retail Life Cycle concept advanced by Davidson et al. [1976] was based on one retail format in 
one country, the US department store, and has failed to genérate significant non-US attention. 
Moreover, the 1920s and 1930s reinvigoration of the US department store and its long run 
persistence cast doubt on the life cycle approach [Hollander, 1980]. ít rejects the possibility of 
adaptation by older institutions to new conditions, and that retail fonns may persist continually 
[Bucklin, 1983], and does not adequately reflect the ability of existing retail organisations to 
metamorphose in effective ways o ver time, as the US department store did in the 1960s and 1970s 
[Bucklin, 1983; McGoldrick, 1989]. 
Like the Wheel of Retailing, the Retail Life Cycle is an intnguing metaphor but a questionable 
theory of institutional change [Markin and Duncan, 1981], with the process unrealistically presented 
as 'inexorable, a fated end of economic and managerial determinism' [ibid.], whereas it should be 
seen as a dependent variable determined by marketing and managerial action [ibid.]. 
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Criticisms levelled at the Product Life Cycle must also apply to the Retail Life Cycle [Filser, 1984], 
namely that it is diffìcult to forecast the likely timing of the beginning of a new phase, especially as 
life cycles shorten. Similarly, Brown [1987b] considers the Retail Life Cycle to be equally as flawed 
as the Product Life Cycle, but held in similar académie esteem. 
The Retail Life Cycle, like other théories of retail change, concentrâtes on only one aspect of retail 
évolution [Brown, 1990b], and the term 'decline' is too strong a description, as retail institutions, 
unlike products, rarely disappear completely. 
Extensions to the Retail Life Cycle 
Applying the Retail Life Cycle at an individuai store level, Holmes and Hoskins [1977] add a stage 
to each end of the Retail Life Cycle, embryonic and sénescence. The embryonic, pre-opening stage is 
characterised by research, planning, recruitment and the raising of capital, while the sénescence stage 
involves a steady decline in store traffic and deteriorating sales and profits, often caused by factors 
such as a declining population, urban decay, and falling incomes in the trading area [Holmes and 
Hoskins, 1977]. 
Like the Wheel and the Accordion, the Retail Life Cycle originally referred to retailing formats or 
institutions, but arguably the most significant application is to retail firms [Brown, 1988b]. Applying 
the Retail Life Cycle to companies, Roth and Klein [1993] found that the limited size of a population 
for a retail type, compétition from imitators and new retail forms, and government control ail 
contribute to the slowdown and decline of a company. 
Davidson and Johnson [1981] fragment the Retail Life Cycle, into departments and classifications as 
well as products and retail outlets, arguing that a store is simply a composite of life cycles with each 
component moving at its own pace and scale, and that a retail organisation is a collection of stores, 
each with its own life cycle. Davidson and Johnson's [1981] extension implies that departments, as 
well as stores and organisations, must be managed with considération for life cycles, and they 
continue to recommend the strategie development of a portfolio of stores, departments, locations and 
merchandise classifications. 
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Brown [1988b] proposed a combination theory of the Wheel, Accordion and Retail Life Cycle 
concepts, explained in full under extensions to the Wheel of Retailing (p.25-29, above). 
Environmental Approach 
2.1.6 Darwinian Theory 
The transposition of Darwin's [1859] Natural Sélection theory of biological évolution to retail 
institutional évolution means that retail institutions must be viewed as economic species confronting 
their environments and competing over scarce resources [Etgar, 1984], with only the fittest surviving 
[Gist, 1968]. Described as 'perhaps one of the most meaningful and relevant propositions 
contributing to an understanding of the transformation of retail institutions' [Markin and Duncan, 
1981], it was advanced as Gist's [1968] 'adjustment theory', although some attribute it to Dreesmann 
[1968] who also suggested the 'existence of various retailing species' [see Filser, 1984]. Gist [1968] 
reasons that Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' theory, stripped of référence to specific biological 
types, holds that the species that best adjusts to its environment is most likely to survive. Because 
retail institutions are economic species, retailers confront an environment composed of customers, 
competitors, and a fluctuating technology, the transposition is suitable to explain, to a certain degree, 
the success of some institutional species and the failure of others [Gist, 1968]. 
Although not exhaustive, the major éléments of affecting retail évolution are changes in the 
consumer character (démographie, social, economie, cultural), in technology, in compétition [Gist, 
1968], and in the legai environment [Brown, 1988a]. 
In summary, environmental forces driving retail évolution include changes in per capita income, 
income disparity, employment, urban form, population size, population density, rate of population 
growth, sociological forces (such as middle-class esteem), legal constraints (like anti-chain 
législation), and, most significantly, technological development (mass transit, escalators, motor car, 
téléphone and computer pénétration, for example) [Brown, 1987b; Roth and Klein, 1993]. 
Evidence 
The application of Darwinian évolution to retailing suggests that new retail forms are a manifestation 
of changes in underlying economic, social, démographie, legal and technological conditions [Brown, 
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1995b], and forms that fail to adapt to changing conditions will fade away. Evidence of the 
importance of environmental factors in the birth, growth, decline and death of retail institutions is 
widespread: 
The department store was made possible by environmental change, aithough this subsequently 
caused its decline, contends Gist [1968], citing research by Mayfield [1949], suggesting that it 
emerged in response to the growth of cities, improved transportation Systems, rising standards of 
living, increased capital, the coming of the electrical âge, and the development of plate glass and 
retail advertising, catalysts supported by Bucklin [1972], to which the development of elevators and 
consumer acceptance of fixed price trading are added [Brown, 1987b]. The department store's 
decline resulted partly from failure to relocate when suburbanisation and growth of the motor car 
altered consumers' shopping pattems, and failure to adopt merchandise lines demanded by 
consumers [Gist, 1968], effectively failing to adapt to its changing environment. 
The US mail-order house was also made possible by a changing environment, claims Gist [1968], 
citing Converse et al. [1958; p.322], including factors such as the development of railways, improved 
postal services, growing literacy and increased circulation of periodicals, and growing rural demand 
for a wider assortaient of better quality goods than were available locally. By the 1920s, however, 
the environment had changée! as urbanisation, motor car ownership, collapsing rural incomes and 
rising costs conspired against mail-order, the market leaders of which responded by moving into 
fixed store opérations [Bucklin, 1972; Brown, 1987b], 
Growth of the US supermarket was aided by changing environmental conditions, such as the 
Depression, rising car and refrigerator pénétration, and technological advance in the packaging, 
processing and purveyance of foods [Bucklin, 1972; Brown, 1987b]. Similarly, UK food retail co­
opératives, once pacesetters in retail innovation, failed to recognise and respond to the environmental 
opportunités of the 1970s and 1980s [Brown, 1987b], signalling their demise as the country's 
leading food retailers. 
Discount opérations were also driven by favourable environmental changes, contends Gist [1968], 
again citing Converse et al. [1958; pp.340-341], especially 'fair trade' pricing, successori brand 
advertising, and improved product quality and dependability. The spread of US suburbia, an 
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environmental change enabling the development of suburban shopping centres in the early post-war 
period, eventually worked against these first generation developments as suburbia spread further out, 
and new centres emerged closer to the majority of suburban consutuers' homes [Masón and Mayer, 
1990]. 
US warehouse membership clubs' rapid grovvth was aided by environmental factors including 
recession, the maturing of the packaged goods industry, technological advance in inventory control 
and product movement, and increasing consumer willingness to sacrifice choice and convenience for 
quality producís at reasonable pnces [Sampson and Tigert, 1994], At company, rather than 
institutional, levek Sears' fall from the premier US retail position resulted from its 'caretaker 
mentality', which was dedicated to maintaining the majesty of Sears that management thought was 
unassailable, and its failure to adapt to changing consumer preferences. 
In short, there are many examples of environmental changes facilitating retail development and 
hastening retail demise, and of retail formáis failing to adapt over time. Academic attention also 
focuscs on the identification of stages in the life cycle process: 
Stages 
A short 'mutation' or 'innovation' period is evident, whereby a new retail species (form) develops 
rapidly and violently, leaving imprints of lasting importance [Dreesmann, 1968], followed by a 
period of slower, more stable development, when small adjustments are made over a long period 
[Gist, 1968], although the sum of these changes represents major evolution all the same. Similarty, 
Markin and Duncan [1981] contend that retail change is shaped by a period of radical change 
followed by a series of small adjustments. 
Three sequential stages of natural selection are proposed [Etgar, 1984] - variation, whereby several 
diverse retail species appear, selection, when only a subset of these survive and the rest fail, sooner 
or later, and retention, whereby successful forms are retained and diffused, or reproduced, ensuring 
survival. Similarly, Masón and Mayer [1990] make a distinction between 'adaptive behaviour', 
which explains the inception or development of an institution, and 'natural selection', meaning 
subsequent survival and prospering, or otherwise, of an institution. 
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Uses and strengths 
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Described as having 'intuitive appeal' [Brown, 1987b], the theory of natural sélection, unlike other 
théories of retail change, does not généralise excessively about observations carried out on one 
specific sector [Filser, 1984]. ït underlines the fact that no retail institution or retailer is immune 
from the effects of the changing environment [Gist, 1968], and that there must be market opportunity 
for a retail institution to survive [Markin and Duncan, 1981]. 
It also implies that a prolonged ability to adjust to changing environmental conditions at short notice 
is an extremely désirable characteristic of a retailer or a retail institution [Gist, 1968; Markin and 
Duncan, 1981], while fai Iure to do so means risking being replaced by new institutions. 
Continuai adaptation to the surroundings is the real secret of retail growth and survival [Markin and 
Duncan, 1981], awareness of and rapid reaction to changes in the operating environment allows a 
retail institution to avoid 'unfriendly' or potentially harmful éléments of change, while realising 
disproportionate gains from changes in 'friendly' éléments that work in the institutions favour [Gist, 
1968]. 
The theory infers that fitness is a moving target, that what survives for the Urne being is fit now. 
meaning that the functions and services of the institution are deemed valuable by the marketing 
environment of the time [Markin and Duncan, 1981], underlining the importance of adaptation to the 
prevailing environment [Brown, 1987b]. In effect, institutional innovations will only prove 
successful when operational conditions are favourable and only those techniques which are able to 
adapt to altérations in their trading milieu will survive and prosper in the longer tenu [Brown, 1987b, 
1988a; Sampson and Tigert, 1994], explaining the diversity in the number and type of retail 
institutions, both within cultures and between différent cultures - différent environments spawn 
différent types of retail institutions [Markin and Duncan, 1981]. 
Retail changes are a resuit of planned or unplanned adaptive responses to threats and opportunities 
embedded in the environment, argues Etgar [1984], and identification of the key environmental 
forces affecting retail change is useful in forecasting, as it was in Arndt's [1972] forecast of 
Norwegian supermarket development, using cross-country comparative economic indicators. 
Weaknesses 
Unlike animais, retail executives can think, meaning that retail firms can deliberately change their 
own forms and function, which is impossible for animais [Dreesmann, 1968; Roth and Klein, 1993]. 
Similarly, Brown [1987b] human foresight and ability to initiate, choose and plan for change is a key 
weakness of the biotic analogy, argues Brown [1987b], adding that the environment does not 
détermine what will occur in retailing, it créâtes possibilities which individuals or organisations are 
free to exploit or reject as they please [Brown, 1987b], 
The original objective of the transposition was to provide an original, non-deterministic path of retail 
change analysis, while stressing the importance of environmental factors in retail institutional 
évolution, but lack of empirica! validation means that its original potential remains unrealised 
[Filser, 1984]. The lack of application of the thesis is due to Gist's [1968] fai Iure to identify the 
mechanisms of sélection and survival of novel retail forms [Etgar, 1984]. Brown [1987b] considers 
existing research on the environmental factors underpinning retail évolution to be almost entirely 
anecdotal, rather than analytical. 
In short, the approach remains relatively unproven academically, although there has been almost 
universal adoption of an adaptive approach to doing business, while environmental monitoring and 
strategie planning have become key retail stratégies [Brown, 1987b]. 
Extensions 
Markin and Duncan [1981] adopt more biological terms in a largely ignored extension, suggesting 
that they are equally applicable to retailing. Parasitism occurs when one or two organisms needs the 
other to survive, as trading stamp companies need retailers. Symbiosis is when association between 
two or more species benefits ail, as voluntary and co-operative chains do the retailer and the overall 
retail brand owner. Finally, commensalism occurs when organisms belonging to différent species 
have nearly the same requirements, enabling them lo live together in the same habitat, as retailers do 
in trade centres and Clusters. 
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Conflict-based Approach 
2.1.7 Dialectic Theory 
Although Hollander [1963] had briefly referred to 'concepts of tension within retailing that seem to 
lead to almost automatic change, in a sort of Hegalian thesis and antithesis', Gist [1968] formally 
transposed Marx and Hegel's 'Dialectical Matenalism' theory of évolution to retail institutional 
change, an application far from the socio-political and economie changes that it was intended for. 
Based on the old adage, 'if you can't beat them, join them' [Masón and Mayer, 1990], it argues that 
an existing thesis is challenged by its antithesis and a synthesis eventually emerges from the melding 
of the two [Brown, 1987b, 1988a]. It can be summed up as a three step process of retail change: 
1. A thesis develops, which in retailing is an established retail institutional form, but in other cases 
may be a social, politicai or an economie institution, embodying a philosophical position regarding 
virtually any issue or question. For example, in politics, this could be a Taissez-faire' or a 'hands-
off policy in government [Gist, 1968]. 
2. Over time, an innovative position opposed to the thesis develops, called the antithesis. with a 
philosophical position opposite that of the thesis, or in retailing, a position opposed to the thesis 
retail institution. In the politicai example, the antithesis to the 'laissez-faire* governmental policy 
could be a 'get tough' policy on big business. The antithesis is a challenge to the thesis, with 
opposite characteristics, although the two need not necessarily represent polar or complete opposites 
[Gist, 1968]. 
3. A subséquent melding or blending of the thesis and the antithesis results in what is called the 
synthesis. a philosophical position or institution between the original thesis and the antithesis [Gist, 
1968]. 
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Figure 2.1.7. The dialectic process: 
Thesis" 
Department störe 
high marg in 
low t u m o v e r 
h igh pr ice 
füll se rv ice . 
d o w n t o w n location 
plush facilities 
'Antithesis" 
Discount store 
low marg in 
h igh turnover 
low pr ice 
self-service 
low rent locat ions 
spartan facilities 
"Synthesis" 
Discount department store 
average margins 
average tumover 
modes t prices 
limited services 
suburban locat ions 
modes t facilities 
[Source: Lewison, 1997, p.641] 
Synthesis is not necessarily the end of the process, instead it can become the thesis in turther 
évolution, provoking an antithesis which results in further synthesis, and so the process continues 
[Gist, 1968]. In effect, a synthesis of institutions can become a new thesis, open to challenge by an 
antithesis institution [Kaufman, 1985]. 
Described as a 'mutuai adjustment process', the dialectic process is a form of compromise, 
accommodation or even régression of two competing value Systems embodied in two différent 
institutional types [Markin and Duncan, 1981], which may, over time, result in temporary resolution 
of the conflict between the two types. It holds that various retail types 'negate' their competitors' 
advantages by taking on their strengths, thus mutually adapting [Kaufman, 1985], in a process 
labelled a 'melting pot' theory of retail institutional change [Lewison, 1997]. 
Evidence 
US department stores developed because some retailers were attracted by the high-margins earned by 
specialists, and gradually added new lines, eventually resulting in the department store [Bucklin, 
1972], implying that the early department store represented synthesis between the low-margin 
general retailer and the high-margin specialised retailer. The department store itself became a thesis, 
as mail-order companies emerged as a challenging antithesis; again resulting in synthesis as leading 
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mail-order companies Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward moved into Fixed-store retailing and 
became department store Operators themselves [Bucklin, 1972]. 
Later in retail évolution, Gist [1968] considered the US department store to be a thesis, challenged 
by an antithesis, the discount opération, which opposed the department store in terms of location, 
level of service, organisational structure, mark-up policy, level of stockturn and margin 
requirements. In time, the discount department store emerged, a synthesis of the two forms, with a 
margin and turnover policy mid way betvveen them [Gist, 1968; Davies, 1976]. Similarly, Jung 
[1961], revealed a narrowing of the price differential between Chicago discount houses and 
conventional retailers of durable goods, particularly department stores, which he attnbuted to 
conventional retailers' élimination or modification of services in order to become more price 
competitive, and discount houses' addition of some service and costs in the form of better 
showrooms and more expensive locations, supporting the principle of synthesis before its 
transposition to retailing. Tillman [1971] also found that US discount stores moved to more 
expensive locations and added sidelines such as drug and grocery departments, until they resembled 
discount department stores, far from their original form. 
Later department stores' focus on high fashion merchandising while abandoning many staple 
classifications contradicts department store-discount store synthesis [Hollander, 1980], while their 
adoption of self-service and high density display techniques, plus the émergence of 'upgraded' 
discount stores supports it [ibid.]. Department stores' discounting of merchandise similar to that 
offered by off-price retailers negated the challenger's strengths to some degree, argues Kaufman 
[1985]. Similarly, in the UK, London 'middle-class' co-operative societies of the 19 t h Century, which 
were industry price-setters, forced competitors to follow their price-cutting, cash-sales policies, and 
eventually became largely indistinguishable from privately-owned department stores [Pennance and 
Yamey, 1955]. 
The tight between downtown department stores and suburban shopping centres led to the 
development of a synthesis, with department stores establishing branches in suburban shopping 
centres [Gist, 1971, and merchants establishing downtown shopping malls [Etgar, 1984], and 
discount department stores [Brown, 1987b, 1988a]. Similarly, Mason and Mayer [1990] consider 
that the department store (offering both hard and soft goods, a wide array of services, and attractive 
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surroundings) represented a thesis, the discount store (offering similar merchandise, but in 
unattractive, low-cost surroundings, without services such as credit and delivery) its antithesis, 
resulting in synthesis, namely the promotional department store such as K-Mart, a blend of the 
strengths of both. 
Preferring to employ biological analogies, Dreesmann [1968] referred to a metamorphosis of 
superettes, drugstores and small variety stores into new forms which were indistinguishable to the 
untrained eye, while Bucklin [1972] states that in the US, the chain store system spread quickly from 
variety store retailing, where it originated in the late 19 t h century, to the pharmaceutical, clothing, 
furniture, shoe, food and department store fields, suggesting that a degree of synthesis occurred to 
which Kacker [1988a] added the field of toys. 
Pennance and Yamey [1955] noted tendencies towards synthesis in UK grocery retailing, namely 
that in the second half of the 19 t h century, privately-owned grocers adopted characteristics of co­
operative societies, including the payment of patronage dividends, while Duncan [1965] claims that 
the US independent grocery store and independent meat store merged into the combination food 
store, and then the supermarket, both writing prior to the formal transposition of the Dialectic 
process. 
In the USA, the thesis of established food retail chains was challenged by independent operators, 
who seized the early supermarket initiative, representing an antithesis. Chains of supermarkets 
resulted from both established retailers moving into supermarkets themselves and the growth of 
independent supermarket pioneers into chains [Bucklin, 1972; Etgar, 1984]. These efforts soon 
became obsolete, however, and a second antithesis emerged as a second wave of larger supermarkets 
developed from the 1960s [Bucklin, 1972]. In the UK, melding of the traditional counter-service 
grocery store and the supermarket, its antithesis, resulted in a synthesis, the self-service grocery store 
[Davies, 1976; Brown 1987b, 1988a], while in LDCs, entrepreneurial retailers have created mini-
supermarkets that are an intermediary step between traditional small food stores and supermarkets 
[Goldman, 1981], representing synthesis of the two. 
The 'soft goods' discount house is a synthesis of soft and hard goods retailers, which were 
challenged by self-service supermarkets [Bucklin, 1972], and the 'Toys R Us' chain blends the 
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concepts of self-service, discounting and speciality retailing [Kacker, 1988a], while a catalogue 
showroom is a hybrid of traditional retail merchandising, with in-store counters and displays, and 
non-store retailing, offering telephone and mail-order shopping [Korgaonkar, 1981], supporting 
mail-order companies' moves into both traditional retailing and catalogue showrooms following the 
1920s decline of the US mail-order market [Duncan, 1965]. 
There is further evidence of established retailers' dialectic reactions to low-cost entrants in Appendix 
8. Tn short, however, there is significant evidence of dialectic tendencies in retailing, which has been 
observed between general and specialised retailers; department stores and discount operations; 
department stores and mail-order houses; department stores and supermarkets; co-operative and 
private retailing; superettes, pharmacists and variety stores; self-service and numerous retail forms; 
food chains and supermarkets; counter-service grocers and supermarkets; hard & soft goods retailers 
and supermarkets; and traditional retail merchandising and non-store retailing. Many retail forms 
have emerged due to partial synthesis, at least, occurring between conflicting retail types, including 
department stores, discount department stores, soft goods discount houses, suburban department 
stores, supermarket chains, self-service grocery stores, catalogue showrooms, and wholesale/ 
warehouse clubs. 
Forces driving Dialectic evolution 
When attacked by a new retail form meeting with great success and expanding rapidly, established 
retailers can be driven to undertake a conscious revolution, wilfully transforming themselves as 
quickly as possible into the more modern type [Dreesmann, 1968]. Similarly, the penetration of local 
discount competition was found to be directly related to department stores' adoption of self-service 
and implementation of direct price matching and repositioning policies [Gross, 1964], suggesting 
that department stores were reactive rather than proactive. In the same vein, US food retail chains 
rapidly evolved to become supermarket chains when new and deadly supermarket competitors 
appeared [Dreesmann, 1968]. 
Any established retail formula will always attract an 'opposite' [Filser, 1984]. For example a retail 
sales format offering no service will emerge to compete against a format with high levels of service, 
forcing the latter to adopt certain characteristics of the innovator, driving a degree of convergence 
between the two [ibid.]. 
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US department stores' adoption of private label, which was an attempt to develop a new differential 
strength, drove synthesis because private label is easily replicated [Kaufman, 1985]. Extensive 
upgrading of services, including the sales environment, also tends to move stores closer together, 
particularly when major players embark on extensive store remodelling programmes [ibid.] and 
common responses to the changing environment drive synthesis [ibid.]. 
In the eyes of US consumers, the differences between department stores, discount stores, mass 
merchandisers, speciality stores and off-price retailers are diminishing [Kaufman, 1985], due to a 
proliferation of branded merchandise at discount prices, growth of private label, extensive store 
upgrading, and improved services, yet stopping short of full synthesis. 
Strengths, weaknesses and uses 
The dialectic process is a means through which to observe and explain retail change more 
systematically [Gist, 1971], particularly that brought about through competition [Fullerton, 1987]. It 
is 'a comprehensive strategic tool in analysing today's rapid retail evolution', [Kaufman, 1985], a 
useful management tool for identifying potential strategic problems, that may also assist in the 
anticipation of future competitive response to strategies [ibid.]. Recognising a synthesised 
marketplace presents retailers the opportunity to differentiate and grow [ibid.], rather than trying so 
hard to emulate others' strengths that few real strengths of their own emerge [ibid.]. Conversely, 
efficient and successful retailers often profit from the entry of'revolutionary' firms, by applying to 
their own business any new innovations they offer, turning a temporary disadvantage into a long-
term benefit [Jung, 1961]. 
In effect, the dialectic process teaches retailers that they must maintain vision and institutional 
flexibility, as those that do are able to avoid the synthesis trap, identify new opportunities early, 
reposition themselves rapidly, and pre-empt competition in profitable growth markets [Kaufman, 
1985]. When faced with the challenge of an innovator, established institutions must either respond or 
risk failure, but the melding process is by no means inevitable [Brown, 1988a], as it is still possible 
to develop non-emulatable strengths [Kaufman, 1985]. 
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The Dialectic process explains what happens to a retail innovation once it appears on the retai! scene 
and how it bccomes accepted in the retail community, but fails to explain how and why a specific 
retail innovation appears and succeeds, while olhers fail [Etgar, 1984]. Il is of 'limited interest' 
because of the dìfficulty in pinpointing the position of a format in its dialectical process, according to 
Filser [1984], and, like other théories of retail change, is accused of only addressing a partial aspect 
of retail change - évolution following inception [Etgar, 1984], but provides a clear, risemi process of 
retail institutional conflict nonetheless. 
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2.1.8 Overview of the théories of retail change 
T h e o r y Key h y p o t h e s i s Cases of application C a s e s of n o n -
application 
Notes 
Wheel of 
Retai l ing 
low-pr ice , low-quali ty 
opérat ions ' t rade-up" to 
become high-pr ice , high-
quali ty opéra t ions 
Widely observed in 
many areas of retail 
change, in particular 
in high-level, 
devcloped 
économies . 
Not appl icable to ail 
areas, even in the 
U S and the UK. 
Not applicable to 
countries with iow-
level économies . 
Has received the most 
académie attention, but 
addresses only onc aspect 
- t rading up. Numerous 
causes of t rading up 
advanced, but no 
consensus reached. 
Retail 
Accordion 
wide- range , general retail 
opéra t ions g ive way to 
na r row-range , specialised 
retail opéra t ions , which in turn 
g ive way to wide- range . 
general retail opérat ions, and 
so on. 
Successfully applied 
to many areas of 
retail change, but 
thèse are 
concentrated in the 
USA and Europe. 
Not applicable to ail 
areas, several cases 
of non-appl icat ion, 
even in the U S A and 
Europe . 
Again , addresses only one 
aspect - cycle in which 
traders alternate be tween 
spécial isat ion and 
diversification. Less 
académie scrutiny than 
Wheel , but m a n y causes 
p roposed 
Polarisat ion 
Principle 
T h e growth of large 
insti tutions créâtes a market 
for small , conven ience stores, 
located ncar to p e o p l e ' s 
h o m e s . 
Successfully applied 
to several countries, 
notably the USA, the 
UK, Western Europe 
and Japan 
Has not received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases o f 
non-appl icat ion to 
arise. 
Has no t received large 
amounts of académie 
attention, and again 
addresses only one aspect 
- the re la t ionship be tween 
large and smal l stores. 
Limi ted debate on causes 
of the process . 
Multi-
polarisation 
model 
Sugges ts that devc lopments at 
o n c end of the price, 
assor ta ient or service level 
spect rum will induce counter-
ba lanc ing activities at the 
opposi te end . 
Has not received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases of 
application to arise, 
al though those of the 
Wheel , Accord ion & 
Polarisation Principle 
rcmain valid. 
Has no t received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases of 
non-appl icat ion to 
arise, a l though it 
must suffer the s ame 
cri t icisms as the 
Wheel , Accord ion & 
Polarisation 
Principle. 
Combines the Whee l , 
Accord ion and 
Polarisat ion models , but is 
not thoroughly tested 
itself. Addresses mult iple 
aspects of retail change, 
and retains conceptual 
clarity. 
Retail Life 
Cycle 
An inst i tut ion goes through 
stages, or life cycles , from 
bir th, t h rough to growth , 
matur i ty and decl ine. 
Valid for many retail 
formats in the U S A , 
but has received little 
académie attention. 
Has not received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases of 
non-appl icat ion to 
arise. 
Not thoroughly tested 
Observed paral le l with the 
whee l o f retail ing. 
Limited académie 
at tent ion means few 
causes have been 
advanced . 
Darwinian 
Theory 
T h e react ion o f individuai 
insti tutions to changes in their 
env i ronment is the key to 
survival . 
"Surv iva l of the fittest" 
Has not received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases of 
application lo arisc. 
Has not received 
sufficient académie 
attention for cases of 
non-appl icat ion to 
arise. 
N o t thoroughly tested. 
Easy to envisage, bu t in 
many w ay s a s ta tement of 
the obv ious , with no 
clearly stated cause of 
process . 
Dialectic 
Theory 
Retail change is a resuit of 
négat ion of compet i to r s ' 
advantages . In t ime, mutuai 
adaptat ion takes p lace . "If you 
cant beat t hem, jo in them" 
[Mason and Maycr , 1990] 
Part synthesis 
observed in UK food 
retailing, and other 
markets. 
Full synthesis not 
yet observed. 
Easy to envisage . 
Observed, at least in part. 
Fails to account for the 
influence of the operat ing 
envi ronment . 
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2.1.9 Conclusion 
The various théories of retail change are criticised most frequently for addressing only one aspect of 
retail change, not being applicable to ail types of economy, having cases of non-con form ìty in 
qualifying économies, and for focusing excessively on US retail change. In response to this, 
proponents would argue that addressing only one aspect of retail change (three in the case of the 
multi-polarisation model) allows a model to retain the possibility of presenting a conceptually clear 
and unmuddled message, that the vast cultural and economie différences between the developed and 
the developing countries make it unreasonable to expect any single theory of retail change to apply 
universally, and that exceptions to the rule are common in many theoretical fields, meaning that 
examples of théories failing to explain retail development will always surface, no matter how 
sophisticated the theory, although this does not automatically mean that a theory should lose its 
respected position (see appendix 6). 
Awareness of the criticisms of the théories is central to overcoming any bias that may be inhérent in 
them, a theory should never be considered universal, as by définition this would mean it becoming a 
law (appendix 6), and there is always a possibility that the case in question could be an example of 
non-application. Excessive focus on the USA can only be addressed by research and application of 
the théories in other settings. 
There is confusion as to whether théories of retail change should be applied to retail institutions or 
compames, far removed events are distorted by the lack of good historical information, définitions of 
institutions can be misleading, and, as with cloud watching, the data becomes vaguer and vaguer as it 
is approached [Hollander, 1980]. The ahistorical nature of the théories of retail change means that we 
can never be sure that the patterns will continue into the future [ibid.], and they are said to attempt to 
predict the future by taking the cultural/historical setting as static [Kumcu, 1987]. Analysis rests too 
heavily on selected examples [Holländer, 1980; Brown, 1897b], meaning that writing on the subject 
généralises excessively, claiming relevance beyond the single line of trade and short period into 
which research was carried out [Savitt, 1989]. 
Cyclical théories are described as simplistic, overly speculative, deterministic, offering insufficient 
explanation of how and why change takes place, failing to recognise that change can be explained 
only within the broader context of the society and culture [Markin and Duncan, 1981], being 
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preoccupied with pattern, lacking firm empirical support, and presupposing long-term retail 
institutional equilibrium [Brown, 1987b, 1988a]. In addition, most cyclical théories are considered as 
relating to partial, rather than complète, cycles, meaning that they deal only with the rise and fall of 
institutions, rather than with a répétitive, truly cyclical, wave-like phenonienon [Gist, 1971; p.364]. 
The environmental approach relegates the innovator to a rôle of secondary importance, présents 
retail institutions as passive and automatic, and ignores the decision-making élément, contends 
Brown [1987b, 1988a], the majority of studies on the environmental approach are anecdotal rather 
than analytical [ibid.], and favourable environmental conditions by no means guarantee the 
émergence of a retail institution [ibid.]. Conflict models pay little attention to the reasons behind the 
success or failure of institutions [Etgar, 1984; Brown, 1987b], the origins of institutions, or the form 
they eventuatly take [Brown, 1987b], Moreover, they fail to incorporate external influences, with ail 
change rather narrowly being seen as resulting from inter-institutional strife [Brown, 1987b, 1988a]. 
Extensions to théories havc generally disappointed due to their lack of conceptual clarity, despite 
notable exceptions such as Brown's [1987a] multi-polarisation model, and have failed to ignite 
académie imagination. The basic concepts of the various théories, however, are relatively well 
founded, and retail change in the developed, free world fréquently demonstrates their relevance. The 
review of the literature pertaining to the théories of retail change (2.1) identifies many dozens of 
cases of application, and arguably more importantly, cases of non-application, driving forces, and 
consequential effects of retail change. 
Arguably the most significant application of retail change theory, however, is to individual retail 
firms [Brown, 1988b], which maximises their stratégie value and stimulâtes académie debate [ibid.]. 
This approach is gaining momentum, and alleviates the problem of lack of detailed statistics, side-
steps the problem of institutional définition, gives institutional concepts managerial relevance 
[Brown, 1988a], and fits in with modem retail history, which is often set in the framework of 
company history and merchant biography [Hollander, 1963]. This study straddles the traditional 
'institutional' approach and the more récent, company-specific approach, by allowing retail movers 
and shakers from various retail company backgrounds to explain their understanding of the UK food 
retail industry since 1950. 
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2.2 Review of publisher! literature on UK food retailing 
Although there is a considérable, albeit fragmented, body of published literature on the théories of 
retail change, little attention had been paid to the évolution of UK food retailing itself. The last major 
chronicle of UK retail development was published nearly 50 years ago by Jefferys' [1954], and was 
an epic chronicle of British retail development from 1850-1950 explaining retail évolution in 
general, while devoting signifìcant attention to the grocery trade [pp.126-180], among other types of 
food retailers. Although it is impossible to do justice to Jefferys [1954] work in few words, the 
period covered is signifìcant as it included the growth of co-operative societies, following on from 
the 1844 Rochdale Pioneers, finding that the key co-operative catalysts included the growth of mass-
produced products in the industrialised society, which were better suited to retail by large-scale 
retailers, the unsatisfied food needs of the Iate-I9 t h Century working classes, to whom price became 
more important prior to World War 1. In the inter-war period, rapidly growing large-scale 
manufacturers attempted to control the retailing of their products more closely, and private, skilled 
grocers lost ground to both multiples and co-operatives, who increasingly secured the prime 
locations and the largest customer bases, while multiple growth outpaced that of co-operatives. 
The second half of the 20 t h Century, however, suffered a serious drought in literature on UK food 
retail development. Books tended to concentrate on specific fields of retail development such as 
resale price maintenance, trading stamps and Sunday trading, or were specific retail company 
historiés or key personalities' biographies. Ail thèse approaches are valuable and serve a purpose, 
but do not go a long way towards a comprehensive post-war food retail history, explaining how and 
why developments occurred. Récent moves redress this balance somewhat, particularly Seth and 
Randall's [1999] work outlining the development of the leading contemporary food retailers, 
providing an authoritative voice on the development of individuai food retailers. 
Literature focusing on a single élément of retail development are a useful source of detailed 
information. The issues addressed tend to be the most hotly and longly debated ones, such as RPM 
[Yamey, 1954, 1964, 1966; MacDonald, 1964; Stamp, 1964; Crâne, 1969], trading stamps [Fulop, 
1973; Fox, 1968], and Sunday trading [URP1, 1983; Kay et al., 1984; Burke and Shackleton, 1986, 
1989; Kay, 1987; Burton, 1993; Healey & Baker, 1996]. Company historiés and executives' 
biographies concentrate on the longest established retailers. The co-operative movement takes the 
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lion's share of attention [see for example, Hollyoake, 1897, 1907, 1908; Redfern, 1913, 1938; Smith, 
1932; Carr-Saunders et al., 1938; CWS, 1951; Bonner, 1970; Richardson, 1977; Kinloch and Butt, 
1981], although like the movement itself, literature on it suffers from being rather fragmented in 
nature. Salisbury's history is set out in detail by Boswell [1969] and Williams [1994a], while that of 
Tesco is addressed in the biographies of Cohen [Corina, 1978] and MacLaurin [MacLaurin, 1999] 
and the company histories of Powell [1983, 1991]. The development of Kwik Save, now part of the 
Somerfield group, is documented by Sparks [1988], and that of William Low, absorbed in 1994 by 
Tesco, by Howe [2000]. Although M&S have only a minority interest in food, in comparison to 
clothing, their long history has ensured a great deal of literary interest, through both company 
histories [see for example, Rees, 1969; Briggs, 1984; Tse, 1985; Bookbinder, 1989; Burns and 
Hyman, 1994;], and works of key executives [see for example, Sieff, 1970; Sieff, 1986; Goldenberg, 
1989]. 
Jeffreys [1954], however, remains the reference yardstick of UK food retail development, and a 
sizeable void was left when this much quoted, oft referenced volume stopped at 1950. Although 
there is a significant body of literature addressing UK food retailing in the post-1950 period, this is 
focused on either individual companies, retail personalities, or specific developments, leaving an 
unfilled vacuum for a major chronicle of UK food retail change on the second half of the 20 t h 
century, taking an industry-wide, multi-development perspective, with an emphasis on explanation 
rather than merely chronicling developments, a vacuum that this present study seeks to fill. 
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Chapter 3. 
Aims and Methodology 
3.1 Aims and Methodologv 
A multi-stage approach was adopted to answer the aims and objectives of the research, which were 
identified as being: 
• to identify the éléments of the théories of retail change best suited to explaining UK food retail 
change post-1950, to use in forecasting. 
• to develop new theory and better understanding of existing theory, grounded specifically in UK 
food retailing post-1950. 
• to uncover the forces driving the changes identified as being important. 
• to provide information to explain the key changes in UK food retailing post-1950 
• to generate quotations and références to illustrate the changes, and to bring the project to life 
with a human dimension. 
Although initially it appeared ambitious to attempt to fulfil multiple criteria, many of the areas 
shared common ground, and could therefore be addressed at the same time. In aiming to uncover the 
forces driving the changes, a by-products was a 'history' of the major events to have taken place, 
from the viewpoint of the interview subject, because the interviews were unstructured (see below). 
Likewise, the fifth objective of generating quotations and références with which to illustrate the 
chronology was amply fulfilled in the interviews. 
Thus, the last three objectives were Condensed into one main research agenda : to uncover the forces 
driving changes in UK food retailing post-1950. In uncovering the driving forces, a history of the 
main events to have taken place was developed, and quotations were obtained which were used to 
explain the changing retail structure in chapters 5 and 6. 
The first two objectives were also closely related, as their common goal was to generate theory and 
understanding of theory, grounded in UK food retailing post-1950, whether existing or new in origin. 
Chapter 7 évaluâtes the success of this, and chapter 8's forecast of likely future developments in UK 
food retailing to 2010 is based upon it. 
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In summary, the main objectives of the qualitative research were to uncover the forces 
driving/constraining UK food retail change post-1950, and to identify the patterns of thèse forces so 
as to generate or verify retail change theory, 
Secondary research and primary research both played a rôle, with primary research being the key 
tool. Secondary data was used to chronicìe the development of UK food retailing between 1950 and 
2000, and primary research in the form of unstructured interviews generated explanations for this, 
based on the lesumonies of key actors of the period, and also reinforced the major trends identiiïed 
from the secondary data. The qualitative data obtained from interviews with the décision makers of 
the period forms the basis of the explanations advanced in chapters 4 and 5, and is supported by 
référence to secondary materials. 
The interview transcripts were analysed using a technique based on grounded theory to establish the 
relevance of existing retail change theory to UK food retail change post-1950, to generate new 
explanations and better understanding of the existing body of theory, and to suggest new theory, ail 
grounded in UK food retail change post-1950. 
Primary research in the form of a Delphi survey was used to make a forecast of likely developments 
in the sector to 2010, and a second forecast based on relevant theoretical aspects was compared to 
this. A third forecast, based on likely socio-economic and technological trends was produced from 
secondary sources, as socio-economic and technological change has been a major influence on UK 
food retail development post-1950, and is likely to continue to be. 
3.1.Î: Secondary Data 
Books, industry reports, magazines and Journals were studied before the primary research was 
undertaken, with the aim of developing a thorough understanding of UK food retail change post-
1950, before beginning the interview process. This was necessary in order to be able to ask relevant 
questions in the interviews, to understand responses to questions, and to be able to probe further 
when necessary, as well as to find statistics suitable for illustrating the changing nature of UK food 
retailing. The primary aim, therefore, of the secondary research was to provide a background 
knowledge and understanding of the forces driving UK food retail change which could be expanded 
and extended during the primary research phase, and to uncover statistics for illustrative purposes. 
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The Grocer was studied in the early phase of secondary research, at the IGD which holds a collection 
dating back ío the I9th century. International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management 
(replacing Retail and Distribution Management) approaches the material with more academic rigour, 
and provided some good reference articles from 1974 onwards. Retail Business, published by 
Economist Publications was another good source of materials, particularly of statistics, from 1969-
1998. Service Industries Journal occasionally focuses on retailing, and provided a few useful insights 
from 1981, as does 77ie Economist, which was studied from 1970 onwards. 
Government publications provide valuable data on the structure of the UK food retailing, but data is 
limited post-1975, because "the provisión of government statistics in general and those of the 
distributive trades in particular slowed down as the Government of 1976 to 1979 sought to cut 
government expenditure " [Moir and Dawson, 1992; p.26], a programme which the incoming 
govenvment of 1979 accelerated [ibid., p.26]. The Census of Distribution, taken in the years 1950, 
1957, 1961, 1966 and 1971 is a valuable source of statistical information, although some 
classifications change from year to year, sometimes making comparative analysis diffícuit. Tt was 
also based on a sample in 1957 and 1966, making data from these years less reliable. It was replaced 
by the Retail Inquiry, the results of which were published in Business Monitor SDA25/SD025: 
Retailing, but was less useful because it failed to include statistics on shop sizes and the geographical 
distribution of retail outlets [ibid., p.25], and altered its defínitions and classifications so frequently 
that it made use of the data diffícult [ibid., p.26], and was published only for the period from 1976 to 
1986, annually at first, then biannually. A full evaluation of government and non-government sources 
of retail and wholesale statistics has been carried out [Moir and Dawson, 1992], and the primary aim 
of researching such sources was to obtain statistical data. As the defínitions employed have altered 
over the years, care needs to be taken when interpreting results in detail, but for the purposes of a 
qualitative study it remains valuable as a means of depicting long-term trends. 
Finaüy, newspapers were not neglected, and of particular use was The Financial Times, which 
periodically addresses issues relevant to the food retail industry. The Times was also useful on 
occasions, as was The Guardian, 
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3.1.ii: Primary Data - qualitative research 
Qualitative research was undertaken to establish 'how' and 'why' changes took place in UK food 
retailing post-1950. The primary aim of the research was not to discover 'what' the changes were, 
although this was in fact a desired by-product of the research, the principie objectives were to 
uncover the forces driving or conslraining change, to corroborate the key changes identified from the 
secondar/ research, and to explain how and why change took place. 
Qualitative research is particularly suited to answering 'how' and £why' questions [Yin, 1994], so it 
was clear that this was an appropriate approach. In addition, the décision to undertake qualitative 
research was supported by the fact that numerous contacts were available in the industry, and were a 
potential source of original data that could provide new insight into the changes that have taken 
place. Qualitative research, through interviewing, seemed the natural and most effective way to 
benefit from this potential. 
Quantitative research is well suited to the manipulation of raw numerical data, while qualitative 
research is likely to be of more use in discovering the forces at work behind the data. Qualitative 
research was deemed appropriate for this project because it is "a source of well-grounded, rich 
descriptions and explanations of processes" [Miles and Huberman, 1984], offering "opportunités to 
develop analytic perspectives" [Miller, 1997], and it allows the researcher to "preserve chronologicai 
flow" and "derive fruitful explanations" [Miles and Huberman, 1984]. 
The outlined advantages of the qualitative research technique fitted well with the main aim of 
uncovering the forces at work behind the changes. Qualitative research also has the advantage that 
the end resuit is in words, which to quantitative advocates may seem a disadvantage. In this case, 
however, the use of words has certain advantages, namely that they have a "concrete, vivid, 
meaningful flavour that often proves far more convincing to a reader than a page of numbers" [Miles 
and Huberman, 1984]. Qualitative research, thus, is conducive to the production of a readable end 
product. 
Qualitative research is a broad term encompassing numerous différent techniques such as "case 
studies...ethnography and grounded theory" [Yin, 1994]. Having chosen to undertake qualitative 
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research because of its general suitability to the research agenda, it was necessary to choose a 
specific technique. 
Ideally, two or more sets of qualitative research could have been carried out, as the vérification of 
existing body of theory would traditionally have taken a différent approach from the generation of 
new theory. Time constraints, however, mied this out at the outset. The research was limited by time, 
as were the interview subjects, so it was decided to interviews key décision makers of the period, in a 
way that would accommodate both the key research objectives of the qualitative research. 
It was decided to conduct unstructured interviews. A study of the literature and examples of 
qualitative research suggested that a structured approach to data collection can force or bend data to 
lit catégories, encourage the overlooking of underlying phenomena [Miles and Huberman, 1984], and 
suppress unexpected révélations [Baszanger and Dodier, 1997]. The unstructured approach is more 
likely to uncover unexpected révélations and underlying phenomena, better suited to theory 
generation [Glaser and Strauss, 1967], and practitioners have found that "...generating theory goes 
hand in hand with verifying it" [ibid.]. The unstructured approach promised to satisfy ali the research 
objectives, and presented the opportunity to allow subjects to digress, which often results in 'useful 
information' [Simon, Sohal and Brown, 1996], largely because it encourages subjects to behave in an 
'endogenous manner...not influenced by the study arrangements' [Baszanger and Dodier, 1997], and 
enables people to teli "real" stories' [Simon, Sohal and Brown, 1996]. 
The unstructured interview approach aimed to encourage the subject to explain the changes important 
to him or her, and to avoid any Teading' of the subject. Questions asked were to clarify 
understanding of points rather than to influence the course of the conversation, an approach which 
has been shown to bring many benefits, notably by Terkel [1972], who claims to simply tum on his 
tape recorder and invite people to talk: 
"In short, it was conversation. In Urne, the sluice gates of damned ttp hurts and dreams 
were opened" [Terkel, 1972] 
The unstructured interview technique was employed, based upon Terkel's technique, and the 
interviewer simply introduced himself and explained his objectives for the interview. The subject of 
the interview was then asked to explain what, in his or her mind, were the most important changes to 
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hâve taken place in UK food retailing since 1950, and to explain how and vvhy they happened. 
Furlher questions followed in order to clarify points, while remaining sensitive so as not to divert the 
patii of the interview. The questions were of a casual nature, as asked in a conversation, a technique 
that has been successful in Terkel's work, and were normally saved until the end of the interview to 
avoid interrupting the flow of conversation. 
Bias is a probfem inhérent in qualitative research, and although hard to quantify, it is certainly 
impossible to eliminate. It has been shown to enter the research at several stages, including the 
sélection of the researcher [Miller and Glassner, 1997], the way in which questions are asked 
[Holstein and Gubrium, 1997], asking the wrong questions [Kirk and Miller, 1986], and through the 
influence of subjects' opinions [Kirk and Miller, 1986]. 
In short, bias is inhérent in qualitative research through interviewing. While the élimination of bias is 
unrealistic, the study aimed to minimise it by allowing the interview subjects to drive the direction of 
the interview, and by verifying stories and claims in later interviews. 
Having established what the research aimed to find out, and established the basic format of the 
interview, it remained only to decide on the method of data analysis. A method based on the 
grounded theory technique was chosen [Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987], although existing 
knowledge of the théories of retail change precluded use of the grounded theory technique in its 
purest form, as this involves the researcher approaching the data with little or no knowledge of 
existing theory in the area [Goulding, 1999; p.869]. 
The grounded theory approach, however, does allow 'concepts and théories from related fields (to 
be) explored to provide and enhance theoretical sensitivity throughout the process' [Goulding, 1999; 
p.868], although they should not be allowed to colour the perceptions of the researcher [ibid., p.868-
9]. Prior theoretical knowledge is therefore not necessarily an impediment to the successful use of the 
grounded theory technique, and in fact plays a sensitising role [Glaser, 1978], as long as the 
researcher avoids constraint of vision, which can cut off the possibility of developing new theoretical 
insigni. 
74 
Although not explicitly using the grounded theory approach, research using techniques drawing on 
'recommendations by Glaser and Strauss [1967] and Miles and Huberman [1984]', has successfully 
established that 'some elements suggested by the literature and prior intuitions could be grounded in 
evidence, while others could not' [Sutton, 1987; p.547], It was decided to adopt a similar approach, 
based on grounded theory, as proposed by Glaser and Strauss [1967] and Miles and Huberman 
[1984], to generate new understanding of retail change, whether entirely new theoretical ideas, or 
enhanced understanding of existing ideas, and to evaluate the relevance of the body of existing retail 
change theory, grounded in UK food retail change post-1950. The researcher remained sensitive to 
new theoretical developments throughout the interview process, allowing explanations of change to 
emerge, rather than forcing them to fit existing theories, despite a knowledge of the existing body of 
retail change theory prior to undertaking the interviews. In fact, it is rare for studies to genuinely 
interweave data collection and theorising of the kind advocated by grounded theory [Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994; p.6], and the technique 'is widely adopted as an approving bumper sticker in 
qualitative studies' [Richards and Richards, 1991; p.43], making an adapted approach seem more 
appropriate than bending a technique to fit the needs of the project. 
A key principle in the grounded theory technique is its emphasis on 'the generation of theory and the 
data in which that theory is grounded." [Strauss, 1987 ' ] . The researcher is said to benefit from 
'regarding all theoretical explanations as provisional; and following clearly defined research 
procedures' [Carson and Coviello, 1996]. The fact that all concepts are initially regarded as 
provisional brings rigour to the technique, and the approach based on the grounded theory technique 
aimed to preserve this. The modified approach, based on the grounded theory technique, answered 
the research agenda of verifying existing theory, providing new explanations and generating new 
theory, grounded in the testimonies of key decision makers whose strategic vision and foresight was 
instrumental in shaping UK food retail change in the second half of the 20 t h century. In approaching 
only key decision makers, such as chief executives of the period, the research objective of developing 
an understanding of the key forces shaping change over the period was more likely to be answered, 
as these are the people who made the actual decisions shaping change in the industry. 
The sample of interview subjects was drawn up over several brainstorming sessions with industry 
contacts, and was revised on each occasion. The sample focused on senior (board level) members of 
1
 Rep roduced in Glaser [1978] . 
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the important food retail organisations of the period, or those who could tell about them, and on 
senior characters specialised in specific fields. Some of the key movers and shakers of the period 
were deceased, and others declined to be interviewed, but of the 39 subjects approached, 23 agreed to 
be interviewed, representing an uptake rate of 59%. Four of the recordings were sadly unusable due 
to their poor quality, and the 19 usable interviews undertaken for the research are detailed in figure 
3.1 .iia, which also briefly summarises their retail careers: 
Figure 3.1.iia: Interview subjects: 
Interview 
subject 
Brief career history Period of 
activity 
Other appointments 
Tony de 
Angeli O B E 
Joumalis t , r ising through local papers 
& Fleet Street agencies to become 
edi tor of the Grocer , and Market ing 
Director, Publ ishing Director and 
Editorial Di rec tor of Will iam Reed 
Publ ishing. 
1953-1996 Magaz ine Editor of the Year, 1971 . 
Regular contr ibutor on B B C Radio 4 ' s J immy 
Young p r o g r a m m e (Thursdays) , for last 29 
years. 
Regular contr ibutor to leadïng magaz ines , 
newspapers , T V & radio. 
Has been a m e m b e r o f I G D Execut ive Counci l , 
chaired the 1995 M A F F Nutr i t ion Task Force . 
Non-Execut ive Direc tor of B lenhe im Group , 
1991 -1996; Cha i rman , Tarsus Publ i sh ing , 
1999-present. 
Peter Asquifh M a c g a y Ltd. - Propcr ty Company . 
Asqui th Dair ies - A S D A . 
Supermarkets - Meat . 
Roya! Navy. 
Family Business - Meat. 
1980-2001 
1965-1980 
1947-1965 
1945-1947 
1943-1945 
Tony 
Campbel l 
A S D A , j o ined as Divis ional Director, 
Operat ions Services rising to 
Operat ions Director , Joint Manag ing 
Director. Trad ing Director, and more 
recently Depu ty Chief Executivc. 
Former ly held sénior management 
posit ions at J Sa insbury pie and 
Hil lards Supers torcs . 
1985-2001 Non-Execu t ive Dircctorships for First Cho ice 
Holidays p i c , Virgin Wines , Pets at H o m e Ltd. , 
Blackwel l Books , Red Dev i l and Alaska F o o d 
Diagnost ics . 
Denis Cassidy Liberty pie, Cha i rman. 
Oliver Group , Cha i rman. 
Bodding ton G r o u p pie , Chai rman. 
Storehouse pie, Depu ty Chai rman. 
British H o m e Stores pie, Chairman, 
Chief Execut ivc Director (various 
roles), Execut ivc . 
1995-1997 
1992-1999 
1989-1995 
1986-1987 
1969-1986* * merger in 1986: Habi ta t -Mothercare 
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Trevor D ixon Associat ion of Convenience Stores, 
Chief Execut ive . 
Independent Consultant , 
N u m a r k Chemis ts , Development 
Manage r r is ing to Managing Director. 
All ied Grocery Distr ibutors (VG Food 
Stores). Marke t ing Director, rising to 
Manag ing Director. 
K e y Markets , Senior Grocery Buyer. 
All iance Wholesa le Grocers , Buyer. 
Lipton Ltd, Buyer . 
1994-prescnt 
1989-1994 
1984-1989 
1970-1983 
1967-1970 
1962-1967 
1956-1962 
Bob Fee Responsible for Food Opérat ions at 
Marks & Spencer , which included 
Market ing, Supply Chain & Store 
Development . 
Cost & M a n a g e m e n t Accountant , 
working in a variety of roles for 
British Rail , Uni lever and Marks & 
Spencer . 
1992-2000 
1967-1992 
John Fletcher Consultant , lecturer & broadcaster , re. 
food industry. 
Barker & D o b s o n , then Budgens p i e , 
Chai rman & Chief Execut ive. 
A S D A , M a n a g i n g Director. 
Oriel Foods, Chief Execut ive. 
1991-Présent 
1985-1991 
1981-1984 
1978-1980 
Fellow, Institute of Grocery Distr ibut ion. 
Companion , Institute of Managemen t . 
Mike Groves Retail ing Wor ld . Founder/Editor . 
Trade Market ing Consultant . 
International, Market ing Director, 
r ising to M a n a g i n g Direc tor /CEO. 
Teseo, Buy ing & Market ing . 
1984-1992 
1982-1998 
1975-1981 
1968-1975 
Michael 
H a g u e - M o s s 
Has worked in retail market rcscarch 
for over 20 years on behalf of many of 
Bri ta in 's leading retail organisat ions. 
1970-present 
Clive H u m b y D u n n h u m b y , Cha i rman. 
CACI, Chief Execut ive . 
CACI, Analyst . 
1989-present 
1985-1989 
1976-1984 
Instrumental in the applicatiun of ACORN to 
retailing. Specialised in the application of 
loyalty scheme data. 
Sir Dennis 
Landau 
C W S , Chief Execut ive 
C W S , Depu ty Chief Execut ive . 
C W S . Control ler - Food Division. 
Cadbury Schweppes Ltd. 
1980-1992 
1974-1980 
1971-1974 
1952-1971 
Lord 
MacLaur in o f 
Knebwor th 
D L 
Teseo , Cha i rman . 
Teseo , appoin ted Deputy Chairman. 
Teseo , appointed M a n a g i n g Director. 
Teseo, appointed to the Board, 
Teseo, M a n a g e m e n t Trainee , rising to 
senior level in Retail Opérat ions. 
1985-1997 
1983 
1973 
1970 
1959 
IGDPres iden t , 1989-1992. 
Retail Consor t ium, Food Policy G r o u p , 
Chai rman, 1980-1984. 
Stock Exchange Advisory Commi t t cc member , 
1988-1991. 
Non-Execut ive Directorships for Enterprise 
Oil, 1984-1990; Guiness , 1986-1995; Nat ional 
Westminster Bank; 1990-1996; Gleneagles 
Hotels pie, 1992-1997; Whi tbread pie, 1997 to 
present; Vodafone , 1997-present , r ising to 
Chairman, 2000 . 
David Malpas Teseo, Manag ing Director. 
Teseo. 
1986-1997 
1966-1997 
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Lord 
Sainsbury of 
Preston 
Candovcr KG 
Sa insbury ' s , Chai rman & Chief 
Execut ivc . 
Sa insbury ' s , appointed Vice-
chai rman. 
Sa insbury ' s , appointed Director. 
Sa insbury ' s , entered service. 
1969-1992 
1967 
1958 
1950 
Alan 
K.P.Smith 
Mothercare pie, Chai rman. 
Kingfíshcr p ie , Group Chief 
Execut ive . 
Marks & Spencer pie, Main Board 
Director. 
Marks & Spencer pie. Management 
Tra inee rising to Executive. 
1996-prescnt 
1993-1995 
1978-1993 
1964-1978 
Current Posit ions: Non-Execu t ive Directorships 
for Colefax & Fowler pic ; Ice land pic ; 
Whitehead M a n n pic ; Space N K Ltd; The 
Health Clinic pic ; Governor , South Bank 
Centre; Board M e m b e r , Art & Business . 
Past Posit ions: Non-Execu t ive Director, Text i le 
Industry, 1979-1984; British Amer i can 
Chamber of C o m m e r c e , N Y C , 1987-1990; 
Institute for Food Research, 1990-1992; 
London Business School Deve lopmen t Board , 
1991-1995. 
Sir Noel 
Stockdale 
Associated Dair ies , r ising to 
Cha i rman. 
1946-1986 
David 
Stoddart 
City Retail Analyst . 
B h S . 
British Steel. 
1985-present 
1983-1985 
1976-1981 
Richard 
Swaab 
W C R S , r is ing to Vice President. 
Has worked in advert ising for C D P , 
Ogi lvy and Mather , and Lowe Lintas. 
1975-present 
Bridget 
Wil l iams 
Has managed Sa insbury ' s Archives, 
deve loping it from a small collectinn 
into one of Br i ta in ' s most respected 
business archives . 
Visi t ing fellow in business history, 
Read ing Universi ty, 
] Lecturer in economic & social history. 
1982-present 
1991-present 
1982-1986 
This study makes use of extensive contacts with strategic decision makers in UK food retailing to 
explain why the industry evolved as it did. Included in the interview subjects are chairmen, chief 
executives and other senior executives of the largest UK food retail companies, who were 
instrumental in making the decisions that shaped the food retail geography of the UK over the second 
half of the 20th century. It is this proximity to the movers and shakers of the industry that lends the 
explanations contained in this study weight, and makes it unique and original. 
Finally, it is necessary to justify what could be perceived as a largely historical approach. The 
literature on UK food retail change in the second half of the 20 t h century is severely limited (see 
above), marketing history provides an avenue for preparing for the future, adds a robust quality to a 
discipline [Savitt, 1980], while it can also be used in the verification and synthesis of hypotheses 
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[ibid.]. In addition, understanding the process of past change might make the future more manageable 
[Savitt, 1982], hence the decision to forecast likely change to 2010 using the theories of retail change 
found to be of most relevance in recent retail evolution. 
3.l.iii: Primary Research. The Delphi Technique. 
The Delphi technique was chosen to make a forecast of likely developments in UK food retailing to 
2010, primarily because it is a forecasting technique that is based upon the 'expert' opinion of a 
panel of members. The panel was made up of key decision makers, in a position to influence the 
future development of leading companies, and therefore industries as a whole, which can be expected 
to yield a more accurate result than a lower level panel. 
The traditional four round approach to Delphi forecasting (appendix 5) was considered too time-
consuming for the high level executives approached to take part in the forecast, and it was felt that 
this would discourage them from taking part, bringing down the participation rate. An abbreviated 
two round Delphi forecast was adopted instead, a technique that has previously been used by Riggs 
[1983] and Ng et al. [1996], which promised to be a more acceptable proposition to those approached 
to take part. Further Delphi rounds have been found to drive convergence of individual forecasts, but 
the 'pull of the median' tends to be stronger than the 'pull towards the true value' [Brockhoff, 1984; 
p.419], and 'it seems that additional rounds yield small gains in accuracy' [Armstrong, 1985; p.119], 
suggesting that a shortened Delphi forecast can retain accuracy all the same. 
Developed by the RAND Corporation, California, the Delphi technique was designed to overcome 
the disadvantages of traditional face-to-face expert discussions [Helmer, 1964], namely the tendency 
for the member with the loudest voice or perceived greatest authority to have undue influence 
[Helmer, 1967; Wolstenholme and Corben, 1994], unwillingness to abandon publicly expressed 
opinions [Helmer, 1967], and the 'bandwagon effect' of majority opinion, where minority members' 
opinions can be bulldozed by those of the majority [Helmer, 1967; Linstone and Turoff, 1975]. It 
aims to induce a panel of experts to refine their estimates of a quantity through a process of 
successive approximation [Helmer, 1964], and is normally executed by post. 
The Delphi technique retains the advantages of 'expert consensus' type panels, namely that it 
recognises the importance of the personal expectations of individuals [Walters, 1976], and has the 
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advantage of being able to identify embryonic needs at an early stage [Bolongaro, 1994], creating the 
opportunity for the early exploitation of a market that may subsequently enter rapid growth. The use 
of a panel is designed to average out différences in opinion among experts, and supports the 
hypothesis that 'n heads are belter than one' [Dalkey, 1972], which is backed up by research and 
experiment [Parenté et al, 1984]. Even an inconclusive Delphi forecast 'serves to crystallise the 
reasoning process' [Helmer, 1967b] and enables the investigator to identify the 'variables that are 
most likely to be sensitive indicators of the direction of change' [Wills et al, 1969] 
Evaluations of the Delphi technique have, in general, supported the advantages of the Delphi 
technique over traditional face-to-face discussions [Dalkey, 1969; Riggs, 1983], and rétrospective 
comparisons of Delphi forecasts with actual developments have also suggested a good performance 
[Ament, 1970; Kruus, 1983]. When accuracy is compared to results obtained from individuai 
panellists, group consensus techniques, of which Delphi is one example, have been found to be more 
accurate [Parenté et al, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1984]. 
Although the process is lengthy, most faults leading to possible inaccuracies have been shown to 
occur in the early stages of the forecast, in particular the sélection of the panel, the number of 
panellists, the questionnaire design and the wording of event statements (appendix 5). As each of 
thèse factors is under the control of the investigator, it is fair to say that they play a crucial rôle in 
eliminating bias and inaccuracy [Salancik et al, 1971; Dalkey, 1972]. The investigator must have a 
certain amount of expérience in the field under investigation for the technique to be accurate [Turner, 
1981], and they must bear in mind that nearly ali avoidable faults are made before round one is even 
distributed: 
"Success of the Delphi is dépendent upon the ingenuity of the design team and the 
background ofthe respondent group. " [Turoff, 1970] 
"The answers may lie somewhere inaccessible to us simpiy because we have not learned 
how to ask the question properly. " [Salancik et al, 1971] 
Other problems are harder for the investigator to control. One of the main advantages of the Delphi 
technique over a straightforward round-table debate is that the panellists do not come into contact 
with each other. This éliminâtes the 'bandwagon' effect and dominance by certain members, referred 
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to above, but it bas been round that 'experts' tend to meet in the course of their work [Dalkcy and 
Helmer, 1963], so therefore their views may not be 'strictly independent'. 
Another frequently encountered probiem is the définition of an expert, vvhich is a subjective 
définition, and the investigator must be careful not to introduce bias when selecting the panel. For 
example, a character with a strong media présence may immediately spring to mind as a potential 
panellist, while several equally qualified experts may have been overlooked. The use of 'self-
appraised compétence ratings' has been found to be effective in overcoming this probiem [Brown 
and Helmer, 1964], A self-ranking is given by the expert for each response, the scale ranging frorn 1 
to 5. A ranking of 5 means that panellists perceive themselves to be expert, while a ranking of 1 
means they consider themselves unknowledgable in the area in question. Later applications of this 
extension to the Delphi technique found it to be of less use [Granger, 1989], although it has been 
found to be 'useful in screening out uninformed panellists' [Parenté and Anderson-Parenté, 1987], 
although self-ranking should not be relied upon to produce high levels of accuracy [ibid.]. For this 
forecast self-ranking was adopted, primarily as an indicator of how 'expert' panellists regarded 
themselves in each area of the survey, providing an overall confidence level for each question, and 
allowing comparison of confidence levels between rounds. 
Formulating the Delphi questionnaire is an area highly prone to the introduction of bias, and this was 
done extremely carefully referring to several sources of possible questions. The interview process 
had been undertaken at this point, and on several occasions interview subjects had digressed to talk 
about likely future developments, which was actively encouraged to furnish ideas for the Delphi 
questionnaire. Consultancy reports were studied for ideas, as were press articles and récent annual 
reports. A trial run of the process with académies at Middlesex University generated further advice 
on the interprétation of questions, the design of the questionnaire, and other areas that could be 
covered. 
The sélection of the panel is the second area in which bias is often introduced. For this reason a 
highly meticulous approach was adopted, so as to ensure an even distribution of the questionnaire 
among leading food retail executives, leaders of trade organisations, leading académies in the field, 
retail consultants, and food retail analysts. The chief executives of the leading nine mainstream 
multiple food retailers were approached, as were those of four voluntary group retailers, two multiple 
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convenience chains, three hard discounters, two trade organisations, two retail consultantes and the 
two large co-operative organisations. In addition, eight food retail anatysts and five leading 
académies in the field were asked to participate. Initial contact was made by letter, and the chief 
executives were asked if they, or a senior member of their team, would participate, while the analysts 
and académies were asked to participate themselves. 
Figure 3.t.iiia. Sample approached to participate in Delphi forecast: 
Tesco pic J.Sainsbury pie Asda G r o u p pie 
Safeway pic Somerfield Group pie M & S Foods 
W m M o m s o n Supermarke ts Waitrose Ltd Iceland Group pie 
C W S Ltd CRS Ltd Spar U K Ltd 
Costcutter Supermarke ts Ltd Mace Market ing Services Ltd Londis U K 
Alldays Stores pic Budgens pie Aldi Stores Ltd 
Net to Food Stores Ltd Lidi U K Ltd I G D (Insti tute Groce ry Dist.) 
Associat ion of Conven ience Stores Dunnhumby Associates Groves & Partner 
O X I R M , Tempte ton Coll. x2 Portsmouth Business School Universi ty of Stirl ing 
University of Exeter Merril Lynch Investec Hender son Cros ihwai te 
Morgan Stanley D e a n Wit ter Credit Lyonnais Laing Char te rhouse Securi t ies 
Charterhouse Securit ies B T Alex Brown International SPP Inves tment M a n a g e m e n t 
The response rate was relatively disappointing, with only 11 of the 37 approached agreeing to take 
part, representing a take-up rate of just under 30%. However, the panel of eleven exceeds the 
minimum of ten suggested by Parente and Anderson-Parente [1987], although this is less than the 
sample of fifteen that Martino [1983] considers acceptable, in effect, the survey went ahead using a 
smaller sample than had been anticipated. 
The Delphi technique, to conclude, is generally considered to be a forecasting technique which 
produces better results than face to face questionnaires. In the area of food retailing it has been used 
in three notable cases: Treadgold and Reynolds [1989] used Delphi forecasting to analyse and reject 
possible saturation in British DÍY and food retailing. The Distributive Industry Training Board 
[3980] carried out an extensive Delphi survey of UK food retailing which recognised some important 
future trends, such as the widespread adoption of bar codes and scanning, increasing pressure on 
manufacturers, and the disappearance of the first generation of supermarkets. Walters [1976] also 
undertook a Delphi forecast in UK food retailing, predicting the increasing importance of own-labels, 
and the increasing size and diversification of stores. Further détails of Delphi forecasting appear in 
appendix 5, and the Delphi forecast results in appendix l. 
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Chapter 4 
The Structure of the UK Food Retail Sector in the second half of the 20th Century. 
The UK food retail landscape of 1950 was dominaled by independently owned counter-
service grocery stores. Under the weight of a post-war regulatory system immense pressure 
was placed on the profit margins of thèse operators (5.1.L p.115-116). By the end of the 
20 t h century, the retail landscape had evolved so that it was dominated by large, out-of-
town superstores (defined in 4 3 , p.97) owned by multiple organisations (defined in 4.1. 
p.84). 
Three interdependent trends, occurring simultaneously, have driven this radical altération in 
the UK food retail structure. First, there has been a constant rise in the UK grocery market 
share of multiple food retailers, achieved at the expense of independent and co-operative 
grocers and specialist food retailers, outlined in section 4.1. Second, the number of major 
operators declined steadily over the period, through natura! expansion of the leading 
operators, and accelerated by takeover activity. This resulted in 50% of 1999 grocery 
turnover being through the five largest UK food retailers (the big five). This is documented 
in section 4.2. Third, counter-service grocery stores have given way to self-service 
opérations, which in tum have evolved into the supermarket and the superstore, and by the 
Iate-1990s development began to focus on small stores, examined in section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 explains UK food retailers' long-term tendencies to enter new markets, whether 
through geographical expansion or diversification of product range, and section 4.5 
examines the changing emphasis on price and service over the period of the study. 
The purpose of chapter 4 is simply to chart the key changes of the period, while thèse 
changes are explained in subséquent chapters. 
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4.1. The rise of the multiple retai! organisation. 
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The first trend to be considered is the rise of the multiple outlet food retailer, which has 
been achteved primarily at the expense of co-operative and independent food retailers. 
Before analysing the changing market shares of the différent types of food retail 
organisation, it is a necessary prerequisite to define what they are. 
A co-operative society is defined as "a Co-operative retailing organisation trading on Co-
operative principles, affiliated to the national Co-operative movement and registered under 
the Industriai and Provident Societies Acts. Many of the Co-operative Retail Societies 
control a number of separate brauch shops and therefore their organisational framework is 
somewhat similar to that of multiple shop organisations. There are however many 
différences between the two types of organisation in other respects, the chief ones being the 
Co-operative practice of démocratie control by the members and the payment of a dividend 
onpurchases. " [Jefferys, 1954; p.465]. 
Multiple Operators, however, are motivated by profit rather than démocratie control, with a 
multiple shop organisation being defìned as "a finn, other than a Co-operative Society, 
possessing IO or more retail establishments... in most trades signifìcant économies of scale 
were not présent untila firm operatedfrom at least 10 branches. " [Jefferys, 1954; p.465] 
An independent retailer is, in effect, neither of the above. An independent retailer normally 
opérâtes only one store, although it is possible to operate up to nine and stili be classifìed as 
an independent, rather than a multiple, retailer. Within the independent sector is a sub-
sector of significance - symbol groups. While ownership of such stores remains 
independent, they have common buying, merchandising and marketing policies, and were 
formed in response to the massification of the multiple sector (6.2. p.204-205), in particular 
to gain efficiencies of centralised buying [Kirby, 1974a; p.526]. 
The primary vehicle for growth of multiple retail organisations has been the érosion of 
independent and co-operative food retailers' market share, as demonstrated by figure 4.la 
and the graph derived from it, figure 4.1b: 
Figure 4.1a: Share of UK grocery trade by type of grocer, 1950-1996. 
1950 1957 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2000 
Mult ip les 2 1 . 9 % 2 3 . 1 % 2 6 . 9 % 3 6 . 3 % 4 3 . 5 % 4 8 . 4 % 5 7 . 5 % 7 1 . 8 % 7 7 . 8 % 8 3 . 6 % 8 7 . 8 % 
C o o p é r a t i v e s 2 4 . 2 % 22 .7% 2 0 . 8 % 16 .7% 14 .9% 15 .8% 14 .5% 1 1 . 1 % 10 .4% 8.0% 6 .7% 
Indepcndents 5 3 . 9 % 54 .2% 5 2 . 3 % 4 7 . 0 % 4 2 . 5 % 3 5 . 8 % 2 8 . 0 % 1 7 . 1 % 11 .8% 8.4% 5 . 5 % 
[Source : 1950-1957, Reporten the Census of Distribution and Other Services 1957, London, H M S O , 1959. 
Adap ted from table 2, p . 10-11 . 
1961-1981, Retail Business Trade Review, 28, N o v e m b e r 1981, p .6 : 
1986-2000, Nielsen Market Research.] 
Figure 4.1b: Share of UK grocery trade by type of grocer, 1950-1996: 
n 
v 
o 
u 
3 
Year 
Multiples 
Co-operativcs 
. Indepcndents 
Analysis of the rate of change in market share reveals that there has been a steady, 
continuous érosion in the market share of co-operative and, particularly, independent food 
retailers. This graduai change in market share has resulted in a reversai in the importance of 
the différent types of retail organisations over the period of the study. 
A closer examination of the rates of change in market share shows that the average (over 5 
years) annual rate of change in the market share held by each type of retailer has varied 
significantly over the period, and highlights the primary loser at différent times. The 
average annual rates of change in market share are presented in figure 4.1 c, below: 
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Figure 4.lc: Average annual rate of change in the market shares of UK food retailers, 
1950-1996. 
1950-57 1957-61 1961-66 1966-71 [ 971 - 76 1976-81 1981-86 19S6-91 1991-96 9 6 - 2 0 0 0 
Multiples +0 .2% + 1.0% + 1.9% + 1 . 4 % + 1.0% + 1.8% + 2 . 9 % + 1.2% + 1.2% + 1.1% 
C o o p é r a t i v e s -0 .2% - 0 . 5 % - 0 . 8 % -0 .4% + 0 . 2 % -0 .3% -0 .7% - 0 . 1 % - 0 . 5 % - 0 . 3 % 
Independents 0% - 0 . 5 % - 1 . 1 % -0 .9% - 1 . 3 % -1.6% - 2 . 2 % - 1 . 1 % - 0 . 7 % . - 0 . 7 % 
The slowest period of multiple growth post-1960 was the five years lo 1976, when growth 
slowed to 1% per annum, although it subsequently picked up to peak at 2.9% per annum 
over the five year period to 1986, which was also the period in which independent market 
share declined most rapidly, averaging an annual decline of 2.2%. A subséquent recovery 
slowed their annual rate of decline to only 0.7% in the five years to 1996. 
The sharpest decline in market share of the co-operative sector occurred during the early-
1960s, with market share decline in the five years to 1966 averaging 0.8% per annum, later 
recovering to show their best performance in the five years to 1976, when the sector 
showed an average 0.2% annual growth in market share. 
In short, multiple growth occurred primarily at the expense of the co-operative sector 
initially, but soon moved on to make the majority of its gains from the independents as the 
co-operative sector showed a slight recovery. The primary engine driving multiple growth, 
therefore, has been the declining independent sector which has borne the brunt of multiple 
expansion, while less severe déclines in the co-operative sector have aided multiple growth 
stili further. 
Changing numbers of retati outlets. Much of the changing market share is the result of 
shop closures and store development programmes, as the figures relatìng to the number of 
food retail outlets (figure 4. Id) demonstrate: 
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Figure 4.1d. Number of grocery outlets and turnover by type of organisation 
Total nuniber of 
grocery outlets 
Total grocery 
turnover 
Avcragc turnover 
per outlct 
Total grocery 
turnover, 1998 terms 
Averagc turnover per 
outlct, 1998 terms 
Co-opcrat ives 
Mult iples 
Independents 
13,919 
16,522 
116,336 
£ 4 8 8 , 0 8 9 , 0 0 0 
£ 6 3 2 , 3 9 3 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 2 3 0 , 2 2 9 , 0 0 0 
£35 ,066 
£38 ,276 
£10 ,575 
£ 8 , 4 0 3 , 3 2 5 , 0 3 0 
£ 1 0 , 8 8 7 , 7 7 6 , 4 6 2 
£ 2 1 , 1 8 0 , 5 9 2 , 3 6 8 
£603 ,731 
£ 6 5 8 , 9 8 7 
£ 1 8 2 , 0 6 4 
Total grocery trade 146,777 £ 2 , 3 5 0 , 7 1 1 , 0 0 0 £16 ,016 £40 ,471 ,693 ,861 £ 2 7 5 , 7 3 6 
1966 
Co-operat ives 
Mult iples 
Independents 
12,819 
14,115 
1 0 3 4 2 4 
£ 4 8 5 , 5 0 3 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 0 5 6 , 3 1 8 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 3 6 5 , 8 3 4 , 0 0 0 
£37 ,874 
£74 ,S37 
£13 ,206 
£ 6 . 9 8 2 , 9 5 5 , 7 7 2 
£ 1 5 , 1 9 2 , 9 4 8 , 0 8 7 
£ 1 9 , 6 4 4 , 6 9 5 , 1 1 8 
£ 5 4 4 , 7 3 5 
£ 1 , 0 7 6 , 3 6 9 
£ 1 8 9 , 9 4 3 
Total grocery trade 130,358 £ 2 , 9 0 7 , 6 5 5 , 0 0 0 £22 ,305 £ 4 1 , 8 2 0 , 5 9 8 , 9 7 8 £320 ,813 
1971 
Co-operat ivcs 
Mult iples 
Independents 
7,745 
10,973 
86 ,565 
£ 5 4 9 , 9 4 3 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 8 4 1 , 8 8 9 , 0 0 0 
£ 1 , 7 6 4 , 6 5 5 , 0 0 0 
£ 7 1 , 0 0 6 
£ 1 6 7 , 8 5 6 
£20 ,385 
£ 6 , 2 5 2 , 7 7 3 , 4 6 4 
£ 2 0 , 9 4 2 , 0 1 5 , 1 9 4 
£20 ,063 ,875 ,631 
£ 8 0 7 , 3 3 0 
£ 1 , 9 0 8 , 5 0 4 
£ 2 3 1 , 7 7 8 
Total grocery trade 105,283 £ 4 , 1 5 6 , 4 8 7 , 0 0 0 £ 3 9 , 4 7 9 £ 4 7 , 2 5 8 , 6 6 4 , 2 8 9 £ 4 4 8 , 8 7 3 
Source: adapted from table 19, page 2 /112 -113 , and table 25, page 2 /124 , Report on the Census of Distribution andother 
services. 1966, London, HMSO; and table 14, page s/90, Report on die Census of Distribution and ather services. 197!, 
supplément, London, H M S O . 
Figures converted to 1998 priecs using: 
Department of Employaient Gazette, April 1971 , table 132, p.412; Employaient Gazette, January 1980, table 132, p.94; 
Employaient Gazette, January 1990, table 6.4, p .S54; and Labour Market Trends, February 1999, table H.14, p .S86 
Analysis of the data presented in figure 4. ld suggests that the best retail performances of 
the 1960s were achieved by those Operators who were actively renewing their retail 
facilities without suffering enormous net losses in the number of their retail outlets. In the 
decade to 1971, the turnover per outlet of multiple Operators rose by 190%, compared to 
34%o for co-operative societies and 27% for the independent sector. Over the sanie period, 
the number of outlets operated by co-operative societies fell by 44%, compared to 
réductions of 34% in the multiple sector and 26% in the independent sector. 
The décade to 1971, therefore, was a period of rapid retail renewal, resulting in a major 
change in shopping destination, as demonstrated by the figures in figure 3.1a, with the 
market share of multiple operators increasing by 62% at the expense of the co-operative 
and independent sectors, whose market shares fell by 28%) and 19%> respectively. 
As this increase in market share of multiple food retailers was not achieved through 
increases in the number of outlets, it is fair to assume that the renewal programme provided 
better, larger and more profitable facilities, examined fully in section 4.3. 
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Erosion of the co-operative market share. Established in 1844 by the Rochdale Pioneers, 
the co-operative movement aimed to protect the working class masses from exploitation by 
commercial retailers, selling good quality merchandise at a market price, and returning 
excess profits to members in the form of dividends. They grew phenomenally, as a 
fragmented group of societies, right through to World War IT, and following the war were 
instrumental in pioneering new trading techniques such as self-service and supermarkets 
[Fulop, 1961; p.28]. 
The post-war progress of the co-operative movement, however, was hampered by a number 
of problems. First, despite innovation, the movement failed to keep pace with multiple 
renewal of store formats and facilities, eventually leaving it with out-dated stores with little 
consumer attraction (6.1. p.200). This failure to renew was due to a handful of seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles: 
S Excessive dividend payments which reduced availability of capital to invest in the post­
war years (6.1, p.200) 
J An ethical dilemma whereby moving to modern, out-of-town premises was seen as 
abandoning the working-class masses without access to motor cars (6.1. p.200) 
S A fragmented structure, which meant that individual operators were too small to 
introduce contemporary techniques in management, training, buying and merchandising 
[Fulop, 1961; p.29]. Fragmentation of these activities also increased the co-operative 
cost-base relative to commercial operators [Seth and Randall, 1999; p.213], with the 
fragmentation issue only recently being addressed with the 2000 CWS/CRS merger, 
after many previous unsuccessful attempts. 
S A lack of agreement between societies drove a lack of coherent strategy [Seth and 
Randall, 1999; p.213]. 
S Poor quality, under-qualified management, and disappointing retention of high flyers 
due to uncompetitive remuneration [Fulop, 1961; p.29]. 
Described as unadventurous and pathologically uncommercial [Seth and Randall, 1999; 
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p.211], the co-operative movement has effectively been decapitateci by its own values and 
ethos, those same values that propelled it to become the leading UK food retail sector in the 
100 years to 1950. Times changed, and the co-operative movement failed to adapt rapidly 
enough. To make matters worse, a newly invigorated post WWII multiple sector took on 
the co-operative mantle of innovation and change, leaving the co-operative movement 
standing stili in a rapidly changing retail world. Were it not for the success of multiple 
Operators, the co-operative movement may have retained a larger market share, but their 
inability to evolve and agrée, coupled with an émergent, dynamic, multiple sector 
effectively pushed the movement into décades of decay and decline. 
Erosion of the specialist food retailer market share. In addition to taking market share 
from independent and co-operative grocery retailers, multiple grocers were able to grow 
through érosion of the food market share of specialist food retailers, such as fishmongers, 
greengrocers and butchers. The market share of specialist food retailers as opposed to 
grocery retailers is presented in figure 4.le, below: 
Figure 4.1e: Market share of grocers compared to specialist food retailers: 
% total food retail market 1950 1961 1971 1980 1990 
Grocers and provision dealers 55.3% 57.2% 61.0% 77.2% 84.7% 
Other food retailers 44.7% 42.8% 39.0% 22.8% 15.3% 
Dairymen and butchers 21.8% 24.0% 21.4% 16.4% 10.0%» 
Fishmongers, poulterers 2.8% 2.0% 1.3% 0.7% 0.6%, 
Greengrocers, fruiterers 8.7% 7.8% 6.0% 3.8% 3.3% 
Bread and flour confectioners 8.0% 5.7% 4.9% 1.9% 1.4%) 
Off-licences 3.4% 3.4% 5.2% n/a n/a 
[Source: figures for 1950-1971: Adap ted from table 1, page 1/15, Census of Disti-ibittìon ¡97!, par t 1; figures 
for 1980-1990: Adap ted from Business Monitor SDA25, 1989 and 1990.] 
Figure 4.1 f: Specialist Food Retailers (excluding off-licences). Number of outlets, 1950-1990. 
Number of outlets 1950 1961 1971 1980 1990 
Dairymen and butchers 52,030 50,828 38,627 31,798 29,442 
Fishmongers, poulterers 9,511 7,857 6,112 2,866 2,974 
Greengrocers, fruiterers 43,948 42,070 28,608 17,778 14,339 
Bread and flour confectioners 24,181 17,549 18,022 8,381 6,656 
Total specialist outlets 129,670 118,304 91,369 60,823 53,411 
[Source: as for figure 4.1e above 
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The changing market shares of UK grocery and specialist food retailers have been profound 
over the period of the study, with the share of specialists falling from 44.7% in 1950 to 
15.3% by 1990. Over the same period the number of specialist food retail outlets dropped 
from 129,670 to only 53,411. 
Analysis of the data presented in figures 4.1e and f suggests that the most rapid decline in 
the fortunes of specialist food retailers occurred in the period between 1971 and 1980, 
assuming continuity of the data sets, while the rate of market share decline of fishmongers, 
poulterers, greengrocers, fruiterers, and bread and flour confectioners was slower during the 
1980s than during previous décades, suggesting that stabilisation was beginning to occur. 
In contrast to this, dairymen and butchers suffered an accélération in their rate of market 
share decline in the 1980s, although the rate of décline in outlet numbers fell, suggesting 
that this sector may atso have begun to stabilise. 
Erosion of the specialist food retailer market share and number of outlets occurred 
relatively slowly during the 1950s and 1960s, accelerating dramatically during the 1970s as 
Superstore development began to gather pace. The 1980s brought a slowing of this érosion 
for ali specialists except dairymen and butchers, who continued to lose market share at an 
ever faster rate, although the slowing of shop closures suggests over-provision is no longer 
occurring, and that a period of relative stability may be forthcoming. 
In short, despite static or slow growth in the food market (4.4. p.101), the grocery sector's 
share of the total food market has increased markedly at the expense of specialist food 
retailers. Meanwhile, multiple operators have increased their share of the growing grocery 
sector at the expense of both independent and co-operative grocery retailers, thus multiple 
grocery retail chains have enjoyed a double boost to growth over the period of the study. 
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4.2. The growth of the 'big fìve' and the changing power relationship. 
Figure 4.2a: Market share of the largest UK food retailers. 1984-1992 
Year Largest 5 operators 6 m to IO1" largest 
operators 
Largest 10 
operators 
1984 28% 13% 41%, 
1986 35% 13% 48% 
1988 41% 12% 53% 
1990 42% 14% 55% 
1992 44% 15% 58% 
[source: Business Monitor SDA25, 1984-1992] 
Parallel to this important change, the second half of the 20 century also witnessed the rise 
to prominence of a limited number of major múltiple food retailers, with 50% of grocery 
sales passing through the leading five food retailers in 1999 [IGD Research Services]. 
These retailers were Tesco, Sainsbury's, Asda, Safeway and Somerfield (including Kwik 
Save) - 'the big five'. Statistics for years prior to 1984 are not strictly comparable due to 
differing methods of calculating market share, but the market share of the 'top five' has 
risen from 28% in 1984 (figure 4.2a), and the enormity of the change is illustrated by the 
fact that the entire múltiple trade accounted for less than 27% of grocery tumo ver in 1961 
(figure 4.1a, p.89). 
Figure 4.2a, above, illustrates the growth of the largest five and the largest ten UK food 
retailers from 1984 to 1992, a period during which the UK food retail industry became 
concentrated into the hands of a select few major players. Between 1984 and 1992, the 
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Between 1961 and 1990, the UK grocery market share of multiple food retailers increased 
from 27% to 75%, the market share of independent food retailers fell from 52%> to 12%, 
and the co-operative share dropped from 21% to 13%. Whiìe acknowledging that différent 
ways of calculating market share produce différent results [Bob Fee], and that market share 
is a very difficult thing to get right [Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG], it is clear 
that the-re has been an enormous shifì in the importance of the différent types of retail 
organisation during the second half of the 20 l b century (4.1). 
market share of the leading five players increased by 54%, tram 28% to 44% of the UK 
grocery market. Over the same period, the market share of the 6 t h to 10 t h largest operators 
increased by only just over 13%., rising from 13% to 15%, and even fell between 1986 and 
1988, suggesting that second division players were struggling. 
Scale of organisation therefore became an issue during the 1980s, and power became 
increasingly concentrated into the hands of fewer key operators. Scale of organisation 
became more important as growth, due to the decline of the co-operative, independent and 
specialist food retailers, began to slow (4.1. p.85). In lieu of growth from weaker types of 
retail organisations and formats, multiple food retailers began to grow at the expense of 
multiple rivais: 
"And in this 'competitive ' market, thère isn't imich to.go. round, dndifone of the 
majors starts to take more, somebody else hàs-ià'.stiffèr.'Iffyou'.h'ctvè:gòt.tw'ò'-big 
players, and one suddenly puts up sales by 1 '•%, • "whick- is: '£MiÌìióhs\per/wéek, '• tHéfi 
ih ere has to he a hit somewhere, a nd if y ou are noi prepcirejlfor il, and. y ou are 
noi. doing something which is an. improvement over what yoU were do in g before, 
you are left bellina." 
;;:;:::::-:::^;.^[TQriy:dë Angeli] 
Concentration in the sector, therefore, resulted from the érosion of the market share of co-
operative, independent and specialist food retailers (4.1). and then from inter-multiple 
attrition of market share, whereby régional players expanded nationally, resulting in larger 
market shares, and takeover of smaller, weaker multiple players (5.2. p.210-211). 
The Changing Power Relationship. 
The évolution of the 1950 retail landscape, dominated by small scale, independent, counter-
service grocery Stores to that of the late 20"' century, dominated by large scale, out-of-town, 
superstores controlied by only a few operators, has resulted in a profound change in the 
relationship between UK food retailers and manufacturers. As the food retail market share 
became more and more concentrated into the hands of fewer and fewer major players (see 
above), thèse players began to exert control over their manufacturers and suppliers. 
Until the mid-1960s, the balance of power in the relationship was in favour of the 
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manufacturing sector. The introduction of self-service techniques and the consequent 
transfer of packaging to manufacturers allowed the development of brand names in 
products that had previously borne the guarantee of quality of the retailer - products such as 
flour, sugar and butter fell into this category. The emergence of manufacturers' brands was 
assisted further by the emergence of commercial television advertising in the mid-1950s 
[Richard Swaab], and reinforced by the resale price maintenance (RPM) system, which 
allowed manufacturers to dictate retail prices at which their products were sold (5.1.Ü). 
Manufacturers were powerful because of the fragmented retail system, and were able to 
dominate the multiple operators, who at this time were small by contemporary standards. 
The abolition of RPM in 1964 (5.1 .ii) provided the first boost to retailers in a relationship 
that changed significantly over the following decades, resulting in the dominance of the 
relationship by the large food retail organisations. During the 1980s, the widely expressed 
fear that their large scale enabled UK food retailers to obtain 'discriminatory discounts' -
discounts arising from the retailers' market dominance rather than through lower costs 
associated with bulk contracts - were confirmed by investigations carried out by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission [1981] and the Office of Fair Trading [1985]. Action 
to prevent such activity, however, was not taken, as evidence of 'some benefit being passed 
on to the consumer' was found [MMC, 1981; p.51]. Tn other words, the benefits of the 
lower prices obtained by the large operators tended to be passed on to the consumer, with 
the sector at that time found to be reasonably competitive. 
The power of the manufacturers has been reduced over the period, therefore, as the strength 
of the multiples has increased, particularly that of the 'Big Five'. By 1998, the share of the 
UK grocery market held by the Big Five was 51.8%, with signs that it is increasing. Thus 
manufacturers must depend on five buying points for over 50%o of their grocery 
consumables - higher still in some categories. On a European scale, in 1995, 'each of 
Europe's top half dozen retailers had larger sales than any of the continent's food 
manufacturers except Nestle and Unilever' [Reid, 1995], thus manufacturers have 
understandably tended to become more compliant in their relationship with food retailers. 
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4.3. The évolution of the retail format. 
The third key trend to have driven the dramatic change in the UK food retail structure is the 
évolution of the retail format. From a position in 1950 when locai counter-service grocery 
stores were the dominant grocery format and the first self-service conversion had taken 
place less than fi ve years earlier [Tanburn, 1960; p.50], the industry has evolved through 
self-service conversions, supermarket and Superstore formats, to a position today where the 
retail landscape is dominated by large, out-of-town purpose built superstores. 
Figure 4.3a. Self-service outlets in Great Britain 
Mid-year Approximate no. of self-service 
stores, including supermarkets 
% increase on 
previous year 
1947 10 
1948 250 
1949 400 60% 
1950 600 50% 
1951 900 50% 
1952 1250 39% 
1953 1700 36% 
1954 2150 26% 
1955 2500 16%, 
1956 3000 20% 
1957 3700 23% 
1958 4500 22% 
1959 5850 30% 
[Source: Tanbum, 1960; p.50] 
The initial growth of UK self-service grocery stores from the late-1940s, presented in figure 
4.3a above, occurred relatively steadily, and by 1961 the format had been adopted by less 
than 5% of ail grocery stores, although thèse stores accounted for over 18% of overall 
grocery sales (figure 4.3b, below). By 1971, almost 25%» of grocery stores operated on a 
self-service basis, accounting for nearly 65% of grocery turnover. Thèse figures are based 
soiely on whether each outlet operated primarily by counter-service or self-service. So they 
also include larger opérations, such as supermarkets and some early superstores, but they 
do illustrate the declining importance of counter-service grocery stores, which were 
superseded by self-service opérations which effectively became larger and larger in order to 
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benefït from économies of scale of establishment, finally becoming the modem superstore. 
Figure 4.3b: Self-service Grocery Shops: Number of establishments and turnover, in 
figures and percentages. 1961 and 1971: 
ESTABLISHMENTS TURNOVER 
Number of 
self-service 
grocery shops 
Total number 
of grocery 
shops 
Pcrcentage of 
total shops 
operating by 
self-service 
Turnover of 
self-service 
grocery shops 
£'000 
Total turnover 
of grocery 
shops 
£'000 
Pcrcentage of 
total grocery 
turnover passing 
through sclf-scrvice 
1961 
Co-operatives 
Multiples 
Indépendants 
3 3 4 2 13919 24.0% 
2763 16522 16.7% 
591 116336 0.5% 
£176,021 £ 4 8 8 , 0 8 9 36 .1% 
£ 2 2 8 , 4 0 9 £ 6 3 2 , 3 9 3 36 .1% 
£23 ,527 £ 1 , 2 3 0 , 2 2 9 1.9% 
Total self-service 
grocery trade, 1961 
6696 146777 4.6% £427,957 £2,350,711 18.2% 
1971 
Co-operatives 
Multiples 
Independents 
6 3 3 0 7745 81.7% 
8315 10973 75,8% 
11252 86565 13.0% 
£508 ,045 £ 5 4 9 , 9 4 3 92.4% 
£1 ,712 ,019 £ 1 , 8 4 1 , 8 8 9 92.9% 
£ 4 7 6 , 3 5 8 £ 1 , 7 6 4 , 6 5 5 27.0% 
Total self-service 
grocery trade, 1971 
15897 105283 24.6% £2,696,422 £4,156,487 64.9% 
[Source: adapted from table 19, page 2 /112-113 , and table 2 5 , page 2/124, Report on the Census of Distribution 
and other services, 1966, London, H M S O , and table 14, p . S/90, Report on the Census of Distribution and 
other services, ¡971, supplément, London , H M S O ] 
While the counter-service grocery store was succeeded by the self-service grocery store, 
this in turn was rapidly displaced by the supermarket, which at the time was defined as a 
store 'of at least 2000 square feet sales area, operateci mainly on self-service, whose range 
of merchandise comprises ali food groups including fresh meat and fresh fruit and 
vegetahles, plus basic household requisites (Le. soaps and cleaning materials) ' 
Larger, and normally purpose built rather than being a conversion of an existing outlet, 
supermarket development laid the foundations for subséquent moves into larger stores. 
Figure 4.3c illustrâtes the growth of the supermarket, which grew from 870 outlets in 1961 
to over 5,000 ten years later. 
1
 Self-service and Supermarket Annua! Survey and Directory, ¡967; referred to in the Census of Distribution, 
1966, p .2 /109 . 
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Figure 4,3c: Growth of supermarkets. by number of establishments and turnover. 
E S T A B L I S H M E N T S T U R N O V E R 
No . of Total number 
supermarkets grocery outlets 
of % of stores 
supermarkets 
Turnover o f Total grocery Supermarket 
supermarkets turnover market share 
1961 
Co-operatives 3 0 8 13,919 2 .2% £ 3 1 , 3 9 2 , 0 0 0 £ 4 8 8 , 0 8 9 , 0 0 0 6 .4% 
Multiples 5 2 4 16,522 3 .2% £ 1 0 5 , 2 4 9 , 0 0 0 £ 6 3 2 , 3 9 3 , 0 0 0 16.6% 
Indcpendents 38 116,336 0 .03% £ 5 , 5 3 8 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 2 3 0 , 2 2 9 , 0 0 0 0 .5% 
Total grocery trade 8 7 0 146,777 0.6% £ 1 4 2 , 1 7 9 , 0 0 0 £ 2 , 3 5 0 , 7 1 1 , 0 0 0 6 .0% 
1966 
Co-operatives 6 4 2 12,819 5.0% £ 7 8 , 4 6 8 , 0 0 0 £ 4 8 5 , 5 0 3 , 0 0 0 16 .2% 
Multiples 1,819 14,115 12.9% £ 4 9 3 , 7 6 9 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 0 5 6 , 3 1 8 , 0 0 0 4 6 . 7 % 
Independents 2 0 8 103,424 0 .2% £ 3 7 , 9 1 9 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 3 6 5 , 8 3 4 , 0 0 0 2 .8% 
Total grocery trade 2 ,669 130,358 2.0% £ 6 1 0 , 1 5 6 , 0 0 0 £ 2 , 9 0 7 , 6 5 5 , 0 0 0 2 1 . 0 % 
1971 
Co-operatives 1,211 7,745 15.6% £ 2 0 8 , 8 7 3 , 0 0 0 £ 5 4 9 , 9 4 3 , 0 0 0 3 8 . 0 % 
Multiples 3 ,342 10,973 30 .5% £ 1 , 3 4 6 , 0 0 4 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 8 4 1 , 8 8 9 , 0 0 0 7 3 . 1 % 
Independents 513 86 ,565 0 .6% £ 9 1 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 1 , 7 6 4 , 6 5 5 , 0 0 0 5 . 2 % 
Total grocery trade 5 ; 0 6 6 105,283 4 .8% £ 1 , 6 4 6 , 1 7 7 , 0 0 0 £ 4 , 1 5 6 , 4 8 7 , 0 0 0 3 9 . 6 % 
[source: adapted from Census of Distribution, H M S O , 1961, 1966 & 1977] 
Over the saine period the importance of the supermarket format grew significantly, as its 
share of the grocery market rose from just 6% in 1961 to nearly 40% in 1971. The 1960s, 
therefore, were the period in which the supermarket format made a significant impact on 
TJK food retailing. 
The main operators driving this rapid expansion of the supermarket format were multiple 
food retailers, and, to a lesser extent, co-operative food societies. Opérations were being 
rationalised, with several small stores being replaced by one supermarket. Analysis of 
figure 4.3c shows that between 1961 and 1971, the co-operative sector showed the largest 
proportion of net store closures, with 44%t of their 1961 outlet numbers closing, while 
multiples closed 34%J of their stores and independents only 26%. Although the figures do 
not show the number of openings, an indication of the degree of rationalisation taking place 
is the number of supermarkets opened over the period. The rising number of supermarkets 
in the multiple portfolio suggests that rationalisation was fastest in the multiple sector -
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increasing by 538% to 3,342 in the decade to 1971, compared to an increase of 293%o to 
1,211 for co-operatives and a surprisingly high 1250%« increase to 513 for independents, 
although the small number of independent supermarkets in 1961 (38) makes this figure of 
expansion seem more impressive than it actually is. 
The market share of the supermarket within each type of retail organisation also suggests 
that multiple Operators were the primary driver of supermarkets, as the supermarket 
accounted for 16.6% of multiple trade in 1961, rising to 73.1% in 1971 (figure 4.3c). Over 
the same period, the contribution of supermarkets in the co-operative sector rose from 6.4%» 
to 38%o, and for independents from 0.5% to 5.2%. Over the same period, the market share 
of the multiple Operators incrcased by 62%, while the co-operative and independent 
sectors' feil 28% and 19% respectively (4.1. p.84). The multiple trade was, therefore, the 
primary adopter of the supermarket in the 1960s, trailed by the co-operative sector, with the 
independent sector largely failing to move into the format. 
While the supermarket was being developed, the North of England was witnessing yet 
another new type of retailing, which became known as the superstore. In effect, the self-
service grocery store concept had been expanded to create what became known as the 
supermarket, which was again stretched into the format that became known as the 
superstore, defined as "a self service grocery store with at least 25,000 sq. fi. of selling 
area. " by the Institute of Grocery Distribution [Webb, 1982]. A similar définition adopted 
by the Unit for Retail Planning Information (URP1) stipulâtes the same sales area, plus 
additional characteristics - single level shopping and car parking [Jones, 1976]. The IGD 
définition is chosen for ease of manipulation of existing data, which rarely gives 
information on facilities such as car parking. Although some food superstores can be found 
in town-centres, they were normally situated in out-of-town locations [Euromonitor, 1994; 
p.4]. 
Often known as Retail Cash and Carries or Discount Stores, early superstores were 
typically crude conversions of disused industriai buildings such as woollen mills, and were 
97 
characterised by basic facilities and discounted prices (mid to late-1960s), later evolving to 
offer a more upmarket shopping expérience. The development of the superstore was 
supported by the changing consumer and new technology {S_2 and 5.3). while UK food 
retailers were increasing the sales areas of their new stores so as to increase profitability 
through économies of scale and diversification of offering (4.4. p.100-101). 
After a relatively slow start, the rate of superstore openings increased gradually throughout 
the latter half of the 1960s and the 1970s, before beginning a period of rapid expansion 
during the mid to late-1980s (figure 4.3d): 
Figure 4.3d: Superstore openings. 1964-1996: 
Year Superstore openings Year Superstore openings Y e a r Superstore openings 
1964 2 1975 16 1986 36 
1965 2 1976 22 1987 25 
1966 2 1977 27 1988 43 
1967 1 1978 27 1989 73 
1968 3 1979 35 1990 64 
1969 3 1980 27 1991 89 
1970 6 1981 41 1992 102 
1971 14 1982 38 1993 27 
1972 13 1983 30 1994 128 
1973 16 1984 29 1995 27 
1974 23 1985 26 1996 35 
[Source: Figures for 1964-1991 from Aircy and Bresse, 1993. Figures for 1992-1996 frorn Barnes et al. 1997] 
Trading up during the 1980s created a gap for 'hard discounters' to gain market share from 
the early-1990s, and their spread during the 1990s represents évolution of the retail format 
into small, low-cost premises in low-cost locations (4.5. p.108-109). 
Superstore development is dépendent on access to suitable sites and obtaining planning 
permission for large-scale retail development. From 1996 it became extremely difficult to 
get planning permission to build out-of-town superstores, as the government introduced 
new planning guidelines under PPG6 (5.1.iii. p. 127). In response to this, food retailers in 
general began to focus their developments on alternatives to out-of-town outlets, primarily 
smaller stores in town centres or residential areas, and forecourt retailing (5.1.iii. p.127), as 
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a means of continued growth. 
Teseo had 40 'Metro' stores in October 2000, with plans to increase this to more than 150 
by 2003 : , and 27 'Express' forecourt shops which they expect to increase to 150 by 2003 
in partnership with Esso 3. 
Sainsbury's had 13 'Local' stores open by October 2000, of which one was a forecourt-
based operation in partnership with Shell, and all were based in the London area, although a 
'Local' was due to open in Birmingham in February 2001 4. The small store format is being 
expanded to include a 'Central1 fascia located in business districts, and Sainsbury's expect 
to have another 20 Local and Central stores by October 2001 5. Sainsbury's had previously 
aimed to open 200 Locals by 2003, but later described this plan as "far too ambitious " 
Safeway had 40 stores on BP forecourts in February 2000, with plans to expand this total to 
100 by 2002 \ At the same time, Somerfieid had 19 forecourt stores through their 
partnership with Elf, and were planning 10-20 more by 2001 8. 
In short, the retail format is evolving back into smaller stores and convenience retailing, 
and major multiples are driving its expansion rather than specialist convenience multiples. 
This is a direct result of changes in planning guidelines, and established multiples are able 
to provide an attractive small store retail offering due to their product expertise, particularly 
in fresh foods. The sophisticated distribution systems of established multiple operators 
allow complex, fresh foods to be stocked, and reduce the required back-room capacity 
(5.3.iii. p.170), meaning that such operations are efficient, despite operating from small 
stores, which do not benefit from the efficiencies of large stores. 
" The Grocer, October 28 , 2000 ; "Tesco Metro wins £ 5 0 mill ion", p .6 
3
 In-Store Marketing, M a r c h 2000 ; "Tesco expands Express coneept" , p.7 
4
 The Grocer, October 2 1 , 2000 ; "Sa insbury ' s Squares up to Spar with first Local outs ide the M 2 5 " , p .8 
5
 J.Sainsbury plc Annual Report and Accounts 2000; p .15 
6
 The Grocer, July 1, 2000 ; "Local c-store pulls into Shcl l ' s forecourt si tes", p.6 
7
 Super Marketing, February 18, 2000; "Forecourt collection for home-shopper s" , p .6 
s
 Super Marketing, February 11, 2000; "Petrol: burn ing issue", p . l 
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4.4 Geographical and product diversification. 
During the second half of the 20th Century, UK food retailers have demonstrated a 
tendency of diversification into new producís and différent sectors, and expansion of 
geographical coverage. Initially, expansion of geographical coverage involved expanding 
throughout the UK. In recent years, however, UK. food retailers have been moving into 
overseas markets, and overseas operators have been entering the UK market, either through 
the development of new facilities or through takeover activity. In short, geographical 
diversification and diversification of product has occurred through one or more of the 
following: 
• Extension of range into new food lines 
• Extension of range into non-foods 
• Expansion beyond traditional regional heartland to become nationwide operators 
• Diversification into new retail sectors, such as DIY superstores 
• Diversification into non-UK markets 
Each is considered independently, though this does not imply any sequential arrangement. 
Diversification of location has also been a key feature of UK. food retailing, particularly as 
operators moved from high Street to suburban locations, but this is addressed elsewhere 
(63 , p.217-233). 
Extensions of range into new food and non-food lines 
In post-World War II Britain, extension to the range on offer in UK food retail outlets has 
been a reasonably consistent feature, characterising the development of the industry, and 
being driven primarily by larger store sizes. Initial increases in the number of lines stocked 
was fuelled by the increasing availability of foodstuffs after supply problems during the 
war and immediate post-war period (5.1.i, p. 118). However, the trend to carry more lines 
continued past the point where ail foodstuffs had become re-available (figure 4.4.a): 
100 
Fig. 4.4a: J. Sainsbury, average sales area of new stores and range sold, 1950-90 9: 
Year Average sales area of new stores Number of products sold 
1950 3,000 ft' 550 
1960 4,270 ftz 2,500 
1970 11,500 El' 3,800 
1980 14,830 ft' 7,000 
1990 33,500 ft' 11,700 
Early extension into what were known as lgrocery non-foods' [Jennifer Tanburn] were seen 
as a natural grocery offering, and included washing powder and soap. This was later 
followed by extension into olher non-food areas such as toiletries, haberdashery, off-
licences and sometimes domestic appliances, books, newspapers, magazines, flowers, 
kitchen hardware's, petrol, clothing and financial services. While the spread of non-foods 
in UK food retailing has been graduai, and varies from retailer to retailer and from store to 
store, and dépends on store and customer attributes, according to one source non-foods 
accounted for over halfofUK food retailer turnover by the late-1980s: 
"...the non-food area proved increasingly important andpartly explains (UKfood 
retailers') success in holding on to 38% of total retati turnover, whenfood itself 
only accounts for 14% of customer expenditure. " 
[Gardner and Sheppard, 1989] 
A primary force driving diversification of product into non-foods was Iherefore the fact that 
growth in the market for food was slow or static from the mid-1960s. Extension of range 
into non-foods brought exposure to fast growing markets, driven by rising consumer 
affluence, fuelling growth despite a difficult food marketplace. 
9
 h t tp: / /vvww.j-sainsbury.co.uk/company/main_his .html 
101 
National expansion 
It was noted briefly (4.2. p.92) that in lieu of expansion at the expense of co-operative, 
independent and specialist food retailers, leading multiples began to take market share troni 
weaker ones. This was in part due to naturai compétition for customers, but also due to the 
national expansion of the major multiple operators, where they expanded beyond their 
regional bases to develop a national présence. In effect, the geographical spread of the 
leading UK food retailers resulted in new compétition with regional players, which 
ultimately led to concentration within the sector through erosión of market share and 
takeover. There follows a brief overvìew of the regional expansion of the five leading food 
retailers surviving in 2000. This détails their means of growth, and appendix one présents a 
diagrammane history of acquisition in the UK food retail industry. 
Teseo developed a national présence through both organic regional expansion and takeover 
of regional chains, with acquisition playing a major role in the 1960s and I970s. The 
acquisition of Irwin's in 1960 allowed Teseo to be the first to claim national coverage, with 
400 shops, although the organisation was not sufficiently centralised and organised to be 
able to derive much benefit from this [Seth and Randall, 1999; p.27]. Cadena Cafes and 
Victor Value (1968) were absorbed by Teseo [ibid., p.28], although many of the outdated 
stores purchased had to be closed or undergo major rénovation in the coming years. 
From the early-1980s, under new management, Teseo began to tackle their problem of 
outdated stores, and takeover activity slowed. Organic expansion was slowed by the 
company's earlier disregard for planning régulations, however, which had given planners 
the impression that Teseo were 'cowboy' operators. To rectify this problem, which was 
stifling organic growth, planners were invited to see their most modem stores, shown what 
could be achieved, and Tesco's regional expansion through the development of large stores 
accelerated. 
Takeover did not stop altogether, however, and in the early-1980s, Victor Value and an 
Irish venture were sold [ibid., p.31], before Teseo made a hostile bid for Hillard's, a north 
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eastern multiple, in 1987, beating Sainsbury's in the bidding [ibid., p.32]. A final domestic 
purchase, William Low in 1994, doubled Tesco's market share in Scotland [ibid., p.42], 
and was also won against Sainsbury's. This purchase aided Tesco's 1995 move into the 
leading position in tenus of UK market share. 
Sainsbury 's regional expansion was almost entirely powered by organic growth, with their 
only successful purchase being of BhS's initial 50% stake in Savacentre in 1987. The 
company today remains strongly biased towards London and the south east [ibid., p.69], its 
original trading area, and only entered Scotland in 1992 1 0 and Cornwall in 1994 ". Failed 
attempts to buy Hillard's and William Low, however, suggest that Sainsbury's have not 
achieved the level of national coverage that they once promised. 
Asda was established by Associated Dairies in 1965, in combination with a small 
Yorkshire-based supermarket Operator, and became a major player by recognising the early 
Potential of large stores. In 1965 they purchasing two 70,000 sq. ft stores from Gern, which 
alerted them to the profitability of large stores, and they subsequently adjusted their criteria 
for new stores. Asda set out to offer branded groceries at discounted prices, shirting bulk 
volume through the business, including both food and non-food products [ibid., p.77-78]. 
The capital of Associated Dairies, the parent of Asda, allowed rapid organic expansion, 
Converting mills and cinémas for example, and established multiples were unable to move 
into the Superstore format for several years due to existing commitments (6.3. p.227-228), 
allowing Asda a significant head start. 
This expansion was focused primarily in the north of England, however, and it was not 
until 1985 that real efforts were made to expand at any pace into the south of the country 
[Seth and Randall, 1999; p.81], and this carne at the cost of high borrowing levels [ibid., 
p.83]. The 1989 purchase of 61 large stores from Gateway aided Asda's regional 
expansion, although the price of this purchase was regarded as high [ibid., p.S 1]. Store 
development was suspended in 1991 due to financial difficulties, before tentatively 
10
 Super Marketing, N o v e m b e r 15, 1991 ; " D i s c o u n t e n no threat", p . 10 
11
 Super Marketing, July 1, 1994; " N o r m a n ' s shows its w i sdom" , p .18 
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beginning again in 1993/94. Further geographical expansión was flirted with when 
proposals to merge with Safeway were made, but these were abandoned as it was 
considered unlikely that the competition authorities would allow the deal to proceed (5.1.vi. 
p.140-141), paving the way for US giant Wal-Mart to purchase Asda in 1999 (5,1 .vi, 
P 141). 
Safeway is the legacy of numerous grocery chains, pnmarily Argyll, later renamed 
Safeway following the 1987 £681 million acquisition of the UK retail operations of US-
based Safeway. Prior to this major acquisition, a long list of companies contributed to the 
build up of Argyll, which between 1978 and 1980 absorbed Louis C Edwards, Cordón 
Bleu, Dalgety, Supavalu, Freezer Fare, Bonimart, and Oríel Foods which was mainly 
wholesale and manufacturing based but included the Lo-Cost chain. In 1982 Pricerite and 
then Allied Suppliers, including Presto, Lipton's, Templeton and Galbraith fascias, were 
added, and Amos Hinton joined the stable in 1984 [Seth and Randall, 1999; p,102-104]. 
These numerous múltiple brands were reduced to just Presto and Lo-Cost by 1987, the 
same year in which Safeway UK was bought and adopted as the key brand of the group. 
Safeway was the most profitable element in Argyll, which in 1996 changed its ñame to 
Safeway pie to suit its trading pro file [ibid., p,108] as it fazed out the secondary Presto 
fase i a. 
The US-based original owner of Safeway UK, Safeway Inc., built the chain from the early 
1960s, and expanded to 69 stores by 1978 and 133 by 1987 [ibid., p.107]. It stocked a 
detailed and wide range of foods, and was respected for the good way in which staff were 
treated, creating a culture of good relations from top to bottom, and for their excellent 
customer service and innovative ideas [Jennifer Tanbum]. A 1986 management buyout of 
Safeway Inc. meant that assets had to be sold in order to reduce debt [Seth and Randall, 
1999; p.108], and their UK operations were sold to Argyll early the following year, 
although Tesco and Dee were also interested in the chain [Jennifer Tanburn]. 
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All of these takeovers were of regionally-based chains, with the exception of Safeway, 
which was a national chain heavily biased towards London, the south of England and 
Scotland [Seth and Randall, 1999; p,108], By 1987, the result of this frenzied takeover 
activity was a truly national operator, built up from a medley of regional players, and 
organic expansión superseded acquisition. 
Somerfield is a legacy of the Gateway and Dee supermarket chains, and was also built 
primarily through acquisition. In the nud-l980s, the Dee Corporation grew by rapidly 
taking over regional retail chains such as MacMarkets, Pricerite, F J.Wallis, Dee, Gateway, 
Mainstop, Shopper's Paradise, Fine Fare, KeyMarkets, International, F.A.Wellworth and 
Lennoivs. They also bought hypermarkets from Woolco and Carrefour. In 1988, the Dee 
Corporation was renamed Gateway, and the group focused on the Gateway fascia. A 1989 
leveraged buyout finally ended in Isósceles gaining control of the organisation, and 61 
superstores were sold to Asda 1 2 as part of the deal. This was followed by the sale of 42 
north eastem stores to Kwik Save in 1991 l 3. 
In April 1993, Somerfield acquired the assets of its former parent company, Isósceles , 4, 
and the chain focused on the Somerfield fascia, while fazing out the Gateway brand. In 
1998, the company bought Kwik Save 15 with the aim of converting many of their stores to 
the Somerfield format. Sales at converted stores were disappointing, and sales at the 
remaining Kwik Save stores plummeted. Somerfield suffered flnancially from this, to the 
point that 46 prime Somerfield stores had to be sold after failing to sell the Kwik Save 
chain Kj, 
Diversification into new sectors and non-UK markets 
Overseas expansión is said to have become a key element in the future success of food 
12
 Super Marketing, Augus t 2, 1996; " F r o m little acoms. . . " , p .85-86 
13
 Supermarket News, Apri l 29, 1991; "42 Ga teways are sold to discounter K w i k Save" , p .52 
14
 The Grocer, A u g u s t 27 , 1994; "Reward ing t ime on the road to recovery" 
15
 Super Marketing, June 12, 1998; "The traffic lights test", p .20-21 
Somerf ie ld press re léase , see ht tp : / /www.somerf ie ldplc .co.uk 
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retailers [for example see Moody, 1997]. It can enable the retailer to achieve global 
économies of scale and organisation, global purchasing power, and provides access to 
markets that are expanding faster than the UK. Internationalisation can also act as a 
protective mechanism, as a domestic-orientated food retailer is a more feasible acquisition 
for international retail giants (6.4. p.240): 
/ think îhere will bè more and more internationalisation in retailing, you can see 
that from Teseo. When I lefî Teseo, we had businesses in Hungaty, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, within the UK, Scotland, and just before l left I hought a business 
in Southern [reland. Since I have left they have bóught a business in Thailand, and 
I wouid certainly expect them to add on to the business in maybe Korea and that 
sort of area of the world. So successful retailers are going to become, or. are, 
international retailers. I have no doubt at ail about that: 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebworth ÜL] 
Similarly, UK food retailers have diversified into new sectors, notably Sainsbury's 
development of Homebase, a UK based DIY chain. However, the size of thèse secondary 
opérations remains small at présent, vvhich is inevitable given the large size of the UK food 
retailing opérations. J Sainsbury is one of the more advanced UK food retailers in tenus of 
diversification, having expanded internationally through the acquisition of Shaw's 
supermarkets in the USA, and into new UK retail sectors with Homebase DIY superstores -
however, their .1 Sainsbury supermarket opérations (including Savacentre) accounted for 
nearly 80% of their turnover in 1998/9, with Shaw's (US) contributing over 12% to 
turnover and Homebase (UK DIY) under 8% , 7 . An analysis of Teseo annual reports 1 3 
provides similar statistics, with over 88% of group turnover being generated in British food 
retailing, the remainder being made up of Ireland and Northern Ireland (over 6%) and other 
Europe (5%). Diversification into new retail sectors and countries, therefore, may provide 
valuable opportunities for capital-investment. Thèse opérations, however, will remain small 
scale when compared to their main UK food retail opérations for the foreseeable future 
1 7
 calculated from J .Sainsbury pic 1999 annual report, year ending 6 March 1999, 
ace: ht tp: / /www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/f inres/1999_final / js_ovenVglance.html 
I K
 calculated from Teseo pic annual report, year ending 28/2/98, 
see: b t tp : / /www.tcsco .co .uk/ indexn.htm 
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despite rapid expansion - largely because they are dwarfed by the scale of the leading UK 
food retail chains' domestic food retailing activities. 
4.5 The changing price/service relationship. 
In the early post-war years, food retailers were prevented from entering into priée 
compétition by the rationing system, which dictated both the price and sales volume of 
foods (5.1-i, p.114-116). Even after the abolition of rationing, RPM meant that retailers 
could noi lower the priées of many branded goods, as thèse were set by the manufacturers 
(5.1.ti. p.l 19). When RPM was abolished in 1964, UK food retailers were able to engage in 
pure price compétition for the first time, and the adopters of low-overhead retail techniques, 
such as self-service, supermarkets and then superstores, were able to pass on the benefits of 
their lower overheads in the form of lower priées. When innovatore' superstores began to 
build market share, industry-wide lowering of priées was provoked (6.3. p.227). 
Price, therefore, became the primary competitive weapon from the mid-l960s through to 
the late- 1970s, as thèse were made possible by moves into more efficient retail formats. 
From the mid- 1970s, government imposed wage constraints, designed to curb inflation, 
were resulting in falling real incomes, which in tum contributed to a risïng price 
consciousness in the UK consumer. In response to this, food retailers launched price-
cuttïng initiatives such as Tesco's 'Operation Checkout' in 1977, followed by similar 
competitive reactions from other Operators, when turnover was increased drastically 
through high profile price cutting campaigns, which brought price-conscious consumers 
flocking through the doors. 
From the early-1980s, however, Operators began to provide better facilities, services and 
products, making quality of shopping environment the primary competitive weapon, rather 
than price. This changing emphasis is strongly associated with moves to large, out-of-town 
stores, which provided the space necessary to develop a quality shopping expérience 
through the provision of facilities such as restaurants, bakeries, ample parking and in-store 
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pharmacies: 
"When we carne out of stamps in ¡977 with Operation Checkout, which was 
phenomenally successfid, our markeí share went up by spades. But we coiddn V 
cope with it, so we had to look ai our logistics - our warehousing situation, our 
buying, we had to look at evetything - and we decided we would move out of town. 
So we then went about getting Tesco to move out of town, to the stores that you 
see today with-the fíat, free car parking, petrol fdling stations, coffee shops. And I 
suppose that from 1977 right to the present day, we have closed down our smaller 
stores and developed these superstores, and with these superstores we started to 
develop a quality image. It took quite a long time for the quality image to come 
•through and for it to be accepted, but we stuck at it with decent marketing and 
gopd advertising, and gradually became the number one groce?y retailer in the 
United Kiñgdom..." 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebworth DI,] 
Thus there is a tendency for UK food retailers to compete over eitfier price or quality of 
shopping experience. Price tends to resurface as a key issue periodically, but the general 
trend over the period of the study has been for UK food retailer investment in the quality of 
the shopping experience to take precedence over investment in lower prices, particularly 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and for retail margins to increase to cover the additional costs. 
Although it was noted above that the improved shopping experience had been driven by the 
addition of facilities such as in-store restaurants, it has equally been achieved through 
trading up of the quality of the range on offer. In no área is this clearer than in the evolution 
of UK food retailer prívate labels, which have matured from "inferior, 'me-too' producís 
that competed with the leading brands on the basis of price" [Doel, 1996; p49], through a 
cióse relationship with the "pile it high, sell it cheap" formula of the I970s [ibid.], to have 
a "vastly improved quality image" today, as well as a much more signifícant market share 
[ibid.]. The increasing quality of private label is particularly important as it accounted for 
40% of UK grocery sales in 1996 and is therefore a key factor influencing the quality 
positioning of the food retail sector as a whole. 
1 9
 Taylor Nelson A G B 
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The trading up that occurred in the industry, however, left a void in the price-sensitive end 
of the food retail market, which European hard discounters moved into from the early-
1990s. Duke [1993; p.36] suggests that the reduced emphasis placed on pñce-based 
competition during the 1980s allowed a steady rise in the net margins of most retailers, 
making the market more attractive to potential new entrants, and leaving the price-sensitive 
lower end of the market largely abandoned, defended mainly by Kwik Save. Significant 
trading up by established operators during the 1980s was followed by a rapid injection of 
capital into the UK by European-based hard discount chains in the early-1990s, occupying 
a low-cost, low-price, low-service position. 
Described by Scth and Randall [1999; p.147-148] as stores where líthe queues are longer, 
the space limited, the wire haskets nastier and the whoíe experience a whole lot shorter on 
aspiration than British consumers have been used /o", the entrance of hard discounters 
presented a formidable threat to the established retail hierarchy in the early-1990s. 
Germany-based Aldi was the first European hard discounter to enter the UK retail market in 
April 1990 2 0 , followed by Denmark-based Netto in December of the same year l 3 . Their 
developments were initially focused on the Midlands and the north, áreas badly affected by 
the deep recession of the period, which was perceived as shaping consumer price 
consciousness in favour of discount operations l 3 . Discounting itself was not new to the 
UK, demonstrated by Kwik Save opening its 750th store in 1992 1 3 , but this type of 'hard 
discounting' was. 
The difference between European discounters and existing UK operators such as Kwik 
Save is in their set-up. According to the IGD 2 I , iimited-line discounters', Aldi and Netto 
for example, carry less than 1000 lines and prices are 10% to 15%o lower than in non-
discount shops, while a discount supermarket carries between 1000 and 3000 lines and has 
a more flexible range including more fresh, frozen and chilled foods, with Kwik Save being 
2 0
 Super Marketing, January 17, 1992; "Discounters on the march" , p. 14-16 
2 1
 scc Super Marketing, June 7, 1991; "The European discount phenomenon" , p . 12 
109 
an example of this. These are also known respectively as 'hard' and 'soft' discounters. 
Aldi announced in 1990 that it wanted 200 UK stores operaling by the end of 1993 2 2 , but 
grevv at a pace much slower than this, and had less than 100 stores in August 1994 B , and 
230 by mid-1999, giving it a UK grocery market share of around 0.8% 2 S . Their growth was 
slowed by a combination of factors, namely simultaneous expansion into eastern Germany 
following reunification 2 \ difficultés obtaining planning permission 2 6 and established 
Operators' extension of prices and ranges downwards into low-price private label 2 7 , with 
Teseo Value, Sainsbury's Essentials, Safeway Savers, Asda Farm Stores, Somerfield 
Basics, Morrison Bettabuy, Iceland Everyday Super Value, Kwik Save No Frills, and Co-
op Everyday, all being launched in 1993 and 1994 2 S . 
At this point Aldi were expanding into the south, Carrefour-owned discounter Ed was 
concentrating on entering the UK via the south east, while Netto were continuing to focus 
on the north 2 9. In November 1994, Lidi of Germany entered the UK 3 0 , and expanded to 40 
stores within 6 months before slowing their expansion 3 l . in 1995, Budgen's pulled out of 
its srnall discount opération, Penny Chain, selling five to Lidi and Converting the remaining 
seven to the Budgen's format 3 2, and Netto bought the Ed stores from their French owner 
Carrefour, and focused on expansion in London and the south east 3 3 . A significant impact 
of hard discounters was on the fortunes of Kwik Save, supporting Porter's [1980, p.41-44] 
view that being 'stuck in the middle' with no clear strategy towards cost leadership, 
differentiation or focus, is extremcly damaging: 
2 2
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"" Super Marketing, Augus t 5, 1994; " W h o do you think you are k idding" , p. 17 
2 4
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Asda were bearing down on Kwik Save from above, closing the gap as we 
managed to get ottr cost base down. In the end we were almost as price 
compétitive as Kwik Save... then you had Lidl and Aldi coming in and compietely 
stealing their clothes in the discount bracket, as they are properly structured for 
discoitnting, in every sensé. 
[Tony Campbell] 
Although the threat of discounters appears to have receded somewhat, a major effect of 
their entrance vvas to drive Kwik Save into the hands of Somerfield, a merger which 
appears to have been harmful to both companies f4.4. p. 105), and many outlets have been 
converted to the Somerfield fascia. 
Conclusion 
fn summary, the second half of the 20th century witnessed profound change in the UK food 
retail structure. Multiple food organisations came to dominate the industry, at the expense 
of co-operative and, particularly, independent operators, and was largely driven by store 
rationalisation. Specialist food retailers also lost market share to the multiples, and the 
number of their outlets plummeted accordingly. While the multiples were coming to 
dominate the industry, a select few multiples were beginning to dominate the multiple 
sector itself, as the 'big five' rose to prominence and power became increasingly 
concentrated. This was a resuit of their geographical expansion, and of takeover within the 
sector. The growing scale of the leading food retailers forced manufacturers into a 
compilant rôle in the relationship. 
The retail format evolved from counter-service, through self-service conversions to high 
street superrnarkets, and then to out-of-town superstores, and was primarily driven by 
multiple organisations, hence their rise to prominence. Thèse larger stores allowed 
extension of product offering, and slow growth in food sales encouraged this to be in the 
non-foods arena. Planning restrictions forced operators to consider opening smaller stores 
from the mid-l990s, and the retail format evolved once more. Géographie expansion sped 
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consolidation in the industry, as leading operators entered into compétition with regionally-
based players, often resulting in takeover. This geographical expansion developed an 
international flavour as UK opportunities diminished, and the greater potential for growth 
overseas was recognised. The lack of growth in the UK market for food also drove food 
retailers' moves into new sectors within the UK. 
Over the period of the study, the focus of the price/service relationship has changed 
penodically. Service reigned in the days of counter-service, but the abolition of RPM in 
1964 drove the development of efficient formats and lower priées. This price compétition 
intensi fied during the 1970s, as real incomes fell, to be superseded once again by service 
from the early-1980s. By the early-1990s, price compétition had been bypassed in favour of 
compétition over service and quality to such an extent that European hard discounters 
became attracted to the market, and several such operators established themselves, although 
it seems their initial threat appeared larger than their actual impact. Price became more 
important from the late-1990s, largely due to competitive pressures, but in general, the 
trend has been towards providing a more upmarket shopping expérience, although price 
remains an important élément in this. 
Tn short, the most marked change of the second half of the 20th century was to the retail 
landscape, which in 1950 was dominated by independent, counter-service grocery shops, 
and by 2000 had evolved to be dominated by large, facility-packed, service-orientated, out-
of-town superstores, with 50% of UK grocery sales passing through only five major 
multiple retail organisations. 
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Chapter 5 
Major factors affecting the UK food retail system post-1950 
Before explaining the forces driving the major changes outlined in chapter 4, it is a 
necessary pre-requisite to consider the major exogenous and endogenous forces 
impacting upon the food retail industry post-1950. These are considered in four 
categories - forces due to government intervention and policy (5 .0 . those due to socio­
economic change and the changing consumer (5.2), the impact of changing technology 
(5.3). and the effects of retailers' behaviour on the industry (5.4). This is necessary 
because chapter 6 draws on the findings of this chapter in order to explain the changes 
outlined in chapter 4. 
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5.1 Government Policy 
Government policy was a key influence on the development of the UK food retail 
industry during the second half of the 20 l h Century, impacting profoundly upon food 
retailing in many areas including pricing, planning, opening hours, merger activity, wages 
and taxation. This section examines the effects of rationing in the years of austerity 
following World War II, the effects of the return to the free market, and the impact of 
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), its abolition, the planning regime, compétition policy, 
the libéralisation of trading hours and other factors such as wage régulation. 
5.1 .i Post-war shortages, rationing and the return to the free market 
World War II brought severe food shortages to the United Kingdom, necessitating 
rationing of the limited amount of food available, in order to ensure that everybody 
received a fair share, as indicated in chapter 4 (4.5. p. 107). The retail landscape was 
dominated by independent counter-service grocery stores, with the independent sector 
accounting for 52% of grocery turnover, even as late as 1961, compared to 27% for 
multiples and 2 1 % for co-operative societies1, and rationing effectively preserved the 
existing retail system by suppressing compétition. 
Ration books were issued to all UK résidents in January 1940. Each household had to 
register with a grocer and a butcher of their choice. The grocer carrying the registration of 
each household would be their supplier of butter, bacon, sugar, préserves, margarine, 
cooking fats and cheese [Williams, 1994a; p.l 15], provided that the customer surrendered 
their weekly ration coupon when paying the grocer. A points allowance scheine was also 
introduced, covering a wide range of grocery lines [ibid., p.l 16], whereby a certain 
number of points had to be handed over to the grocer for each product, with the least 
plentiful goods commanding higher point values than others. Consumers were free to buy 
whatever products they wanted from the scheine with their points, but were issued with a 
limited number of points per month. 
1
 Rciail Business Trade Review, 28, November 1981; p .6 
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The shortage of food remai ned acute after the war ended in 1945, and rationìng continued 
into the 1950s, by which time the grocery trade was feeling the impact of prolonged food 
shortages. The transition from wartime to peace brought little change in the food rations 
allowed to the people of the UK, with rationing continuing because it was feared that 
restoration of the free market would drive food prices upwards and out of the reach of the 
poor, for two main reasons - basic food prices were subsidised by the government's 
Ministry of Food, thus the price of basic rationed foods was cheaper than would 
otherwise bave been the case, and restoration of the free market may have meant that 
those who could afford to pay a premium would take more than their fair share of what 
was available, which would have driven up prices and created shortages. 
Major losses in agricultural production had been suffered in occupied Europe, and 
continued rationing in the UK also aimed to create a surplus of food to send to the 
European mainland . For severa! years after the war, there were no signs of a return to 
normality, in fact fat, bacon and soap rations, as well as the monthly points allowance ', 
were all reduced in May 1945. 
Bar minor adjustments, rationing and other controls rcmained static until the early-1950s. 
The grocery trade was considered an essential part of the national wartime effort, charged 
with the fair and just distribution of food, and was proud of its part in victory 3. But 
continuing short supplies, strictly controlied margins, rising wages and other expenses 
began to anger the industry in the early post-war years 3 . The early-1950s were 
particularly difficult for UK food retailers 3 , independents, co-operatives and multiples 
alike [ibid.], because the majority of their turnover was generated from the sale of 
controlied goods. This control not only governed the quantity that could be sold, it also 
dictated the price at which it could be sold, constraining grocers' turnover in both volume 
and revenue. Furthermore, retailers could not exercise their buying skills, as rationed 
2
 The Grocer , January 12, 1946, p7 
3
 The Grocer , Sep tember 28 , 1946, p8 
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goods were supplied by the Ministry of Food, meaning that gross profit margins were 
fixed beyond the control of the retailer. Net profits were also under pressure - Staffing 
levels could not realistically be cut due to the large amount of administration generated 
by rationing and the points system, and the generally small sized shops tended to lend 
themselves to opération by a limited personnel, again making staff cutbacks difficult, as 
over 57% of stores had a sales area inferior to 1000 square feet in 1961*. Wages could not 
be reduced, in fact from September 1949, wages paid in the retail food trades were 
subject to statutory wage régulation through the Retali Food Wages Council, which 
resul ted in "a regulär succession of wage "adjustments "... in the upward direction " 5. 
A sharp increase in petrol and commercial vehicle purchase taxes in 1950, coupled with 
rising lighting charges 6 , exaeerbated the problems of the grocery industry. In this 
situation over which they had little control, grocer's earnings feil, as they were meeting 
increasing business expenses from a static gross profit margin. The situation was so dire 
that trade associations, such as the National Fédération of Grocers' and Provision 
Dealers' Associations, were sometimes successful in lobbying the Ministry of Food for 
increased margins on controlled goods 7 : 
"By deputation, by memorandum, by deputation again, every possible plea was 
made for improved margins. Thefight continues " s. 
A shortage of skilled labour due to military service made grocers' problems worse, and 
pockets of food retailers attempted to reduce overheads by experimenting with self-
service 5 . Conversion to self-service could alleviate the two key problems of staff 
shortages and falling net margins, as staff no longer needed to be fully trained grocers, 
and the proprietor's eamings could theoretically be raised through increased productivity 
per man-hour worked, plus gains in turnover could be achieved through increased 
4
 Census of Distribution arid other services, 1966, 2, London, H M S O , 1971; table 25 , page 2/124 
5
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7
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patronage and "impulse shopping". Shortages in pre-packaging materials impeded the 
development of self-service, however, as did the requirement to dispense rationed goods 
(6.3. p.224-225), but wartime controls did force retailers to seek ways of cutting fìxed 
costs - price rises were not an option, so rationing effectively "encouragea greaier 
efficiency..." [Howe, 1992, p24], primarity through conversion to self-service. At this 
time, there was control on entry into retailing [Howe, 1992, p24], removing the threat of a 
new store taking trade from an established food retailer, and suppressing compétition, and 
in order to "obtain the basic fixed rations, a cusiomer had to register with a particular 
shopkeeper for a period of twelve months " [Addison, 1995, p30], meaning that 
consumers were not particularly free to shop around. 
Although war and post-war controls had made food retailing "much less competitive in 
structure" [Howe, 1992, p24], when a customer's twelve month registration period was 
close to lapsing, certain grocers would tempt them with special favours, in a bid to win 
their continued registration. Using the margins allowed for wastage on controlied goods, 
the grocer could offer enticements to customers: 
"...you could gradually build up a little extra stock so that when it carne to re-
registering you coidd say to Mrs Jones, I can let you bave another couple of 
ounces this week. " - Mr.Mucklow, grocer in Stratford-on-Avon. 
[Addison, 1995, p32] 
The spirit of compétition in the grocery trade was therefore not altogether dead, merely 
suppressed. Everyday grocery shopping, however, tended to be done in the same shop, 
day to day, year to year, driving a profound lack of compétition: "If there lias been one 
thing that has been lacking during the years of control, it has been the spirit of 
compétition and émulation that, in fact, built up Britain 's greatness " 9 . The long period 
of government control generated a "tendency... to blâme others for difficultés, but the 
most valuable prizes were won by those who knew... their own business " . 
There was a shortage of funds in the grocery business, primarily because of price controls 
9
 The Grocer , June 3, 1950, p23-24 
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on both the input and output sides. This lack of funds made the rebuilding of bomb-
damaged sites unfeasible, as did government reluctance to issue building licences due to a 
shortage of building materiate [Williams, 1994a], effectively reducing the number of 
grocery stores and hence the level of compétition within the industry. 
However, the early-1950s also saw world food shortages becoming less acute, and 
wartime controls slowly being wound down. In May 1950 the Points Rationing Scheme, 
in place since 1941, was abolished: 
"With something of the air of a returned warrior hanging up his sword in the 
hall, the (grocery) trade may now hang up its scissors, for the Points Rationing 
Scheme is dead. " 10 
Food rationing was gradually phased out over the following few years, with tea being 
freed in October 1952, followed steadily by other goods until the derationing of meat on 
July 3 r d 1954, which marked the end of post-war rationing [Williams, 1994a], the return 
of free compétition to the grocery industry after fifteen years, and the ending of the 
obligation to register with a particular shop in order to obtain rationed goods, as well as 
the obligation to patronise this shop. RPM, however, meant that there were many grocery 
Unes over which food retailers could still not compete on price (5.I.Ü. p. 119). 
After the abolition of rationing, each trader's profits were more closely related to the level 
of proficiency shown than had been the case under wartime régulations. While there was 
still much to complain about, and the "tendency to blâme other s for difficultés" 8 
remained, free compétition had effectively returned to the industry. As Herman Kent, 
secretary of the National Fédération of Grocers' and Provision Dealers' Associations, 
observed, the 1940s was "a decade of pernuts" and the 1950s was "a decade of 
performance with proficiency" . Free of wartime controls, every trader bore the ultimate 
responsibility for his own success as "margins, and consequently profits, became less 
and less dépendent on collective negotiations between (trade organisations) and the 
T h e Grocer , M a y 27, 1950, "Epi logue on the Points S c h e m e " 
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Ministry (of Food) but more on individual bargains with manufacturers and first-hand 
distributors. " 11 
5.1.ii Resale Price Maintenance 
Until 1964, manufacturers could diciate the price at which retailers sold their producís, 
under a system known as resale price maintenance (RPM), defined as "whenever a 
manufacturer sets the price at which a retali shop which he does noi own must reseli his 
product io the public, or ai which a wholesale business he does noi own must reseli that 
product to a retailer. " [MacDonald, 1964; p3]. Introduced in the 1890s [Jones, 1993], the 
practice spread rapidly, in particular during the 1930s [Yamey, 1966; p.5]. 
RPM had two key effects on the UK food retail sector. First, it enabled manufacturers to 
set retail prices high enough to fund major investment in the strength of their brands 
[John Fletcher], with many of the strong brands of today emerging during the 1950s and 
1960s, aided by the dawn of commercial television [Richard Swaab]. Second, it 
prevented UK food retailers from entering into price compétition on a large proportion of 
their range, effectively prolonging the existence of the fragmented grocery sector. 
Operators of modem self-service stores, benefiting from lower overheads, were unable to 
pass on their operating efficiencies in the form of lower prices. which in theory would 
have attracted customers away from traditional grocery stores, and driven out weaker 
competitore. Concentration in the UK food retail industry was therefore delayed by RPM, 
because until its 1964 abolition, inefficient food retailers with relatively high operating 
costs were able to offer the same prices as their more efficient competitore. It also 
prevented low-cost entrants to the retail market from passing on their lower overheads in 
the form of lower prices, as suggested by Hollander's [1960] 'Wheel of Retailing'. In 
effect, RPM bolstered the position of manufacturers relative to retailers, and, in line with 
Galbraith's [1952] Theory of Countervaìling Power, opposition to the practice grew amd 
it broke down, allowing retailers to increase their influence over manufacturers. 
" T h e Groccr , February 14, 1953, p i 5 , "Retail Margins : H o p e and W a r n i n g " 
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Tools such as co-operative 'dividends' and 'trading stamps' issued by multiple 
organisations and some independent Operators, offered a means of bypassing resale price 
législation, providing an alternative to pure price compétition (5.4.i. p.177): 
Green shield stamps carrìed a discount, an infinitesimal amount... but the 
manufacturers could not trace how many of those coupons in a customer's 
purchase applied to their merchandise. So you bought £50 worth of goods and 
you got so many stamps. This is literally how discounts were given to overcome 
RPM. 
[Sir Noel Stockdate] 
Equally, RPM was a factor driving retailers' development of private label (5.4.Ü. p. 180), 
enabling retailers to compete over price, as they were able to undercut highly-priced 
branded products. 
Co-operative societies wanted to treat all groceries equally and pay dividends relating to 
the purchase of all products, irrespective of whether or not the goods were the subject of 
RPM, which some manufacturers regarded as équivalent to discounting their stipulated 
price. In response, "some manufacturers...either altogether denied supplies of their goods 
to retali establishments which distributed surplus trading profits to their customers or 
insisted that if a dividend was paid the price to the customer should be increased by the 
full amount of the dividend. " 12 
In response to thcse conflicts, the govemment initiated the 1949 'Committee on Resale 
Price Maintenance', chaired by Lloyd-Jacob. Their key recommendation was that RPM 
should not "obstruct the development of particular methods of trading" l 3. Co-operative 
societies, thus, could continue paying dividends on all products sold. Multiple and 
independent retailers, too, could offer 'discounts' through stamp trading, (5.4.L p.177) 
although its popularity did not peak until the 1960s. 
The Lloyd-Jacob Report, as it became known, provided the first blow to RPM and hence 
1 2
 T h e Grocer , June I I , 1949, pIO 
1 1
 T h e Grocer , June 4, 1949, p9 
120 
to manufacturers. Other investigations into RPM, see MacDonald [1964, p6-9] for détails, 
included the Committee on Resale Priées Act (1948), the Council of Priées, Productivity 
and Income (1958) and the Committee on Consumer Protection (l962).While each of 
thèse investigations made différent recommendations, a trend towards libéralisation was 
évident: "...the pendulum had been graduaiiy swinging against resale priée maintenance 
since thefirst investigation in 1920" [MacDonald, 1964; p9] 
While the pendulum may have been 'swinging against RPM* in légal terms, in retail 
ternis its importance was increasing, with manufacturer price-dictated products rising 
from 3% of total UK consumer expenditure at the dawn of the 20 l h century to over 40% 
by the mid-1950s: 
Figure 5.l.ii.a: Extent of influence of RPM: 
Year Percentage of total consumer expenditure 
spent on products affected by RPM 
1900 3%) 
1938 30%. 
mid-1950s 40-50% 
[Source: Howe, 1992; p.22] 
In 1964, Edward Heath's parliamentary bill abolished RPM in all but a few select 
categories of goods such as household medicines and books [Howe, 1992]. Despite active 
campaigning against the bill by manufacturers and independent retailers, parliament 
passed the bill with a majority of just one vote: 
/ wanted to abolish resale price maintenance because I believed it would lead io 
greater competition, and that would benefit the consumer. It would lead to lower 
prices, and that was in his benefit... We recognised, at the time that, of course, 
many of the small retailers might be adversely affected, but that can't be an 
argument for holding up the whole of the development of sales in the modern 
community. 
[Sir Edward Heath, speaking in British Empires: Teseo, Channel Four, MM] 
In UK food retailing, RPM had largely broken down prior to the change in legislation, 
because self-service grocery chains were tending to focus their price cuts on private label, 
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for fear of prosecution. Manufacturer of price-maintained branded products found that 
their sales were falling, and that allowing price-cutting restored sales, hence 
manufacturer "tended to lose interest in price maintenance'1 [Stamp, 1964; p. 11]. A 
second reason for the break down of RPM was competitive pressure between 
manufacturer, although it is not entirely clear whether this or legislative changes were 
the key cause of RPM's demise [Pickering, 1966; p.121-122]. It is certain, however, that 
the législation made the abolition of RPM permanent, and that this did indeed herald a 
new era of price compétition, acting as a spur for retailers to run efficient, cost effective 
opérations. Its abolition meant that Operators of larger, modem stores, with low overheads 
and a low cost-base, could, in theory at least, pass on their cost savings in the form of 
lower priées for the first time. Lower priées should theoretically increase the appeal of the 
supermarket compared to the traditional counter-service grocery shop, and push many 
outlets, including some owned by multiple organisations, into marginal profitability or 
unprofitabiîity, leading to their subséquent disappearance (6T, p.197-198). Gardner and 
Sheppard [1989] note that the fate of the manufacturer was 'inextricably linked to the 
survival of the local corner shop', and that manufacturer would remain dominant as long 
as the food retail industry remained fragmented. The onset of price compétition between 
supennarkets from the early-1960s, however, began to erode the base of corner shops - a 
side-effect that was fully understood by the government when deciding on the future of 
RPM [Stamp, 1964; p.7-8] - and to speed up consolidation between multiple Operators: 
So trading with independènigrocers was always going lo be difficult, and what 
manufaciurers had to do was to find.-a .way to accomrnodate that difficulty, 
which they never did. So it.was goodbye to twenty or thirty thousând retailers 
over 15 years. Goodbye to very many indépendants and goodbye to the 
manufacturées of many branded products. 
[Mike Grovesj 
To resumé, supermarket retailers achieved économies of opération relative to smaller 
self-service and counter-service stores, which they were able to pass on in the form of 
lower prices on branded products following the abolition of RPM in 1964, although some 
Operators' continued use of trading stamps may partly have negated their price 
competitiveness. The ability to offer lower prices can be considered one of the key factors 
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driving the spread of larger stores. The mid-1960s were also the period when the first UK 
superstores were developed (4.3. p.97-98), initially basing their appeal on competitive 
pricing of leading branded products, effectively made possible by the abolition of RPM 
and the marked économies of scale achievable from the opération of large stores (6.3. 
p.219-222). 
5.1JÜ Planning restrictions 
Although local authorities are responsible for planning issues, they are governed by 
guidelines issued by the Department of the Environment, and are ultimately answerable 
to the Secretary of State. The Department of the Environment, in its rôle as legislator, 
issues Guidance Notes to local planning authorities - the notes introducing major policy 
changes are summarised in figure 5.1.iii.a below. The rôle of enforcer is played by the 
Secretary of State, who has the power to overturn local authority décisions at appeal. The 
possibility of losing an appeal tends to force local authorities to follow central 
government planning guidelines reasonably closely, as losing an appeal wastes time and 
effort, plus the obligation to pay the applicante expenses [Guy, 1994; p.77]. 
The UK government therefore contrats the planning process relatively closely, although 
its délégation to local authorities produces discrepancies between neighbouring 
authorities, and differing attitudes according to broad géographie location. Local 
discrepancies occur when local authorities lacking a major town-centre allow substantial 
new development in order to build up retail capacity [ibid., p.89], and when local 
authorities fear that refusai of an application may resuit in an approvai just inside the 
boundaries of a bordering authority, having a similar negative impact on existing retail 
provision, yet not bringing them the benefits of locally levied business rates [ibid., p.89]. 
Also, less affluent régions tend to have the highest concentration of superstores per 
capita, suggesting that planners may welcome development schemes perceived as 
creatmg employment in deprived areas [ibid., p.89], although thèse différences are being 
eroded with time [Lee Donaldson, 1991]. 
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There follows a summary of the key changes in government policy since planning 
became a major issue in food retailing - essentially the mid- 1960s when superstores 
began to appear: 
Figurę 5.1.iii.a: Key changes in regulatory planning policy towards out-of-town 
retailing: 
Year 
1972 
1974 
1977 
July 1985 
1988 
1993 
1996 
S u m m a r y of change 
Secretary of Slate became responsible for p lanning applicat ions for 
stores in excess of 50 ,000 ft" outside existing towns or districts-
Dist inct ion madc be tween wholesale and retail to the general public , 
and be tween cash and carry wholesal ing to trade and to the general 
public. Developments conceming cash and carry to the public must 
c o m e under DPCN 13 
Secretary of State became responsable for p lanning applicat ions for 
stores in excess of 100,000 ft" outside exist ing towns or districts. 
The impact of a proposed deve lopment on other retailers no longer a 
considérat ion, except in the case where a nearby town centre as a 
who le could be affected. 
Green belt land, open countryside a n d industriai areas reserved for 
other uses 
N e w retail deve lopments to be located in areas accessible by a choice 
of means of transport, and to encourage e c o n o m y in fuel consumpt ion 
Revision to PPG6 - the preferred site for a big retail centre must b e the 
town centre ìf there is a ' su ì table ' and ' ava i lab le ' site 
Refe ren te 
Deve lopmen t Policy 
Control Note 13 
Deve lopmen t Pol icy 
Control N o t e 14 
Deve lopmen t Pol icy 
Control Note 13 (reviscd) 
Depar tmen t of the 
Envi ronment , 1988; 
paragraph 7 
Depar tmen t of the 
Env i ronment , 1988 
Depa r tmen t o f the 
Envi ronment , 1993; 
pa ragraph 36 
Moir , 1995, p l 7 . 
According to Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG, planning constraints stifled food 
retail development in several areas, notably early supermarkets and car parking 
provisions, and slowed superstore development in general [Tanburn, 1972; p.6]. 
Developers of superstores in particular encountered difficulties obtaining planning 
permission, and devised devious methods of gaining planning permission or avoiding the 
requirement altogether. One technique employed by early superstore developers was to 
exploit the inexpérience of planners with the superstore format - claiming to be wholesale 
cash and carry warehouses instead of obtaining full retail planning consent [Kirby, 
1974a]: 
It was difficult, hut we got several Stores, with planning permission for 
wholesale, and retail cash and carry, to get around the planning, which allowed 
us to trade. 
[Peter Asqüith] 
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In effect, superstore developers were aìded by the rapid expansion of cash and carry 
wholesale warehouses, which became a major dement in the distributive trades in the 
late-1960s [Dawson and Kirby, 1977; p.l 19]. Ironically though, the trite role of cash and 
carry was to supply independent grocers who were struggling to compete with the new 
generation of supermarkets and superstores. To planners therefore, applications for large 
wholesale grocery units were reasonably common, while only a minority of applicante 
were deliberately misleading. Development Control Policy Note 14 (1974) made a 
distinction between genuine wholesale cash and carry and retail cash and carry, 
effectively ending this as a means of developing retail superstores. Section 6.1 (p.204-
205) analyses the impact of the development of cash and carry warehouses. 
An alternative strategy was to seek permission just inside the boundaries of superstore-
friendly local authorities, only a short distance from sites refused superstore planning 
permission by neighbouring locai authorities [Gransby, 1984; p.50]: 
We applied to put a store just inside the Lincoln bourìdary, but Lincoln wére. 
against iL We applied to.put one on. the North Hykèham side of the boundary 
and we gotoûr permission.'. 
[Peter Asquith] 
Barly superstores were something of an unknown quantity, the effects of which were not 
particularly obvious, especially to planning officiais who sometimes failed to appreciate 
the possible negative impact: 
... if you were interested in putting a superstore in a certain area you wòuld gel 
the planning people from ihat area uptó a nie e new As da < to have a. look at jt. 
You weren 't actually hiding from them what you were planning io do, but very 
often the righiquestions may not have been asked, in terms of ali the issues. So 
for example there was always the issue of how many other shops would bè 
affected, will the superstore close down lots ofsmall shops, where will the trade 
come from, thcit type of thing, thèse questions were not always asked. 
[John Fletcher] 
The planning system is a much crìticised force slowing out-of-town retail development 
[Brown, 1992a, pl91]. Such techniques to avoid the planning system or mislead officiais, 
illustrate the difficulties in obtaining planning permission for out-of-town retail units. 
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The UK planning system has also driven the development of retail units just under the 
size threshold at which they must be referred to the Secretary of State [Dawson, 1984; 
pi 78]. As a result, out-of-town superstores built between 1972 and 1977 tended to be just 
below 50,000 fi2, increasing to just under 100,000 ft2 post-1977 (see figure 5.1.iii.a, 
p. 124, for changing size criteria). 
A further option was to bypass the planning system entirely, by developing retail units 
within 'enterprise zones', set up by the government and local authorities to increase 
business activity and employment in designated areas from 1981 [Thomas & Bromley, 
1993, p.128]. The key magnet attracting retailers to enterprise zones was 'speedier 
planning' [Department of the Environment, 1987; p.60], although they also gained capital 
allowances and exemption from rates. Each enterprise zone had different criteria for the 
type of development permitted, and the more relaxed enterprise zones were subject to 
extensive retail development [Sparks, 1987; p.40] . A proposed development which 
satisfied all the criteria would be 'deemed' to have been granted planning permission, 
although no application was actually necessary. Proposals exceeding the maximum 
criteria set down by the Secretary of State (figure 5.1.iii.a, p.124) still had to obtain full 
planning permission, although this was rushed through at a faster pace than normal 
[Sparks, 1987; p.6-7], providing "an irresistible opportunity for retailers and property 
developers alike" [Brown, 1992a, p.191] 
Such devious techniques largely ended by the mid-1980s, when the planning system 
became less restrictive, with the period between July 1985 and July 1993 being the most 
superstore-friendly, demonstrated by the rapid growth of the format during this time (4.3. 
p.98), allowing a lag of 2-3 years for development to occur (see appendix 4). The number 
of appeals refused by the Secretary of State rose from under 50% pre-1993 to 68% 
between 1993 and 1997 [Ruston, 1999; p.7], also suggesting that it became harder to gain 
planning permission for large stores. Planning policy dictated that factors relating mainly 
to accessibility were to be taken into account from 1993, as the government became 
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concernée! with existing town centres, and large-scale out-of-town development was 
effectiveiy curbed by John Gummer (then Minister of the Environment) in 1996, when 
PPG6 was revised to favour town centre retailing whenever viable: 
We were spenâing huge amounîs of money on regeneration, vast amounîs öf tax 
payers ' money to recreate the centres of our big cïties, and yet we had a 
planning system which seemed to be encouraging out-of-town shopping. I 
thought that we had enough of that, and that we ought to change the direction 
fairly significantly. 
[John Gummer, speaking in British Empires: Teseo, Channel Four, MM] 
This planning policy U-turn forced a change of direction for food retailers, driving them 
to seek avenues of growth other than the out-of-town superstore, despite strong consumer 
demand for large stores with car parking [Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG]: 
Lord MacLaurin: about 1996, John Gümmer brought out PPG6, which 
curtailed out-of-town superstore opérations and shopping centres, and 
redirected us to the edge of town and in-town. Now, in about 1995, we knewthat 
this was coming,- so through the sheer efficiencies of the business we starteâ to 
think about going back into town, and we opened Teseo Metro and Teseo 
Express. " 
Roger Clough: "So the main impetus for thèse was the planning changes? " 
Lord MacLaurin; "Yes. We adapted to the planning... John Gummer said .'[OK, 
you are not now going out-ofitown,/we. are not going;io allow any more 
out-of-town developments", and that. is fine, wé have to go with that, and build 
other stores, which we do often." 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebworth DL] 
'Planning gain' also became an issue from 1971, when the Town and Country Planning 
Act (1971) aliowed for "section 52 planning agreements, popularly known as planning 
gains" [Association of London Borough Planning Officers, 1989]. Developers, including 
retailers seeking planning permission for a store, subsequently found that local authorities 
could ask them to finance improvements in the vicinity of the proposed store, with 
planning permission being dépendent on their agreement. Planning gain is seen to be 
problematic only when planning authorities attempi "...to incorporate into the proposed 
development some élément of public benefit or advantage which the developer, left to his 
own devices, would not have volunteered, but which he is expected to provide... at his 
own expense as part of his scheme." [Department of the Environment, 1981; p.2] 
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Teseo remarked that "in most cases as part of the application you need to consider and 
allow for things like road traffic improvements" [Barrett, 1995]. Other examples of 
retailer funded schemes, agreed as a package presented to planners, include town-centre 
enhancements, consultancy fees, funds towards appointing a town manager, the funding 
of roadworks, park and ride schemes, community centres, improvements to Spotting and 
leisure facilities, hospitals, and new road schemes [ibid.]. Retailers tend to agree to 
finance local initiatives rather than see their application go to public enquiry [ibid.], 
While "there seems little sign of this tendency abating" [Healy et al, 1995; p.223], and it 
offers a construetive vehicle for regeneration [Association of London Borough Planning 
Officers, 1989], it drives up retailers' development costs, putting upwards pressure on 
margins as suggested by the Wheel of Retailing (7.1.1. p.267). 
The influence of the planning regime in retail development has been profound, 
particularly in the field of superstores, with "77/e over-riding factor ... affecting the 
development of superstores appearing to he the attitude of government, taken in its 
broadest sense, including that of planning authorities" [Tanbum, 1972; p6]. Developers 
devised clever methods to bypass strict planning régulations, but local authorities soon 
got wise to such behaviour, and the days passed when it was possible to 'gain planning 
permission for a superstore without the implications heing appreciated' [John Fletcher]. 
In the 1980s, the development of out-of-town superstores became easier, in terms of 
obtaining planning permission at teast, and devious behaviour was no longer necessary. 
Planners' demands forced up the cost of superstore development (6.3. p.229), and by the 
mid- 1990s the planning regime had once again turned against out-of-town retail 
development, forcing food retailers to re-focus their development stratégies on the town 
centre and smaller stores with smaller ranges. 
A key effect of the planning regime, therefore, has been to influence the development of 
the retail system, in terms of size and location, and to delay its development. In short, 
planning has influenced the shape of UK food retail developments, pushing outlets to be 
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just under the varying limits at which they would be referred to the Secretary of State [see 
Dawson, 1984; pl78] (figure S.l.ìii.a, p.124). The planning regime has had a significant 
impact on UK food retail geography, slowing its development. Food retailers, however, 
have adjusted their developments to suit the planning regime at any given time, meaning 
that development has continued despite the constraints imposed, albeit in a différent form 
and with signifìcant difficulties and is frequently conditional on bearing the costs of 
improvements to facilities in the surrounding area. 
5-l.iv Compétition Policy 
Compétition Policy is an important exogenous force on UK food retailers. Until 1965, a 
company exceeding 33% market strare could be regulated indirectly, using existing 
monopoly législation, rather than by specialist institutions [Weir, 1993], Subséquent 
changes to the system, however, resulted in a more complex system of institutions 
surveying and governing UK compétition, with four main statutes in force at the end of 
the 20th century [Maitland-Walker, 1995; p.395]. 
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 is concerned primarily with agreements 
between competitors on price, as welt as on quality and source of supply, and any such 
agreements must be registered with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), who may request 
court action on the matter. The Resale Prices Act 1976 is concerned with resale price 
maintenance and minimum price maintenance, both of which are banned in most 
catégories. The Compétition Act 1980 allows the OFT to investigate anti-competitive 
practices, which if found to be in existence, are referred to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC), who advise the Secretary of State, who décides on appropriate 
action. An anti-competitive practicc has, or is likely to have, "...the effect of restricting, 
distorting or preventing compétition in connection with the production, supply or 
acquisition of goods..." [ibid., p.401]. Finally, the Fair Trading Act 1973 régulâtes 
monopolies and mergers, whereby apparent monopolies (at least 25%» market share) are 
referred to the MMC for investigation, as well as complex monopolies, which occur when 
players with a combined market share of over 25% collude, having a similar effect to a 
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straightforward monopoly. Market share can be determiried regionally as well as 
nationally [ibid., p.403]. 
The general effect of compétition policy, of relevance to UK food retailing, is that the 
OFT can carry out short investigations into possible monopolistic behaviour, when one 
Operator exceeds 25% market share, or dominâtes a local area [Weir, 1993], and refers the 
matter to the Secretary of State or the MMC if monopolistic behaviour is apparent. When 
referred a case, the MMC had to establish whether a situation or practice existed, whether 
it operated against the public interest, and what the likely effects on public interest would 
be [Gardner, 1996; p.63]. The OFT also has a surveillance role, and in this are 
responsible for the collection of data on UK commercial activities, and the monitoring of 
possible merger or monopoly situations. The OFT also advises the Secretary of State on 
solutions proposed by Ihe MMC, and is responsible for seeking understandings from 
companies involved, and to ensure that these are followed. [ibid., p.55] 
The Compétition Act 1998, which came into force in March 2000, introduced the 
Compétition Commission as an overseeing body, made compétition policy in the UK 
'more like Europe' [Hay, 1998; p-34], and provided better protections for victims of anti­
competitive activity as well as harsher penalties for offending companies , 4 . While this 
was an important legislative change, it's importance to the second half of the 20th Century 
is minimal as it had not entered into force, and therefore no further analysis is required, 
although a key threat to retailers from this new législation are new provisions prohibiting 
abuse of market power by firms in a dominant position in a particular market 1 5, for 
example in one géographie area. Mergers can also be blocked by the European 
Commission, although this is rare, but did occur in the travel industry in the late-1990s 16. 
By the late-1970s and early-1980s, fears had arisen that large UK food retailers were 
14
 Management. Today, March 2000; p. 12, " tn my opinion". 
15
 The Çroccr, Dccember 5, 1998; p . 3 3 , "Brakes on Power" . 
u
' Financial Times, Sep tember 22, 1999; p .27 , "Brüssels moves to frustrate Air tours deal" . 
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obtaining discounts from suppliers that were unrelated to lower costs per unit incurred by 
the manufacturer in distribution and account handling, raising fears that smaller retailers 
were unfairly disadvantaged and that manufacturers would struggle. It was feared that the 
scale and market dominance of leading retailers (4.2. p.92-93) drove manufacturers to 
offer favourable terms because of the fear of losing just one major retail customer. 
Investigations into such 'discriminatory discounts' by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission [MMC, 1981] and the Office of Fair Trading [OFT, 1985] found evidence 
that this was the case, however, they reasoned that the practice was good for competition 
because of evidence that retailers were passing on the savings to customers, concluding 
that controls were unnecessary. 
Large food retailers were therefore allowed to continue using their commercial power to 
negotiate favourable terms with suppliers, irrespective of whether manufacturers enjoyed 
lower costs compared to dealing with smaller organisations. The inquiries' decisions 
bolstered the position of large multiple retailers, allowing them to develop buying 
strength and gain further competitive advantage over smaller organisations. Moreover, 
the recent findings (2000) of the Competition Commission inquiry into the industry -
which looked for evidence of "monopolies that appear to operate against the public 
interest" 1 7 - suggest once again that little action will be taken against the leading players. 
Government sponsored investigations into the industry have therefore tended to conclude 
that while UK food retailers may abuse and exploit manufacturers and suppliers, the 
practice is good for the consumer because savings tend to be passed on through lower 
prices. As the number of major food retailers has fallen and the 'big five' have increased 
their market share (4.2. p.91), it is fair to assume that retailer influence over suppliers has 
increased, yet the 1990s witnessed a considerable softening in retailer attitudes towards 
suppliers [Hobson, 1992; Tenser, 1995], It is suggested that the primary effect of the 
concentration of power in the industry is heightened competition, rather than abuse of 
Financial Times, N o v e m b e r 2 , 1999; p . 2 
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suppliers, as the surviving Operators are those that were harder to compete with than those 
that have failed or been absorbed by other retailers: 
/ think the most important effect of concentration within the indûstry is grëatér 
compétition - as they have got fewer, it has got tougher. ït is quite simple, y ou 
take the most trade from the weakest competitor, although you may take a little 
trade from the strongest as well. There was a time when there were a lot of 
inadequate, smallish, medium sizeü1 super market s, which weren't very well run, 
and were very vulnerable, lots of names have gone, like FineFare, Allied 
Suppliers. These were weak competitors and they went out of business in the 
end. So this was concentration. So what it meant was (hat to doy.well, you had to 
take more trade from your biggest competitors, you couldn't rely.ön taking trade 
from weak ones. The Co-op was the biggest example, we were all taking ahuge 
atnount of trade from the Co-op. Wlien I started they had a huge share of the 
trade, and now they have realìy a very small share of the trade, so there were 
always ways of building up trade from them. But now you have got to take trade 
from the big competitors, really, and you only do that by being very tough on 
pric.e. So the answer to the effect of concentration is in my yiew is greater 
compétition. 
[hora Sainsbury. of Presión Gandovéf KG] 
5.1.v The deregulation of shopping hours 
The Shops Act 1950 prohibited "...the sale of all but a very limited range of necessary 
items to the public" [Burke and Shackleton, 1996; p.60] on Sundays and after 8pm on 
other days [Morris and Jaffer, 1983; p. 138], meaning that most shops had to cióse by 8pm 
on weekdays and remain closed on Sundays. With time, the anomalies of the law which 
allowed newspapers but not bibles, and fresh cream but not evaporated milk to be sold on 
Sundays [Burke and Shackleton, 1996; p.60-61] led to widespread discontent, and certain 
retailers began to illegally open their doors to the public on Sundays. As this became 
more common over the years, reform of the law became more desirable if only to regúlate 
the length of Sunday opening and to encourage reasonable terms and a prcmium wage to 
compénsate employees for antisocial hours. Thus 22 Parliamentary Bills between 1950 
and 1993 sought to "reform or repeal" the Sunday Trading Act of 1950 [Burton, 1993; 
p.l 1], all of which were unsuccessful, in general due to the high levéis of opposition. 
Sunday trading caught on during the 1980s, despite the fact that it was ¡Ilegal in England 
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and Wales (with the exception of a handful of retail types, such as newsagents). A 1984 
study of Sunday trading in Cardiff found that just under half of all purchases made on 
Sunday were of illegal items [Wrigley and Guy, 1984; p.239], thus there was widespread 
law breaking. Local authorities were not keen on prosecuting retailers for breaking 
Sunday trading laws, retailers were keen to gain an extra day's sales, and consumers 
demonstrated demand for Sunday shopping through their patronage. 
"In recent years, enforcement of the existìng law has hecome very lax, with 
large retailing business openly flouting the législation. " 
[Morris and Jaffer, 1983;p.l38] 
This open disregard for the law was particularly noticeable from the mid-1980s [Buckley, 
1995], although even as far back as 1949, there was a marked movement towards Sunday 
trading by many grocers, who "defended the small man 's tight to seil on his "best 
trading day of the week- Sunday". The law in this regard was ignored over a wide area 
from Carliste down to parts of Wales. " l s 
Sunday trading laws were finally reformed when the Sunday Trading Act 1994 came into 
force on 26 August, 1994 l 9. The new act permilted ail goods to be sold on Sundays, 
while restricting large stores (defined as having a sales area in excess of 280 m 2 , 
équivalent to just over 3000 ft2) to six hours trading. It also gave shop workers new 
rights, and made dismissal or other disciplinary action for declining work on Sundays 
illegal 3 . Further libéralisation of trading hours came in December 1994, when the 
Deregulation Act "removed all restrictions on shop opening hours during the week, and 
for smaller ones on Sundays" [Buckley, 1995]. All UK retailers could subsequently open 
for 24 hours a day during the week, and small stores could remain open continuously, 
seven days a week. 
'For and against' reform of the 1950 Shops Act: 
When retailers opened illegally on Sundays (or even legally in Scotland where Sunday 
The Grocei-, N o v e m b e r 19, 1949; p .17 
Internationaljournal of Retail & Distribution Management, 1994, 22(8) , pp . 11-12 
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trading laws were different), the fact that the public responded and patronised these 
establishments suggested that the consumer was in favour of Sunday opening. Demand 
for Sunday opening was increasing as consumers changed over the years, with increasing 
numbers of dual income households, more single person households, and more shift 
work. Described as evidently keen to shop on Sundays [Burton, 1993; p.7], the changing 
demands of consumers provided the market necessary to make Sunday opening feasible 
for retailers from around the beginning of the 1980s: 
"We were arguing in the 1980s, the 1970s really, to stay open longer. Teseo 
were seen to be revolutionary for staying open until 7'or.8 o'clock on a 
Thursday. You just couldn't stay open - except for one night a.week. Saturday 
afternoons were still a half day. Multiple retailers wanted to stay open longer 
because there were more and more working women, and they wanted to provide 
the convenience, and the opportunity tö shop outside of working hours. 
If you went into, the shops, you had. to-queue, because the only, time you could 
shop was when every one else could shop. It was ridicidous,. so to actually 
spread the load had got to be hugely productive for all concerned:'' 
[Mike Groves] 
A key factor delaying reform of the 1950 Shops Act was the influence of trade unions, 
who feared that Sunday trading would affect the rest days of shop workers and disrupt 
family life. Certain retailers, particularly small ones, opposed changing the law. as small 
stores were permitted to open, and stood to lose their Sunday trading monopolies. 
Religious organisations were also opposed to reform of the law, for the obvious reason 
that they wanted the Sabbath to remain a day of rest for shop workers: 
"What an unholy alliance of thé trade unions and the Lord's; Day Observance 
Society to say we shouldn't shop On Sundays!" 
[Denis Cassidy] 
Thus there was a strong alliance of powerful organisations lobbying against reform of the 
1950 Shops Act, demonstrated by the 22 failed attempts at reform. The voice and actions 
of the consumer, strong demand, and widespread law-breaking by some large retailers, 
shifted the balance and Sunday and evening opening hours were deregulated in August 
and December 1994 respectively. 
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Winners and losers from the Sunday Trading Act 1994: 
Any change in législation results in winners and losers, and the Sunday Trading Act was 
no exception. Prior to the change in the law, those who would lose and benefit were 
summarised as follows: 
"Those opposing such a change - notahly the more established retailer and the 
trade unions - daim thaï the industry will he damaged. Those in favour -
consumer groups. rapidly growing retati husinesses, notably DIY retailers and 
superstore Operators - argue that the change is widely desired by consumers and 
will generate additional retali sales. " 
[Morris and Jaffer, 1983; p.139] 
Consultancy reports suggest that little additional trade is created by Sunday trading, with 
Healey and Baker [1996] finding that free-standing supermarkets were the key gainers 
from Sunday trading, and that the same level of weekly consumer expenditure was re-
arranged, rather than extra trade being generated. Similarly, Kay et al [1984; p.11-12] 
expected that "...the majority of Sunday sales would be drawn ftom other commodities, 
other retailers, or other days of the week", resulting in increased retailing costs per unit of 
sales, and Kirby [1984; p.233-234] predicted that libéralisation of trading hours would 
"accelerate the decline of the small independent store, by removing one of their few 
trading advantages over large, multiple organisations" and "lead to an increase in the 
concentration of power". Conversely, US research has found that Sunday trading drives 
increased economie activity through higher employment and increased per capita income 
[Laband and Heinbuch, 1987;p.205] 
Competitive forces were expected to drive widespread Sunday opening, with Townsend 
and Schulter [1985; p.3] claiming that "the market opérâtes in such a way that many 
retailers will open even though collectively il would have been more profitable for them 
to stay shuf'. The pressure on marginal retailing would be intensified. because of the 
rising cost of sales [Kay et al, 1984; p.12], effectively driving "...accélération of the trend 
towards the disappearance from the market place of independent traders and towards 
increasing concentration among multiples." [ibid., p. 12] 
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In short, there are two sides to the argument, one being that by opening for longer, fixed 
costs are used more efficiently, with overheads absorbed over a longer working week and 
a higher turnover. The other is that the retail market is relatively fixed, and that by 
opening for longer, variable costs increase, merely spreading the turnover over seven 
days instead of six, meaning that a store, chain, or industry effectively would have to 
absorb higher variable costs into a fixed turnover, reducing profit margins: 
"... people like Sainsbury 's and M&S didn7 want Sunday trading. In faci 
trading on Sundays is a trade off, on the one band you utilise your fixed costs 
more effectively, property for example. But on the other band, your variable 
costs go up, labour costs... Ft is up toyou now to make the most of the beneficiai 
impact on the équation and reduce the others. Now, that is a case where 
consumer préférence, as it were, was ahead ofthe govemmenl. " 
[Denis Cassidyj 
The Institute of Fiscal Studies took the latter view, that extended hours would not resuit 
in sufficient gains in turnover and would therefore squeeze profit margins, particularly in 
small stores: 
"The Institute for Fiscal Studies thinks that after deregulation in England and 
Wales, over-capacity in retailing would mean tighter profit margins and more 
shop closures. The existing trends towards bigger shops and more part-time 
women workers would thus be accelerated. " 20 
The importance ofthe outlct: 
In fact, the Institute for Fiscal Studies were correct in their assertion that the small store 
would suffer, although it was perhaps not entirely because of falling profit margins, it was 
also connected with being forced to open by competitive pressures (see below), while not 
proving attractive enough to the Sunday consumer, who has more time to travel, browse 
and to generally shop than the weekday consumer. Thus outlets providing a large range of 
foods, non-foods, car parking, and services such as in-store restaurants proved to be the 
key beneficiari es of Sunday opening, because consumers were Willing to travel further to 
reach such outlets, passing medium sized stores on the way, supporting Dunn and 
Wrigley's [1984] findings that store loyalty could be either negative, due to necessity, or 
The Economista Apri l 5, 1986, p.29 
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positive, due to choice. A resulting decline in small, local shops would further alienate 
'disadvantaged shoppers', identified as the least mobile sectors of the community, those 
without the finance to bulk buy, households without adequate storage space or 
equipment, or the ability to plan meals in advance, all of which have particular need of 
small shops [Kirby, 1975; p.500; also see Westlake, 1993]. In effect, Sunday opening 
meant that non-disadvantaged consumers were able to exercise their choice without 
worrying so much about time spent shopping and travelling to the store: 
"I think that the good, large supermarket, with all the conveniences that a large 
supermarket has, gains trade from Sunday trading, because it is worth going 
further to on a Sunday to get your supplies, as it were. You have got the 
advantages of all the things that you like; like lots of range, a coffee shop; 
petrol, all those things. And if you are a medium sized, fairly ordinary 
supermarket you lose trade, because those are the supermarkets that people go 
to because they happen to be the nearest, even though they don't think.it's the 
best, but they haven't got time to go that bit further to the large Sainsbury's or 
the large Tesco, or whatever. So I would say that Sunday trading benefited: the. 
best large supermarkets, at the. cost of the smaller ones. Not the small. or 
smallest; but smaller. They still have jo. open, to be. co mpetitive, as it were,; '• but 
they wouldn't get extra business, they would .probably lose it on the whole: " ;: . .: 
[Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG] 
In effect, the counter arguments put forward above are correct - that Sunday opening 
would either generate extra trade, effectively lowering fixed overheads, or that it would 
merely divert trade from other days, resulting in higher variable overheads. However, in 
reality, the counter arguments operate at individual store level, with the sum of the parts 
adding up to affect each operator as a whole. While larger stores, well suited to Sunday 
trading, gained turnover and therefore absorbed their fixed costs more effectively, small 
to medium sized stores inconveniently located for car access were faced with an overall 
loss of trade to the larger stores, while suffering increased variable costs through the 
forces of competition which tend to force them to open on Sundays all the same, see 'the 
influence of competition' below: 
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Tony Campbell: "On the extended hours, and on Sunday trading in particular, 
we traded well, because we bave a big non-food division, including a big. 
clothing division. The clothing and the home & leisure department afe 
catégories that shop vety nicely on Sundays, because Sunday is much more of a 
fatnily occasion. Ifyou go into a store on a Sunday you can see that it is mum, 
dad and the kids. " 
Roger Clough: "And they spend morepresumably? " 
Tony Campbell: 'Tes, they spend more, and they spend more in those more 
discretionary catégories, because they are together. ". 
[Tony Campbell] 
In effect, Sunday trading drove the trend towards larger, multiple-owned stores which 
gained market share at the expense of smaller, independently-owned stores (4.1. p.85), by 
giving competitive advantage to large, out-of-town stores. It also removed one of the few 
advantages of small, independent shops, who no longer retained a monopoly on Sunday 
shopping, effectively harming their business, although the 6 hour Sunday trading limit 
imposed on medium to large stores went some way to redress this balance. 
The influence of compétition: 
Once Sunday trading laws had been repealed, competitive pressure began to force 
retailers to adopt near 'universal' Sunday trading. 
Roger Clough: Haye some smaller supermarkets. beert, forceâto ppëh?.. ;•" 
Lord Sainsbury: Ôh somewere, yes, '• certqinly. Forced by pressure ôf compétition 
. [Lord Sainsbury of Preston Cando.ver KGj 
In effect, many medium-sized supermarkets were caught in a no win situation. They 
could choose to remain closed on Sundays, and lose a proportion of their customers, who 
would choose to shop elsewhere on a Sunday. The store would therefore become less 
profitable through the loss of customers who previously shopped on weekdays, but now 
wanted to do so on Sundays. Yet by opening on Sunday the store may not gain any extra 
trade because customers tend to fréquent large stores on Sundays (see above), meaning 
that turnover would merely be spread out over seven rather than six days, and may even 
decline, while staff and store mnning costs rise. The real question, therefore, is not who 
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gained most out of the deregulation of shopping, it is "how should retailers maximise 
profit in a new competitive playing field, by opening on Sundays or staying closed, 
bearing in mind most competitors will be open?". The real answer must be that 
competitive pressures have forced many medium sized stores to open on Sundays, with it 
being the better of only two unattractive options. 
Benefits of continuous trading: 
Sunday and night time opening bring further benefits unrelated to the increased turnover 
of the store, such as continuous restocking of products, particularly perishables. With no 
need to close the store on Saturday only to reopen on Monday with unsaleable goods past 
their 'sell-by' dates, a continuous cycle helps to reduce wastage if the necessary systems 
are operating efficiently: 
"I think that they are now organising extended hours to improve efficiency..!dm 
told that in terms of rotating stock and applying business activity; it is easier-to-
do it on a seven-day week than it.is on a six-day -week.-:.Uninterrupted! • ThereK-is'a 
flow. They are also quite•canny,, because they don't open, everythingali'night; 
some of the departments are closed. - they don't have cafeterias all night, the 
wines and spirits are closed because of the licensing regulations; they tend to 
put the brakes on a number of the fresh food counters, and so forth. They can 
run the stores with low staff costs, especially now that the legislation allows for 
contracts with employees to be much more flexible; so part-timers •cànjurmìip&t' 
nights. And I am sure that they can make a profit. And they are hot doihjgit 
everywhere - they are doing it where it suits. " ' 
[Tony de Angeli] 
Thus, the smooth operation of the longer week is a significant by-product of the 
deregulation of shop opening hours, and retailers are selective in the departments and 
stores that they open in order to maintain maximum profitability, although competitive 
pressures, rather than the carrot of additional profitability, can sometimes force longer 
opening hours. 
S.l.vi. Miscellaneous government factors 
Introduction of VAT 
Although it did not explicitly disadvantage small operators, the 1972 introduction of 
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VAT did impose "a major burden on small businesses and many of the self-employed" 
[Dawson and Kirby, 1977; p.75-76] due to their lack of time and expertise. It can 
therefore be considered a factor disadvantaging the small operator [ibid.], promoting 
further polarisation into large and small organisations (7.1.4. p.274). 
EU Single Market 1992-3 
The birth of the European Single Market in 1993 gave European residents the freedom to 
shop in any member state they pleased. UK duty on alcohol and tobacco in particular is 
high compared to those of continental partners, and has driven at least 5% of the £30 
billion UK market for alcohol 2 1 , and 8% 2 2 of the £12 billion UK market for tobacco to 
be purchased in mainline Europe, whether legitimately or through smuggling. This results 
in lower sales of these products for UK retailers, including UK food retailers. Changes in 
indirect taxes were also found to substantially increase the volume of cross-border trade 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland [Fitzgerald et al, 1988; p . l ] . In 
summary, while taxation generally affects all domestic food retailers equally, it can cause 
diversion of trade to other countries, the development of a black market, and the 
perception of over-pricing compared to foreign food retailers, all of which are damaging 
to the trade of UK food retailers. Smaller operators are particularly disadvantaged by the 
loss of trade to continental Europe, as the convenience store sector holds over 65% of the 
UK tobacco market , 9 , and therefore feels the impact of any loss most severely. 
The end of major domestic mergers? 
The mid-1990s saw the government becoming increasingly concerned about local 
monopolistic tendencies in UK food retailing, resulting in the Office of Fair Trading 
becoming less likely to allow further consolidation among leading industry players: 
21
 The Grocer, December 19, 1998; p .79, "Top Products Survey: Wine, Beers , Spirits and T o b a c c o " . 
" Financial Times, March 3 , 1999; p.21 
2 3
 The Grocer, July 8, 2000; supplement , p.S2 
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You have got the further constraint of the Office of Fair Trading in this country, 
which basically keeps an eye on local monopolies and sought to prevent further 
integration which might allow some player to have a major monopoly in any 
particular community... So that's a dissuading factor. 
[John Fletcher] 
Government attitude in this respect has effectively reduced the market share and 
concentration of the country's leading grocery retailers, illustrated by Asda and Safeway 
abandoning 1997 merger talks because of the likelihood of the OFT referring the case to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, meaning that even if eventually permitted, the 
merger process would be long and painful for the parties involved 2 4. Indirectly, this 
government imposed brake on takeover, coupled with the near blanket ban on out-of-
town development (S.l.iii. p. 127), has reduced growth in the market share of leading UK 
food retailers, making them more likely targets for foreign predators. Asda were bought 
by US giant Wal-Mart in 1999, yet it is arguable whether this would have occurred had 
they successfully merged with Safeway. 
Minimum Wage 
Statutory wage regulation in the early-1950s resulted in successive salary increases for 
retail employees, putting pressure on the profit margins of the grocery sector (5.1.i, 
p.l 16). The introduction of the minimum wage in 1999 will have had little or no effect on 
the grocery retailers who already paid a reasonable wage. However, it will have had a 
more profound effect on the lower payers in the industry, although the low level at which 
it was introduced has meant that there has in fact been little impact. A higher minimum 
wage in the future would have little or no effect on those who pay well in excess of the 
current rate, and could work to their advantage by squeezing lower paying players. 
Stronger players therefore stand to benefit from minimum wage legislation, while weak 
players who pay poor wages will be badly affected, suggesting that Darwinian 'survival 
of the fittest', as proposed by Dreesmann [1968], can be driven by regulatory change. 
The Grocer, Oc tober 4, 1997; p.32 
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Effects of Taxation 
The effects of taxation are broadly similar for all U'K food retailers, as they all operate 
under the same taxation regime, meaning that changes have similar effects on each 
player. However, disparity with overseas taxation levels can create lo wer or higher costs 
in the industry when compared to overseas opérations (see below). It is suggested that 
cross border comparisons are unfair to UK food retailers for several reasons, one of which 
is the UK fuel taxation regime resulting in higher distribution costs which are eventually 
passed on to the consumer: 
"li costs £300 per tony more in Britain -to fili up with diesel'than it does on the 
continent. They dont tell you that, they say environmental responsibilities are 
stich that we are going to put higher and higher tax on ii: They don't say, but the 
cost to you, the taxpayer, and you, the consumer, is that ali the goods you buy in 
the shops are going to be fractionally more expensive than they would otherwìse 
have been... " 
[Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG] 
A counter argument to this is that high fuel duties enable lower VAT, business taxes, and 
national insurance charges 3 i , ali of which could counter-balance the effect of higher 
transportation costs on retailers' profits. In addition, high levels of duty on certain 
produets such as petrol and tobacco has resulted in a degree of price inelasticity for thèse 
produets, reducing the likelihood of retailers entering into fierce price compétition over 
these lines (£5 , p.247-248). 
General effects of government policy 
Governmental policy has profoundly affected the development of UK food retailing post-
1950, and continues to do so. It was shown above that rationing and government 
controlied profit margins drove UK food retailers to experiment with self-service as a 
low-cost alternative to counter service, and that the abolition of RPM drove consolidation 
in the sector, empowering UK food retailers over suppliers. Planning régulations stifled 
the development of early supermarkets and stores with car parking, particularly the 
2 5
 scc editcd transcript of Tony Blair ' s speech given to the Labour Party conférence o n 26 Sep tember 2000 , 
The Times, 27 Sep tember 2000, p.8 
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superstore. In response operators found ways around the system, but the planning regime 
has slowed UK food retail development and altered its course. The deregulation of 
trading hours in 1994 and the introduction of the minimum wage in 1999 rebased the 
industry, proving beneficial for some operators and detrimental to others. Reluctance to 
allow domestic merger activity has slowed concentration in the sector and created foreign 
interest in the industry, while taxation levels have increased the costs of UK operators 
and diverted the purchase of certain products to other European countries, driving down 
UK sales. In short, the effects of government policies have been far reaching in UK food 
retailing, and have led to operators having to improve business efficiency: 
"...quite visibly within retailing circles generally, retailers were terrified by the 
weight of legislation that followed Labour coming back in 1974. They hadn't 
been particularly good employers, with some notable exceptions, and I think 
governments' attempts at controls or imposition of different laws only created 
the need for retailers to become better professional managers, which they did. " 
[Denis Cassidy] 
Much government legislation has worked against smaller shops, particularly the decision 
to abolish RPM in 1964. The (abandoned) Food Standards Agency charges would have 
favoured large retailers over their smaller counterparts [Trevor Dixon], as uniform 
business rates do: 
"...I think the government have been very unhelpful with things like uniform 
business rates on small shopkeepers. During a period of low inflation and very 
often deflation, smaller shop costs have gone up. " 
[Denis Cassidy] 
To summarise, legislative changes and changes in government attitude (whether local, 
national or European) can favour large retailers over small, large store operators over 
small, UK food retailers over European competitors, or vice-versa in all cases. The 
regulatory environment is constantly changing, whether due to the influence of local 
government, the newly devolved regional governments, Westminster or Brussels, and it 
will continue to affect the structure of UK food retailing for the foreseeable future. 
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5.2 Socio-economie Change 
The second half of the 20L h Century brought profound changes in the socio-economie 
status of UK consumers, with women becoming increasingly economically active, and 
the percentage of men in employment falling (5.2.ij. Wages rose dramatically, which in 
hand with higher overail participation in employment provided a double boost to 
household income (5.2.ÜV further complimented by the consumer credit boom (5.2.iv). 
Consumer tastes changed over the period (5.2.iii). and the retail offering evolved in 
response. With a larger proportion of the population in employment, the retail system 
developed to suit the consumer with less time and more money, evolving from a pattern 
of fragmented daily shopping to offer 'one-stop shopping' facilities under one roof , 
while the retail offering progressively moved to favour convenience over price (4.5. 
p.108-109). 
The importance of socio-economie change is evident, as it has profoundly influenced the 
retail structure, and those Operators that have responded most effectively to it are those 
that have survived and prospered. 
5.2.Ì The growth of female employment 
From the mid-20 l h Century the number of women in the workforce began to increase 
dramatically, with the first boost to this being World War II, when women filled the jobs 
vacated by men entering military service. Female employment Ievels remained higher 
after the war than before, despite trade union insistence on jobs being retumed to men 
[Summerfield, 1989; p. 187-188]. This increase was due primarily to increased 
participation from older, married women [ibid.; p.188], and the continuing graduai 
increase in the number of working women over the second half of the 20 t h Century 
resulted in a profound change in the structure of society. 
The proportion of men in work has fallen from over 80% in 1971 to just under 74% in 
1991, and the fall appears to have been largely arrested by the late-1980s, while the 
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Proportion of women in employment has continued to rise at a relatively Constant rate, 
from just under 44% in 1971 to over 52% two decades later (figure 5.2.i.a). In effect the 
increasing number of women in work has more than compensated for the falling nuniber 
of working men, resulting in an increase in the overall proportion of the population in 
work, and bringing increased prosperity to the country. 
Figure 5.2.i.a: Civilian labour force economic activity rates, by gender and age: 
% Age All aged 16 & over 
16-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 (includes those over 65) 
Males 
1971 69.4% 87.7% 94.6% 96.2% 95.7% 93.0% 82.9% 80.5% 
1976 70.5% 85.9% 95.1% 96.4% 96.1% 92.4% 80.4% 78.9% 
1981 72.4% 85.1% 95.4% 96.0% 94.8% 89.4% 69.3% 76.5% 
1986 73.2% 86.2% 93.7% 94.8% 91.8% 81.1% 53.8% 73.8% 
1991 70.4% 85.6% 94.0% 94.7% 91.0% 80.3% 54.1% 73.7% 
Females 
1971 65.0% 60.2% 45.5% 59.7% 62.0% 50.9% 28.8% 43.9% 
1976 68.2% 64.8% 54.0% 67.4% 66.5% 54.3% 26.9% 46.8% 
1981 70.4% 68.8% 56.4% 68.0% 68.0% 53.4% 23.3% 47.6% 
1986 70.3% 70.7% 63.5% 72.1% 70.5% 51.8% 19.9% 49.6% 
1991 69.1% 72.7% 69.7% 76.7% 72.7% 54.5% 24.1% 52.4% 
Based on the percentage of the resident populat ion w h o are in the civilian labour force, source: Depar tment 
of Employmen t , ( table 4.4, Social Trends 1970-1995, C D R O M , Central Statistical Office, 1995). 
The group showing the largest decline in economic activity is males aged over 45, with 
the decline being larger in the over 55s and over 60s in particular. While there have been 
minor reduetions in the percentage of men in work of most other ages, these changes are 
reasonably small compared to those aged over 45. Older married women were also 
increasingly entering into employment [Summerfield, 1989; p. 188]. 
In short, the increase in working women has occurred as males in particular have retired 
earlier - whether voluntarily or not. The overall effect of the changing working 
population is increased economic activity, a larger workforce, and thus increased national 
prosperity. 
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Graph 5.2.i.b, derived from figure 5.2.i.a: 
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As more women went to vvork and the number of dual income households increased, time 
available for shopping fell. Whereas previously housewives had time to shop daily in a 
variety of shops, less price conscious households emerged without time for fragmented 
daily shopping. This drove the development of large stores with the facility to shop 
weekly or fortnightly for a full array of products (6.3. p.219), although this was made 
possible by consumer and retailer adoption of new technology (5.3.i. p. 158-159 and 
5.3.ii. p.l62V 
5.2.ii Rising (and falling) consumer incomes 
Section 5.2.Ì considered the importance of working women to household income and 
retail provision. While working women have driven an increase in the working 
population, and hence household income, there was also a long-term improvement in 
earnings during the second half of the 20 l h century, with the average weekly wage 
increasing from £179 in 1955 to £384 in 1998, in real (1998) priées, more than doubling 
after taking account of inflation. There were periods when real incomes fell, notably the 
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mid-1970s, which was a product of the oil crisis of the mid- 1970s leading to high levels 
of inflation. In 1975, the government and trade unions agreed to allow only below-
inflation salary increases in order to curb runaway inflation [see Benn, 1989; p .4 l l ; 
p.528], which was running as high as 23% in 1976 2 6. While thèse measures helped 
control inflation, they resulted in declining real incomes: 
Figure 5.2.ii.a. Average earnings in £ per week, in 1998 terms, 1956-1998: 
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Source of figures: aclapted from: Department of Employment Gazette, April 1971, table 132, p.412; Employment Gazette, January 1980, table 132, p.94; 
Emptoyment Gazette, January 1990, table 6.4, p.S54; and Labour Market Trends, February 1999. table H. 14, p.S86 
Limitations of figures: Figures for 1972 to 1998 arc based on earnings in all sectors of the economy, while figures for 1956 to 1971 arc bascd 
solcly on changes in earnings of manual workers- Figures to 1982 arc bascd on maies over 21 years of âge and females 
over 18 ycars of age, while ligures from 1983 are based on workers rcccivmg 'adult rates' 
The relationship between fading real incomes and priée consciousness 
Falling real consumer incomes in the mid-1970s created an increasingly price conscious 
grocery shopper, with Teseo reporting that "the general public was becoming price-
conscious in a way {hat had not been apparent for many years. These trends were 
intensified as inflation began to war away and wages began to fall behind. " 2 l . At least 
one major UK food retailer, thereforc, believed that consumers had become more price-
conscious due to falling real incomes and would respond well to lower priées, resulting in 
Tesco's 1977 Operation Checkout, a price-cutting campaign which invested the savings 
26 Department of Employment Gazette, January 1979, table 132, p .96 
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achieved by dropping trading stamps in lower prices: 
"In thefamoas Operation Checkout of 1977-78, Teseo drove its market share up 
from under 8 per cent to 12 per cent, by loweringprices 9 per cent. " 
[Raven et al, 1998; p.29] 
With hindsigbt, the campaign was obviously successful, increasing their market share by 
40 to 50 per cent [Killen and Pattison, 1987; p.76, Raven et al, 1998, p.29]. However, it 
involved a "calculated risk" [Tan MacLaurin, Managing Director, Teseo Ltd. 2 7], as 
although the basis of the décision rested on trading stamps being past their useful 
lifetime, there was disagreement within the company as to whether this was true 
[MacLaurin, 1999]. 
Both International and Sainsbury's joined the price-war started by Operation Checkout. 
International launched a low-cost, no frills range of household basics: 
"With an awareness of the price-conscious attitude which prevails at the 
moment, International have launched a 'Plain and Simple ' campaign which 
answers housewives ' fears of overspending their budgets and at the same time 
gives them value for money. ' ' 2 3 
Sainsbury's launched theîr own version of Operation Checkout, the deputy chairman, 
E.Roy Griffiths saying, "It would be a serious Understatement to say that the food retali 
industry is presently highly price competitive "29. 
Other forces are also quoted as driving the grocery price wars of the late-1970s, such as 
the extra capacity gained from superstore development against a depressed market 3 0 , the 
lower operating costs of superstore opérations 4 , and a slowing in the rate of multiple 
growth at the expense of co-operative and independent Operators (4.1. p. 85). A "reversal 
in the previous long-term decline in the fortunes of the co-operative grocety sector" 22, 
27
 Retai! & Distribution Management, Nov. /Dec . 1977, p p . 2 9 - 3 1 . 
2S
 Retai! & Distribution Management, Nov. /Dec . 1977, p . 19 
2 9
 Retai! & Distribution Management, Jul . /Aug. 1978, p .48 
3 0
 Retai! & Distribution Management, Nov. /Dec. 1978, pp. 10-15. 
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although short-lived, was also said to be a contributing factor, yet it is clear from 
retailers' comments that the primary force driving price-cutting in the late-1970s was the 
increasingly price conscious consumer of the period. 
The relationship between rising real incomes and improvements to the shopping 
expérience 
The end of the period of intense price compétition was also consumer driven, because 
while not expressly asking to pay more, consumers were increasingly "looking beyond 
price alone for value. " *\ and the quality of the total shopping expérience increased in 
importance as real incomes returned to growth (figure 5,2.ii.a, p.147). Campaigns such as 
Operation Checkout gave way to compétition over services and facilities as the 1980s 
progressed: 
Tesco has grown up with ils customers. In other words,. as the great working 
class masses started to change - change their outlook, change the things that 
they were interested in - Tesco has ail changed too. Sô in many wqys the change 
in Tesco> has' niirrored the change in sàciety: 
[Terry Leahy, speaking in BritisH Empires:. Xesco, Channel Four, 
Although other factors such as inter-superstore compétition drove increasing investment 
in the shopping expérience (6.3. p,229), causing revolution of the Wheel of Retailing 
[Hollander, 1960], the réalisation among Operators that fierce price compétition "leads to 
reduced profits for all " [Killen and Pattison, 1987, p.76], and that the changing consumer 
no longer prioritised price alone was the key driver of change once again. Price wars 
therefore tend to be a function of falling real incomes, while improvements to the 
shopping expérience tend to be driven by increasing real incomes, supporting the 'secular 
trends' hypothesis [Hollander, 1960], which argues that rising consumer incomes are the 
key force driving trading up of the 'Wheel of Retailing'. 
Retai! & Distribution Management, Jul . /Aug. 1984, p.12 
1 4 9 
; "Thè combination of the ordinary man's greater: wealth : and increasing House 
an d kitchen size, : allowing. room - for fridges and storing, food, meant thai the 
frequency; of shopping tended to go.downwards,.The frequency 
down; and the size of purchase went up. And then of course the biggest factor of 
all.was the car. The weight, ofpurchase of shopping toddy.is huge; so the car has 
brought shopping-frequency down." 
[Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG] 
Rising real incomes drove improvement in the quality of the grocery retail offering as 
consumers became more attracted to pleasant stores, with facilities such as restaurants, in-
stare bakeries, delicatessens, quality products and ample car parking. In effect, 'leisure 
shopping' was developing, whereby shoppers gain satisfaction and enjoyment from 
shopping in a pleasurable environment [Newby, 1993; p.213]. Price, although remaining 
important, declined in importance relative to the 'shopping experience' as consumers 
increasingly favoured it over price issues alone: 
It was. quite, clear, when-wé '• came • out of stamps in .1977, fluii, customers : wanted 
more than just prices, they wanted, a decent facility in which to shop; and they 
wanted quality' merchandise at a good price. -At that tiitie.you hù& 
food, reta Her s;. Marks' : & Spen cer and Sainsbury; who- were yety expensive^ the 
quality was excellent, but it was '• expensive. \ Wëfell,there, was- room for; a quality 
retailer who "was not so expensive. So we set our sights on the quality of hiarks 
&. Spencer, but d;much;more, reasonable priced0i(T that ; Oyer the yeiirs;weyv0ré; 
able to. achieve;:. Good retailing, is consumer.driven; " \• 
[Cord MäcLaurih òf Knebworth Dli]; 
As retailers traded up their facilities and offerings in response to the changing consumer, 
retailers previously occupying the highest quality pole found their differentiation falling, 
largely explaining the poor performances of Sainsbury's and M&S during the late-1990s. 
While price becomes more important in times of recession, and the number of 'sales' 
increases [David Kirby], over time consumers in general became more willing to pay for 
quality and value, rather than basing their purchasing decisions on price alone, and UK 
food retailers responded to this emerging trend, driven primarily by increasing household 
incomes: 
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"People don't mìndpayìngfor quality and conveniénce. It is a fàllacy that price 
is all-important topeople in the UK. Value is criticai. Priée is onlypart ofthqi-
people have proved ti me and lime again that thèy will pay for better quality and 
heiter service. " 
[David Stoddart] 
The more wealthy sybaritic consumer again drove retail change with the development of 
delivered shopping facilities in the late-1990s. Initially the income is necessary to enable 
the adoption of new technology - internet access via computer or television - as for 
fridges and motor cars in the 1960s. However the internet is accessed, the user must have 
the financial means to fund this access, although usage in the workplace is common. At 
présent the consumer must also generally have the means to fund a delivery charge, 
although there are exceptions to this mie, with some retailers (Asda and Iceland for 
example) not charging for delivery, subject to a minimum order. The key force driving 
delivered grocery shopping, however, is the value of the consumer's time. Research 
suggests that over an average UK lifetime, two years are spent in a supermarket - or 3% 
of the working lifetime [Seth and Randall, 1999; p209 - quoting 1999 research completed 
by Cable and Wireless], and initiatives to reduce this are gathering momentum. 
In short, the retail system reacts to the changing consumer, and the primary changes in 
the consumer have been driven by steadily increasing incomes and rising employment. 
The twin forces of rising household incomes and the associated lack of time for shopping 
resulted in the émergence of 'money rich, time poor \ sybaritic consumers, who attached 
différent values to the shopping expérience than the post-war consumer of the I950s, who 
was primarily motivated by price. 
thè whole objective of the business was.tò move upmarkèt. That coi ncided with 
Thatcher's Britain, when tnany of our custpmers increased in wealth, their 
aspirations changea, and we had a maiyellous period ofabout 6 or 7 yedfs 
whéhwe moved forward, ever upmarkèt;.ih wòhderfulharmony. 
This created an opportunity at the price-sensitive end of the market, for a low-cost 
[Tim iviasòn, speaking m British Empires: Teseo, Chanhëf Four, MM] 
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discount proposition to fulfil the needs of the 'money-poor, tirne-ricìi households, known 
as frontief consumers, with tight budgets and shopping purchases that tend to be small 
and fréquent [Kirby, 1987]. In the early-1990s, European-based hard discounters entered 
the market to fili this need (4,5, p. 109-111) 
5.2.iii Changing consumer tastes 
It was noted above that rising consumer incomes result in only modest Upgrades to 
domestic eating. People will spend a little more on food, but the percentage of total 
consumer expenditure spent on food tends to fall as incomes rise. Food for consumption 
at home is therefore a priority that is eclipsed by other produci catégories as incomes rise, 
meaning that there is inelastic demand for food for consumption at home. 
A key issue outlined in sections 5.2.i/ii was the émergence of the 'money rich, time poor' 
sybaritic consumer, with higher incomes and less free time than had previously been the 
case. UK food retailers tapped this emerging trend successfìiUy with the introduction of 
time-saving prepared foods. Pioneered by Marks and Spencer, and adopted industry-
wide, prepared foods range from washed and peeled vegetables to chilled ready meals. 
'Money rich, time poor' sybaritic consumers effectively value their time more than the 
price différence between prepared and unprepared foods, and are Willing to pay a 
premium to make their lives easier. Consumer taste has evolved, therefore, driving a 
higher degree of processing in the food chain due to increased employment, resulting in a 
less price sensitive consumer with a time shortage. The retailer response to this has 
brought extension of the retail accordion (2.1.21 and increased margins through 
'scrambled merchandising', meaning that overall retail margins rise because of the 
addition of higher margin, more highly processed lines, while the margins of the originai 
products remain static (2.1.0: 
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The grpcery industry is benefitingfröm incréased affluente, bùi competihg with 
mahy othèr drèàs •• of leisure: - Mere people ; spetid money > ; eàting '- oui, • cinema, 
holidays, hobbies, : • ; • what bave you. •: There : is : also compétition for . tinte, so tf 
somebody can offer yousomethingfor£ì that takes 5 minutes, or 30p that takes 
an hour, • thè eus to mers mäy.well, spend £l. Compétition is also abouti ime. 
[Tony-de Angeli] 
Increasing employraent and rising incomes have also brought the means to travel further 
afield than was previously possible. Aided by falling real costs of long distance air travel 
and package holidays, people are better travelled than they were just a generation ago. 
Travel to foreign countries exposes people to foreign cultures and foreign cuisine [Tony 
Campbell], which, coupled with the development of a diverse ethnie UK restaurant scene, 
has resulted in higher demand for exotic food produets. Immigration into the UK supports 
this demand, being said to have "nourished the British palate... most of us grow up with a 
broad knowledge of Indian and Chinese food' 3 2 , and food retailers have reacted by 
introducing foods sourced around the world, many of which were unavailable here just a 
few years ago. The évolution of consumer taste, becoming more exotic and adventurous, 
has therefore driven product diversification into high margin, exotic food, sourced on a 
global basis. 
Consumers developed a taste for (one-stop shopping' (5.3.i. p.159), and therefore 
increasingly favoured large stores over small to medium sized stores, a trend exacerbated 
by the légalisation of Sunday trading, which incréased the appeal of larger stores (S.l.v, 
p.137-138). As consumers increasingly favoured large out-of-town-stores, there was a 
graduai réduction in the number of smaller grocery stores, which resulted in the dramatic 
decline in market share of independent traders and the less severe, yet alarmingly 
constant, decline in co-operative market share. Multiple market share has incréased 
primarily because this sector has most actively developed the larger stores more suited to 
the needs of the changing consumer. 
3 2
 New Statesman and Society, October 27 , 1995, 8(376) , p .46(2) . 
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Consumers have developed a taste for quaìity over the years, which they find very hard to 
relinquish once they have experienced it. This has resulted in an upwards trend in the 
quality of products, whether food, clothing or other products. Changing consumer taste 
has therefore driven the offerings of TJK retailers upmarket: 
• 'Il doesn 't matter whether y òli.; are talkìhg about food òr textiles: For quality 
sHirts, cottoti is quite good becàuse it is a lovely fabric to wear, it hangs Hice, 
and [it feels nice. But when cotton.was first talked about, itwas so expensive, ypu 
goup the quality curve and then pèople decide to büy it beca use it :is: rìew - I 
don'i care whether we are talking.about new foodpw 
price goesup. Bui after a bitpeòplesay, ho I wantthatquality bull wqnt it back 
atthat price- so it levéis outAncltfieri.along comes anotherMuova^ usually 
with quality, tip goes the price àgdih; -and then it ley els off òr it comes down: 
Tlie price goes up and down, the qüaliiy^pnée yóu 've got il goes rémprselèssiy 
upwards, you] tiever go back oh¡qüalityi people riéyer,. evergoibàckwaM^ 
heyer sacrifìce quality. -'•";[ ; .::[De^ K 
The improvements in the quality of UK food retail stores, facilities, services and products 
which began in the early-1980s were therefore food retailers' responses to a changing 
consumer with more money to spend (5.2.ri. p.150-152), who based purchasing decisions 
primarily on quality criteria, rather than price. In addition, consumers were unwilling to 
'trade-down' once they had experienced quality products introduced by retailers, driving 
UK food retailers' offerings, facilities and the overall shopping experience upmarket, 
causing revolution of the 'Wheel of Retailing'. 
Tn short, changing consumer taste affects the food retail industry considerably, and 
impacts not only upon the product range, but also on the lifetime size of stores, the 
quality of products and the quality of the shopping experience. The successful operator 
must respond to and anticipate changing consumer tastes better than the competition, and 
this has tended to drive considerable upgrading of the food retail system. 
5.2.ÍV The consumer credit boom 
Consumer debt is a further influence on UK food retail development, with the amount of 
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credit extended to UK consumers increasing steadily from the early 1970s in particular3 3. 
The amount of credit extended to consumers, excluding mortgage debt, is represented in 
figure 5.2.iv.a, as is the credit card debt component of this: 
Figure 5.2.iv.a: Consumer credit levels. 1985-2001: 
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[source, Financial Statistici!, London, H M S O ; table 9 .3 , p . 104, vo l .338; table 9.3, p . 104, vo l .368 ; table 
3.2b, p .60 , vo l .399 ; table 3.2b, p .60, vo l .435 ; table 3.2b, p . 7 3 , vol .478] 
The boom in consumer credit is an important influence on UK food retail development, 
and, in essence, exacerbâtes trends driven by rising household incomes. In other words, 
the consumer credit boom, in conjunction with rising household incomes, has given UK 
consumers the fmancial muscle to invest in consumer durables and motor cars. Similarly, 
it has given consumers the financial means to bulk-buy when grocery shopping, 
decreasing shopping frequency while driving up transaction sizes, breaking down the 
fragmented shopping patterns of the early post-war period (£3 , p.219). 
In the same vein, the consumer credit boom can be considered to have had an effect on 
3 3
 source: Office for Nat iona l Statistics, via Datastream. 
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consumer price consciousness, driving society towards sybaritic, rather than frontier 
shopping (5.2.Ü, p.152-155), although this does bring with it the increased risk that a 
sudden reduction in consumer debt could have the opposite effect. 
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5.3 Changes in Technology 
During the second half of the 20 t h century the impact of technology vvas important, with 
consumer adoption of technology and advances in retail and distribution technology 
profoundly affecting food retailing. Without technological advance, the retail format 
could not have evolved, chilled foods would be harder to handle, and the large scale of 
retail organisations would be unthinkable. This section examines the developments in 
consumer technology, retail technology and distribution technology, including the supply 
chain, that shaped UK food retailing post-1950. 
5.3.1 Consumer adoption of technology 
Consumer adoption of technology was an important influence on UK food retail 
development post-1950. Consumer adoption of télévisions was followed by refrigerators, 
cars, freezers, microwaves and home computers, ail of which had a varying but 
significant impact on UK food retail development. Although refrigerators and motor cars 
are discussed briefly in section 5.2.ii (p. 150), this section assesses the impact of consumer 
adoption of technology in more détail. 
Consumer adoption of refrigerators gave fresh food purchases a longer life, enabling less 
fréquent shopping, breaking the necessity to shop daily because of the rapid détérioration 
of fresh foods at room temperature. Rising real incomes and the move to monthly pay 
(5.2.ii. p. 150), also drove less fréquent shopping, but this could not have occurred without 
domestic réfrigération, which by 1972 had extended to 73% of households, rising to 95% 
in 1985 (figures 5.3.i.a and 5.3.i.b): 
Figure 5.3.i.a: Consumer durable and motor vehicle pénétration. 1972-1998: 
1972 1975 1979 1981 1983 1985 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 
Refrigerator 73% 88% 92% 93% 94% 95% 
Deep freezer 40% 49% 57% 66% 79% 83% 86% 88% 88% 9 1 % 93% 
Home computer 13% 19% 2 1 % 24% 24% 25% 27% 34% 
Microwave oven 47% 55% 62% 67% 70% 74% 79%> 
1 or more car/van 52% 56% 57% 59% 59% 62% 67% 67% 68% 69% 7 1 % 70% 72% 
[source of statisîics: Livingin Briiain: Results of the 1994 General Household Survey, London, HMSO, 1996, table 2.6, p.26; 
Living in Britain: Results of the 1996 General Household Survey, London, HMSO, 1998, table 3.20, p.40; and Living in 
Britain: Results of the 1998 General Household Survey, London, HMSO, 2000, table 4.23, p.57] 
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Figure 5.3-i.b, consumer durable and motor vehicle pénétration, 1972-1998: 
o—Refrigerator 
ù— Deep freezer 
X— Home computer 
o— Microwave oven 
— 1 or more car/van 
Consumers' financial and technologìcal ability to bulk buy and store foods in the home 
presented a new problem, that of transporting their shopping home. The motor car -
owned by 52% of households in 1972 and 72% in 1998, answered this problem, 
facilitating the transportation of bulk purchases. Adoption of cars accelerated the trend 
towards larger, less fréquent grocery purchases, set in motion by adoption of refrigerators, 
while also allowing retailers to slowly abandon congested high streets in favour of large 
out-of-town stores with car parking (4.3. p.97-98), offering 4one-stop shopping' as 
demanded by the consumer durable and car owning population (5.2.ii. p.150), causing 
accélération of Davidson et al's [1976] retail life cycle (2.1.5) for larger stores at the 
expense of smaller stores: 
"Thëre was.a complete change of attitude,: and we sensed it'front •' our : wiyès) 
Peter Asquith's andmine fin particular.l'live on the outskirts òfteeds,andfny 
wife couldn't park inLéeds; iiwds impossible, so stìe ùsèd to go ibÓtley and do 
the food shopping ihere, wHich was just às nèar. but jit'st a -little'town on the 
outskirts ofLeecis-. Well'/ihat 's. d'stari,- and .of; course' it got bigger and.biggér. 
Non food retailers followéd, for one reason, customers can park. You saia it 
yourselftoday, you didn 't come into Leeds in your car, because you didn 't know 
ifyou would be able to park... " - * 
[SirNoelStockdalè] 
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The rise of the multiple (4.1. p.85) was aided by the introduction of commercial 
television in the mid-l950s, with over 90% of households having a television by 1972, 
enabling commercial television to reach most of the population relatively easily. The 
segmentation of the independent television network into régions aided the development 
of régional multiples [Richard Swaab] by minimising wasted advertising, while operators 
could adopt new régional advertising areas as they expanded geographically (4.4). The 
high cost of television advertising, and the ability of multiple operators to absorb costs 
over a Iarger number of stores (5.3.ii. p. 166), lowering the cost of advertising per £ 
turnover, gave large multiples a competitive advantage over smaller competitors, and 
were therefore factors contributing to the decline of the independent sector (4J_, p.85) and 
subsequently to the decline of small multiple operators (4,2, p.91). 
Consumer adoption of freezers, which rose from 40%o of households in 1979 to 93% by 
1998, also drove less fréquent, higher volume grocery shopping, reinforcing the trend 
begun by adoption of refrigerators. Domestic freezers also drove the development of 
'freezer centres', Bejam and Iceland for example, although in the long-term, success of 
this type of format foundered, with only Iceland remaining in business at the end of the 
20 c h century. Freezers became particularly popular during the mid to late-1970s when 
high inflation drove consumers to stock up with food in order to save money by 
anticipating rapid price rises [John Fletcher]. Over time, dependence on the freezer 
decreased as consumers increasingly favoured fresh foods [Trevor Dixon], and freezer 
size decreased as chest freezers gave way to fridge freezers [Bridget Williams]. 
In short, consumer adoption of freezers was a third force driving less fréquent shopping, 
and the development of specialised freezer centres. Consumer reliance on freezers, 
however, decreased during the 1980s, as consumer préférence moved towards fresh 
foods, indicating a préférence for quality over price, albeit while sacrificing convenience 
(4^ , p.108). 
Most recently, consumer adoption of the computer, and more specifically the internet, has 
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begun once again to dnve retail change. With home computers being developed from the 
early-1980s, household pénétration reached 13% by 1985 and 34% by 1998, driven 
largely by falling costs. Many more people have access to computers elsewhere - at 
work, in libraries, or internet cafés for example. The development of intemet-based home 
delivery Systems from the late-1990s vvould not have been possible without the 
development and adoption of the computer, and total turnover was £50 million in 1999, 
expected to reach around £370 million in 2000 [Fletcher Research, 2000], representing 
0.05% of the £94.7 billion3 4 UK grocery market in 1999, expected to rise to 0.39% in 
2000. While such opérations are small scale at présent, particularly compared to store-
based opérations, rising internet access and new means of accessing the internet (mobile 
phones, digital television), coupled with increasing pressure on consumers' time and 
declining fear of internet fraud will drive this new retail Channel and influence the future 
UK food retail system, and is reflected by the rapid year-on-year growth. The number of 
UK adults accessing the internet reached 15 million in December 1999 [Fletcher 
Research 3 5], representing over 25% of the UK population 3 6: 
Consumer adoption of technology has profoundly affected UK food retailing, because 
retailers have sought to satisfy changing consumer demand. Underpinning all consumer 
adoption of technology are increasing levels of employment and rising real incomes (5.2.Î 
and 5.2-ii). which provide the financial means to adopt new technology. Consumer 
adoption of refrigerators, freezers and cars created demand for 'one-stop shopping' 
facilities with car parking, and enabled the évolution of the retail format - from local 
store to supermarkets and superstores (43). Meanwhile, consumers seeking 'one-stop 
shopping' broke down the fragmented retail system, causing the decline of many 
independent, co-operative and specialist food retailers located in high streets, while many 
multiple Operators were actively moving out-of-town to provide for the changing 
consumer. The introduction of commercial television favoured multiple over independent 
3 4
 source: I G D Research Services, June 1999 figures. See Eurofood, February 17, 2 0 0 0 ; p .21 
3 5
 source of internet pénétra t ion figures: ht tp: / /www.fle tch.co.uk/content /monitor / f indings.html 
3 6
 source of popula t ion figures: 
ht tp . / /n-avel .yahoo.com/Dest ìnat ions/Europe/ /Coun 
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operators, and aided the géographie expansion of leading operators (44), driving the 
decline of small multiples and increasing concentration in the sector (42, p.91). More 
recently, rapid consumer uptake of internet technology has begun to threaten the long-
term fortune of out-of-town superstores, by enabling consumers to order their groceries 
from home, although the effect on the market share of the leading players as a whole will 
be negligible as they are also the leading players in the delivered groceries sector. Such 
developments were forecast for the 1970s by Doody and Davidson [1967], and Kirby 
[1982; p.14] suggested that the end of the century may be a more realistic time span for 
such a change. 
5.3.iî Retail technology 
Consumer adoption of new technology is driven primarily by rising household incomes 
(5.3.i. p,159), but retailer adoption of new technology is also an important factor in the 
development of food retailing post-1950, allowing developments such as self-service, 
supermarkets, superstores, temperature-contro lied central distribution, bar-code scanning, 
data mining and internet shopping Systems. This section explains the impact of retailer 
adoption of technology, as the previous section explained the consumer side of the 
équation. 
The introduction of self-service to UK food retailing following World War II was the first 
'revolutionary' change of the latter 20 t h century [Dawson and Kirby, 1977; p.20], and was 
made possible, like most changes, by advancing technology. Considered fully in section 
4.3, self-service was enabled by improvements in packaging technology, resulting in the 
pre-packaging of products that were previously measured and packaged by individuai 
grocers. The immediate beneficiaries of this were manufacturers [John Fletcher], who 
were able to build brands where previously they had dealt in commodity-like products, 
delivered in large sacks, the quality of which was largely attributed to local grocers. 
However, the development of packaged brands also facilitated self-service food retailing, 
as did advances in in-store réfrigération and cash registers. Technological advances 
therefore made self-service food retailing possible, and more effective once in place, 
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pushing self-service grocery retailing into the rapid growth phase of Davidson et al*s 
[1976] retail life cycle. Subséquent évolution of the retail format (4.3. p.97-98) built upon 
thèse technological advances, as food retailers sought économies of scale while 
responding to consumer demand for 'one-stop shopping' (5.2.Ü. p.150-151). 
Central distribution and warehousing (5.3.iii). introduced by UK multiples from the mid-
1970s, were enabled by advances in refrigerated lorries, improvements to the road 
network, and leading retailers' large scale. It has profoundly affected UK food retailing, 
boosting retailer power over manufacturers, causing the disappearance of some secondary 
manu facturer s, and bringing improved buying terms and margins for retailers. These 
savings have tended to be passed on in the form of an improved shopping expérience 
rather than lower priées (^5 , p.253-254). 
Independent and co-operative Operators were hit by thèse multiple efficiency gains and 
specialists were hit by multiple product diversification (<L4, p.240-241), enabled partly by 
temperature controlied distribution (5.3.iü). Concentration in the multiple sector occurred 
as central distribution facilitated regional expansion of key Operators, at the expense of 
weaker regional Operators (6.4. p.240-24l). 
Central distribution facilitated évolution of the retail format, because collated deliveries 
suit the replenishment requirements of superstores stocking over 25,000 lines, driving 
superstores' growth ( 4 3 , p.97-98). Queues of suppliers vehicles unloading at the rear of 
superstores have been eiiminated, and private label development was aided as Operators 
no longer dépend on manufacturers' co-operation to distribute private label products. 
Fork-lift trucks, warehousing, cages and pallets simplify the stocking of large stores. The 
development of fork-lift trucks allowed warehouse Storage space to be higher, meaning 
that the surface area could be reduced while maintaining Storage volume. In turn this 
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meant that sales area could be extended by converting unnecessary warehouse space 
driving expansion of tbe retail accordion (7,1.2. p.268-269) and scrambled merchandising 
as a cause of trading up (7.1.1. p.261-262). Developments in fork-lift truck handling 
improved manoeuvrability, which had a similar effect, as warehouse space could once 
again be reduced by halving the width of the aisles, presenting further opportunity for 
extension of sales area 3 5 . 
Caging, focused on fast-selling lines, involved manufacturers marking priées on products, 
and packing them into specifïed cages, which were placed directly in the store. This 
improved distribution efficiency, increased the storage capacity of the sales floor, 
eliminated outer packaging, disciplined space allocation on the sales floor, and allowed 
further warehouse space to be converted to sales area 3 5 , driving further expansion of the 
retail accordion (7.1.2. p.268-269) and scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up 
(7.1.1. p.261-262), as well as reducing staffing costs by between 1 and 1.5% 3 S. 
Scanning, EPoS and automatic replenishment Systems brought significant advantages to 
UK food retailers, despite the initial reluctance of some manufacturers to introduce bar-
codes because of the increased costs [Sir Dennis Landau]. Price-coded scanning créâtes 
immédiate sales information, facilitating management décisions and enabling the 
development of automatic product re-ordering Systems, based on weekly, daily or even 
hourly sales of lines, plus other variables such as the weather, promotional activity, and 
time of year. This technology built upon benefits brought by central distribution, as 
"major advantages in information technology greatly increased the relative advantages 
of centralised distribution" [McKinnon, 1990; p.83], enabling 'just-in-time' ordering, 
which reduces stock holding and allows conversion of further storage space to sales area. 
Eventually, data obtained from scanning allowed automatic replenishment Systems to be 
developed, although this took more than a décade [David Malpas]. The primary benefit of 
37
 Retail and Distribution Management, Novembe i /December 1975; " A s d a ' s cost-cutt ing pays d iv idends" 
3 8
 Retail and Distribution Management, March/Apri l 1976; p. 12, "Tesco ' s biggest hypermarke t opens at 
I r lam." 
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scanning was the generation of sales data line-by-line, départment-by-department or 
store-by-store, enabling retailers to access valuable information on current sales trends 
and business activity. It also reduced checkout error and dishonesty, facilitated stock 
control and enabled priée changes to be made more easily [Sir Noel Stockdale]: 
"/ can sii in my office ài Teseo House and look at Aberdeen's. store, and f would 
know how much sugar the Aberdeen store has:sold. in three hours of 
trading in the morning. You have gài ali that information just flowing through to 
you ali the time, so it helps the buyers. it. helps the wàrehouse, it helps 
eveiything. So everything is becoming more ànd mòre automàtica especially now 
with Sunday trading of course. "' 
[LurdMàcLaiiriii ofKneb 
Internet ordering of groceries for home delivery is being driven primarily by consumer 
adoption of internet technology (5.3.i. p.160-161), yet an equally important driver is 
retailer adoption of ordering and delivery facilities, resulting in e-commerce based 
delivery services to meet demand created by rising internet usage among 'time-poor' 
consumers. 
A key factor affecting the success of UK food retailers is their ability to meet consumer 
demand, yet a key factor driving key operators' development of e-commerce based 
delivery services is the fear of a new entrant doing it instead, which would probably result 
in lost business for their existing stores [David Stoddart]. Thus, even if delivered services 
of the main UK food retailers remain small, unprofìtable or marginal, it is préférable to 
losing business to new entrants as superstore customers move to home delivery. In effect, 
by introducing delivery services that compete with their own physical stores, major UK 
food retailers may have cannibalised a certain amount of their own business, but have 
eliminated a gap in the market that could be filled by a new entrant. 
While internet technology created a new shopping channel, which may or may not benefit 
the existing key operators, it does bring cost savings over téléphone based ordering, 
which can cost eight times as much to process as a computerised order [David Stoddart]. 
Further savings are achievable from dedicated delivery warehouses, with 'pick by lights' 
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Systems in such facilities being four times more efficient than manual identification of 
products [David Stoddart]. Technology therefore drives cost réductions in retailing, 
although new retail channels driven by technological uptake can lead to increased costs 
overall. 
Scale of organisation is an important driver of investment in technology because the 
increasing market share of multiple food retailers (4.1. p.85), and the concentration of it 
into fewer opérations (4.2. p.91), has effectively enabled the surviving large operators to 
invest heavily in new technology, the investment costs of which are absorbed over a 
larger turnover, meaning that the cost of new technology per £ turnover is lower for a 
large operator than for a smaller one: 
"Trie ability to make the ihvestments; ih superstores, EPoS, 'ihvèhioiy control, 
\ etc.: hàs.been: driven : by sedie: Y ou. can. àfford io ; spend imillions. pria, system, 
; because -. fou • câh nmortize : theit spend, ': • ànd : spread ; thè. bënefiis ; over '• a hiige 
turnover. In ihe.UK the] biggër chàins; naturàHy àdopf first.• in the 1980s\thëre 
was massive '.cònsciidation wheh Dee and Ârgyll hpòyeredfiplnidssës^^smdtl^ 
:operators-, fThis theaht thaï, money coidcl be spëhf on ]^ysfémsv. àndiehabïed thihgs:. 
'• iike. sales • based :-òrderihg: i and labour \ schedûïikg \ systeins: \ io ; 'bèli ^èvetópèiì; 
because the cost.couUl he absorbed}Investment in thèse Systems lias beéh bôth 
offehsive and, defehsiyey: it has been offensive\because. smàllet players could noi 
replicate ii, i0gàvè\yòu:'-a chance. ; ió gei clôser\tp:\ypun eus tornerà. Man) smàller 
operators. lilïasïbeeh défensive hëcàuse tffTèscpdOiïixu^ \Sàinsbufy!s 
will:.Tins is common in retail, you have to have M'hai .your competitors bave, 
even if:yóu don'i.khovv M'hai io dò,yyitfcfti:Iffheyliayè(goffianeti\hdven% fhèy 
may he. able tó. do-nasty tìiings io me.. 
ï ; : ; x ^ ; [David Stoddart] 
In short, investment in technology has primarily been by large retailers, and similarly 
sized competitors tend to react by also adopting the technology through fear of being 
damaged by the competitor's innovation, effectively erecting a barrier to the entry and 
growth of small players [David Stoddart/John Fletcher]. Independent retailers, in 
particular, have been adversely effected by larger operators' adoption of technology, as 
they find it hard to justify the expense of adopting EPoS, although voluntary group 
members and convenience chains tend to adopt technology faster [Kirby and Turner, 
1993; p.23]. Prior to the widespread adoption of EPoS by larger operators, it was feared 
166 
that, with automated stock control and EFT, it "would probably reìnforce the trend 
towards fewer and larger stores, especially for food." [Taylor, 1983; p.9]. In effect, 
independents appear to have lost further market share to multiple Operators (4.1. p.85) 
due to their Financial inability to adopt new technology. 
Technology's effect on costs and profits tends to be positive, for adopters, with 
technological adoption tending to reduce operating costs and therefore increase profits, 
proving a worthwhile investment. The interviews found no examples of technological 
innovations increasing costs without bringing distinct advantages to cover thèse costs. 
There are many examples of good investment, such as the development of the chili chain 
and supporting IT infrastructure, which reduced staff costs, increased sales of fresh foods, 
while minimising wastage [Bob Fee], and faster store construction techniques which 
cover their costs by enabling the store to open up to 25 weeks earlier [Tony Campbell]. In 
short, technological developments by UK food retailers have tended to bring either 
réductions in operating costs, or improvements to the retail offering, which although 
harder to quantify, normally brings tangible benefits in terms of profitability: 
• : ' ^ yè^tmënti in ne\v technology & dlwdys. qcleqr; business décision, but dis- oftën 
noi an easy ohe- ; YouhàVe io dssess the value of ilio the company; Sónietimes it 
is easy, jbr éxample \yheh il is acqlcuJätiori of höw this is going• io reduce our 
costs in : thè ; longer termi -. evén ; $ Ö ^ # ; i , f £ 
limes, it döesn'i reàuçè;bur costs,. it : c / î à % ^ 5 / Ä e vve dò things, : àndènds tip 
by-giving the public a: better service. Nowthat Miï^esiïoiï^judg -y où. 
säy; it is a heiter service ¡1 but:dpwe isredlly giving 
dfietièr service ^ii is givihg-ypwa dïfferéiit sèmieëf some pëppiefnight. 
think that's beitér, other people might not, and which do we go for, so it isn'l 
•. àlways stfa ightforward. ' ; \ ; 
; : [Lord:;Sainsbury of PrestönCändoyer KG] 
The conséquences of non-adoption of technology by UK food retailers are possibly 
greater than the danger of investing in ineffective technology, largely explaining their 
inclination to copy technology introduced by competitors, whether or not the advantages 
are clear (5.3.Ü. p.166). The pace of technological development has been phénoménal, 
and has tended to improve the performance of UK food retailers. From a situation in 1950 
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where few stores had cash registers, technological progress brought scanning, the 
development of logistica] Systems for the ordering and distribution of goods, replacing 
rows of head office clerks, and e-commerce, among other things, ail within one retail 
career [Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG]. The pace of development is also noted 
by other key actors of the period: 
"Wheii l first started I had a hit of papér and riiarked evérything. down ori thè 
back of a cigarette packet. Wìien l le fi èyeryth ing was doue äutomaticäüy. [Now 
that is not that long, really. When you think how technology is taking over inali 
things now, heaven knows what is going io Happen in the next ten y earsi" ; 
: : [Lord: MäcLaurin of Knebwortb DL] 
"Compared • io. Our paper .& pendi dàys,] the technology : now isfrightening. 
Buy ing or s e li ing they would kiiOw to point nought nOUght s omet hing the èfféct. 
ori the bottoni line; " 
[Peter Àsquith]: 
In short, the impact of technology has been profound in many différent areas. Advances 
in packaging technology enabled the development of self-service food retailing and 
subséquent expansion into supermarkets and superstores, which were in demand due to 
consumer adoption of domestic appliances and motor vehicles. Servicing of large stores 
was facilitated by the development of the motorway network, making centrai distribution 
possible, with goods dispatched centrally in temperature controlied vehicles. Fork-lift 
truck and caging technology reduced the need for warehouse space and brought labour 
efficiencies in large stores. Bar-code scanning and EPoS Systems made centrai 
distribution more efficient, gave retailers rapid access to valuable sales information, and 
reduced stock loss through détérioration, staff error and dishonesty. E-commerce 
technology has driven closer relations with suppliers and the development of a new retail 
Channel - internet-ordered groceries delivered to the consumer. Adoption of technology 
also drives retail change rather than the other way round, and the increasing scale of 
leading Operators has facilitated their in-house adoption of technology. 
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5.3.iii Distribution technology 
The primary change to distribution technology occurred during the 1970s and early-
1980s, when UK food retailers centralised their distribution Systems, which 
revolutionised food retailing [Alan K.P.Smith], created the most efficient food retali 
system in the world [Bob Fee], and was one of the major developments in food retailing 
[Tony de Angeli]. Central distribution involves manufacturers delivering to a few large, 
strategically placed warehouses, where the retailer assembles collated deliveries for each 
store, rather than manufacturers' lorries delivering to hundreds of stores. 
Central distribution eliminated the queues of suppliers1 vehicles at the rear of the store, 
brought efficiencies in restocking, and allowed retailers to re-negotiate terms with 
suppliers and make large savings in input prices [see Dawson and Shaw, 1990; p31], 
which more than covered the expense of their own distribution functions (see below), 
contradicting McKinnon's [1985] findings that savings from central distribution "are 
never large enough...to finance multiples' warehouse and transport opérations". These 
cost savings tended to be passed on in the form of improved customer facilities and 
shopping environment, rather than lower prices (6.5. p.252-253). Central distribution also 
affected the manufacturer-retailer relationship (6.2. p.214), driving it further in favour of 
the retailer, who gained control over the entire distribution system, from farm-gate to 
store, as vehicles could be scheduled to collect goods from suppliers after having made 
their store deliveries: 
"Teseo hadn't quite gotto the point on their owtvwhëfcthèywM öwn 
distribution,: it was simply.: that the. :^ysiëm'''-hrokë:'down .becàuse of thé sheèr 
number ôf vehicles queidng to deliver to thé stores, This \ màde ihem .say, we 
cari 't go\pnjlike. this, wefhavë fà ^produce. \our own :colläted\delivery: Äh& it is 
this, ; the colläted. '• delivery -: delivering intó yoûr oivh \ distributióh vcéhtre -. àha 
making composite loadè inorder to go io your òwn Stores r that réaìly makes the 
food manufacturer/prodiicer/packer. a kind of slave to the supermarket, ft 
enables better buying terms, which more than cover the ddditional distribution 
costs. L meati when we did it at BHS, it gave us something like 2% or 2,5% 
margin improvement. Very, vety substdntial." 
[Denis Cassidy] 
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Central distribution also presented multiple Operators with the opportunity to expand 
beyond their regional bases without compromising quality [Denis Cassidy], and to add 
chilled prepared foods to their private label range (5.4.Ü. p. 183). In addition it ended food 
retailers' rebanee on branded manufacturers for private label distribution (5.4.Ü. p.184), 
while its effect of centralising the buying fonction increased buying power, and drove 
weak manufacturers of branded products out of business, or into private label as a means 
of survival [Mike Graves]. 
Manufacturers suffered from retailers' development of central distribution, particularly 
secondary manufacturers who subsequently found that running their own sales and 
distribution networks had become uneconomical [Mike Graves]. Specialist food retailers, 
such as butchers, also suffered, as central distribution allowed multiple food retailers to 
distribute short-life goods, fresh chickens for example, on a nationwide basis. Whereas 
previously, trade in thèse products was dominated by local specialists drawing on local 
supplies [Bob Fee]. In this area, therefore, multiple food retailers with central distribution 
achieved économies of buying because bulk purchases could be broken down and 
distributed nationwide. They also gained an important competitive advantage over 
specialist local distributors, and increased margins by handling higher profit products. 
Central distribution Systems led to reduced in-store warehousing, with space being 
converted to sales area, in turn enabling diversification of offering and driving extension 
of the "retail accordion" (7.1.2. p.268-269) and moves into higher margin Unes, as 
suggested by the 'scrambled merchandising' hypothesis (7.1.1. p.262). In addition, 
central distribution enabled retailers to extend store sizes and ranges, by providing the 
capacity to service them fully, although the early development of Asda without central 
distribution suggests that it is not a mandatory pre-requisite 3 9 : 
30 
Without central distribution the food industry couldn't have developed 
superstores: How could ah out-oftowh store; stocking ten thousand Unes, hâve 
been serviced without central distribution? Títere would have be'en a Uñé of 
lorries front London io Newcastle to go to a single store. .'• 
[Sir Dennis Landau] 
Marketing, A u g u s t 1977, p . 12 
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With so many advantages, why was central distribution not introduced until the mid-
1970s? First, each individual food retailer must reach a certain size in order to make 
central distribution feasible - without the critical mass of stores and turnover, the 
servicing of large warehouses and distribution fleets is uneconomical. The scale of food 
retail organisations has therefore enabled the rationalisation of distribution functions (6.2. 
p.210). Second, development of the motorway network was a necessary prerequisite for 
central distribution to be feasible, meaning that outlying stores could be reached front a 
few central dépôts on the same day: 
Without : the motorways, you couldh 't./uiye superstorés. You couldh 't hâve 
central dépôts servicing large shops, the logis tics were completely wrong: So 
once a gain, you havegoi one of thèse paràllels. Th e big stores, y es, theyiare 
very important, but iliey came with the rodd network. 
: [Tony de Àngeîi] 
In short, centralised warehousing and distribution enabled UK food retailers to negotiate 
tenus with suppliers on a national, rather than local, basis, increasing retailer buying 
power [Sir Dennis Landau]. They also obtained discounts from manufacturers that more 
than covered the cost of extra functions taken on by the retailer, and were able to 
replenish stores daily, assisted by information technology. This reduced the need for 
stock-holding in the rear of the store, allowing increased store sizes through the 
conversion of obsolète warehousing. As multiple operators were the primary adopters of 
central distribution, it is a further factor contributing to the décline of the independent, co-
opérative and specialist sectors (4.1, p.85), despite co-operative attempts to reform their 
outmoded, ancient System of fragmented buying40 through centralisation of their buying, 
distribution and marketing functions, which were largely unsuccessfiil because individual 
co-operative societies liked to retain control of their buying functions: 
Retail & Distribution Management, JulVAug. 1980, p6 ; "The Co-ops have lost the way" . 
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¡fe.lt that provided the Co-op coula buy.together and. market Jogèiher, the faci 
that individuai communities açhmlly .eontrolled their local .societies ;was 
immatérial. In fact the CWS made gréât strides, we were great Innovators, X We 
were the first organisation in the UK tohave central warehpusing. In pracûçé 
too. many. individuai societies wanted. to: continue io contWt^^p.-^n^uy^^. 
negötiating, and sclling. So althoughin tJiëo.ryall of thè Coopérative, societies 
could '.- hâve beert serviced by nihe or ten strategicaïly piàced distribution 
warehouses, across the UK - and that was pur master pian in the CWS .-.we 
never really achieved it because too many societies wanted io go their own way... 
[Sir Dennis Landau] 
Central distribution enlarged the gulf between the best and worst retailers, promoting 
further 'Darwinian' survival of the fittest (7.1.6. p.280-281), while also ending retailers' 
reliance on manufacturer distribution Channels, giving retailers more power over 
manufacturer and enabling extensive development of private label (5.4.Ü. p. 169) into 
areas such as chilled and prepared foods which carry higher margins (44, p.236-237). 
Central distribution also reduced the number of store deliveries, eliminated back door 
congestion, reduced staff costs, and enabled retailers to expand nationally while 
maintaining consistent quality - driving polarisation of size of organisation by removing 
one of the few advantages of regional Operators. Retailers were able to deal with "much 
more specialised, small niche suppliers" [David Malpas], achieve économies of scale in 
warehousing, decrease inventory levels [McFadyen, 1987], and store stock in cheaper 
locations [McKinnon, 1990, p79]. 
Central distribution, however, would not have been possible without the development of 
motorways, improved réfrigération technology in lorries, the large scale of retailers, and 
the geographical 'gift' of the UK being a small, densely populated country, the outposts 
of which are reachable in one day's driving from a few centrally located warehouses. 
Central distribution has not been developed in larger, less densely populated countries 
such as the USA, where retail margins and private label market share are consequently 
lower, and manufacturer continue to wield power over food retailers [Tony de Angeli, 
Denis Cassidy]. Central distribution was made more effective by developments in 
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information technology, which eventually enabled the translation of sales figures into 
'just in time' replenishment orders. 
5.3.ÍV The evolving supply chain 
The concentration of UK food retailing (p.90-92). the resuUing shift of power away from 
manufacturers to retailers (4.5. p.92-93), and the centralisation of distribution f5.3.iii. 
p.169-173) are three interdependent trends that gave UK food retailers increasing control 
over the supply chain. This control was extended, through the 1980s and 1990s, and used 
to grow profits and returns on investments. 
Central distribution, introduced from the late 1970s (5.3.iii. p.169-173), allowed UK food 
retailers to re-negotiate wholesale priées, making considerable margin improvements a 
reality (5.3.iii. p.169). There were also other effects, however, including: 
S Better control over the supply chain, giving retailers more power in the 
relationship with manufacturers. 
S Ending of retailers' reliance on manufacturer distribution Channels, particularly 
for private label. 
S Ability to develop a full, comprehensive private label range. 
S Greater retailer involvement, therefore, in traditional activities of manufacturing -
including market research, product design, product testing and packaging design, 
in addition to distribution. 
The 1980s introduction of scanning and Electronic Point of Sale (EPoS) technology 
(5.3.Ü. p.164-165) brought an unprecedented amount of sales information, giving retailers 
a valuable tool in the áreas of sales forecasting, stock ordering and product development. 
Coupled with retailers' extended involvement in manufacturers' traditional activities (see 
above), retailers developed knowledge and understanding of sales and consumer demand 
that manufacturers had previously had to estimate. Loyalty card data extended this access 
to data from the mid-1990s. In effect, retailers developed proximity to consumers while 
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manufacturéis became increasingly alienated from their end consumers, in terms of 
information on their purchasing habits at least. 
During the 1980s, this proximity to sales data and ownership of their own distribution 
networks was exploited by retailers to develop just-in-time ordering. In brief, this 
involved manufacturer dropping to central warehouses within tight delivery windows, 
with the stock being transferred to stores, via retailer distribution networks, with little or 
no delay at ail. This reduced retailers' stock-holding, but meant that manufacturer often 
had to increase their stock levéis to compénsate [Marden and Wrigley, 1996; p.35], 
improving retailers' levéis of profitability and return on capital at the expense of those of 
their supplier [ibid., p.35]. 
The implementation of technology, therefore, was responsible for a fundamental shift in 
ownership of information, and technology subsequently facilitated the sharing of this 
information, providing at least some redress in the balance of the relationship. The 
possibility of improving the efficiency of the entire supply chain, reducing stocks of both 
retailers and manufacturer, led the two parties to begin sharing EPoS and sales forecasts 
via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 4 I . Early initiatives grew into Efficient Consumer 
Response (ECR), which became a key strategy of the 1990s. By sharing relevant 
information, using a technology-based platform, the following benefits were realised: 
S Improved stock availability. 
S Faster replenishment. 
S Fewer out-of-stock situations. 
S Reduced waste. 
J Reduced stock-holding throughout the supply chain, lowering costs and 
improving returns for both retailers and manufacturer. 
S Better, more closely monitored, more effective promotions. 
•S Closer, improved relations between the two parties, as partnerships developed. 
4 1
 Super Marketing, M a r c h 6, 1992, "Perfect Partners" , p .31-32 . 
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S Manufacturers become closer to end-consumer 
Initiatives in ECR continue, as does reform of the supply chain, as retail operators 
attempt to introduce 'factory-gate pricing1, and assume more control of the chain. It is 
clear that the development of long-term partnerships has become a priority, as the 
changing supply chain demands closer co-operation and increased capital investment in 
order to bring tangiable benefits to both retailer and manufacturer. 
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5.4 Retailer Change 
The final major influence affecting the development of UK food retailing over the second 
half of the 20th Century was the retailers themselves, and the way in which they traded. 
This section examines retailers' use of trading stamps, private label, customer loyalty 
schemes and internationalisation, and sets out the key effects of such trading techniques. 
5.4.i Trading stamps 
The rìse of trading stamps: 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the use of trading stamps became common in the UK 
food retail sector. FineFare and Teseo began to give trading stamps in 1963 [Williams, 
1994a; p.151], beginning what was referred to as "the great Trading Stamp War of 
1963/64"42: 
"The first.people into trading stamps were FineFare^the WëHoyi's, and they 
wer e in terrible trouble, : thèy werenfdòing al all well;: They}branghi ovëtï ah 
American to rûn it^fM-brbùjfâ andihat iriggered Teseo to 
do the same. So Teseo wereh't the firsi>but they were jdiefbig they were 
the first to riiake a big scene. about itlthink, thefaefis ihat fysco^stahips-
appealed. to their.. cùstomers. : more. tlian thëy \ would bave appedled to. • ours, 
anyway, bui we meide a virtue out ; ofigopd value, rather than gimmiçks, • and. we 
both promoted oui side: ofithe story -. Teseo, proihoted. thè illusion of value giveh 
by the stämps, and : we promoted goodhónest Value." 
[Lord Sainsburyof Preston Candover KG] 
Trading stamps were a relatively simple phenomenon. For every pound spent, a fixed 
number of stamps were given to the consumer. The consumer pasted the stamps into a 
book, which could be exchanged for free gifts, with higher value gifts requiring more 
completed books. The normal procedure was for retailers to purchase the stamps from 
specialist trading stamp companies, such as Green Shield, who would then provide the 
free gifts for consumers. Although influenced by North American retailers, the 
development of stamp trading techniques in the 1960s was not new to the United 
Kingdom. As far back as the 1880s, trading stamps were being used as a tool to entice 
cùstomers [Fox, 1968; p . l ] . 
4 2
 Retail Business, 154, D e c e m b e r 1970; p.28 
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Signing up to stamp trading schemes was said to bring numerous benefits to retailers. It 
was claimed that stamps gave the store "continuous promotional appeal" allowing it to 
move "away from the temporary, transitory appeal of special sales and special 
promotional events to an integrated promotion with constant drawing power" [Brand, 
1963; p.86]. Stamps were also said to attract "steady customers" and to "increase the 
average sales ticket" [ibid.; p.86]. It was argued that stamp-collecting customers were 
less likely to do part of their shopping in other stores, thus stamps "encourage total store 
shopping " and "increase the sale of general merchandise ". Consumers were attracted to 
stores giving trading stamps during the 1960s largely because of the desirability of the 
'gifts' on offer, such as steam irons and portable radios, which were strongly aspired to in 
the period following the deprivation of the war and immediate post-war years. In 
addition, incomes were low (5.2.Ü. p.147), which made it difficult for many households 
to save up for appliances such as toasters and irons: 
".;whëh:Qrëén \ Shield Stamps started,: Gréai Britain was fecOverihgfroth the 
War, so a lot \ of things^thai are. absolutely ;CW weren't 
commonplace in those days. THingslike toasters, steam irons, portable: radios, 
all that sort of thing, you could collëétGrëét^ 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebworih. DL] 
Retail operators were also driven to give stamps by the existence of RPM, which largely 
prohibited price competition (5.1,ii. p.119). In this period, when price could not be used 
as a competitive weapon, and 'modern' trading techniques such as self-service and 
supermarket retailing were bringing reductions in operating costs, trading stamps were 
seen as an alternative method to price reductions - they would bring in the customers, yet 
the retailer remained within the law, as explained by Sir Noel Stockdale (5.I.Ü. p.l 19-
120). 
Trading stamps were attractive to the consumer, who could begin to amass consumer 
durables after years of deprivation, and to the retailer, who wanted to offer a discount in 
order to attract more customers, yet by law was prohibited from so doing. For Teseo, the 
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turnover gain when trading stamps were introduced was phenomenal: 
"yöti had turnover increases, of20-30% in thé first two or three weeks ^ you. 
didn't quite, main tain thèse, but it became a marketing tool, you would do double. 
stamps on Tuesday. " [Laurence Don, Teseo 
Director 1957-1971, speaking in British Empires: Teseo, Channel Four, MM].: 
Not all retailers, however, were keen to adopt stamps. It was feared that their cost would 
force up prices and would have a catastrophic effect if universal adoption occurred "3, a 
fear which predated the "great Trading Stamp War of 1963/64" 2 4 by many years. 
Concern was also expressed about how to abandon stamp trading without loss of 
customers and/or face 4 4 . FineFare dropped stamp trading after only a year because its 
owner, Associated British Foods, also owned a bakery that supplied other supermarkets, 
and it was feared that they would lose the accounts of supermarkets opposed to stamp 
trading [Williams, 1994a; pl52-3]. Meanwhile, Sainsbury's focused their marketing 
activity on their good value, made possible because they did not issue stamps: 
"Their trade went up through stamps
 : in iiialiy; ours} went ; up hugely because, wé 
made such a strong campaign for good value àiiH-gòod\ quality dp Osgood price, 
rather than gimmicks like stamps, which was a terrific : help: for; us;. The two. 
people who gained hwst out of stampsj:dh?ithe-shÓrt- term, were us and Teseo, the 
two extremes of the argument, äs it. were.:' ' ' • •
 :
 :
 :
: 
. : [Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover KG] 
Thus there was a certain polarisation of activity with the two key beneficiaries of this 
'stamp war' taking opposing stances, yet both deriving significant benefit (7.1.4. p.275). 
The Fall of Trading Stamps: 
The fall of trading stamps in the late-1970s was largely initiated by Teseo dropping the 
scheme, much to the dismay of Green Shield who mistakenly believed they had a long 
contract with the company [MacLaurin, 1999, p.39]. It was sensed that their customers 
were no longer keen to collect stamps because the 'gifts' on offer that excited the 
consumer were effectively unattainable. Supporting the claim that the consumers reaction 
4 3
 see: The Grocer, October 2 3 , 1948, p l 7 ; The Grocer, October 30, 1948, p 5 ; The Grocer, D e c e m b e r 24 , 
1949, p i 5 . 
4 4
 The Grocer, June 3 , 1950, p l 8 
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is "...the key to the system's existence" [Fox, 1968; p.13], Teseo decided to discontinue 
stamps and to reinvest the savings in more appropriate initiatives, which were deemed to 
be lower pnees, through Opération Checkout (5.2.ii. p.147-148): 
"Now, we gavé stamps for 14 years. At the end of 14 years, people didn'twqnt 
any more steam irons or portable radios for 20 books, they wanted a colôur 
télévision set or even. a motor car. A colour television set was 700.[bòófàfWow 
that ; is forever, I mean yoii cari go on saving stamps for everl Iwàs goirig droiind 
the stores ai the Urne, : and it was quite clear to. me that the eus to mer was saying 
"well we don 't want stamps" to. thé cashier.. But il was. cosiing Teseo £^ 
million a y car to. givé- stdriips, and. we] were próhiotìng ih e m hëavily,. so y pu -were. 
getting ; double stamps, triple stamps, ; quàdruple, ^tà^s^làlffhàt \ 'sf^jc^Êpïgf-. 
and in faci the custòmers saidfyou know "we.don f want dïëm, thm 
much ". So we were actiiaily giving away £20 million a year, and people didn-i 
want it, so it was a waste of money. So we were far hetter re-investirig thàt& 
million in eut priées, and starting to reposition the business. " : 
[Lord : MacLaurin : o f Khéb wpfth DL] 
Stamp trading had largely faded away by the end of the 1970s, displaying cyclical 
properties driven by changing consumer interest in the technique, which in turn was 
driven by economie conditions, as outlined by Fox [1968, p3]. This is supported by the 
view that "the inflationary 1970s killed off thèse schemes, as shoppers sensibly sought 
oui old-fashioned low priées instead of added frills. " 4 S. In addition, it follows that 
trading stamps are a self-devouring entity - as their pénétration in a particular market 
increases, the incrementai value to the retai 1er (in terms of additional sales) effectively 
must decrease. This must be the case due to falling differentiation and novelty of stamp 
trading retailers, and the saturation of the market - there are only so many consumers who 
are attracted by stamps. The retailer therefore becomes less likely to adopt stamps, and 
those that have adopted them become more Ukely to abandon them in order to follow 
alternative approaches. By the late-1970s, the main alternative to stamp trading was price 
compétition, and a fierce price war erupted (5.2.ii. p.147-148). 
Economist, February 4, 1989; p .32 
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5.4.U Private label 
From their initial appearance in the early-1960s, private label groceries have matured 
from "inferior, ' me-too' products that competed with the leading brands on the basis of 
priée" [Doel, 1996; p49], through a close relationship with the "pile it high, seil it 
cheap" formula of the 1970s [ibid.]. Currently, private label groceries have a "vastly 
improved quality image" in line with the improved image of the leading food retailers, as 
well as a much more significant market share (4.5. p. 108) 
The share of total grocery expenditure spent on private label in 1993 was 37%, rising to 
40% in 1996 [Taylor Nelson AGB], pushing out second and third placed brands [Killen 
and Pattison, 1987; p62]. At Sainsbury's and Teseo, the share of private label was 
higher, at 55% and 42% respectively in 1992 [Williams, 1994b; p291]. Initially, private 
label emerged and grew for two key reasons. First, it developed naturally as supermarkets 
began to seil more and more fresh foods, extending their range into catégories in which 
there had never been brands, naturally stamping their own name on the packaging. 
Second, private label meant that manufacturers were unable to dictate retail priées, thus 
private label was, in part, a tool to bypass the high priées of branded products, imposed 
by RPM (5.I.Ü. p.l 19-120): 
... a II ih e fresh fqods were then comirig ihtothe store, arid that Wa^pnpp^ 
the retailers, but there were basically no; brands in those catégoriesfËvenïri. 
things !ike;bacon, stores quite naturally started là put their .Own ridrije on the 
label, and Ithirik triai kind of started to form the idea. 
:Wy.iïW'.' • : : [Tony Campbell]: 
"Resale Price Maintenance.. .stimulated (Sainsbury 's) to circumvent such 
restrictions by developing their own brands in direct response to proprietary 
products. " 
[Williams, 1994b; p.300] 
The development of private label made manufacturers more dépendent on food retailers. 
While many of the manufacturers of leading branded products also make private label for 
retailers, and the leading brands generally stand up well to private label compétition4 6, the 
4 0
 The Economist, D e c e m b e r 24, 1988; referring to research of the Institute of Retail Studies, St ir l ing. 
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fact that they are manufacturing goods in partnership with a retailer tends to lead to them 
deveioping a subservient rôle in the relationship. Equally, as food retailers gained 
expertise in the development of private labels, they were able to respond to new branded 
product launches by quickly deveioping competing private label products: 
...a lot of manufacturers have to makeLstuff for retailers dnyway, obyipusly 
because it pays a lot oftheir overhéûa^yândin 
incrëdibly sensible. In the longer teiinfrdm their .point ofyieyv ii's more bfan 
issue. Not leasi, because it can compromise manufacturers 'freedom io market 
products with complete freedom. 
Food manufacturer margins are generqlly; not that high, costs of investment in 
innovation are pretty high - it s. costly : doïng, fésëarch, ; getting; products. to 
market, advertising, them - and the. spëëd di which retailers are able io : pick up 
on it and develop their own label counierpart is getting quickerùndquiçker. So 
even when the manufacturées are aheud, you can reckOn on ra màximunfvfsix 
months before there is a retailer eqiuvcderii. So it's dotl muchfun peingfd 
manufacturer thèse days, long-ter m you ;drefìgiding a wàr wlïere it is hard.for 
you to win. 
[Richard Swaab] 
The increasing market share of private label in UK. food retailing has brought UK food 
retailers higher gross profit margins. This is for two key reasons - first, the costs 
associated with creating a brand présence are not built into the own-label équivalent, 
therefore food retailers are able to undercut the price of the brand while maintaining 
higher retail margins than are achievable on proprietary products. Secondly, chilled goods 
and prepared foods tend to be private label, while they also tend to be high margin Unes, 
thus the private label mix has brought increased margins for UK food retailers (6.4. 
p.236-237). 
While early private label drove UK food retailer margins upwards and increased their 
power over manufacturers, it also lefl a gap for a retailer to compete over the priées of 
branded products. Asda bargained with manufacturers using the fact that it did not sell 
private label groceries as a tool to obtain better priées from branded goods manufacturers. 
While this was a new technique effectively enabled by the abolition of RPM, it was also 
made possible because of the increasing hold of the major grocery retailers over 
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manufacturers: 
Thé. key aspect l think of Asda and the basis for its growth was ihe fact they 
discovered ai an early stage that the opportunity was right to discount the prices 
of the brands. This was the unique différence, and although others tended to 
follow, Asda was able to create the price perception that they were always the 
cheapest across the brands, and at that stage there was a wide range of branded 
foods.. This creqted some _ difficultiés \ with sitppliers, who tried to mdintain a 
degree of price level... but Asda nianqged to keep that position partly becduse 
their argument was always that they didn't have own label, therefore they had to 
be compétitive on the brands.. 
[John Fletcher] 
Increasing quai ity and sophistication of private label 
Private label was initially introduced as a price-focused alternative to quality focused 
brands (5.1.fi. p.120), with the exception of Sainsbury's private label which came from an 
upmarket perspective, and the évolution of private label has broadly followed the overall 
retail trend towards better quality (4.5. p. 108). Thus there has been a broad trend in 
private label towards higher standards of quality, with occasional periods where price 
takes precedence, driven by the changing demands of the consumer, who in turn is driven 
by the économie scénario at any given point in time. The widespread copying of 
Sainsbury's quality private label stance supports Gist's [1968] Dialectic principle. 
Although private label was certainly in existence before the introduction of central 
distribution Systems, the development of retailer distribution functions enabled more 
extensive private label development, particularly in limited life products, as there was no 
longer a requirement to rely on manufacturer distribution to individual stores. This 
enabled higher standards of quality to be introduced in private label, which has 
contributed increasingly to the changing consumer perception that the food retail store 
was the primary brand rather than the manufacturer branded grocery products housed 
within it. In addition to increased customer loyalty, private label is said to give the retailer 
"¿1 discrète brand identity and image of its own, which increasingly sets it apart from its 
competitors. " [Gardner and Sheppard, 1989]. 
Although private label has tended to increase in quality over time, bringing notable 
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benefits to the retailer, there have been two notable examples of UK food retailers 
competing over price-focused private label. Low-cost, no-frills own-label products were 
important during the priée wars of the late-1970s 4 7 , and were once again launched 
alongside the standard private label offering in response to the threat posed by the entry 
of discounters such as Aldi, Lidi and Netto, in the early-1990s (4.5. p.108-111). 
Similarly, Private label grew rapidly in the US following the onset of the dépression in 
1929 [Harding, 1935; p.66]. Private label offerings have therefore attempted to respond to 
evolving consumer demand for price or quality focused food retailing (5.2.Ü. p.152), 
supporting the secular trends proposed by Hollander[1960] as a cause of trading up, 
increasing demand for better quality services, facilities and offerings (including private 
label), although price tends to re-emerge periodically as a primary consumer concern. It is 
in responding efficiently to changing consumer demand that initiatives achieve success, 
and the successful évolution of private label as a competitive tool is illustrated by its high 
market share - 40% of total grocery expenditure in 1996 was on private label, higher still 
among leading Operators such as Sainsbury and Teseo. 
While the development of private label lias had a negative impact on many manufacturer 
of branded products because of the transfer of consumer spending to private label, the 
increasing quality and sophistication of private label products has driven a closer 
relationship between food retailers and the manufacturer of their private label products, 
and has increased customer loyalty to the retailer4 8. As retailers have sought higher 
quality private label products, and broadened their range to include products such as 
chilled prepared foods, their relationship with supplier has necessarily become closer as 
retailers have exerted more influence over the manufacturing process: 
Economia, Apri i 16, 1988; p .86 
The Economist, Apr i i 16, 1988, p86 
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I; think qui te cleatiy that M&S's focus on own brand has driven better 
relationships with suppliers, because you are specifying what product is Under 
that.brand, and as I said earlier it is M&S 's policy that if you. wantko, maxim ise 
your brand,. you : will therefore have fo '• influence pot : only thé spécification;, but 
the. conditions ôf manufacturé^-. '•• and how-.you. sourcelthe. :rqm mdiërials \ thaï ga 
irito the product. ". The. only way you cari do that is by hàyitig a \ close patfnefship 
with the supplier or manufacturer, unless you do . it '. your self ;whlch M&S 
doësn't. One ofthe key eiëméntsthat M donc, and avéryimpoftdnionè, 
is ip have a veiy close relationship with its supplier base. îfyoïi 'rejgoingjo: dp 
the job prôperly, l don 't think you could achievë ihis withodt it^ Yësypucould go 
along and say give me a slighily différent version ofthat. packei pf biscuits, you 
know put another four or five init, wrap it.up, and l will sell it as my own; brand, 
but it; dépends what your marketing stance is - you can haye own brand that is 
cheaper, you can have own brand product that 's : différent,. or pur own brand 
that. is far superior. 
:\\:f^^ 
The retailer, however, now controls the supply chain, and captures the data on consumer 
buying habits and wants, then spécifies to the supplier what thèse are and what the 
product should be. The supplier has therefore become dépendent on the retailer for 
market intelligence, driving the relationship in favour ofthe retailer (6.2. p.215-216). 
5.4.iii Customer loyalty schemes 
In the mid-1990s 'loyalty schemes' were widely introduced by UK food retailers. 
Customers join a scheme and receive a loyalty card, which they présent at the checkout. 
In return for their custom, they are given money-off vouchers and/or other rewards, 
according to their level of spending. The first such scheme to be launched nationwide was 
the Teseo Clubcard in February 1995, which stimulated rival retailers to launch their own 
versions - Safeway's ABC card was launched in October 1995, followed by Sainsbury's 
Reward card, which was rolled out nationally in July 1996. Asda's limited trials of 
loyalty cards were halted in 1999, with the savings being invested in their 'Rollback' 
price cuts 4 \ while Safeway abandoned their ABC loyalty scheme in June 2000, citing 
consumers' boredom of points and vouchers, reinvesting the cost savings in price, 'offers 
The Grocer, Augus t 14, 1999; p .10. 
184 
not gimmicks' s o . In one respect, loyalty schemes are a relaunch of trading stamps, in that 
they give free products in return for custom, theoretically increasing sales sufficiently to 
cover the costs of the scheme. The Chairman of Sainsbury's at the time, David Sainsbury, 
famously denounced loyalty schemes as "electronic Green Shield Stamps" 5\ and 
maintained that customers preferred price cuts [Springen and Chaudhary, 1995], shortly 
before the company performed a U-turn and launched their Reward Card scheme. The 
widespread adoption of such schemes suggests Dialectic-like behaviour whereby retailers 
attempi to negate advantages that could otherwise favour rivai retailers, although 
universal adoption could theoretically negate the value of incrementai sales increases 
from the schemes, and lead to upward pressure on margins and hence revolution of the 
Wheel of Retailing. The key différence between modem loyalty schemes and trading 
stamps of the 1960s and 1970s is the customer information that the schemes bring the 
retai 1er: 
: • 'And Î think•.the big différence, is that a; tot of people,-anti certain lySainshury 's 
in;fhë^edrty^dufè 
think that isfimdamentally^rohg. Greene 
that wasn 't the case withCliibcdrd dt \ ali. What Clubcard dóes is\ itgiyesyoitd 
reward for bèing my customer, and ds '. part ofthaf reward programme, l 
widerstand whoyou are,, arid Ican learnwhat to dowith that data. Green shield 
stamps . never gave anything . back,/, pther thw/efifeétivedy/doing, a .priée 
promotion. Clubcärd; andati the:loyalty. Scheines, n;ow\,dà give backdfótiThey 
•give '". back this intimate \ knówledge òfwhdt \IO million shoppersilo, : whdt they 
buyy when they. buy it, ; and what they bìiy;inStead:iffy 
knówledge is there now, and tt is your ability to.exploit that biowledg 
becomes the retàit challenge/'\ . : './:o : ;>^ f^K^ 'l 
: • ' : :\ • ; : ••:-:: ; :•: ; • ^ [tìitVe ^Hurnb^ 
Thus the key benefit to retailers is the data they are able to capture on the shopping habits 
of their customers, but if this data is not used to the retailer's advantage the scheme can 
become a cost bürden, causing upward pressure on margins and hence revolution of the 
Wheel of Retailing. The data captured is more reminiscent of the data available to the 
old-style grocer doing deliveries to locai households than it is to the days of trading 
The Grocer, M a y 6, 2000; p.4 
Independent on Sunday, N o v e m b e r 19, 1995. 
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stamps, as grocers doing home deliveries could use their record of producís purchased by 
each household to make suggestions to them, and to act on any changes in shopping 
habits: 
"In the days\ of counter service, • wfien yoii fiad;hónie dekyety,; '^óu.-knew:-\vhat 
customérs wére buying bécause you hdd iiltle accoünt bpóksliké Üiisfexhibits a 
book). Often íhe retailer would know his customérs' pref eren ees personal ly, but 
in fací Sainsbury s had a datábase of customérs shopping habits onapuncheárd 
systeni, and would send targeted mailing to customérs,;saying 'I npiice madám 
thatyou are buyingporkwithus butnotlatnb, andifyouiake this letter alongto 
your branch we will do...' whatever itjs: 
So it is too unsubtle to say, nowadays we are able do this, and in the/olddáys we 
couldn 'i.:.lt was home delivery that.gaye you access topeople 's shopping habits, 
that wasn't achievable under selfservice" 
. . :ff;':;-:- •: - - ' /¿:M/\^ 
The data obtained from loyalty schemes, however, is highly organised, collected 
electrónica]ly, and follows earlier advances in shopping basket analysis made possible 
through the introduction of bar-coding and scanning in the early-1980s [Sir Dermis 
Landau]. 
Retailers developed loyalty schemes for three key reasons - they hoped that the incentive 
to spend would genérate sufficient incremental sales to cover the costs of the system and 
make a profit, they wanted to gain valuable customer data, and they were attempting to 
respond to consumer demand, thus loyalty schemes were driven, in part at least, by the 
consumer: 
"One of the great marketing epups PfÜie/I990s wds Tesco1 Clübcard. \Thai catiie 
to us from cüstomers, Customérs saidr'wéTovéyour;shop; fdnidsiic,: áñd.wé 
spend a lot ofmoney witli you. ¡Vhy can iyoügive us something else?Why can 't 
you..do spmething like Briiish.Airways?'. So rié- thougfii dbout;ii\-andsüid 0K 
• we Uhavé the Ctubcárd '••.;_ 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebwortfr DL] 
The operational costs of the schemes are reasonably high - Safeway's ABC loyalty card 
required a 2 to 3 percent rise in sales to cover its costs 5 2, while Tesco calculated "that to 
Supermarket News, Octobcr 23 , 1995 
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cover the cosí of the ¡% discount it will need to increase sales by less than 5% " S 3. If this 
increase in sales is not achieved, the net result ís an erosión of profits, albeit while 
bringing valuable information which can be used in business decisions which may recoup 
any such losses. 
Loyalty scheme data can be used in many different ways, with its primary functions at 
present being to reward customers for their spending, to encourage them to spend more in 
categories where their spend is low (indicating that they may use alternative facilities 
such as a greengrocer, butcher or off-licence), and to identify and attract back deserting 
customers: 
"Whén ahybódy gives their Clubcard: in: to the. checkput operütpr, wé 
immediately' know whp it is;\tye'jpujw:y}^ 
we can.tnáil oui to them e.veiyrqüarter, qri "Thánk^ 
shopping with us,-.we-appreciaté.your Custom/Píeré\aré sóriie\vouchérs ypü háVé 
earned over the last three m.ohths, here, areisOméextrabecaiise we see 
that yon haven 'tbought anyflowers and yoii hqVen 't bqüght any wine, i so here 's 
£1. úffthe úéxt bunch offloy/ers, and. £1 óff the next: bótdeófRioja, ünd/pleúse 
continué to. shpp with Us'/fVe cilso ¡kkm^Á^ 
cari dciually follów it up áhdsay "DearMrs; dones/ weSee that yóu;haven :r 
béen shopping. with us, 1 hope that Oür Service is still gópd,ifit is nóiplease let 
iLS.kiiow, andplease come back. Here is. a £5vpucherjqryQur iiéXt shopping''.. 
So thüt: marketing: initiatiye. :• ivas'; qbspíiitely ícéy ib ¡ We^p0c^i^^trt\ cfiheSespó 
success" . X;^ -'.;- i;' 
' • • [Lord MacLátirin o f t^ebwor th p L ] 
At a store level, the data can be used to measure customers' advocacy to the store, based 
on whether the store is merely convenient for the consumer or whether they are willing to 
go out of their way to get to it - "Do you shop with me purely because I am convenient, 
or do you put yourself out to come to me versus the competition. I would cali that 
advocacy". [Clive Humby]. The data is also useful in deciding which producís to stock in 
each particular store [Clive Humby] and in identifying and acting upon like-for-like sales 
trends, which can now be broken down much further than was previously possible 
without data on customer shopping habits: 
Evening Standard, February 10, 1995 
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"You have always been cible to go to the store, and see store like-for-likë. With 
Clubcard we can now go to each customer and see customer likérfpr.-like. 
Sömetimes it can gel rid of issues vety easily.for example, the school holidays 
started a week eqrlier this year ~ does that change iike-for-like ? You cari bet 
your '• botlom; dollar it does! And you : can ;say, well\ wdii a '• miriute;. wliy should 
yoûngfam dies ha ve stöpped shoppingihisi\vëëfc/m •thp$fiptyris? 
school holidays started this week in thoSë. tôwhs! Welt like-for-likë is riot dowri 
then, is iti 
Or conversely, you know, this group of customers : ha ve stOpped shopping, have 
we dohe somelhing to chëese them ojp You know, pënsioriérs hâve stöpped 
shopping, maybe we have not had enOugh single portion päcks oh thé shelf You 
can.say, portion control is very important, porHori controlqf^ctslikërfof/ïike: 
No-one could:hqvè provedit; before, : bëçqusëpt:. top-lèyel data,:.;ihe: stdiistics 
would have beëri top spurious. \ You • drill dowri, yPucdn find à group i of.pëoplë 
whère the likè-fpr-like change is.: significant, ; and you • çan :: look di\:why • that is 
happening. Il giyes you all ofyöur steeringwhéel; ail of yoiir levers for pidlirig. 
Andearly warnings." 
\ .[Gliyc-rivjrruby]: 
At an individual customer level, data obtained from loyalty schemes gives retailers the 
facility to understand the customer better and to tailor their discounts to each individual 
customer [Clive Humby]. In addition to the factors discussed above, it can enable the 
identification of the top customers who account for a large percentage of a store's 
turnover, as suggested by Pareto's rule 5 4. These customers can then be incentivised and 
rewarded, and retailers can ensure that they continue to stock the producís purcbased by 
this group of people, even if a particular line would normally be wilhdrawn due to limited 
sales: 
S4
 European Business Journal, Fall 1994; p .28 ( l 1). 
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"In grocery retailìng 70% of the pepple buy 30% ofthe goods, and 30% of the 
people buy 70% ofthe goods. Nqbpdy knows \vhy. but this figure isabput right 
inretailing,. Ypuwouid think we wpuld be. sqyirig; • 'whp are.pur loyal: cuàtorrieïs; 
s pending ä lot of money '. Instèad, • ifypii. hffö'sifc'üems,. al fóri ppeciPlöffers, ypü 
go, through a fast checkout. Bût if ypü spèndi £500; y ou-ré in à queUéfoffiftèëh 
minutes, then th ey condescendihgly àccept your money. Youthen hdvé iolodd it 
info, the car. If a store runs a loyaity card system it will knowfwho thé 30 
percènters, and thé 70 ;pérperdersiàt^ 
knowledge io. great èffect by offering.a free fiirkey to ëverypne spehding;spècifiç. 
amounts in the nth-up to Christmas. The 30percènters speiid moréip getiheir 
free bini; and the .70 percènters get a reward.for tfieir. loyaity. Anâfthe store 
mak.es a bigger profit. Loyaity card information, isoverwhëlming;^^ 
good effect is not an easy objective." f:.''-'^--::/f:y'-\? 
In terms of business development, loyaity scheme data is an invaluable tool. It can be 
used to assess new initiatives such as home shopping [Clive Humby], to develop new 
products such as premium quality ranges [Clive Humby], effectively cutting out much 
market research and cost. In addition, promotional activity can be assessed and focused, 
effectively targeting promotional spending more efficiently: 
"So the data tells: us. what you. buy, it.teïlsus whenyou buy ït;it fèttsits 
your use of promotions. If you think about.hqw much is giveiv/avvay on 
promotions,:yérsus:;ï% offWitfi;Clubcqrd^ïtfs far.rhore;than;fheyrewqrd^ 
Clubcard.. If f can target •tfjqfcprprhöiipnäf/^^ 
more effective.": 
[CHveHurnby] 
Incentives, if cleverly thought out, can be used to invoke additional sales, rather than a 
réduction in price on a sale that would have been made anyway. The use of fiat 'money-
off coupons, which work against like-for-like sales [Clive Humby] therefore, is likely to 
decline, to be favoured by initiatives that promote cross-selling of products and services: 
"... the marginal cost to the retailer of points redeemed against... services, the 
car wash or dry-cleaners, is less than money off at the tili It is extra spending in 
the store, not saving off the bill. "55 
Scotsman, October 11, 1995 
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The database generated through the opération of loyalty schemes can also lead to savings 
in other areas such as advertising, which can be focused on existing customers, although 
there are obviousiy drawbacks in that this type of advertising can not attract new 
customers. Ali the same, loyalty scheme data can reduce costs in areas such as 
promotional activity, and enable a focused targeting of the consumer, as Teseo discovered 
in 1995: 
"Teseo... is scrapping the normal iìmillion pre-Christmas advertising splurge 
in favour ofa direct-marketing campaign centred on its loyalty card. "56 
Section 4.2 considered the changing relationship between retailer and manufacturer, 
finding that retailers were able to innovate more quickly than manufacturers, mainly due 
to their proximity to, and understanding of, the consumer. The use of directly obtained 
customer data (from EPoS technology and schemes like Teseo Clubcard) can be 
considered to have increased retailers' lead over manufacturers, empowering them further 
stili in the relationship [Richard Swaab]. In addition, in times of limited growth from new 
store openings, loyalty cards give retailers the opportunity to exploit more effectively the 
stores they already have: 
"...jt's much more dredi issue riow that ihere\iytll'fòe,:à.Vèiy ìimitèd:;^mbèr';òf 
new sites, and the kéy has gol to he to exploit the ones that ypu'vegot: This 
explqins • thè importancespplpyalty carde,:. àttd. the extènsiqirtb other services like 
finançial< services r il\M io : exploit more pndymprepuiqf thè ones \ypu/Vé:got,: 
because thèsè: are gòuigto 'beine :orifyavëHUës; io gei • the rèM^o\yM]tndt 
hilherto came hatùrally from openitig new stores." 
:ï-;:;.;\ ' . ï - [John.Fletcher] 
There is also a possibility that data ownership can create a barrier to entry to new players, 
as existing players have an understanding of consumer behaviour that new entrants are 
not party to [John Fletcher]. 
To conclude on loyalty schemes, the benefits can be simply classified in three areas -
those relating to customers, retail chains or individuai stores. Loyalty scheme data 
f
' Independent on Sunday, N o v e m b e r 19, 1995 
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enables retailers to identify the minority of customers who are responsible for a large 
proportion of their sales, and to ensure that the store is run to suit these customers. The 
discounts and incentives available to customers can excite them and lead to additional 
sales, while the data obtained on individual customers means that they can be 
incentivised in categories where their spend tends to be low, and deserting customers can 
be identified and tempted back. At store level, the data enables operators to measure 
consumer advocacy to a certain store - how strongly attached they are to the store, and to 
stock the products purchased by the top spenders. Like-for-like sales figures can be 
investigated more effectively than was previously possible, and like-for-like groups such 
as young families or old-aged pensioners can be identified, effectively giving the business 
the information to improve the performance of each individual store, and hence the whole 
retail chain. At head-office level, the data can be used to assess new initiatives such as 
home shopping, to develop new products, and to assess the benefit of promotional 
activities, leading to more accurate targeting of promotional spend as well as better 
targeting of the advertising budget. In short, the possibilities for the exploitation of 
customer data are extensive, and can be used at all levels of the business from individual 
customers to head-office strategic decision making. 
Effects of the introduction of loyalty schemes: 
Near sector-wide adoption of loyalty schemes among multiple food retailers could be 
considered to have negated a certain amount of the incremental sales increases brought by 
the introduction of the scheme by each retailer (5.4.iii. p. 185), which is supported by two 
major operators dropping the schemes. While this in itself does not mean that loyalty 
schemes are unviable, it does invoke problems if customers hold multiple cards and shop 
randomly (promiscuous shoppers): 
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"Look up thè .word loyalty in .any. •dictiottary: It is] hard, io 'fintila. :^tòmer. • 
does nói hàye three tofive loyalty cards. Now, it pan't be working.top well can 
it? They have millions oflittle bits of data about our transactions, dndJhey hâve, 
got tò sort it ont!. When they do sort itout, whatthe helldo,.^ 
are so many variations in the customér profde, so. many différent needs/thatat 
best, ali they can do is respond tótlie total: For exampléfsales are gòirig tip in, 
wiries & spirits, maybe we should giye more space? But you mighl be better off 
giving the space to something else. There are mathematica^ complications, and. 
the re is no quick answer. " . 
[Tonyyde Arigeli] 
Promiscuity in grocery shopping and the multiple ownership of loyalty cards can 
therefore contribute to a muddling of the information available to the retailer, making it 
difficult to extract reliable data. Competitive advantage is gained by the retailers who are 
most effective at obtaining and applying data, which should build net profit. As the use of 
the data is key to the successful opération of the schemes, those that can not make it work 
could fìnd themselves in a zero-sum game where incrementai sales are cancelled out by 
competitors' schemes [Clive Humbyj, the data obtained is of little use, and the scheme 
can effectively become a cost: "...instead of customers holding a card for the store to 
which they are most loyal, it's common for consumers to have cards from ali the major 
chains and simply use the onefor the store they are in at that particular moment. " 51. In 
addition, customér loyalty schemes have acted as an enabler allowing the development of 
self-scanning, where a record of the customér is required in order to build a relationship 
of trust (or otherwise!). Self-scanning helps to reduce the amount of time spent in-store, 
and to reduce staff costs, yet would not be feasible without loyalty schemes: 
"...customers scan their own shopping and, hopefully, wave bye-bye to the hassle of 
loading and unloading trolleys of shopping and long checkout queues. "5B. 
The near-widespread introduction of loyalty schemes among multiple operators in the 
mid-1990s was worrying for independent retailers, as membership of thèse gave card-
Supermarket News, M a y 5, 1997; p .57 -59 
5 8
 Scotsman, March 3 , 1995 
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holders incentive to shop in multiple, rather than independent stores. Although this threat 
has now receded somewhat due to the withdrawal of some schemes, it remains real, and 
independent operators' fears of the impact are illustrated by their development of a 'town 
centre loyalty card' in Leominster, among other towns. Although basic in comparison to 
multiple loyalty cards, the 'Loyal to Leominster' scheme was found to increase footfall in 
the town centre by 10% [Worthington, 1998], and is therefore partially successful in its 
objective of encouraging shoppers away from out-of-town developments back to the town 
centre. Such schemes are the exception rather than the rule, however, and it can otherwise 
be considered that multiple loyalty schemes have driven further market share in the 
direction of multiple, rather than independent, food retailers (4.1. p.85). 
5.4.iv Internationalisation of UK food retailers 
Internationalisation became a food retail buzz-word in the late 20 t h Century, often 
presented as the only way forward in an increasingly competitive market, but the reality 
of developing overseas operations is that the possibility of failure is high. Despite being 
the topic of the late 20 t h Century, internationalisation is by no means just a recent 
phenomenon, it is a long term trend [Alexander, 1997; p.77], which in UK food retailing 
is illustrated by the 1962 arrival of US-based Safeway Inc., although the UK operation 
that was established is now UK-owned (4.4. p.104-105). The pace and importance of 
internationalisation, however, did increase from the late-1980s, which is reflected by an 
increase in the literary output on the matter [see Akehurst and Alexander, 1995; p.5-6]. 
Forces driving internationalisation are separated by Alexander [1997; p.129] into 'push' 
and 'pull' factors, with the former being related to limited opportunities in the domestic 
market, particularly as retail saturation approaches, and the latter being driven by 
perceived opportunities overseas, particularly as consumer demand, necessary 
infrastructure and public policy progress to make new retail formats more feasible in 
previously under-served markets. 
Tesco is the UK-based food retailer with the highest overseas sales, and perhaps the 
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greatest ambition. Analysis of their annual reports shows that overseas sales have risen 
from 12.5% of group turnover in 1997 to 19.3% in 2001, while the contribution to 
operating profits rose from 1.8% to 6.3% over the same period: 
Table 5.4.iv.a, Teseo pic, Overseas sales and profits S 9: 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
% of group turnover generated outside the UK 12.5% 15.8% 14.6% 16.7% 19.3% 
% of operating profit generated outside the UK 1.8% 4.1% 4.8% 4.8% 6.3% 
Analysis of J.Sainsbury's US opération, Shaw's, reveals a similar level of international 
exposure, with 16.2% of non-discontinued opérations' turnover being generated in the 
US, and 17.3% of operating profit M . The two companies, however, have chosen very 
différent routes, with Sainsbury's acquiring a US chain, and Tesco entering alliances and 
partnerships to build overseas opérations, primarily in Central Europe and South East 
Asia, areas where saturation of food retail outlets is far away and potential for growth is 
high, unlike the US, which, however, has established demand and infrastructure for large-
scale food retail opérations. 
The second, equally important, feature of internationalisation in UK food retailing is non-
UK ownership of UK chains, the key élément of this being Wal-Mart's ownership of 
Asda. Wal-Mart's international (non-US) sales have increased substantially over récent 
years, and 2001 figures show the impact of their ASDA acquisition for the first time: 
Table 5.4.iv.b, WalMart, Overseas sales 6 1 : 
1999 2000 2001 
% of group turnover generated outside the US 8.9% 13.8% 16.8% 
Although UK food retailers are often criticised for lack of international progress, this is 
perhaps a little harsh, with Tesco in particular having great ambitions internationally. 
5 9
 F igures adapted from Tesco pic Annual Reports , see 
h t tp : / /62 .169.137.18 l / tesco/newinvestor /pubandresul ts /annandint /an2001 / inves tor .h tm 
6 0
 Source of figures: adapted from ht tp: / /www.i-sainsbury.co.uk/anrptQl/f inancial / f inindex.htm 
0 1
 F igures adapted from WalMar t Annua l Repor ts , see ht tp : / /www.wa1mart .com 
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Only one of the 'big rive' UK food retailers is currently under overseas ownership, and a 
significant non-UK présence in UK food retailing is by no means a new phenomenon (see 
Safeway example above). Remaining a domestic chain is a risky strategy in modem 
times, one that is likely to attract predators (6,4. p.240), and, despite notable failures in 
France for Teseo and Egypt for Sainsbury's, our leading food retailers have developed 
significant and profitable overseas interests, interests that continue to grow more rapidly 
than domestic opérations, signifying that internationalisation is likely to increase steadily 
in importance. 
Conclusion 
Government décisions, socio-economic change, technological development and retailer 
change have ail been instrumental in shaping UK food retail development post-1950. 
Figure 5a, below, présents a time-line of the key factors identified in chapter 5, which 
occurred against a background of rising employment levels, increasing real incomes, and 
growth in the number of dual-income households. These major socio-economic changes 
combined to drive real household income up significanti y, which led to major change in 
the way people wished to shop. Higher levels of employment and dual-income 
households mean that there is less time available for shopping, and frequency of shopping 
declined. This was reinforced by consumer adoption of fridges, freezers and motor cars, 
made possible by rising incomes, which enabled the transportati on and préservation of 
bulk food purchases. 
The food retail response to the changing structure and demands of society was an 
evolving retail structure centred around larger stores with car parking facilities, and lone-
stop shopping1 emerged as the dominant retail Channel. Many small stores closed as a 
resuit (4.3). and the multiple Operators that invested in larger stores came to dominate the 
sector (4.1). 
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Figure 5a: Time-line of key factors affecting UK food retailing post-1950: 
1950 : a r ly -1950s . Food retali profitability severely constrained by government-control led margins . 
ì a r ly -1950s . Basic conversions to self-service be ing carried out, despite difficultics o f ra t ioning. 
1955 
1954. Ra t ion ing wi thdrawn. Free compét i t ion returns. 
1950s. M a n y retail pr ices controlled by manufacturers , mean ing that all shops had to seil their p roduc ts at idenrical 
pr ices . 
1960 Ear ly-1960s. Private label develops as a pr ice-focused alternative to R P M control ied brands (except at Sa insbury ' s ) . 
Ear ly-1960s. R P M failing in the grocery sector. 
1965 
1963. F ineFare & Teseo introduce trading s tamps. 
1964. R P M abolished by parl iament. Free price compét i t ion, benefiting efficient Operators. 
M i d - 1 9 6 0 s . Early-superstores developed, general ly convers ions of disused industriai bui ld ings . 
1970 
1971 . Planning gain became an issue. 
1972. P lann ing guidel ines become more favourable to out-of- town Stores up to 50 ,000 sq.fì. A l so , V A T introduced. 
1975 
1974. D P C N 1 4 clarifies distinction be tween retail & wholesale warehouses , closes loophole to out -of - town 
deve lopment . 
M i d - 1 9 7 0 s . Central warehous ing & distribution int roduced. 
1977. P lanning guidel ines eased, and become favourable to out-of- town stores up to 100,000 sq.fì. 
La te -1970s . Trading s tamps largely abandoned, catalysed by intense pr ice wars . 
Late 1970s . Discriminatory Discounts b e c a m e an issue. 
1980 
1985 
1981 . Invest igat ion b y MonopoHcs & Mergers Commiss ion 
Ear ly -1980s . Scanning & E P o S introduced. 
Ear ly -1980s . Rctailers deve lop superstores in enterprise zones to overcome p lanning difficulties. 
M i d - 1 9 8 0 s . Illegal Sunday t rading becomes widespread. 
1985. Invest igat ion by Office of Fair Trading, 
Jury 1985. Out -of - town planning guidel ines relaxed. Per iod to 1993 easiest in wh ich to deve lop supers tores . 
1990 
1 9 9 ! 
Early 1990s . European 'hard discounters* beg in to develop U K chains 
1992/93 . European Single Marke t cornes into exis tence. 
1993. P lanning guidel ines begin to turn against out -of - town development . 
1994. Sunday and evening t rading hours deregulated b y parl iament. 
M i d - 1 9 9 0 s . Loyalty schemes widely introduced. 
1996. P lanning guidel ines redirect deve lopment to town centres, s lowing out-of- town deve lopment . 
1996/97. O F T takes s tance against further mergers within the 'Big Pive*. 
La te -1990s . Loyalty schemes d r o p p e d b y s o m e Operators. Only the 'Big T w o ' o f the 'B ig F ive 1 retain t h e m ( 2 0 0 1 ) 
1999. Nat iona l m i n i m u m wage introduced. 
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Chapter 6 
Explanation of the changing UK food retail system: the impact of exogenous and endogenous 
factors on the food retail system, 1950-1999 
Chapter 6 explains the changes identified in chapter 4, and identifies the forces driving these 
changes, drawing on the major factors outlined in chapter 5. Both endogenous forces (internal to 
retailers) and exogenous forces (external to retailers), are considered, and a technique based on and 
inspired by grounded theory (3.1 .ii. p.74-75) is used to generate chapter 7, which assesses the 
relevance of the various théories of retail change and proposes new explanations. 
6.1 The domination of UK food retailing by multiple retail organisations 
The rise of multiple food retailers in the UK is illustrated by their market share, which climbed from 
27% to 86% in the 36 years to 1997 This dramatic increase carne primarily at the expense of 
independent Operators, but was also due to declining co-operative societies, a lack of retail renewal 
being responsible in both sectors - as multiple Operators moved into supermarkets and superstores, 
co-operative Operators feil behind the pace, and independents remained almost static. In addition, 
multiple rationalisation into fewer, larger stores brought expansion of the product offering, bringing 
them into compétition with specialist food retailers such as butchers and fishmongers, who suffered 
as a result, particularly during the 1970s, when multiple attrition of specialist food retailers' trade 
was most severe. 
This section considers the exogenous and endogenous forces driving the uninterrupted rise of 
multiple food retailers, and examines the (endogenous) competitive reaction of other retail types to 
their aggressive expansion. 
Exogenous forces driving the rise of multiple food retailers 
The regulatory environment was the primary exogenous force affecting the expansion of the multiple 
food retail trade during the second half of the 20 l h Century. The first major change in the regulatory 
environment was the 1964 abolition of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) (5.I.Ü. p-119), allowing 
efficient Operators to pass on their lower costs in the form of lower priées, giving efficient Operators 
competitive advantage, while theoretically allowing entry of low-cost, low-price entrants, as 
1
 Nieisen Market Research 
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suggested by Hollander's [1960] Wheel of Retailing (7.1.1. p.258-259). While the abolition of RPM 
did not favour the multiple sector per se, it favoured Operators of large, efficient, self-service based 
grocery stores, to which multiple Operators were best suited (5.1.iL p.122). From the 1960s, multiple 
Operators focused their efforts on this type of store, outpacing development by co-operative and 
particularly independent retailers (4.3, p.96-97), thus multiple grocery chains were the key 
beneficiary of RPM's abolition, which also laid the foundations for superstore development, initially 
attracting consumers by discounting major branded groceries. In short, the abolition of RPM drove 
the development of low-cost trading formats, and was followed by a period of intense restructuring 
into such formats, supporting the Wheel of Retailing (7.1.1. p.258-259), and causing accélération of 
the retail life cycle for self-service and supermarkets formats (7.1.5. p.277). 
The Government's attitude towards planning is clearly important to UK food retailers, with the 
development of supermarkets and superstores both slowed by the restrictive planning regime, 
particularly in early phases of their development. Planning restrictions on superstores began to be 
relaxed from 1972, and development was particularly rapid in the 1980s when planning permission 
was easiest to obtain. From 1988, successive guidelines made out-of-town development harder, with 
PPG6 (1996) effectively ending large-scale out-of-town development altogether (5.1.iii. p.126-127). 
In brief, the planning regime initially prevented the superstore format from entering the rapid growth 
phase of the retail life cycle (7.1.5. p.278), although developers found clever ways of beating the 
system (5.Lui, p.124-126), and when planning laws were later relaxed, the format grew rapidly, 
before tougher planning guidelines once again arrested growth, supporting the idea that the planning 
system is a factor slowing out-of-town retail development [see Brown, 1992a; p.191] and therefore 
slowing the rise of the multiple sector that dominâtes superstore retailing. 
By the late-1970s and early-1980s, the government had become worried that the large scale of the 
leading UK food retailers (4.2. p.91) had driven manufacturers to offer key players 'discriminatory 
discounts' (5.1.ÌV. p.130-131) catalysing government investigations into the key players [MMC, 
1981; OFT, 1985]. While damning conclusions could have led to régulation of the industry, with 
serious implications for large Operators, it was decided that further régulation was unnecessary, 
because retailers tended to pass on benefits achieved to consumers. This gave large Operators the 
green light to use size as a bargaining tool in negotiations with manufacturers. The late-1990s again 
brought a Compétition Commission inquiry into leading food retailers' pricing stratégies and alleged 
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abuse of suppliers, which again found largely in favour of retailers, to the dismay of farmers. 
Government investigations into the industry, while creating much upheaval and uncertainty, have 
effectively failed to stop the growth of multiple food retailing. 
Deregulation of shopping hours in 1994 put medium-sized food stores at a disadvantage, by driving 
consumer demand for large stores more suited to Sunday and evening trading (5.1.v. p.136-138), and 
is therefore a force driving recent evolution of the retail format (4.3). Because large stores are 
generally multiple-owned, the multiple sector as a whole has gained substantially from this change in 
legislation. While small stores initially suffered from the change in legislation due to the removal of 
their exclusive Sunday trading rights (5.1.v. p.138), stores under 3000 sq. ft. retain exclusive trading 
hours on Sunday mornings and evenings, which can now be considered to be driving polarisation of 
the industry into large out-of-town units and small, local shops, as suggested by Kirby's [1976a, 
1976b] polarisation principle (7.1.3. p.272-273), by explicitly putting stores slightly in excess of 
3000 sq. ft. at a disadvantage. 
Adoption of technology is a further force driving the success of multiple operators at the expense of 
independent operators, which although an endogenous action, is enabled by the exogenous 
development of technology. Small stores, typically independent, failed to invest in technology or 
financially could not do so (5.3.ii. p. 166), allowing larger operators to gain competitive advantage, 
reinforcing the trend towards multiple domination of the industry (4 .1. p.85). Similarly, from the 
mid-1990s, multiple loyalty schemes reinforced the trend of multiple growth at the expense of 
independent operators, who generally do not operate loyalty schemes (5.4.iii. p.192-193) 
Endogenous forces driving the rise of multiple food retailers 
The independent and co-operative sectors' failure to keep pace with multiples in the renewal of their 
facilities is a key factor contributing to their decline, because self-service and larger stores were more 
efficient and profitable than earlier formats, and made existing facilities outdated and less attractive 
to the consumer. As rationalisation took place, and several small stores were replaced by one large 
store ( 4 3 , p.96-97), existing multiple, independent and co-operative retail stores became less 
profitable [Kirby, 1974b, pl4-18; Kirby, 1975, p469-500]. In the mid-1970s, the trade of a medium-
sized food retail outlet was found to decline by an average of 16% when a superstore opened nearby, 
while the trade of independent operators was largely unaffected [Thorpe et al, 1976], supporting the 
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polarisation principle (7.1.3, p.272), and suggesting that multiple operators cannibalised their 
existing businesses in order to prevent new entrants from doing so: 
People say, • look at all the independents; that have •closed:. But \ the : multiples: • have < closed: 
thousands of shops: They have replaced three or four with one shop.. : 
[Tony de Angelt] 
Although co-operative societies' closed half of their stores between 1966 and 1975 [Dawson and 
KJrby, 1977; p.20], this was not accompanied by a large increase in the number of co-operative 
supermarkets (4.3. p.96-97), suggesting that many of these closures resulted from declining 
profitability rather than store rationalisation programmes, underlining the potential problems of 
failing to move into retail formats in the positive growth phase of the retail life cycle (7.1._5. p.277): 
The history of the Co-op, really, is the history of British food retailing, and moving from.the 
small, local shop •• - the sociological \ changes of car ôwnérshipi of yeomen going to. work; and 
the Co-op did not respond quickly enough; 
: [Sir Dcnnis Landau;]: 
Co-operative societies failed to keep pace with phénoménal multiple store rationalisation because 
individual co-operative societies' were competing over who could pay the highest dividend to 
members, reducing the capital available for store development, leading to under-investment relative 
to multiple operators, even in societies generating healthy operating profits. This under-investment 
relative to multiple operators eventually resulted in co-operative stores becoming out-dated and 
uneconomical: 
l meati the iragedyfor the Cô-op wàstliat ihey didh fi rein vest: ih thëir shdps\ aller the -war,. 
becàuse individual s mail focal societies.we^ the dividend ihey wéré pàyirig and 
ihey weren 't '• yisidnàry ériough to • devélôp the. asséts dhey hdd, when the Co-ops. collectivèly, 
hadfar more, trade than'Tësco, Safeway, Sainsbury.dllput togeïher, 
: : [Sir Dennis Landau]; 
A further factor slowing co-operative moves into larger stores was that co-operative societies were 
established to serve working class, local communities, and were presented with a dilemma of 
watching existing stores decline or abandoning their local shops, principles and roots in order to 
improve profits, deserting immobile members along the way: 
"For a Movement that prides itself both on caring and sharing ... the question of trading 
through smaller shops is a searing one. It is just the disadvantaged, the immobile, who are 
likely to need such facilities, and the social conscience is pricked. Yet the Movement is 
socially owned in a trade dominated by private enterprise, and can only propound 
successfully its social commitment if it can achieve economic trading success also. " 
[Co-operative Union Ltd, 1981] 
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Co-operatives therefore fell behind multiples in large store development for the two key reasons of 
insufficient availability of investment funds after the payment of generous dividends, and reluctance 
to close small, local shops due to the clash of cultures between socially-owned ethical values and 
survival in a tough business environment. 
Independent food retailers also lacked investment funds for large store development, as well as 
inclination to make such large investments, and struggled to attract external sources of finance: 
Access to capital has been an. important.factor for independent operators. They haven't 
the resources: or access to finance. . Traditional : sources- of:finance,, bdnj^l/eic/ are. not 
happy hunting grounds, and the wholesalers haven't been profitable enough fb help with 
finance schemes, even for their own. In fact, one could argue, that today if they, do find à 
retailer who wishes to dispose of a business, then the wholesaler is likely to buy-it as a 
wholly owned operation, rather-than to help an independent purchaser: y r S - : f : f'•'•'['/. 
[TreVòr Dixon] 
Self-service and supermarket developments were termed 'revolutionary' causes of change which 
allowed and encouraged larger and more profitable organisations by virtue of the necessary fixed 
capital expenditure [Dawson and Kirby, 1977; p.29], putting independent operators with little access 
to investment capital at a serious disadvantage, and ensuring that the independent sector continued to 
operate stores in the decline phase of the retail life cycle (7.1.5. p.277-278). 
In short, the co-operative and independent food retail sectors suffered from a lack of investment 
relative to multiple operators, whose high levels of investment pushed the food retail life cycle into a 
new phase of 'one-stop shopping' in large, purpose-built stores with parking facilities (4.3. p.97-98). 
Meanwhile co-operatives and particularly independents continued trading from the old generation of 
small local or high street stores, which were progressively becoming less attractive to demanding 
consumers compared to modem multiple facilities. Reduced patronage and closure of unprofitable 
outlets drove their declining market shares, with their key failure being the retention of small outlets, 
which are intrinsically less profitable than larger stores, no matter what the form of ownership 
[Dawson and Kirby, 1977; p.29]. 
Multiple takeovers of small chains with less than 10 outlets, previously classed as independent 
operators, contributed to growth in multiple market share, with market share passing from the 
independent sector to the multiple predator, as Dawson and Kirby [1979; p.22] found was the case in 
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the department store industry. Similarly symbol independents have been purchased by their 
wholesalers in order to secure continuation of the business [Trevor Dixon], so statistics for 'symbol 
independents' should be treated carefully, as included in this définition can be large wholesaler-
retailers such as C J Lang, a wholesaler owning 60 Spar stores2, and A F Blakemore, another Spar 
wholesaler, which operated 165 stores in 19953. The extent of vertical integration in the symbol 
group sector is therefore reasonably advanced, and symbol stores can appear to be independent 
Operators when in fact they are wholesaler-owned retai! chains. 
The endogenous competitive reaction to the rise of the multiples 
Independent retailers attempted to counter multiple buying power through the formation of symbol 
groups, which appeared in the mid-1950s following the ending of food rationing and building 
restrictions (5.1 .il. and were pioneered by wholesalers Peter Keevil, Kinlochs, Danish Bacon Co., 
Stewarts, and Evershed, following similar developments in continental Europe and the USA [Fulop, 
1961; p.12-13]. In the USA, the voluntary chain sector represented over 16% of grocery stores by 
1930 [Harding, 1935; p.32]. In the UK, these pioneering wholesalers feared that the expansion of 
multiple and co-operative grocers into self-service would harm independent grocers, who were their 
chief customers, and symbol groups were formed in response to this [Fulop, 1961; p.12-13]. Early 
growth of voluntary groups was rapid (figure 6.1a), documented in detail by Fulop [1962], though it 
was noted that the field for further recruitment had become 'somewhat limited' by 1963 [BPC, 1966; 
p.4]. 
Figure 6.1a Number of voluntary group shops, 1954-1964. 
Year N u m b e r of voluntary group shops 
1954 50 
1957 2000 
1958 8000 
1960 12000 
1962 25000 
1963 26000 
1964 25776 
[source: BPC, 1966; p.4] 
2
 The Grocer, January 9 , 1999, p I 2 . 
3
 The Grocer, Apr i i 8, 1995, p 2 8 . 
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Voluntary groups were formed to offer independent members centralised buying, distribution, 
advertising, promotion, private label and management support in order to be able to compete with 
the increasing power of multiple Operators. White there remained a consumer market for the small, 
local store, symbol groups brought such stores advantages, particularly in économies of scale, buying 
power and retail skill, aiding their survival and therefore driving polarisation of the industry, 
supporting the polarisation principie (7.1.3. p.272). 
Members of symbol groups normally remain independent and are obliged to place a minimum 
weekly order with the group, accept deliveries on specified days and times, pass on price réductions 
to customers, ensure that the shop confirms to minimum standards of hygiène and service, and 
display the insignia of the symbol group in the shop window [Fulop, 1961; p. 13]. This enables the 
symbol wholesaler to reduce transport, handling and selling costs, which are passed on to the retailer 
in the form of cheaper supplies [Fulop, 1961; p.13]. In addition retailers increase stock turnover and 
reduce Storage requirements, which means that capital is more productive and gives potential for 
conversion of Storage area to sales space [BPC, 1966; p.20]. They also gain access to specialist 
skills, advice, training and contact with other retail members [BPC, 1966; p.20], in general equipping 
them better to compete with multiple retail organisations. 
White independent Operators gained many of the advantages of large chains through affiliation to a 
symbol group, symbol group market share began to decline in the 1970s, following stagnation in 
recruitment from 1963. This decline was relative to both the whole food trade and to the total 
independent food sector, meaning that symbol groups represent a declining proportion of a shrinking 
independent sector: 
Figure 6.1-b: Share of food trade by type oi retailer, 1976-1986: 
Year 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
Symbol independents 12.4% 10.0% 7.9%» 6.3% 5.0% 3.6%» 
Other independents 10.1% 8.1% 7.0% 6.1% 5.9% 5.5% 
% independent trade through symbols: 55.1% 55.2% 53.0% 50.8% 45.9% 39.6% 
[source: adapted from Gardner and Sheppard, 1989] 
In the decade to 1986, symbol independents' share of the total UK food retail market fell from 
12.4% to 3.6%, thus it is fair to assume that the économies achieved through symbol group 
opérations diminished with time, although the contraction in the number of symbol groups 4 and 
4
 The Grocer, 29 Apri i 1995, p6 . 
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severe decline in others, such as VG 5, leaving a few large symbol organisations to dominate the 
sector means that the purchasing power of those remaining is largely intact, particularly as buying 
groups such as NISA Today began to act on behalf of symbol groups rather than solely unaffiliated 
independents. 
The development of cash and carry wholesaling in the 1960s was a major factor in the decline of 
symbol retailing, a conflict identified by Fulop [1964; p.167]. Cash and carry warehouses are 
generally 3,000 to 35,000 sq.ft., and operate on a self-service basis [Fulop, 1964; p.164-165]. It is 
"based on the retailer selecting, collecting and paying cash for his goods, thereby enabling the 
wholesaler to reduce selling, assembly, distribution and credit costs and to pass on the savings to the 
customer (retailer)" [Kirby, 1974a; p.527]. Ironically, cash and carry was developed largely by 
symbol wholesalers seeking both retail and catering clients [Richard Branston], and was also used by 
chemists, butchers and hardware retailers [Fulop, 1964; p.165]. Many symbol-affiliated retailers 
changed their wholesale channel to cash and carry [Richard Branston], with 75% of symbol retailers 
using cash and carry facilities by 1974 [Kirby, 1974a; p.527], effectively reducing the average 
percentage of products purchased from symbol wholesalers to just 66% [ibid.]. Symbol retailers 
were using cash and carry as a secondary source in order to broaden their range, to rectify 
wholesalers' out-of-stock situations, and to achieve lower prices [Kirby, 1975; p.500]. It also 
reduced the financial benefits of joining symbol groups, as cash and carry undercut traditional 
wholesalers by around 4-6% [Fulop, 1964; p. 165]. Effectively, symbol wholesalers sealed their own 
fate by claiming that collaboration with one wholesaler was the way forward, while providing 
alternative facilities that detracted from their symbol wholesale business: 
Unfortunately it went slightly Wrong, because the/yvkolesalersfeti had to develop 
in other areasf. and they, launched cash/and 
unaffiliated field, while they were trying to. prove-that ^ was through 
affiliation. It was a terrible contradiction. No mqiier what the wholesalers tell you, it does 
not make sense to preach that you shoidd.be. Jewish arid a at the same time! You. 
can say you can be a Jew or a Catholic and it is-QK) but if one minister is giving you two 
alternatives it can seem strange... 
;:.:\''''".']f:..y [Tony de Angeli] 
Symbol wholesalers' reluctance to serve small stores placing small orders led to their rejection of 
small retailers, driving cash and carry as a wholesale channel for those unable to, or unwilling to, 
5
 The Grocer, 21 Sep tember 1996, p 4 3 . 
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affiliate to symbol groups [Kirby, 1974a; p.527], The competitive emphasis of independent food 
retailers changed direction over time, as it became clear that superstores had enormous pricing 
advantages, despite the introduction of cash and carry, and independents began to move towards 
convenience, in terms of both location and opening hours, effectively supporting the demand pattern 
suggested by the polarisation principie (7.1.3. p.272). 
Co-operative food retailers attempted to counter the increasing buying power of the leading 
múltiples by centralising individual societies' buying, marketing and distribution functions, which 
proved unsuccessful because individual societies preferred to maintain autonomy in these áreas 
(5.3.iii. p.171-172). The full benefíts of unifíed purchasing, distribution and marketing were 
therefore not achieved, meaning that co-operative societies remained unable to negotiate with the 
same weight as large múltiples. In time, co-operative attention also focused on convenience rather 
than outright price competition with a lean múltiple sector, again supporting the demand pattern of 
the polarisation principie (7.1.3. p.272). 
Both co-operative and independent food retailers, therefore, made considerable efforts to achieve 
economies of scale in procurement, yet the long-term decline in their market shares has continued 
unabated, with the key factor being that such efforts only met with limited success, despite showing 
initial promise. In addition, there was scant expansión in independent store sizes, and the increases in 
co-operative store sizes remain small relative to those of múltiple operators, meaning that sales área 
relative to the múltiple sector, and henee buying power, fell. 
Conclusión 
The enormous change in market share that took place between 1960 and 1980 resulted in múltiples 
coming to dominate the índustry, at the expense of independent and co-operative operators. The rise 
of the múltiple sector during the 1960s and 1970s reñected the inability of independent and co-
operative operators to move out of small, local stores in serious decline at a fast enough rate, while 
múltiple retailers pursued aggressive store development plans. Both the co-operative and 
independent sectors therefore suffered from a lack of investment, due to a lack of access to capital in 
both sectors, and also to conflicting commercial-social pressures within the socially owned co-
operative movement. 
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Equally, the rise of multiple operators was aided by the abolition of RPM, which favoured low-
overhead up-to-date stores which tended to be owned by multiple operators, and by a graduai 
softening in planning attitudes from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, which enabled multiples to 
drive rapid évolution of the retail format (5.1.iii. p.126). Government inquines have tended to find in 
favour of multiple operators (5.1 .iv. p. 131) allowing their growth to continue, and the deregulation 
of shopping hours (5.1.v. p. 136-138) favoured the large, modem stores that are dominated by 
multiple operators. 
In short, exogenous factors have generally originated at govemment level, and have tended to favour 
the trading style of multiples, rather than directly favour actual multiple organisations, and have 
supported multiple operators1 endogenous store rationalisation programmes, which have placed them 
at a huge advantage over independent and co-operative operators. Independent and co-operative 
attempts to counter the buying advantages of multiples were based on the centralisation of buying, 
marketing and distribution functions, yet the fragmented nature of both retail types prevented thèse 
initiatives from achicving their potential, allowing multiple operators to maintain substantial buying 
power over independent and co-operative operators. 
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Figure 6.1c. Forces driving the rise of multiple food retail organisations: 
ENDOGENOUSFORCES EXOGENOUSFORCES 
1950 o n . Independent failure 
to k e e p pace with mul t ip le 
s tore renewal , due to lack of 
access to capital. 
1950 o n . Co-op failure to 
keep p a c e with mul t ip le store 
r enewal , lack of capi tal due 
to excess ive divi p aymen t s . 
1960s on. Symbol g roups fail 
to achieve potential due to 
cash & carry, and reluctance 
to serve smaller stores. 
L a t e 1960s on. Mult iple 
takeover of small chains (<10 
out le ts ) , share passes from 
independen ts to multiples. . 
1970 on . Co-op ethical 
d i l emma: failed.tp m o v e out-
of - town as established; to : 
se rve local communi ty . 
Mid 1970s . Có-op centrai 
b u y i n g & distr ibution not 
ve ry successa l i , as societies 
preferred to control their o w n 
Mid 1990s . Mul t ip les ' 
loyalty schemes , if ü sed 
effectively, give advantage 
over independents & co-ops . 
RISE OF THE 
MULTIPLE FOOD 
RETAIL 
ORGANISATION 
1950 on . It is à lways m o r e 
cost effective for large chains 
to adopt technologyj able to 
spread the cost more:widely : 
1964 o n . Abol i t ion of R P M 
catalyses p u r s u i t o f ; : 
économies , which còhie wi th 
prganisa t iòr ià lscale . : ' 
197-2-mid 1990s; Mul t ip le 
g rowth aided b y relàxed 
p lann ing att i tude tò òut-of-
tpwii development . . ^  
1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 5 & 2000 . 
Fayourâblè compét i t ion • > 
ir iquiriès r allow niuitìple 
g rowth to cont inue. 
1994 . Deregula t ion o f t rading 
hoùrs favo'urs la rge stores; im;l' : 
which are general ly mul t ip le -
owned T . 
6.2 The concentration of power into the 'big live', and the impact on the relationship 
between retailers and manufacturer 
In 1998, Teseo, Sainsbury's, Asda, Safeway and Somerfield collectively accounted for over 50% of 
the UK grocery market, representing a high degree of concentration within the industry. Tn 1984, the 
'top ftve food retailers combined market share was only 28%, thus the rate of concentration in the 
industry was profound during the 1980s and 1990s (4,2. p.91). 
The growth of the leading players was driven by many factors, and the key exogenous and 
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endogenous driving forces are considered below, followed by an analysis of trie forces slowing 
concentration and an analysis of the impact of the rise of the 'big five'. 
Exogenous forces driving the rise of the 'big five' 
While takeover activity is an endogenous phenomenon, the exogenous environment determines its 
altractiveness to retailers. The first major exogenous forcé driving takeover in UK food retailing was 
the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, when real incomes fell and consumers became more price 
sensitive (5.2.Ü, p.147-148), in response to which food retailers launched price cutting campaigns, 
such as Operation Checkout and Discount '78, and fíerce price wars broke out. While these price 
wars were an endogenous response to exogenous change, one área of impact was retailers' profits, 
because price wars reduce proñts and depress share valúes (6.5, p.250), meaning that takeover of 
weaker players becomes better valué, and is therefore more attractive to the predator. 
A further exogenous factor driving takeover activity has been the restrictive planning system (5,1 .ni. 
p.123-129), whereby difficulties obtaining planning consent for new stores can drive retailers to 
consider takeover of operators with good stores, in order to maintain growth in periods when organic 
expansión is impeded by the regulatory environment: 
Roger Clough: ; Can one reason fot takeovers be that tófget:the planning 
permission? • -
Peter Asqüith:; . '• Yes,, if they. ¡rayé gpt \ decent, stores.;'. Bui there \ isalways a •• lot ••. lo do, to get 
¿he stores into.yóüfspylei\tp réydmp:¿fierri,\ióiputthéhilp:thé;s tanda rdíhdt-Mdddénidnd.lys/ 
Because the leading UK food retailers are public companies, they are bound to deliver shareholder 
valué, and to respect shareholders' wishes. This can lead to takeover when a large proportion of the 
shares are owned by a few large institutional shareholders (pensión funds for example) who may 
forcé takeover in the hope of driving up the share price, as was the case with Somerfield's 1998 
purchase of Kwik Save: 
The Somerfield deal. with Kwik Sayéhad no trading senseto it ai all, it was qlnióst certa inly. 
encouraged hy Phillips &. Drew, who had a 20% share ofeach company ... There were ohly 
two shareholders ihat mattered in Kwik Save, Dairyfahñs had 29% and Phillips & Drew 
fühd management had ahout 22%.. They hadseén those sitares go dówn\from 700p toühder 
300p, dramatic falls; and they weren-tgoing to go dnywhere. Thefaci ihat Phillips & Drew 
fund management also had 20% plus of Somerfield, which was also underpressure, surely 
meant that they were instrumental in getting tfióse two tógether. 
[Mike Graves] 
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In addition to pressure from institutional shareholders, public companies are generally expected to 
show annual profit growth, and failure to meet City expectations normally hits the share price, 
leaving companies susceptible to takeover: 
Roger Glough: This growth, this pressure to grow year-on-year, is it:related to being 
public companies, listèdpn the.stock exchange? 
John Fletcher: Yes, 1 think the évidence is that there hasn't been thè sàrnè lèvel of 
intensive growth withthe Co-op,. which is.differently owned, and neither did FineFare show 
that \ sort: of intensity • when it. was. o\vned;hy. A B Foods, ifwas hidden . w ithin ; the ; pverall 
scheine, of ihings, there : wasri 't .quitè . the : sort - öf pressure;. \compdratively ispéaking. flïey. 
wer en't quite so aggressive. Só -generally-ipeaking flhfnfcyés. òbviouslyinàny business the 
person at the top has set. certain standards, butyffdf^ouldypèì^m 
y ou didn 't have to showyear on y ear profit- improvèmerit, every yëar,: every six mòhihs. 
The final exogenous factors aiding the rise of the lbig five' are the favourable findings of 
government inquiries into discriminatory discounts (5.1.iv. p.131). Successive investigations [MMC, 
1981; OFT, 1985] found that régulation of retai 1er power over manufacturers was unnecessary, 
allowing leading players to develop, in terms of both scale and power, relative to suppliers, and an 
elite handful of multiple food retailers carne to dominate the industry. In effect, there has been 
polarisation of organisational size, driven by 'Darwinian-style' survival of the fittest as many weaker 
multiples have been taken over (7.1.6. p.281). Further forces driving polarisation of organisational 
size include difficulties in obtaining planning permission, which made takeover more attractive as a 
vehicle for growth, the influence of stock market listings and institutional shareholders, which tend 
to drive takeover, and favourable inquiry findings, which allowed consolidation to continue. 
Endogenous forces driving the rise of the 'big five1 
The first endogenous force driving the rise of the 'big five' was the finite potential for growth due to 
the decline of the co-operative, independent and specialist sectors (4.1. p.89-90), which dramatically 
aided the development of multiple retailing. Growth could not continue indefinitely at the historic 
rate because of the sectors' small residuai market share, meaning that growth had to come from other 
sources, namely other multiples - one multiple operator's gain became another's loss, and attrition of 
market share drove the rise of the big five (4,2, p.91-92). Attrition of a competitor's market share can 
reinforce the position of the big five, particularly if it leads to the competitor being taken over by one 
of the 'big five', as their entire market share then passes to one of the 'big five'. In short, the 
réalisation that growth could not continue indefinitely from independent and co-operative Operators 
suggests that 'Darwinian' survival of the fittest had resulted in relatively stable, albeit depleted, co-
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operative and independent sectors, forcing multiple operators to fight each other for market share 
(7.1.6. p.281). In turn, 'Darwinian' survival of the fittest multiples resulted in the rise of the big five, 
particularly when takeover was involved. 
Concentration of the business among the 'big five' was also driven by geographical diversification of 
major operators, with food retailers expanding beyond their regional heartlands to become national 
players (4.4. p.100-107). Thus the leading players became larger, through both natural expansion and 
takeover, demonstrated by the fierce battle between Sainsbury's and Tesco over William Low in 
1994, eventually won by Tesco, albeit at a higher price because of Sainsbury's interest. Expanding 
regionally through takeover was not a new experience for Tesco, the company having used 
acquisition to expand beyond the South East in the 1960s: 
Tesco moved on from just self-service stores into-supermarkets in the back end of the 1950s 
and early-1960s, and continued to. develop their, business, - both organically/and by 
acquisition. By the mid-J960s,. lâte~i9.60s;. tfieyJidd taken over bdsihessès.,tnd 
John Irwin '$;in the North, and.had a number of self service stores, ahd'afeW'supernuirketS: 
[Lord MacLaurin of Knebworth, DL] 
In effect, the regional expansion of multiple operators made 'fitness of organisation' a more critical 
issue, as they entered into competition with regional operators who were generally less fit (7.1.6. 
p.281). The regional expansion of the leading operators was facilitated by their adoption of central 
distribution systems during the 1970s, which enabled operators to expand beyond their regional 
bases while being able to assure the quality of their merchandise nationwide (5.3.iii. p. 170), and the 
centralisation of buying functions brought them better buying terms, bringing further economies of 
scale of organisation, putting smaller players at a disadvantage. The development of advanced 
technological systems has made scale of organisation more critical, as large players are able to 
absorb the cost of systems over a larger turnover, meaning that it is harder for small operators to 
introduce technological systems (5-3.iL p.166), again reinforcing the position of the 'fittest*, 
according to the Darwinian analogy, as the least fit are unable to invest in technology that could 
make them more competitive, or 'fitter' (7.1.6. p.281-282). It also suggests further polarisation of 
organisational size by disadvantaging medium-sized organisations (7.1.4. p.274-275). 
Takeover activity was extensive during the 1980s when some large food retail conglomerates were 
built up from many smaller operators, driving substantial concentration in the industry. At this time, 
'survival of the largest' was evident (7.1.6. p.281), with Argyll being built up from the acquisition of 
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Cordon Bleu (1979), Freezer Fare (1980), Lo-Cost (1980), Pricerite (1982), Liptons, Templeton, 
Galbraith and Presto (from Allied Suppliers in 1982) and Safeway (1987), later undertaking 
conversions to focus on the Safeway brand: 
In the 1980s there was massive consolidation, Dee and Argyll hoovered up masses of 
smaller operators. This meant that money could he spent, on systems, and enabled, things 
like sales based ordering and labour scheduling systems to be developed, the cost could he-
absorbed .• 
: ; :[DaviòVStoddàrt]: 
The internationalisation of food retailing ((±A, p.238-240) suggests that the big five of the future will 
be determined internationally rather than nationally, and that international conglomerates will be 
created, following a similar pattern to consolidation in UK food retailing. Buying power, and hence 
competitiveness and profitability, is closely correlated to organisational scale, with the pursuit of 
buying power being a key force driving UK food retailers' concentration on increasing their scale: 
"Teseo wasn't that big back In 1976/77, it was one of the smaller retailers really. As it 
developed'pndp&we got more.and more volume through Me\ business^ {we-^vere .able to: dp 
• better, and better.I deals mth the .manufacturer-!ö ^ ^ >^i^^sj ; ^ ^r^^ ^  J^^^: |^ ^es>?i^  
and we ensured that everybody shared in 'the profits: y 
^:\fxjrd MacLaurin-of KnebWórfhi t)L} 
Finally, on endogenous factors, the rising power of the 'big five' operators brought substantial 
competitive advantage over secondary operators, meaning that it became harder for these smaller 
retailers to compete and attract customers. One escape from terminal decline is the sale of the 
business, thus there tends to be a domino effect, where consolidation induces further consolidation. 
Exogenous forces slowing the rise of the 'big five' 
The key force retarding the development of the 'big five' in UK food retailing is the regulatory 
environment, with planning regulations slowing multiple development, particularly of those 
attempting to move into larger stores (5.1 .iii, p.127), also slowing the phases of the superstore retail 
life cycle (7.1.5. p.278). The rise of the 'big five' was undoubtedly slowed by difficulties securing 
development opportunities, although such difficulties can induce takeover attempts, meaning that 
concentration, to a certain extent, occurs despite stifled store development programmes (6.2. p.208). 
Takeover activity, however, became more difficult following Tesco's 1994 purchase of William 
Low, which was the last major domestic merger in the industry, with the exception of Somerfield-
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Kwik Save in 1998. The mid-1990s saw not only a tightening of planning regulations that ended 
large-scale out-of-town development (5.1.iii. p.126-127), they also witnessed the end of major 
domestic mergers due to the Office of Fair Trading's reUictance to allow them, because of fears that 
local monopolies may develop, slowing concentration in the industry (5.1 .vi, p.140-141). Further 
polarisation of organisational size has therefore been averted by the regulatory environment, while 
the Darwinian 'crunch-point', where the fittest survive and the weakest die has effectively been 
delayed (7.1.6. p.282). 
Effects of the ríse of the 'big five' 
Concentration of power in UK food retailing has had two key effects. First, competition between 
remaining players has become more intense because it became harder to gain market share due to the 
disappearance of weak players (5.1 .iv. p. 132). Second, the power relationship between UK food 
retailers and manufacturers has altered dramatically (4.2). with Nestlé and Unilever being the only 
European manufacturers comparable in size to any of Europe's top half dozen retailers [Reid, 1995], 
This growth of retailers relative to manufacturers means that leading food retailers can use their size 
to obtain favourable terms from manufacturers [MMC, 1981; OFT, 1985], considered fully below. 
To summarise, the rise of the 'big five' múltiple food retailers has been driven by many forces, 
including several exogenous ones, which influenced retailers' attitude towards takeover. Favourable 
government inquines into the industry allowed concentration to continué. The rise of the 'big five' 
has also been influenced by several endogenous factors, such as the decline of weak múltiples, 
particularly if this results in takeover, geographical diversification, aided by the development of 
central distribution, and retailers' pursuit of scale, driven by their desire to absorb the cost of systems 
over a larger tumover base and to gain buying efficiencies. Finally, there tends to be a domino effect, 
whereby the growth of leading organisations means that smaller competitors find it harder to 
compete, which can lead to them being absorbed by a larger operator. From the mid-1990s, however, 
concentration within the sector was slowed by OFT guidelines (5.1.vi. p.140-141). 
The changing power relationship 
As UK food retailing became more concentrated, leading players were able to use their size and 
market share to exert control over manufacturers, a profound change to the scenario in the mid-20 , h 
century when manufacturers wielded control over the fragmented grocery industry (4.2. p91-92). 
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With the 'big five' accounting for over 50% of the grocery market by the end of the 20 Century, ail 
but the largest manufacturers have been negatively affected. 
Exogenous forces driving the changing power relationship 
Until the mid-1960s, RPM was the key exogenous force empowering manufacturers over food 
retailers (5.I.Ü. p.l 19), enabling manufacturers to generate sufficient profit to fund the building of 
brands, while prolonging the existence of the fragmented grocery industry, and therefore the relative 
size and power of manufacturers. Its abolition in 1964 was the first blow to manufacturers and set the 
foundations for the empowerment of food retailers (5.1.Ü, p.121-123), through the transformation of 
the industry from a fragmented one dominated by independent counter-service shops to a highly 
concentrated one, dominated by out-of-town superstores. 
Endogenous forces driving the changing power relationship 
Endogenous forces also favoured manufacturers in the years following World War II, driving 
de-mand for packaged groceries. While grocers had previously weighed and packaged commodity-
like products such as sugar, flour and butter, the introduction of self-service meant that this was 
largely transferred to the manufacturer, although some préparation took place in the rear of stores. 
Aided by the launch of commercial television in the mid-1950s [Richard Swaab], manufacturer 
packaging led to the development of some powerful brands, empowering brand-owners over 
retailers: 
The mairi manufacturers Wäiited to reinforce the, strengt h of: their.product -and creale:art. 
a\vdrèness of their produci, \ and whdt emerged '-yyasìffi 
food producís; There had been food brands befare, bútbrand récognition^^ 
brands and the; création: 6fnew brands through the 1950s wäsd y où 
gol the émergence of major brands around this time, and you.got the packaging of the 
brand as well, so you shifted front the bulk product distrïbuted.by the retqiler,. cprninodities, 
to the fact • thaï:you göt sugar, dried fr;uits, margarine; dttrdcfiveiy packaged in: packs; 
printed, with more information on the.bàckthan hi0frfot bui;tìjm 
and that's the way it arrivedat the distribution outlei. So in packaging andhqndlihg terms, 
il wasn 't that big a step to move to the next stage of reiailing which was self-service. 
. ; .?'"-•: • '•'•:f.;f;:;f:'y '.•'•:-';f.:.. - y f - f f - ' - ' f [John Fletcher] 
Subséquent endogenous factors, however, aided the empowerment of food retailers over 
manufacturers. The increasing scale and market dominance of the leading UTC food retailers, 
described above and aided by the abolition of RPM, meant that manufacturers became subservient to 
main Operators, offering them prices unrelated to their buying power, through fear of losing key 
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retail clients (S.l.iv. p.130-131). The contraction of the industry into fewer, fitter operators therefore 
had a serious secondary impact on manufacturers, who were disempowered relative to retailers, and 
losing the business of just one major operator can seriously hit profits. For example, shares in 
Snackhouse fell 30% when it announced that profits had been hit by their loss of Asda as an outlet 6 . 
Leading food retailers' development of central distribution brought further power over 
manufacturers, as retailers no longer had to rely on their distribution channels, as well as higher 
margins for retailers and lower selling prices for manufacturers (5.3.iii. p.169-170). It is also credited 
with driving some secondary manufacturers into private label production (5.3.iii. p. 170), which 
empowered retailers over manufacturers further still. Relations between retailers and their private 
label suppliers, however, have since been driven closer by improvements in quality of product, 
which necessitates closer co-operation between the two parties (5.4.ii. p. 183-184), bringing 
substantial trading-up of offering because of the large market share of private label (5.4.ii. p.180). 
Key effects of the changing power relationship 
As UK food retailers became more powerful, numerous examples emerged of relations with 
manufacturers becoming strained. Food retailers have the advantage that manufacturers may well 
need retailers more than the retailers need them [Richard Swaab], and although manufacturers of 
major brands did not fear delisting [David Stoddart], it is fair to assume that the threat was greater 
for secondary brands. In short, the odds became more weighted in favour of food retailers, who could 
generally obtain a better price for a larger throughput of products, although this was not always the 
case, being largely dependent upon buying department skill: 
In the early days of takeovers;} there were: countless examples: of retailers ^&^lbefsefk 
after they: had taken over a much smaller competdor. \ because theyfdiscovered: that the. 
smaller -companies were getting, better deals, from suppliers: 1 know that Gateway did-'. the 
Chairman told me himself! He went absolutely mad, a bread manufacturer was giving 
better prices to a minor competitor he had 
•. . - • ' . [Tony de Angeli]: 
Size of organisation was therefore not the only issue affecting the manufacturer-retailer relationship, 
retail expertise and negotiation skill also played an important role. Retailers' attempts to extend their 
offerings into new areas such as petrol, pharmacies and news, were sometimes unsuccessful because 
they were declined supply, with suppliers being unwilling to risk their relationship with established 
6
 Financial Times, Oc tober 5, 2 0 0 0 ; p .32 . 
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vendors of the products and disturb a status quo that worked well for both parties, meaning that 
expansion of the retail accordion is not always possible, regardless of consumer or retailer demand 
for products: 
l wanted.to sell newspapers and magazines, bût itdidn 'tmatter what priées, ypu soldat,., y où 
couldn 't.get them, because wholesalers didn.'i waht To upset the iraditional newsdgènts..: 
they jusïsaid "you can 't have them ". They set this arbitrary rule about where and what the; 
distribution levé! was, and newsagents were exaçtly that. . JMike Groves] 
Although différent retailers took différent approaches in dealing with manufacturer, over time there 
was a general récognition that both parties needed to make a profit, and that size of retail opération 
could be used as a tool to obtain better terms, but in conjunction with good terms for the 
manufacturer, rather than food retailers simply driving manufacturera' priées as low as possible: 
...Ycar s ago, in .the old y day s of fesco, it was very-.; 'cinti' - mànufaçturers agdinsi the 
retailers. And ; certàinly öne of the ihings ïtidtU;:dhàngèd;ffi:: ' fesco, was ; io gei all the 
mànufaçturers ih and say, you know, none ofUsàctUàlly make any. money untilweactuàlly 
seil that produci io the consumer, so we have got toworktogethér •••So there was noi ù bit. 
öf \ Teseo, rloing a• deal •;;with.-.\lHeWtpMj^è)ìM^.\that\iwäs /sùclia g0didéaifihàt the 
manufacturer made nò money; \ìfthèy are nói makihg. atiy,•.hión0:fhdómn 
the game at ali. The purpdse of thè game istP bè 'as ifficientjdsypu pò cähfhroügh 
the • chaih, • and you : make; sure that the. maniifàcturêrshaVè thè ìfacditfffor keeping fhèlr 
plants up io speéd, and. efficient; and all thosé fhirigs, and also : béingablè. ipfiä^'^äfin^. 
to innovate and develop tlw business. That is what it is about. 
..-. : [Lord MacLaurin of r^ebwdrth; DLj 
A further effect of the changing manufacturer-retailer relationship is the transfer of innovation in 
new products from the manufacturer to the retailer, with new products tending to originate in private 
label rather than as primary branded products, aiding margin improvement through 'scrambled 
merchandising', causing révolution of the Wheel of Retailing: 
Nowàdàys ail the big retailers Idûhcii aroundlQOO or 2500 priyàte label products ; èàch per 
year, whereas spmebody. likè Hèinz . or Mars may bring 4 or 5 products to mdrket. So 
innovation has changea thèpace ofitall, nowit.is driven by the retailers, not the big brqhd 
mànufaçturers. 
[Tony Campbell]. 
When mànufaçturers innovate, retailers have the product development expertise and contacts to 
quickly imitate new products, reducing the benefits of manufacturer innovation, explained fully by 
Richard Swaab (5.4.ii. p. 181). In effect, retailers tend to negate the advantages of mànufaçturers as 
well as those of other retailers, extending their 'Dialectic' tendencies (7.1.7. p.284): 
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So it's a kihd of twô-pronged îhing - on the one handthere are areas where it is easier for 
the retaUer to ïnnovate th'an the manufacturer, so the retaùersiget ahead on that. Whenthe 
manufacturers do get ahead, the retaUers hav'e'gôt~the' technical skilland'thé"muscles 
terms of the development, to match what the. manufacturer are doinganyway.tSoftkey.are 
caught.ih a pincer movement. . , „ . -
 t ' 
,. [Richard Swaab] 
In short, the changing power relationship is primarily the resuit of the increasing dominance of the 
'big five' UK food retailers, who have increased enormously in size relative to manufacturer. While 
manufacturers were the initial beneficiaries of the move to self-service, which enabled them to 
develop some strong pre-packaged brands, retailers gained momentum from the 1964 abolition of 
RPM, and as leading retailers grew, they generally obtained better buying terms, with manufacturers 
becoming intimidated by their scale. Retailers' development of central distribution broke 
manufacturers' control over distribution Channels, and therefore over food retailers, increasing food 
retailers' control over private label manufacturers in particular, although relations later sweetened as 
the quality of private label improved (5.4.Ü. p.183-184) and retailers accepted that both parties 
needed to profit in order to make the relationship work in the long-term. 
Figure 6.2a. Forces driving concentration in UK food retailing: 
ENDOGENOUS FORCES EXOGENOUS FORCES 
1970 on . Fini te potent ial for 
g rowth from ind & co-op 
mean t that-mult iples h a d to 
grow at each o t h e r ' s expensë 
1970 on; D i f f i cu l t é s ger t ing 
p l ann i r i gpe rmt s s ion for n e w ; 
s tores can dr ive takeover as a 
m e â n s of gà in ing m o r e s tores 
1970 o n . Regiona l expans ion 
b rought leading p layers into 
comp wi th reg iona l cha ins , 
w h o general ly lost out. 
M i d 1970s to c a r i v i 9 8 0 s . : 
Economie! çrisis provpîced a 
pr ice war , >yhich led ,to;a • 
shakeout ö f w e a k e r p layers . 
Mid 1970s on . D e v e l o p m e n t 
of central distr ibution a ided 
regional expans ion o f leading 
players. 
1980s. City-backed growth of 
Dee and Argy l l removed 
many smaller Operators 
through takeovers. 
RISEOF; 
THÉ BIG FI VE 
MULTIPLE FOOD 
RETAILERS 
1980 on. D o m i n o effect; 
économies d e v e l o p e d b y B ig 
Five m a d e it ha rd for smal le r 
players to compete= takeover . 
1980 on: Failure to mee t 
' C i t y ' expeçta t ions pun i shes 
share pr ice , p r o v o k i n g 
t â k e o v é t i n . s o m e instances. 
1980 o n . Large inst i tut ional 
shareholders in p l c ' s c an 
somet imes force mergers that 
m a k e l i tue t rading sensé . 
RESULTED IN: 
A dramatic altération 
in the relationship 
between retailers & 
manufacturers 
1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 5 & 2000 . 
Favourab le compét i t ion 
inquirïes a l low consol ida t ion 
wi th in the sector to cont inue . 
M i d 1990s . Concent ra t ion 
wi th in the sector cons t ra ined 
b y O F T ' s ant i -merger 
pol ic ies . 
216 
6.3 The évolution of the retail format from counter-service grocery store through to the 
out-of-town superstore 
The UK food retail structure of the 1950s was characterised by small, locai counter-service grocery 
shops, which half a Century later had largely been swept away by successive tides of new retail 
formats, with large out-of-town superstores offering 'one-stop shopping' and extensive facilities 
Coming to dominate the food retail landscape (43 , p.93-99). This évolution of the retail format had 
profound effects on the industry, yet was familiär, with counter-service grocery stores themselves 
having replaced market-based food retailing in the latter years of the 19 t h Century [Jefferys, 1954]. In 
the same way that it had driven the decline of market-based food retailing, the counter-service 
grocery store was thrown into decline by the development of new, more efficient, retail formats 
OL5, p.277). 
Exogenous factors driving évolution of the retail format 
The first significant évolution of retail format during the second half of the 20 t h Century occurred 
when counter-service grocery stores were converted to self-service in the late-1940s and early-1950s, 
initially driven partly by exogenous problems specific to the decade following the end of World War 
II, when government control of input prices, output prices and sales volume resulted in declining 
grocery margins, forcing grocers to reduce operating costs (5.1.i. p.l 15-118), with conversion to self-
service becoming a populär way to achieve this. 
The development of UK self-service grocery retailing was partly inspired by US developments, with 
stories appearing in the press about "Walk-round stores of America" \ and "Super-market 
technique, the American way" 8 . In the USA, customers had embraced self-service because of faster 
service, the option of taking one's time, openly displayed prices, absence of sales talk, reduced 
danger of forgetting items, increased quality of produce and the fact that the stores seemed hygienic9. 
Sainsbury's [Bridget Williams] and Teseo, both adopted self-service following visits to the US: 
When I went to America with my wife; in 1946, Isawthese supèrmdrkets in America, ondi 
thought that our small stores, although they'were so small, wouldhe the hegihnihg ofit. . 
[Jack Cohen, speaking in 1967. Featured in British Empires; fesco, Channel Four, MM] 
7
 The Grocer , December 2 5 , 1948, p l 4 
8
 T h e Grocer , January 7, 1950, p20 
9
 The Grocer , N o v e m b e r 22 , 1952, p46 
217 
The British government believed that UK grocery retailing was inefficient, and therefore supported 
the development of self-service. One hundred special building licences were issued in 1949, which 
allowed self-service development to develop despite post-war restrictions of building materials: 
"The Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Works announce that, after consultation with the 
trade associations concerned, arrangements have been made for licensing the structural 
altérations to a limited number of food shops selling groceries and provisions to enable 
them to be adapted to the 'self-service ' system " - Ministry of Food Notice 6 . 
In effect, the government was attempting to gauge whether self-service could alleviate perceived 
inefficiency within the industry: 
"To-day distribution is a costly process both in terms of cash and labour. An unduly large 
part of the family income is absorbed in meeting the charges of the distributors ai the 
expense ofother things the family want. It follows that the standard of living of the people is 
lower than it would be if distribution charges were lower" - U.S.D.A.W report , 0 . 
The government encouraged conversion to self-service because they believed that it would prove 
more efficient. At this time, pressure groups were constantly lobbying government departments for 
increased margins on foods, lower wage increases among shop workers (5.1.L p.116), and 
conversion to self-service was the government's way of putting responsibility for success and 
profitability back in the hands of the food retailer, who had developed a "tendency... to blame others 
for difficulties... " " (5.1.U p.118). 
Manufacturers were a further exogenous factor driving the development of self-service retailing, as 
more branded products were being packaged at source rather than by grocers (6.2. p.213), which was 
necessary for self-service to develop, although a limited amount of products could be prepared and 
packaged behind the scènes of the grocery shop. As war-related difficulties receded, more products 
became available again, and manufacturers began to increase their product ranges [Bridget 
Williams], which suited self-service stores with more room to display products. Further évolution of 
the retail format was driven by expanding manufacturers' ranges, with outlets becoming larger in 
order to offer customers the full array of products that they carne to expect over time. 
Without consumer acceptance, the retail format could not have evolved. The wider range of products 
available in self-service stores helped gain consumer acceptance, as consumers were frustrated by 
1 0
 The Grocer , Apri i 22, 1950, p32-33 
" T h e G r o c e r , June 3 , 1950, p23-24 
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lack of choice during the years of rationing and shortages [Bridget Williams]. Additionally 
consumers found that the service was faster because they only queued once at the checkout, rather 
than at each separate counter. Retailers found that they benefited from larger 'tili rings', as consumer 
expenditure was driven upwards through 'impulse sales' (S.l.i. p.l 16-117). 
Development of retail technology was necessary for self-service to be effective, particularly of pre­
packaging materials, refrigerated display cabinets and cash registers f5.3.ii. p.162). As the retail 
format evolved into larger stores, retail technology moved on too, with fork-lift trucks facilitating 
their Operation, blast chilling techniques enabling fresh foods to be stocked, and central distribution 
bringing better quality products and prolonged shelf-life (5.3.iii. p.l70). 
Several exogenous forces drove évolution of the retail format into larger units, which built upon the 
cost benefits brought by self-service. However, évolution into larger stores was driven primarily by 
the évolution of the consumer, who by the 1960s, was benefiting from rising household incomes 
(5.2.Ü. p.147) and higher female participation in the workforce (5.2.i. p.144-146), giving them the 
financial means to adopt consumer technology, such as refrigerators, freezers and cars. This drove 
demand for 'one-stop shopping', rather than the fragmented daily shopping that had previously been 
the norm (5.3.i, p.158-159). Over time, as stores grew larger, their size dictated that they had to be 
located away from existing town centres, resulting in out-of-town superstores, which would not have 
been feasible without rising car ownership, driven further by the unsuitability of traditional town 
centres for parking (5.3.i. p. 159). 
The abolition of RPM was a key force driving the pursuit of low-cost retailing, achieved through 
larger stores, the supermarket and superstore (5.I.Ü. p.122-123). 
Early supermarkets and superstores were conversions of disused buildings, cinémas and mills for 
example, for which it was easy to gain planning consent because planners preferred almost anything 
to disused buildings [Jennifer Tanbum]. Developments became more sophisticated and had to 
confront planning authorities' early reluctance to allow large retail development, driving superstore 
developers to develop devious methods of gaining approvai (5.1.iii. p.124-126). From the late-1970s 
to the mid-1990s govemment planning guidelines on out-of-town retailing were more favourable, 
assisting the évolution of the retail format into larger stores (5.1 .ni. p. 126). 
2 1 9 
The final exogenous force driving evolution of the retail format was the 1994 deregulation of 
shopping hours (5.1.v. p. 132-139), which favoured large stores over smaller ones, because 
consumers became more willing to travel further to a iarger storę, particularly on Sundays, when 
they bave more time to browse large product ranges, and shopping becomes a 'family outing', 
spending larger sums of money (5.1.v. p. 136-138). 
Endogenous factors driving evolution of the retail format 
While many exogenous factors have shaped consumer shopping preferences and influenced the 
regulatory environment, evolution of the retail format is primarily retailers* endogenous response to 
a changing exogenous environment. Initially, the evolution into self-service was said to be driven 
partly by grocers' aspirations of easing their workload, with some grocers said to be "...almost flat-
footecl with walking atout 20 yards for a packet of gravy powder, and another 20 yardsfor a packet 
of salt,,, il was time that the shopper helped the shopkeeper a bit. The modem day grocer shuffled 
more miles in a day than did a policeman. " 12 
More seriously, the fundamental endogenous factor driving evolution of the retail format was 
operators' quests for increased profits, achievable through operating efficiencies, improved turnover 
and higher margins, driving retailers to actively renew their facilities on a regular basis. Even simple 
conversion to self-service brought remarkable increases in turnover: 
They turned the counters round, thè. shelyes round,.and we revòlutionised dli our shopś--
our stores started iakihg so much mòre ; money,. ; I ćouldn [tbelieveit, thyséìf. 
[Jack Cohen; speakihg in 1967. Fèatured in British:EMpÌres::5èsco, Charmel Fóur, KtfM]; 
In addition to increased turnover, efficiencies in operating costs were achievable, with self-service 
bringing considerale staff product ivi ty, demonstrated by analysis of data from the 1961 Census of 
Distribution: 
1 2
 T h e Grocer , M a y 14, 1949, p i 1 
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Figure 6.3a: An analysis of grocery shops. by turnover per person engaged. 1961 
Counting two part-time employees as equivalerli io one full-time employee. 
Fully self-service grocery shops Other grocery shops 
Turnover 
£'000 
Perso ns engaged Turnover per 
full-time 
equivalent 
employee 
engaged,£ 
Turnover 
£'000 
Pevsotis engaged Turnover per 
full-time 
equivalent 
employee 
engaged,£ 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-time 
equivalent 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Full-
time 
equivale 
nt 
Grocery shops 
Turnover under £20,000 
£20,000-£ 100,000 
£100,000-£200,000 
£200,000 and over 
£479,561 68,742 18,467 77,976 £6,150 
£22,031 4,821 1,993 5,818 £3,787 
£275,912 41,017 10,737 46,386 £5,948 
£97,398 12,981 3,319 14,641 £6,653 
£84,220 9,923 2,418 11,132 £7,566 
£1,873,209 338,445 123,469 400,180 £4,681 
£976,644 196,757 82,007 237,761 £4,108 
£753,715 120,613 37,245 139,236 £5,413 
£68,437 10,777 2,317 11,936 £5,734 
£74,413 10,298 1,900 11,248 £6,616 
[source: adapted from Census of Distribution, H M S O , 1 9 6 1 ; table 4, p . S/102] 
Figure 6.3a shows that in 1961, économies of labour were achievable through conversion to self-
service of ail but the lowest turnover stores. As labour is the second highest cost in UK food 
retailing, behind the cost of stock, économies of labour are particularly beneficiai to Operators. 
Lower staff costs per £ turnover were therefore a key endogenous factor driving UK food retailers to 
couvert to self-service, which resulted in an average productivity gain of 3 1 % per employee, largely 
explaining the rapid uptake of the format during the 1960s (4.3, p.95-96). 
Because low turnover stores did not achieve staff économies when converted to self-service, it is fair 
to assume that a certain criticai mass was necessary for it to bring notable benefits, a factor that could 
drive retailers to consider larger stores. Economies of labour are more pronounced in larger turnover 
stores, thus scale of establishment became a criticai issue, driving further évolution of the retail 
format into the supermarket and then the superstore. Larger stores also bring savings in other areas 
such as property and utility costs, driving retailers to rationalise their opérations: 
"Certain expenses, for example rent, rates, lighting and heating, tend to decline relatively 
as the area of a store increases. The ability to offer an extended range of related 
merchandise, supplemented by aggressive pricing, créâtes a degree of space and staff 
productivity and encourages a high average transaction value... Wìien thèse (économies) 
are passed on to the consumer, even higher productivity is generated and further 
improvements become attainable " !3 
UK food retailers therefore found that larger stores brought many savings relative to smaller ones, 
which could theoretically be passed on to customers to encourage increased patronage and turnover, 
l î
 Retait Busniess, 175, September 1972, p .14 -23 , "Economies of Scale in Reta i l ing" 
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particularly after the abolition of RPM (5.1.ii. p.122-123). These savings were achieved in general 
overheads such as rent, rates and Utilities bilis, or derived from staff or space productivity: 
... Wefound that the lárger stiops were more efficient, ihéy hád the economy óf scale, ánd 
the great thing is that as the shops got lárger they become more; economic to run -. costs 
were lower in.reldtion to turnover... and most ithportant of áff; you were giving the 
customer what they wanted., To give- a lar ge rqnge of choleé, you liad tóhaw 
to do íL And then ifyou introduce prívate label. alongside the brqnded labél,. you. heéd more, 
space for that aswell, 
[Lord Sainsbury of Presten Candover KG] 
In effect, forward-thinking UK food retailers were happy for the retail format to evolve into self­
service and larger stores, which were demanded by a changing consumer (see above), yet also made 
retailers more efficient and profitable. Thus parallel endogenous and exogenous forces drove 
evolution of the retail format into larger stores, with further pressure being put on size by retailers 
wanting to offer extensive prívate label, driving higher gross margins through scrambled 
merchandising (7.1.1. p.261-262) and expansión of the retail accordion (7.1.2. p.268). 
Lessons learnt from earlier increases in store sizes drove retailers to develop even larger stores, with 
superstores bringing extensión of the economies of scale achieved earlier in supermarkets: "We have 
concentrated on 'superstores' which we consider to be the logical development of 'supermarkets' in 
this country - that is to say supermarkets trading in conditions which allow máximum economies and 
comfortable shopping conditions " [Peter Firmston Williams, Chairman, Asda, 1976; p9]. 
Further economies of scale, including economies of handling, carne as stores grew larger, allowing 
"new management techniques not attempted befare in food retailing, like direct purchasing from 
manufacturers, mechanical goods handling in-store, and devolved departmental management 
responsibility" [Jones, 1978; p l ] . These economies in distribution and handling meant that 
superstores were "more efficient operations" [Barnes et al, 1997; p.134] than smaller outlets. 
Superstores' size generally dictated their out-of-town locations, avoiding the high property costs of 
the town-centre. In short, the numerous economies achievabíe through superstore operations drove 
UK retailers' adoption of the format: 
"// became recognised that these stores could offer significant savings in most of the major 
cost centres - labour, administration, oceupaney, distribution, buying, etc., savings which 
could bepassed on to the consumer and genérate higher sales volumes. " 
[Webb, 1982; p.3] 
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A further endogenous factor driving Superstore development was their negative impact on existing 
medium to large stores (6J., p.205), as Operators' realised that if they did not cannibalise their own 
stores, they could be destroyed by the opening of another operator's Superstore. 
Killen and Pattison [1987; p.25] suggest that "the reasons for the rapid growth of superstores can 
be divided into two main areas; the retailers ' desire to satisfy consumer needs and the retailers ' 
efforts to improve operating efficiency and margins". In other words, a combination of exogenous 
change and endogenous attempts to improve profitability drove the évolution of the retail format, 
gradually evolving from local, counter-service grocery shops to large, out-of-town, lone-stop 
shopping' destinations during the second half of the 20 t h Century. 
To résume, évolution of the format into self-service represented the beginning of a new retail life 
cycle, which quickly entered the rapid growth phase, throwing the counter-service life cycle into 
decline. This was driven by World War II related difficulties, overseas influence, UK govemment 
productivity incentives, technological advances, manufacturer pre-packaging, the abolition of RPM, 
and consumer demand for modem shopping facilities with better choice. The life cycle of the 
converted self-service store, however, passed relatively quickly through rapid growth into decline, 
caused by the rapid growth of larger stores, which were driven by several exogenous forces, 
including technological advance, retailer awareness of modem, low-cost methods, staff efficiencies, 
increased profits, consumer demand for 'one-stop shopping' facilities, and finally the deregulation of 
trading hours. The forces driving changes in retail life cycle phases for any particular format 
therefore vary, although the primary factor appears to be the émergence of a new trading technique 
suited to consumers' changing lifestyles, but also bringing cost savings or profit gains to the retailer, 
although pressure of compétition can also drive Operators to adopt new formats. 
Exogenous factors slowing évolution of the retail format 
While self-service techniques and US developments were hotly debated in the early-1950s trade 
press (6.3. p.217), there was also comment on consumers' attachment to counter-service grocery 
shops, delivery and credit facilities, and the personal touch of the grocer l 4 . Until 1964, RPM meant 
that retailers achieving économies of opération from new formats were unable to pass on the benefits 
in the form of lower priées to customers. This was an important factor slowing the adoption of self-
14
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service, as inefficient retailers with high costs could still offer the same prices as retailers benefiting 
from lower costs through self-service and larger stores (5.1.JL p. 119). Its abolition acted as a spur 
driving UK food retailers to adopt efficient operations (S.l.ii. p.121-123), as this became necessary 
in order to attract consumers and remain competitive. 
Reports suggested that consumers resented the extra money spent on impulse purchases, with one 
retailer finding that customers' "...main worry seems to have been that they spent more money than 
they intended" !S. Thus fear of upsetting consumers slowed evolution of the retail format, partially 
explaining the slow initial uptake of self-service (43., p.94). Operators also feared that conversion to 
self-service would lead to widespread shoplifting by encouraging: "...shoppers with large baskets 
and elastic consciences... to slip goods into their own bags and thus escape the attentions of the 
checker-out, who would be concerned only with what was in the wire basket provided as part of the 
self-service method. " 16. 
Self-service was sometimes regarded with contempt and snobbery, for example when a new 
Sainsbury's self-service store opened in Eastbourne in February 1952 [see Williams, 1994a for 
details]: 
This woman we knew came up to us, and saidio my wife in a shocked fashion, 'Oh! Do you 
go:: into •. that-new • shop'-: '•: She was. talking, about the -first self service ::Sd insbury 's\ ; in 
Eastbourne, which had just opened. She thought that she wcis ahove.gqing rounds 
and collecting her own groceries. She liked the:idea of a leaving d list with a grocer, and 
him coming around to her house later with her.order in. a. box.: 
:
.: •• ;:?; \§&I ?.\\:-.;.-jfj|| \;;\%j:-:::. \ ¡1 §} •: -::; j # '£ [:'•[•• f;f\ l<i |Sidhey^Ripley] 
Consumer rejection therefore slowed the spread of self-service, and supermarkets suffered from a 
similar reaction: 
"...to some customers 'supermarket' is a cheapening word and suggests an impersonal 
approach " - Mr. David Galloway, Chairman, Key Markets, April 1966 l ? . 
Post-war shortages and rationing certainly slowed evolution of the retail format, with the shortage of 
building materials and building licences making the building, rebuilding or extension of shops 
difficult: 
1 5
 T h e Grocer , Jury 2 3 , 1949, p l 5 - 1 6 
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 S e l f s e r v i c e and Supermarke t , Apri l 1966, p38 . 
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"(The self-service system] has not been developed here, except on a small scale, because of 
restrictions on building, and of shortages of packaging materials and supplies. " 18 
The rationing system in place until 1954 also presented operational difficulties for self-service 
opération, because of a shortage of pre-packaging materials , 9 , which are a pre-requisite for self-
service opération, and also because rationed goods were difficult to incorporate into the self-service 
system, for the correct amount had to be weighed up, coupons had to be clipped, and ration books 
marked 1 9 . In effect, rationing slowed the spread of self-service and the supermarket by making their 
opération problematic, although strangely it also drove retailers to consider cost-cutting techniques, 
with self-service and supermarkets being the two key changes bringing substantial cost savings. 
Certain innovative retailers overcame the problems of rationing and achieved full self-service: 
"... to keep the system entirely self-service, a large British Hussmann refrigerated display 
cabinet has been introduced into the wall fixture line, it contains four prepacked lots of 
rationed fats, grouped under the headings, "Rations for One," "Rations for Two," 
"Rations for Three" and "Rations for Four. " The whitepaper bags contain margarine and 
butter to the amount of the weekly ration for the numbers quoted, allowing customers to 
serve ihemselves for this commodity, too. Cheese is also carried in the refrigerated display 
unit."1* 
The more common solution, however, was to retain a rationed goods counter: 
"The present-day difficulties of rationing help to stifle the even flow of customers in the 
self-service shop at the moment. Goods, such as canned meat, milk and dried fruit have to 
be kepi in the staff-service shop or registered customers would be left without their goods 
and would take their registrations elsewhere. " 21 
The abolition of rationing and controls made self-service food retailing more attractive, driving 
évolution of the retail format, although the abolition of points rationing in May 1950 did little to 
help, because although this removed the chore of cutting coupons, grocers were stili expected to 
ensure an even distribution of pointed goods, a form of "under-the-counter rationing of certain 
scarce items" 22. Thus, despite the ending of the points scheme, it remained "unwise for the retailer 
to display openly goods such as syrup for just anybody to take " 1 7. With time, however, self-service 
food retailing became easier and more attractive to UK Operators of ail kinds. 
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A further factor slowing évolution of the retail format, superstores in particular, was undoubtedly the 
planning system (5.1.hi. p.123-129). Planning influenced the shape of retail development, and 
slowed its progress, but retail development tends to continue ali the same, in a différent form than 
would otherwise have been the case (5.1.ih. p. 128-129). 
Endogenous factors slowing évolution of the retail format 
Some grocers converting to self-service encountered staff reluctance to make the change, with staff 
fearing redundancy because self-service was widely said to bring économies in staff costs: "Retailers 
find it necessary before adopting self-service to assure their staff that they need not fear 
redundancy" 2 3 . Sometimes staff also found it hard to adapt to the multi-tasking necessary in self-
service stores: 
"Self service staff have shown a certain objection to undertaking dual functions, according 
to some operators... Trained in an older school, the majority of assistants prefer to be one 
thing or other; that is an impossibility in a period when labour must be flexible and 'multi-
purpose"... "24 
Self-service conversions effected while rationing was in place tended to be basic due to grocers' 
reluctance to close the shop. Each shop had its own registered customers, who had to buy their 
rationed goods from the grocer with whom they were registered, and the very real threat of losing 
registrations (5.1.il was normally enough to ensure that conversions to self-service were carried out 
while the shop was closed for business, over the weekend: "The main problem of conversion is to 
effect it without closing the shop during normal business hours. " l 9, hence their basic nature. 
The évolution of the supermarket format was slowed by the structure of UTC food retailing, which 
was dominated by small, neighbourhood grocery stores, simply too small to become supermarkets 
(43 , p.95). The development of supermarkets therefore depended on access to suitable locations, and 
on access to capital for development or conversion. Independent grocers tend not to have access to 
large investment funds, thus multiple and co-operative operators were the key adopters of 
supermarkets, and co-operative investment fell behind that of multiples (4.3. p.96-97), hence 
multiples' domination of new formats has occurred largely because they are the type of organisation 
best suited to their development and opération. 
The Grocer , Aprii 22, 1950, p32-33 
T h e Grocer , Apri i 12, 1952, p 4 4 
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In essence, exogenous and endogenous forces delaying the decline phase of counter-service grocery 
retailing, and hence the rapid growth phase of self-service, included consumer, staff and retailer 
résistance to change, the post-war rationing system and RPM. Likewise, such forces delaying the 
growth phases of the supermarket and the superstore included RPM, the existing retail structure, lack 
of access to capital, and planning difficulties, simultaneously prolonging the life cycle of the first 
phase of self-service conversions. 
Reaction of establïshed operators to superstore development 
Multiple operators benefited substantially from early supermarket development, as did co-operative 
societies, although to a iesser extent (4.3. p.96-97). Superstores, however, were pioneered by new 
entrants lo the industry, Asda and Morrison for example, who entered the superstore industry as low-
price, low-status, low-overhead operators, subsequently trading-up and becoming established 
multiple operators themselves (7.1.1. p.259 and 7.1.7. p.283-285). 
In the latter half of the 1960s, established multiple operators' initial reaction to the superstore threat 
was slow and ineffective, being based on lower priées - low-cost superstores were offering 
consumers lower priées, and established operators lowered theirs in an attempt to negate their price 
advantage: 
"Ai that Urne ; we ; (Asda) went ''-abolii; 14% or somèthing. like • thaï; belôw. \ the pricès. of ihe 
opposition winch brought down priées tliròiighoiit the country, ' : : • :: 
. '•::.". " .. - : ' ' • [Pctcir Asquith] 
Established operators' dialectic reaction of price réductions (7.1.7. p.284), however, did not arrest 
consumers' attraction to superstores, as they were increasingly demanding 'one-stop shopping', 
driven primarily by rising ownership of cars and refrigerators (5.2.ii. p.150): 
It would hâve ; been pretty rough and ready -it wàs : eut casés, pilèd on : woàden flat-boards, 
things piled up, and there was just a big cardboard price over the top. So it was pretty 
basic, but just càpiwed the moment of the; abolition- of retail priée maintenance, big stores, 
out-oftown, drive io it; big car park, ail that sort ofstujf. And Asda expanded ata colossal 
rate, from nothing ali the way through to 100 stores. 
; > . : • [Tony Camphcil] 
Despite the rapid early growth of superstores, existing multiple operators failed to develop 
superstores for a considérable length of time, with growth driven by new entrants, notably Asda. 
Existing operators found themselves unable to invest in the format because they were already 
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committed to alternative developments for several years in advance, leaving insufficient funds for 
superstore development: 
We 11 never kripw, bui : / think some competitors just hoped that ^/ìm^S V V O M / ^ « 't tqke 
off, because they were atready committed by covenants oh new dëvelopmènts;:f^Mçh they 
couldn 't gel'oui'of. So: it was easy for people to criticise, and say: otheirretàilefs were slow 
in catching on, but seven years on, they were opening them as fast ds wèweré: r -
. '. V ; '•)-'-'-; ' . : ' .fy-f" 'rf : ; [ S i r T ^ ^ 
Superstore innovators therefore received a head start of several years, despite their threat and évident 
popularity, until established multiples' existing commitments lapsed and development capital 
became available, when they quickly moved into superstores, driving the format into a phase of rapid 
expansion from the mid-1970s. Again, this was dialectic-style behaviour (7.1.7. p.283), because 
established multiples moved into facilities similar to those that were working successfully for new 
entrants, therefore negating their advantages, and driving the superstore life cycle into rapid growth 
O L I p.278). 
The évolution of the superstore format 
As superstores became more common from the early-1980s, they began to evolve from a low-price, 
low-status format to become an all-service, air-conditioned, facility-packed shopping expérience, a 
process which is stili continuing, driven by a combination of exogenous and endogenous forces, with 
differing impacts at différent times, resulting in substantial 'trading up' of the retail format, as 
suggested by the 'Wheel of Retailing' (7.1.1. p.259). 
The primary exogenous factor driving improvements in the superstore shopping expérience was 
rising consumer expectation of the format, accompanied by increasing real consumer incomes: 
Concepiualfy-the superstore is ali under òrierbofandyou. drive thèrè-it^ a 
lifestyle thaisays 7 warit to do ali my shopping in one go, and 1 dori [t want to;hàve io lug 
home 60 or 70 Ibs.of shopping'. And the Services that go alongsìdè itjlike adequate car 
parking, in-siore bakeries, the re-introduction of service counters::for:M like 
delicatèssen goodS and fresh meat, and so on - they are the benchmdrks of a superstore. 
And then there are coffee shops and baby changing facilities, a whole range of additional 
services that one sees. 
:": ^f!.±fff^ Jvv-ff:':: ; ; . ; ;ÌBridgetWU 
As superstore pioneers expanded southwards from their northern bases, it was felt that consumers in 
the South would not accept the "rough" retail environment of the early superstores as those in the 
North had, and smarter stores were developed to suit. Effectively, superstore pioneers like Asda had 
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to Upgrade their formats for customers outside their original trading area [Jennifer Tanburn], 
supporting 'secular trends 1 as a cause of trading up (7.1.1. p.264-265). 
Equally, planning authorities drove improvements to superstore retailing, by insisting on high quality 
developments, resulting in higher building costs: 
Superstores wereforcea iobuild in the 'vernacular', what we cali the 'Essex, garden'style 
of building. But certainly they were vèry attractive buildings, and indeed it has to he said; 
very expensive buildings. . • 
[Tim Masón, speaking in British Empires: Teseo, Channel Föur, MM] 
Factors endogenous to UK food retailing also drove the trend towards providing a better superstore 
shopping expérience, with inter-superstore compétition being a notable one. As towns with no 
superstore became a rarity from the early-1980s, new developments began to compete locally with 
existing superstore facilities. This compétition tended to be primarily over facilities and services, 
which began to escalate as superstores under threat of new compétition attempted to attract 
customers through their high level of service and unparalleled facilities, rather than on the basis of 
price alone, supporting Allvine's [1968] view that fear of direct price compétition drives trading up 
through compétition over non-price related functions (7.1.1. p.265-266): 
in the old days thè çhàirman of Asdd usèd.to- say : t'Hai]people wóuldwdìk over gläss. tò 
come io)Àsda, but.onceypu.gót:ähotker Superstore whichmaybèaneweróne, sày. two• ór 
three miles awày, with the samefacility dnd pdr^ then 
suddenly y pu 've gotiö start competing on a différent basis- so ài. tkat timèyòu started lo gèl 
superstore ; compètmg:dgdinstsuperstb^^ Al that stage you start M séethe' beginnings óf 
ivhere the compànies werè-irying io create their own image and their own style, 'and give 
their pwh supprstores apersdnqlityff::^^ •:•:/•;;::•:-. '.• \J0iiìMei(^^^ 
A further endogenous factor driving superstores upmarket was that Operators became increasingly 
sélective when developing superstores as they gained awareness of the variables affecting their 
performance (appendix 2). In effect, this resulted in over-valuations of the limited number of 
remaining sites suitable for superstore development [also see Segal-Horn, 1987; p.29]: 
... in the early stages they would také what was availablë; in the form it was available They 
learned fairly quickly, that if you. could liave a cüstom made. store, '. with the right 
spécifications, it clearly woidd be möre. effective all the way through. ~ 
[John Fletcher] 
Evolution of the superstore supports the Wheel of Retailing hypothesis reasonably strongly, as 
customer expectation, planning guidelines, retailer fear of direct price compétition, land shortages 
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and increasiiigly precise retailer site requirements combined to drive the format upmarket, and henee 
to increase their development and operational costs (7.1.1). 
Results of superstore development and évolution of the format 
The finite number of sites suitable for superstore development drove up property costs, a trend 
exacerbated by retailers seeking more specific qualifies from sites over the years (see above). The 
cost of superstore development therefore increased, pushing up overheads, which inevitably puts 
upwards pressure on prices, partially supporting Holländern [1960] view that reduced vigilance over 
costs causes trading up, although in this case it was retailers' inability to find suitable sites at low 
prices that drove up costs rather than a lack of vigilance (7.1. h p.266). 
While a formai définition of 'superstore saturation' eludes académies [Langston et al, 1997], 
diversification of offering improved retail performance and delayed the point of true saturation (6.4. 
p.242), supporting Hollander's [1960] idea that 'scrambled merchandising' brings higher overall 
margins (7.1.1. p.261-264), while providing a compelling reason to expand the food retail accordion 
rather than retract it (7.1.2. p.271). Secretary of State (1993-1997) John Gummer's revision of PPG6 
[1996] effectively ended the problem of superstore saturation, by termìnating the era of rapid 
development, and forcing polarisation into large stores already trading and future smaller stores 
(5.1.UÌ. p. 127), and is also credited with allowing Operators to escape from spiralling out-of-town 
development costs [see Wrigley, 1998]. 
As moves out-of-town eventually resulted in high quality shopping facilities (see above), leading 
players developed a réputation for quality, and began to be recognised as the brand, whereas 
previously the retailer's primary function was of distributing manufacturera' recognised brands. In 
effect, consumers had begun to place their trust in the retailer rather than the manufacturer, 
particularly M&S and Teseo [Denis Cassidy], enabling them to extend their offer into areas largely 
unrelated to their core product offering, such as financial services and life assurance (6.4. p.235), a 
trend expected to continue into new fields and to enable UK food retailers to maintain or grow 
profits in an increasingly difficult food market [Denis Cassidy]: 
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.., if you want.the greatest change of all in food, retailing, it is thai the store is now the 
brand... who would have said that they would he selling bank accounts as well as:egg 
custard tarts, but they are ihe.sdme brand:^values: [CusWfners trust their, supermarkets, 
making the brand extensible by a long way. 
. / • • • - ^ : : • x - : i . - , ; ' / :;• :. - • ; ^ ; : • : ';,; ffV-c^MiI•::i[A1ari;K:i>;Smith] 
In effect, retailers had gained their customers' trust, making them more likely to alter their shopping 
patterns and adopt new lines, enabling substantial diversification of offering into products such as 
private label, and even beyond the traditional limits of food retailing into areas such as pensions and 
financial services (6.4. p.235). Because branded grocery margins tend to be the lowest of all, this 
diversification has brought substantial margin improvement ( £ A p.236-237), supporting the 
scrambled merchandising hypothesis (7.1.1. p.261-262). Extension of the retail accordion was 
therefore made possible by evolution of the retail format and the development of consumer trust in 
the retailer as a brand (7.1.2. p.269). 
To conclude, the primary forces driving evolution of the retail format have been exogenous, although 
operators have been keen to respond endogenously because new formats have tended to improve 
profits through operating efficiencies or economies of scale. Retailer experience therefore provided a 
secondary thrust to exogenous change, as retailers sought to improve profitability. The three main 
exogenous forces driving evolution of the retail format were consumers, technological progress and 
the regulatory environment. The changing consumer drove demand for 'one-stop shopping', and 
hence larger stores. Technological advance among consumers made 'one-stop shopping' feasible 
(5.3.i. p. 158-159), and among retailers enabled self-service and larger stores to be developed while 
lowering overheads (5.3.ii. p. 168). The regulatory environment has profoundly affected the structural 
evolution of the retail format, as developers have to adapt their propositions to suit the planning 
environment at any given time, in terms of size, location and impact (5.Liii, p.127-128). The 
immediate post-war regulatory environment of shortages, rationing and government-controlled 
margins drove retailers to adopt self-service, despite the difficulties, as a method of reducing costs in 
a constrained marketplace (5.1.i. p.116-117). The key regulatory issue driving evolution of the retail 
format, however, was the 1964 abolition of RPM, which reinforced the advantages of cost-efficient 
retailers, enabling them to lower prices in order to step up competition with higher-overhead 
competitors (5.1.ii. p.121-122). 
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While exogenous and endogenous forces combined to slow évolution of the retail format, thèse were 
generally hindrances rather than major barriers to development, and retail évolution continued 
nonetheless, although they did influence the pace of évolution. Factors endogenous to the différent 
types of food retail organisations gave multiple Operators a large advantage in retail évolution, 
resulting in their domination of the industry (6.1. p.205-206). The birth of superstores threatened the 
dominance of established multiple Operators, and they allowed new entrants to develop the format 
exclusively for several years, before moving into the format themselves. In time, compétition for 
customers drove the format upmarket as two or more superstores began to compete in one town. 
Retailers became more sélective over sites for superstore development, resulting in escalating 
demand and priées for those that remained, pushing the format upmarket, which was encouraged by 
planning authorities and supported by the general upward mobility of consumers. 
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Figure 6.3b. Forces driving évolution of the food retail format: 
ENPOGENOUSFORCES EXOGENOUS FORCES 
1950s & 1960s . Convers ion to self-
service dr iven by réal isat ion tha t 
higher profits could b e m a d e , b u t 
reluctance to close shop d o w n m e a n t 
that convers ions tended to b e bas ic , 
done over a weekend . 
1950s & 1960s . Convers ion to self-
service dr iven b y grocers fed u p 
with walk ing & fetching ali day 
long. S lowed by staff resis tance. 
.EVOLUTION OF 
THE RETAIL 
FORMAT: The 
development of self-
.service 
1950 on . D e v e l o p m e n t ò f 
technology: pre-packaging, , 
refr igerated displays , ca sh registers 
facilitate convers ion 
1950-1954 . Government -cons t ra ined 
gross marg ins droye self-service, bu t 
adminis t ra t ion o f ra t ioning s lowed it 
1950s . Self-serviçë inspired by 
deve lopments in U S A , 
E a r l y l950s l ,Gbvér r imeht issue 
specail bu i ld ing l icences to împrove 
retail efficiency via sëlf-service. 
1950s . ïnc rease in n u m b e r of 
p a c k a g e d Se b r anded p roduc í s 
facilitâtes self-sêrvicè, R P M s lows it 
1950s & 1960s . Conver s ion to self-
service dr iven b y press repor ts of 
high" impulse; sales ¿ "íower staff e -
costs, s lowed by c o n s u m e r rejectiori 
Mid 1960s on . Retai lers bu i ld o n 
earlier lessons o f large stores 
efficiency, dr iv ing even larger 
stores. Lack of independent & c o -
operative inves tment s lowed p rocess 
I 9 7 0 s o n . Nega t ive effect of la rge 
stores o n m e d i u m stores, dr ives 
retailers to cannibal ise exis t ing 
stores. tnabi l i ty t o adap t exis t ing 
infrastructure s lowed the p rocess . 
1970s o n . Retai lers wan ted to.offcr 
more pr ivate label, dr iv ing up store 
sizes. 
1970s. T h r e a t o f superstore ! 
I n n o v a t o r s forced establ ished 
multiples t o enter the format 
themselves . 
EVOLUTION OF 
THE RETAIL -
FORMAT: Moves 
into larger & larger 
stores S 
1960s ; M o r é producta avaüab le , & 
d é m a n d e d b y consumer s used to 
scarcity ó f wàr.-Drives up shop sizes 
1960s o h . C o n s u m e r change , 
derriand for one stop shopping , dr ive 
up store sizes & less fréquent 
shopping . P lann ing s l o w e d prôcess . 
1964 o n . Abol i t ion o f R P M > ..i 
catalysés pursui t o f é conomies , 
w h i c h corne wi th larger store sizes. 
M i d 1970s on. .Central : d is t r ibut ion, 
fork-lift t ruçksj paUets '& cág ing 
increasé efficiency.of large s tores . . 
L a t e 1 9 7 0 s tOiiiid 1990s . Relat ively 
la'x out-of- tovvìvpianning.regime . • 
dr ives rapid supers töre expans ion . 
1994 . Deregula t ion o f t rading hours 
favoured large s tores . 
1980s on . Retai lers adopt qual i ty 
approach w h e n faced wi th inter-
superstore compét i t ion in a local 
area. 
1980s on . Retai lers b e c o m i n g m o r e 
choosy over superstore sites, wh ich 
inflates their cost, as does the 
shortage o f p r ime locat ions. 
EVOLUTION OF 
THE RETAIL 
FORMAT: 
Superstores move 
upmarket 
1980s on . Ris ing c o n s u m e r 
expecta t ions , fired b y increas ing 
weal th , dr ive supers tores upmarke t . 
1980s o n . P lann ing aüthor i t ies 
expec t and d e m a n d h igh qual i ty 
retail deve lopments , dr iv ing 
supers tores upmarke t . 
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6.4 UK food retailers' diversification of offering and geographical diversification 
Diversification into new products, sectors and geographical areas has been a long-term strategy of 
UK food retailers (4.4. p. 100), achieved through extension of range into food and non-food lines, 
geographical expansion within the UK and overseas, and the development of autonomous chains in 
sectors outside food retailing, DIY retailing for example. While UK food retailers have diversified in 
many different ways, they have been driven by similar forces and are therefore investigated as a 
whole, making reference to the particular form of diversification. Again, driving factors are separated 
into exogenous and endogenous categories. 
Exogenous factors driving diversification of offering: 
Initial diversification of product offering during the 1950s was driven by re-availability of products 
as post-war shortages eased (4.4. p. 100), which was the first factor driving extension of range during 
the second half of the 20 l h century, and was a temporary phenomenon related to the exogenous 
economic environment (7.1.2. p.268). 
Technological developments were a critical factor driving diversification in UK food retailing, with 
advances in pre-packaging and in-store refrigeration enabling extension of the self-service offering 
into fresh products such as milk, fish, meat and chilled prepared foods (5.3.Ü. p. 162-163), although it 
can take years for consumers to change their shopping habits: 
:
 What Í regard as the first àharige:fwas\ thè 'fyiovïèV'^ and. 
then it went to fresh cartoned milk, and this process of haying to lift up wings and form a 
spout is:inconvenient and, d^ 
goithe-inpye^^ 
little plastic bottles in a variety of sizes, which are give 
you maximum shelf space but are far better for the fridge - they fit. moreeasilyfthere is--a 
little - handle, it is arnuch more user-friendly pack and fthihìtfhdfiS: thè thing that is finally 
killing off. the milk round.. : //: is this : keep önpushihg^iuntil you actually break ¿lié. barrier, 
wh ich '- is preventing. the customer from \ actually, seeing the benefits, ; because they do need 
quite a strong push to. knock them a\vdy from old habits. :: 
[Denis Gässidyj 
During the 1970s, because consumers adopted freezers and manufacturers launched frozen foods, 
supply of and demand for frozen products increased (7.1.2. p.268), effectively forcing UK food 
retailers to extend the product offering into frozen foods (5.3.i. p. 160). 
Increasing consumer demand for 'one-stop shopping' was a further exogenous force driving 
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diversification of product offering, and was created primarily by changing employment patterns, 
rising household incomes, and consumer adoption of domestic technology (6.3. p.219). 
Consumers' development of trust in the leading food retailers, who have become a brand in their 
own right (6,3. p.230-231), was the final exogenous force enabling retailers to extend their offerings 
further than would otherwise have been the case, as consumers became confident that they would 
provide a good deal in other areas. Thus, diversification of offering was driven by the development 
of consumer trust in the retailer (7.1.2. p.268). 
Endogenous factors driving diversification of offering: 
There were many endogenous forces driving diversification of offering, in parallel to the exogenous 
ones outlined above. Retailers' introduction of self-service (4.3) brought larger sales area because 
préparation space was rationalised and moved behind the scènes, and more room could be given over 
to sales (7.1.2. p.269), supporting findings in North and South America [Goldman, 1974]: 
A- converled self service store had more:Unes t h a n a ; cpun ter-service 
store: Jiï pari ; tins :was dite ; ïo$Md$ 
early sèlf-ser\nce : Stores ôf coursé,-the)préparation :wiis stili going oh behind the scehés:: in 
the store, you just wèren 't doing it at iliè ep^ 
service store oui differeMly, and peopïe helpihg themselvës; ypu.coûld pack ; an. awful 
. lot more in there: Plits the faci that f)ackiigëdfj;Oods ta : ihdngopdsjih big 
sactis,, orsides of baco ti, for 'exemple, w'hich ïcikè tip disprôpotâ 
the counler. . : 
[Bf idge^^ Wi i liains] 
This trend continued as store sizes increased throughout the second half of the 20 t h century (4.3. 
p.94-98). Much diversification of offering has been possible due to the high consumer traffic in 
grocery stores. Because groceries are an essential, they 'pull' customers into the store, presenting 
further opportunity to sell them additional items: 
"The most telling reason (to diversifia), however, appears to be that insufficiently exploited 
circumstance that the grocer 's shop has the biggest customer-traffic of ail. " : s 
A simple extension of range, therefore exploits the présence of existing customers, providing extra 
sales opportunities for the retailer (7.1.2. p.268). There is more récent évidence, conversely, that non-
food lines can also act as the 'magnef attracting customers into the store, presenting an opportunity 
to sell food lines to them, although this remains the exception rather than the rule. For example the 
S
 The Grocer, Augus t 9 , 1952, p .38 
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clothing range on sale at Asda has been noted as drawing customers into the store, as well as 
improving their perception of the shopping experience: 
.. there are three ways it works:. - (a) there are people that come to shop, for food, • basically, 
and while they are there they buy their clothes... (b) they come to buy specific clothes for a 
gift... so that is a specific trip to buy the gift, although they are primarily a food customer. 
And.theh there is another one, which is (c) people who don't shop with us for food, but 
specifically come for: the clothes:: Increasingly we are seeing this, and it gives us a great 
opportunity to convert them to food. 
[Tony Campbell] 
Similarly, there is evidence that Marks and Spencer's customers are sometimes drawn in by non­
food products, and tempted with foods once they are in the store [Bob Fee]. It is also suggested that 
because women do most of the shopping, the key factor driving the successful cross-selling of food 
items at M&S is the quality of ladies clothing, as this is the area in which trust in the brand is 
strongest, which enables substantial cross-selling of products [Branton, 2000; p.23-25]. However, 
M&S's primarily business is not food retailing, and in mainstream food retailing there remain limits 
to how far the non-food offering can be extended - the food element of the product-mix needs to 
remain attractive enough to pull in consumers, and to build consumer trust in the brand. 
Multiple food retailers' moves into petrol retailing were initially through petrol stations located in 
store car parks, and they subsequently developed stand alone petrol stations from the mid-1990s. The 
rise of forecourt food retailing (4.3. p.98-99) is described as a double-edged sword z o , as both oil 
companies and food retail companies are aggressively pursuing growth in the format. This suggests 
that, to a limited extent, synthesis is taking place between oil companies and food retailers, as 
suggested by the Dialectic theory (7.1.7. p.285), although this remains only a partial step. 
Diversification of product offering has been an important strategy pursued by food retailers to 
improve margins, complimenting consumer demand for range extension because of 'one stop 
shopping' (see above). Margins on branded dry groceries tend to be the lowest in the store, therefore 
almost any diversification of product away from the core offering brings higher margins. Private 
label, fresh, chilled and prepared foods carry higher margins than most groceries, as do non-foods: 
Super Marketing, July 3, 1998, p . 8 ; "Chains add fuel to forecourt bat t le" 
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"...branded goqds sold in supermarkets commánd very low margins .-. a Mars bar, a packet 
of Walkers crisps, these are not high margin. lines. If yoù fa •Sàirisbùry packet of 
crisps you are not payìng for the branding cösts of Walkers cHsps - yöii are not payingfor 
advertising, for their sales teams, for their fonnof distribution. Ali costs get ripped 
out of the cosi which you eventually pass to the çusipmeir,:^ that 
Sainsbury 's crisps are cheaper than Walkers crisps, for example. The public expect that to 
be the case, and the supermarkets can proyide it, and siili ; makè. a. good margin as wel l... 
I think the other reason for margins going up is that their produci• mix: has dfahidtically 
shifted towards chitled goods. But it is not the chillcd gqods themselvesthat are hecessarily 
higher margin, it is the fttci: that mòstehilled 
margins are better. You don 't see McVitie's Çhickèn Tikka'-Másala,.you see Sa 
Teseo and M&S Chicken Tikka Másala. Thereis priée competUion 
chains, whieh keeps evetybody on their toes- büt the actual margin. t hat ; the., retditer i s ab le 
to eam òn own-label chilled food is much better thanfhey can edm on; lèi 's sdy, a cùn öf 
Heinz beans. - • 
[Alari KP.Smitri] 
Diversification o f product has therefore been pursued by O p e r a t o r s in order to improve margins and 
retail performance, strongly supporting scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up (7.1.1. 
p.261-264). When into non-foods, diversification can bring access to faster growing markets than 
UK food retailing, which has been static or slow growing since the mid-1960s, illustrated by UK 
expenditure on food, which rose only 10.3% in real terms during the 1960s, compared to a 26.9% 
increase in overall expenditure [Walters, 1975]. The food market grows more slowly than other 
product markets because the already high standard of living means that further increases in income 
are not generally spent on food for consumption at home, which in tum drove retailers* 
diversification into non-foods (7.1.1. p.262, and 7.1.2, p.271): 
"By the mid-sixties it was clear that total food sales were Stabilising and diversification 
into non-food Unes was necessary " Ian MacLaurin, Managing Director, Teseo Ltd. 2 7 
Retailer strategy when diversifying offering: 
Leading UK food retailers have entered new markets, such as petrol retailing and financial services, 
using fierce price compétition, which over time tends to subside as a satisfactory customer base is 
established. Interest rates paid on supermarket savings accounts have failed to maintain their 
"market-beating" launch levéis 2 S , for example, and early market share gains in petrol retailing were 
achieved through intense pricing: 
Retail & Distribution Management, Nov . /Dec . 1977, pp .29 -31 . 
see Financial Mail on Sunday, A u g u s t 8, 1999 
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In the old day s, Teseo woüld he aggressive on pricing, and on petrol they basica! ly forced 
the big brands like Esso down oh price, that 's why they bave gode from nothing to such a 
significarli market shäre. 
[Mike Groves] 
In effect, established food retailers have entered new product markets in the same way that the 
Wfieel of Retailing suggests new entrants tend to enter retailing - using low priées to build market 
share. Thus there are internai Wheel of Retailing-like movements occurring (7.1.1. p.263), with 
margins on any new line tending to increase as it gains market share. Food retailers are able to enter 
new markets using fierce pricing because they can leverage existing overheads, which are low 
anyway - as supermarkets of the 1960s onwards operated on a new set of économies to the traditional 
counter-service grocery store (6.3. p.221-222), the food superstore chain entering the fashion 
clothing market, for example, has a large cost advantage over traditional high S t r e e t clothes retail 
chains, meaning that the offering of the food retailer in the non-food domain can be very difficult for 
traditional retailers to compete with, due to the less efficient nature of their opérations: 
Beedüse of pur lòcatioii àhd sizè. of störe, fye häye beert. dBlè':io. Preaip]dlWhoté: n^sefpf: 
économies, which makéS ùs : very éompèïifwe:;and 
the réti t pnd raies : are a. loi low er:. Weafe- using Space ihät is èffecfively. dlreädy ihéré; so 
the cost per Square foot is '-. m üch lower. We are lêVërqgihgàthér existing ÓVerheqds; like the 
çheckout line whiçh. is ab^ady thére\ theheqiin£:dhd\ ihedìgfi tingi so, 'the in cièmentql \ çost. 
yofUs^òW0^ÌÓÌ^js[ m uch.much Tower Man ilisfór someoné like'Néxt Öh.theMigh Street 
it. is qlsoprimarily self sélection - t hère \ \ are saìès\ '\ assistants, but \ it: is fprimqfily 
self y sélection- as. opposedtö th e. High: Stréèi.which isiallséfved: So \ thé. faboiMéost per sale 
is'-dramaticcilly'•• Tower.'• fife diso distributé io.\20Ó élótfiesDepartments.'• of abbiti-7 io ¡0 
ihpusand. squcireßet èaéh.unlike Buttons yyHohdyé gòt thousdhds dhdjhousqn^ offiny^ 
little shops '• strétehed dui ; over, dil Me:MgH^kéêMT^àÊÇA^ that diäftibutiöhfrom) ihèdepot 
is alitile box vein travelling a round, high strèèts in the rush höurs.. Gän yqü imagine the cosi 
of that?: Our ecohónucscire: completefy-. différent, so. we are qble ïofséfcihestâ^ 
qudlity wise, at 30 .or 40% discount;. dnd.we can do lì ih dn énVirónment ihàt ioday is yéry 
very attractive to the consumer. So not ohly are we creatiiigsóméthing that distinguishes Hs 
from the other : supers iorès, bui I : am ' dbsolutely. clear that • we : are : creating sométhihg 
unmatchable by the people thaioperàie in the High Street: : 
Domestic and international diversification: 
The key endogenous force driving retailers' regional diversification, whether internal to the UK or 
international, are retailers' attempts to develop larger (global) économies of scale and better (global) 
purchasing power. Exogenous factors are also important, with the development of refrigerated 
[Tony Campbell] 
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vehicles and central distribution allowing large Operators to distribute fresh goods nationwide while 
retaining consistent quality, whereas previously, local specialists tended to draw on local supplies 
and offer a local guarantee of quality (5.3.ÜÍ. p. 170). This meant that multiple Operators could 
expand throughout the UK with consistent product quality, and removed a key advantage of 
regionally based multiples in sourcing fresh producís. 
With global expansion said to have become a key élément in the future success of food retailers [see 
Moody, 1997], overseas markets can be penetrated through natural growth (i.e. European hard 
discounters UK pénétration in the early-1990s - p.109-111). or more quickly through the acquisition 
of a national player (i.e. Wal-Mart's 1999 purchase of UK Asda). UK food retailing is a continuously 
evolving business and by the 1990s geographical diversification developed an international flavour. 
Teseo and Sainsbury have developed businesses abroad, with Teseo paying particular attention to 
international strategy. Wal-Mart (USA) acquired Asda in the summer of 1999, thus geographical 
diversification has truly taken on an international dimension, meaning that the 'big five' of the future 
are likely to be determined on an international basis. According to Darwinian analogy, this is criticai, 
as future competitors will be fit by international standards, rather than national or even regional 
standards as has been the case in the recent past, suggesting further shake-up ahead (7.1.6, p.282). 
Most forces driving geographical diversification, however, are exogenous to retailers. The saturation 
of grocery expenditure and slow growth in the domestic food market (see above, p.237) drove UK 
Operators to enter overseas markets, where this saturation point has not been reached, so in 
developing économies for example, food retailers can expect large proportions of rapidly rising 
incomes to be spent on food. In addition, development costs are lower and general economie growth 
tends to be faster: 
"Our aim to grow our business beyond the British Isles is now focused on the emerging 
markets of Centrai Europe. For Teseo, this means Hungary, Poiana, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, 
These markets are growing rapidly, at around 5% GDPper annum...Against this, average 
incomes and expenditure are much lower in Central Europe, but they are growing 
fast...Good sites are available now, at a cost per square foot ofjust one-third of that in the 
UK..," 
[source: Teseo pie internet website 2 9] 
Wrigley [1994, p.18] suggests that UK food retailers may be tempted to turn to international 
2 9
 h t tp : / /www.tesco.co .uk/ repur t98/ review/pagel 1 .html 
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expansion as a means of 'grounding' operating profits as domestic opportunités diminish. Failure to 
invest the large sums generated by a large opération can make the retailer an attractive target for 
other retailers, thus international expansion can serve as a protective mechanism: 
U is simply not possible to remain a domestic supermarket, apart from ahything else, 
because if one was only to do. that, one wotild generale so much cash that somebodywould 
corne along and.buy you, because they wouïd want to useyôur cash for something elsé: 
[Tim Mason, speaking iri British. BtnpiresiTesço, 'C^^^l'^^'^^ 
This need to maintain capital-investment coupled with slow growth in the domestic food market can 
be assumed to be a major exogenous factor driving retailers' development of alternative retail 
formats, such as DIY superstores. The major forces driving expansion overseas, and into 
autonomous formats are the désire and necessity to grow, and limited prospects for domestic grocery 
retailing. It is necessary to uphold capital investment and protect the business from predators, thus 
investment must continue. For many years, slow growth in food sales has been countered by 
diversifying the product offering and expanding throughout the UK, but in récent years, UK food 
retailers turned their attention to alternative retail formats and to international expansion, in a bid to 
maintain their growth as UK food retail capacity approaches saturation. Thèse trends were 
strengthened when changes to planning guidelines ended the era of rapid superstore development in 
1996 (5.1.iii. p. 126-127), yet such ventures remain dwarfed by the large scale of leading UK food 
retailers' domestic opérations, and appear set to remain a small, albeit growing, proportion of their 
overall business (see effects of diversification, p.240-243, below). 
Effects of diversification of offering and geographical diversification 
Diversification of offering and geographical diversification has profoundly affected the UK food 
retail industry, and retailing in gênerai. There follows an analysis of the impact on specialist food 
retailers, retail type by form of ownership and private label development. 
Specialist food retailers and other retail types suffered as multiple food retailers moved into 
superstores (4.1. p.89-90) and diversified their product offering. Effectively, dairymen suffered as 
multiples moved into fresh milk, greengrocers suffered as multiples adopted fruit, and so on. 
Although multiples were diversifying their offerings while still gaining substantial trade from co-
opérative and independent grocers, product diversification was partially driven by the réalisation that 
gain from thèse retail types was finite, and that alternative avenues of growth had to be found. 
Specialist food retailers were the first to suffer, followed by non-food retailers such as clothes and 
240 
music retailers: 
Most wet fish shops kave beert driven out, there are very few left. Not because the 
consumer doesn't want them,.but because too many consümers only wanted tö goto them 
when they wanted something special and were going far the Standard pre^päcked, very 
often chilled or frozenfish, because they didn 't see it''-as as important in theßiefas meati 
and they would pick that up frörn the supermarket So ; the. growth. offrozen. breaded fillets 
just look enough slice, ; as. it .were, out ; of the market tö render the. econom ic. viabilïty öf the 
local fish shop doubtful... 
[Denis Cassidy} 
Extension of the retail accordion and scrambled merchandising (7.1.1. p.258-259, and 7.1.2. p.268), 
made possible by moves to larger stores, nave therefore driven the life cycle of smaller competing 
retail types into the decline phase. 
Both diversification of offering and geographical diversification contributed to the rise of multiples 
and the growth of the 'big five' (6.2. p.210), at the expense of co-operative, independent, specialist 
and weaker multiple retailers. The market share of specialist food retailers declined because of 
diversification of offering, while geographical diversification eroded the market share of co-
operative and independent food retailers, as well as that of regionally-based multiples, many of 
which disappeared as the fìttesi retail organisations survived (6.2. p.210), which made growth in 
market share more difficult as there remain no truly weak players to attack (5.1.iv. p.131-132), 
supporting the Darwinian analogy (7.1.6. p.281). 
Diversification of offering into new areas, such as self-service butchery from the 1970s, in which 
there were naturally no branded products, encouraged food retailers to naturally stamp their own 
name on the packaging. Prior to this there had been no need to brand meat, for example, as it had 
always been dispensed by a specialist butcher, who provided his own locai guarantee of quality and 
consistency, and eliminated the need for pre-packaging, although there were some multiple butchery 
chains which were established from the 1920s to import bulk quantifies of meat from Australasia and 
South America. UK grocery chains diversified their offerings and put their own name on the 
packaging, which over time contributed to the development of trust in the quality of the product 
hearing the retailer's name, forming the basis for the future growth of private-label (5.4.Ü. p.180), 
and bringing higher margins, as suggested by 'scrambled merchandising' as a cause of trading up 
(7.1.1. p.261-262). 
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A tendency for UK food retailers to adopt one another's best ideas means that diversification of 
offering into a certain area can become an industry-wide phenomenon over time, reducing the 
differential between operators and supporting the dialectic principle (7,1.7, p.283-285): 
Marcus Sieff.used to boast so often to John Sainsbwy about. his çhilled chickens that 
eventually John Sainsbury said.'to hell with: il, we 're going io. sell chilled chickens as well. ': 
Andthen of course, ;• ihéy start tò catch up. • 
' ' . ' • ' ' ' . '[:f? ' ' . • [AlahKJP. Smith]; 
Diversification of offering also enabled UK food retail operators to expand floorspace capacity at a 
pace that may otherwise have outstripped demand, created over-capacity, and possibly resulted in 
lower returns for operators. If the amount of new food retail capacity being added by new store 
openings outstrips the pace of growth of the food retail market, diversification of offering can bring 
access to a larger total market, theoretically enabling growth in turnover and profits to continue, 
while preserving margins as more unusual foods and non-foods tend to carry higher margins than 
core grocery items (see above, p.236-237). The increased size of the market is illustrated by food 
retailers accounting for 38% of retail expenditure in 1989, although food itself represents only 14% 
of retail expenditure (4.4. p. 101). In short, it is suggested that diversification of offering helped 
prevent the market for food superstores from reaching saturation point: 
Superstore saturation is sométhing which has always sort ôf. beën pttshed d few yedrs 
ahead, and whqt superstore saturation .mèa^ 
itself was nôt growing at the rate necëssary to saiisjy: the growïng nuni ber ôf supers tores, 
but certainlyfhe market was clianging: Forexcimple theyfhrpughtMoré^n 
basically -a muçh widéf ï rangé \ of mepchandisé; -uiider fhe sdme
 : ròof : so '-. ihaftlièy : àòuid 
achieve the performance ^ range às-ithad 
beèntényearsbefòre. . . ; r 
. . •' , -ffl^f:':: ^•^^•;• : f : j ^ ^ ) r ' ^ . ' : ••• • [fo.firi;Fletcher] 
To conclude, food retailers' diversification of offering was driven by the exogenous forces of post-
war re-availability of foods, the development of pre-packaging and in-store réfrigération, and more 
products being offered by manufacturers. Consumers were a key exogenous driver, with their 
development of trust in the retailer as a brand, their adoption of technology, and increasing consumer 
demand for 'one stop shopping1, ail driving diversification of offering. It was also powered 
endogenously, with retailers' moves into self-service bringing more sales area to fili with additional 
products, and the high consumer traffic in grocery stores presenting a golden opportunity for retailers 
to cross-sell products. Retailers' desires to increase margins, turnover and profitability, and to access 
growth markets are further endogenous factors driving diversification of offering, with almost any 
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such diversification bringing enhanced margins. 
Domestic and international geographical diversification is driven endogenously through retailers' 
seeking growth of the organisation, économies of scale and buying power, but most forces driving it 
are exogenous. Developments in distribution technology, for example, enabled multiple operators to 
diversify throughout the TJK while maintaining the quality of fresh products. Slow growth in the UK 
food market drove domestic expansion, which became international as the leading players began to 
saturate the UK market. Retailers find it necessary to ground their operating profits through 
investment, partly as protection against predators, and limited domestic opportunities drive this 
capital investment overseas or into new domestic retail sectors. Government planning guidelines 
introduced in 1996 effectively ended large-scale domestic superstore development, further driving 
capital investment overseas. 
Diversification of product aided the rise of multiple operators at the expense of specialist retailers, 
while geographical diversification resulted in the rise of the 'big five', which sharpened compétition 
within the sector. UK food retailers tend to enter new markets using low priées, which normally rise 
over time, and are able to undercut traditional retailers of products because of their efficiencies and 
scale. Diversification of offering also facilitated the development of private label, and was driven 
partly by retailers' tendencies to copy each other's innovations. Finally, superstore saturation and 
gênerai over-capacity in the industry have been avoided/delayed by the contribution of non-foods, 
which effectively enlarged the size of the market in which UK food retailers compete. 
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Figure 6.4a. Forces driving food retailers' diversification; 
ENDOGENOIJS FORCES EXOGENOUS FORCES 
1950s & 1960s . Reta i lers ' 
convers ions to self-service b rough t 
larger sales areas, a l lowing r ange 
extension. 
1950 on . Range extension pur sued 
by relailers, because it improves 
margins, in part icular if into pr ivate 
label & fresh foods. 
1960 on. Incréasing store sizes 
enabled range extension, wh ich also 
exploits the h igh consumer trafi le in 
grocery stores. 
1980s on . N e w Unes (i.e. c lò th ing) 
can draw cus tomers into the store, 
present ing an oppOrtiinity t o ç ross -
sell o ther products to them. 
1980s on . N e w marke ts én te rêd : 
using fierce pr icing ,tó bui ld marke t 
share, normal ly subsiding w i t h t ime. 
EXTENSION O F 
R A N G E ; 
RESULTED IN: . 
Decline of specialists, rise 
rh of múlt iples , natural ' 
deve lopment of pr ivate >. 
label, margin growth , and 
^ delay in superstore . 
<. saturation point . 
Mid 1950s . Range of p roduc ís on 
offer ihc reased due to p roduc t re -
âvailabil i ty after WW2 shor tages . 
1950 o n . Pre-packaging and in-store 
réfrigération a l low range extension. 
Cons t ra ined b y s low adapta t ion o f 
c o n s u m e r shopping habits^ 
M i d 1960s o n . T h e static U K market 
for food dròve range ex tens ion as a 
m e a n s o f growth. ----- • .-. 
1970 o n . mercasrng c o n s u m e r 
dernand for 'pne-s top s h o p p i n g ' , 
d r iven b y rising incomes , changing. . 
lifestyles & adopt ion of t echnology . 
19.70 on . Consumere adopted 
freezers & manufac turers ihcreased : 
n ù m b e r o f frozen food liries, forcing 
retailers to exterid the i r r a n g e s ; : ^ 
Mid 1970s on . Ref r ige ra tedveh ic les 
& central distr ibution a l low ränge : 
extens ion into fields d o m i n a t é d by 
local specialists (i:e. fish, bakëry) 
L a t e 1980s on . C o n s u m c r s ' 
deve lopmen t ö f trust in leadirig ¿ ; ; 
retailers enabled them to ;éx tehd; : : ' 
their offering béyorid n o r m a l l imite. 
M i d 1960s on. Retai lers wan t ing t o 
grow despi te static U K marke t for 
food pursued régional expans ion , 
and later, international expans ion . 
1970s on . Retai lers want-to g row, so 
as to develop larger économies o f 
scale & purchasing power , d r iv ing 
régional & international expans ion . 
DOMESTIC & 
INTERNATIONAL 
DIVERSIFICATION 
RESULTEDIN: 
ì Decl ine of regional 
multiples, rise of the Big 
-'. F ive , and heightened 
- compét i t ion be tween ' 
remaining players . -
M i d 1960s u n . T h e static U K market 
fot food drove reg iona l ,expans ion as 
a : mearis of g rowth : i ^ 
Mid 1970s o n . R e f n g e r a t e d v e h i c l c s 
& central distr ibution a l low Iniovés • ' 
into a réâs domina téd b y rég iona l 
mul t ip les , with consis tent qUality. 
1990s on . Saturat ion and matur i ty of 
the domes t ic marke t er icoùragéd 
overseas expans ion as a means . of 
main ta in ing growth . • 
1990s on . Internat ional expans ion 
used as a m e a n s of ' g r o u n d i n g ' 
profits , nëcessary to ayoid takeover 
b y prëda tors seeking cashf lòw. 
M i d 1990s on . Host i le p l ann ing 
env i ronment to large n e w stores 
encouraged overseas inves tment , 
where large s tores could-be buil t . 
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6.5 Forces driving the changing price/service relationship in UK food retailing 
Until the mid-1960s, compétition in UK food retailing was primarily over service provision and 
location, with price becoming the primary competitive weapon from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s. 
From the early-1980s, retailers pursued quality in terms of stores, offerings, facilities and overall 
shopping expérience, leaving behind the price wars of the late-1970s (4.5. p.107-108). The 
exogenous and endogenous factors driving this changing competitive emphasis are examined below, 
as are the effects on UK food retailing. 
Exogenous forces driving changes in the price/service relationship 
Until 1964, manufacturers set the priées of most consumer goods under RPM (5.1.ii. p.119), 
meaning that price compétition in UK food retailing was not possible for many branded products. 
Compétition therefore tended to be over quality of service and convenience of location, illustrated by 
the domination of local, independently-owned, counter-service grocery shops (4.3. p.94). Post-1964, 
however, retailers set their own retail prices, which favoured Operators of self-service and 
supermarkets, who were able to offer lower prices because of their lower operating costs (5.1.ÌL 
p.122). The abolition of RPM also drove superstore development, which brought down prices 
throughout the industry (6.3. p.227), again supporting the Wheel of Retailing's central tenet that new 
formats begin as low-cost, low-status opérations (7.1.1. p.259). These low-cost beginnings aid rapid 
development, pushing the format into the rapid growth phase of the retail life cycle. 
The price wars of the late-1970s are attributed to the rapid addition of superstore facilities in the 
preceding years (5.2.ii. p.148), but are blamed more frequently on the exogenous economic problems 
following the mid-1970s oil crisis (5.2.Ü. p.146-148). In short, thèse problems brought falling real 
incomes and rising consumer sensitivity to prices, driving demand for competitively priced 
groceries, to which price-cutting campaigns were a Utting response. In effect, lower prices increased 
throughput and spending sufficiently to fund the price cuts, and were therefore a successful business 
strategy at the time: 
"Jack Cohen, who .was the, föühder of the business; :änd;.Chairmdn at;thqifìme had a 
réputationidii"Slasher Jack.'fife eût prices. Ând it was the right sort pf merchandising and 
the righi sort of set up for thé lime." 
.-. [Lord MacLaurin of KnCbworth DL] 
From the early-1980s, price sensitivity among UK consumers declined as sybaritic consumers 
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emerged, with consumers' primary demand becoming 'one-stop shopping' facilities, although priée 
remained an important factor (see 5.2.Ü. p.145-152). Food retaüers responded to this changing 
demand by moving into larger stores (<¿J, p.219), to be able to supply the necessary additional 
producís, services and facilities. This drove the development of a quality shopping expérience (6.4. 
p.236-237) as well as ending the era of intense price compétition. In short, rising incomes drove UK 
food retailing up-market, supporting Hollander's [1960] secular trends hypothesis (7.1.1. p.264-265). 
From the early-1980s, continuous improvements to the grocery shopping expérience were driven by 
the parallel forces of increasing incomes and consumers' taste for quality. Rising incomes generated 
increasing demand for quality, £one-stop shopping' facilities (see above), while consumers' 
reluctance to relinquish quality once they have experienced it (5.2.iii. p. 155) drove an inexorable 
improvement in the quality of shopping facilities, services and producís. 
In addition, a product purchased in a well respected, quality retail environment is itself well 
respected by the consumer, even if the product is not worthy, increasing the benefits of investment in 
the retail environment: 
"In 19.7.0 Í weni to s e e ^ a . : ; ^ 
ceilingfitting for us .... BhS.were selling it I think fbt0iher;79s:Ífdor it. mighiihdve been 
59s.IJd,. ùnd whertf weni roMd'tHëfactôry^s 
label oïi.it i.: Hdrrods wëre selling. iifpr I ïgupieqs; ':yff.fú ¡ff if f/.: :. ]:•'.; 
NpwtheJpersdH who weni intpHdrroàs:antiVbbüghi thatiwouidTîbthày^gpHeJnto and. 
paid 79s lïd, bëcausë they wpuldp itanddeçidéd ihdtiirwds not ds 
nice.-:. -they would probably rationalise it bysaying..tí's piobdbly cfieaper, it's piobàbîy not 
as. well niade, ifsaçqpy. \ But itwàs from exacify^ sdmefaçto}~y, sa: the. ^ qlüe¡ équation ds 
vèry\ofreWheavityiï 
• - v - i ^ . - ^ i . - - • ' '• ~ [Dems-Cassidy]: 
Consumer behaviour is therefore affected significantly by the retail environment, meaning that 
investments in improvements to it are generally worthwhile, as they positively influence consumer 
perception of the retail offering. This supports the claim that the quality of the shopping environment 
has been improved as a response to the changing consumer, while also backing-up the fact that 
retailers stand to profit from responding effectively to evolving consumer demand. Trading up has, 
in short, been driven by the triple forces of rising disposable incomes, consumer reluctance to 
relinquish quality, and shoppers' apparent association of a quality retail environment with quality 
merchandise. 
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Consumer behaviour also affects the price/service relationship in other ways, with consumers in 
general only remembering a few prices, normally those of frequently purchased items. While the 
items and prices recalled are different for each consumer, the overall effect is the creation of price 
perception over a narrow range of high sales volume products. Because stores sell thousands of 
products, there is opportunity for retailers to 'profiteer' on low volume lines which rarely affect 
consumers' price perception of the store, meaning that 'scrambled merchandising' can prove a 
profitable retail strategy (7.1.1, p.263). 
Consumers' limited price recollection also drove food retailers' short-term promotions on products, 
offering 'money off or 'extra free', rather than permanent low pricing strategies. Those customers 
that do not recall the price of an item on promotion are reminded by the 'was Xp, now only xp ' sign, 
and those that do recall the price are happy to save money compared to last week, even though the 
same item may be on sale elsewhere for a lower price again. Limited price recollection assists 
retailers to move upmarket through 'scrambled merchandising' while promoting special offers on a 
limited range (7.1.1. p.263). While such short-term, promotional campaigns may excite the 
consumer, the more retailers take this stance, the greater the potential benefit of one operator 
adopting long-term low prices and creating a marketable point of difference (7.1.4. p.275). This is a 
similar phenomenon to that of trading stamps, which induced a polarisation of approach in the mid-
1970s, when near-universal adoption created a gap for Teseo to abandon them and compete over 
lower prices (5.4.i. p.178-179). Taking an opposite approach to competitors also worked for Asda, in 
the short-term, when they obtained better prices for brands because they had no private label (5.4.Ü. 
p.181-182). The 'permanent' price cutting campaigns of the major multiples that began in 1999 
(particularly at Wal-Mart Asda and Teseo) are a further example of this polarisation of pricing 
strategy, as they follow a period of intensive 'multibuy' and short-term promotional activity. See 
section 7.1.4 (p.273-276) for a further explanation of these tendencies towards polarisation. 
High taxation on petrol and tobacco means that intense price competition among retailers appears 
only marginal to the consumer, reducing retailers' benefits from competition over price. This is 
because the consumer receives too small a benefit from shopping around to improve turnover 
sufficiently to cover the cost of the price discount. In other words, high taxation on certain products 
reduces the benefits to retailers of fair price competition, thus discouraging it. Although there is price 
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compétition remaining in thèse markets, the effect o f high taxation is to suppress it artificially: 
"J think food retailers have done a good job on petrol, but how much: of ajob can you do 
xvhen. the taxmah. takës so much ? We go àver to Canada twice ayear; aiid.ii costs 49 • to 52 
cents d litre:., you 're looking ai 20p.per litre ...so priée
 : compétition is greatly. ëlouded by 
the qmount bf tax; very;cloüded. Wë pay more in. tlïe UK ihanianyxvhere,.\in-ÏÏfarieë òr. 
Spai ri." ..;";•': 
''•'}':-'fr::\\fr'.ffff^ 
By reducing the incentive to engage in price compétition, high taxation on thèse producís has 
effectively driven retail margins upwards, as suggested by the Wheel o f Retailing (7.1.1. p.267). 
Increasing levéis of duty on diesel are also a factor putting upwards pressure on margins (5.1 .vi. 
p.142), also driving revolution of the Wheel of Retailing (7.1.1. p.267). 
The final exogenous force driving the relationship away from price and towards service was the 
influence of the planning regime. Teseo were forced 'upmarket', away from their 'pile it high, seil it 
cheap' stance from the late-1970s, because planning authorities viewed them as 'cowboy' O p e r a t o r s , 
and were reluctant to allow them to develop new stores [MacLaurin, 1999; p.53]. Thus the negative 
attitude of planners towards price-focused O p e r a t o r s drove revolution of the. Wheel of Retailing by 
forcing Teseo to improve the quality of their opérations (7.1.1. p.267). 
Endogenous forces driving the changing price/service relationship 
The initial phase of superstore development, when large industrial buildings were converted t o seil 
branded producís at low priées, was followed by a second phase, from íhe laíe-1970s, when the 
qualily shopping expérience began io emerge through the development of large, purpose-built, out-
of-town stores, which provided the space necessary for car parking, in-store reslauranls, bakeries, 
pharmacies, baby changing facilities and other additional services and facilities (4J>, p.107-108). 
Larger stores also brought enough space to allow diversification of product offering, with 
delicatessens and fresh fish counters being introduced in addition l o non-foods. As any 
diversificalion of produci provides higher gross profit margins than the core grocery offering (6.4, 
p.236-237), retailers' motives are clear, yet standards had to be high, as O p e r a t o r s were unwilling to 
risk consumer dissatisfaction with new Unes, particularly in fresh foods, supporting the 'scrambled 
merchandising' hypothesis as a driver of the Wheel of Retailing. In addition, labour costs rose: 
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Roger Clough: "Thèse diversifications; into deli: courtiers and the pilier things yôu 
men tioned, do they provide.higher.profits ? '. ' ' 
lan MacLaufin: "Yes they do, basicdlly, but y ou hdve got to run it right. I rneari, the 
quality standards in the chillchaïn hdyegot tobe^rédîlîftopclxiss.. 
foods in a hqphazard way, ; because firstly ii is ahealth haïqrd, andifypUisëll'suMstajuidA 
freshfoods, people '• willnever corne back to yôu. : You khow; y ou can qpéh a can pfsôup- àrid 
a : can ofspiip is a can : ofsoup, but if yôu : sëll a iôpside jôirit, : sdy,;fofihe .wéefcènd. aruiihe 
family are ait sitting round; and you hdve just carved,. and someboay sdys "wherè didyou 
get tins from?", anâmum says, "l got. it from Tescô^iand iheyfsày:^ heïl, donH go 
backtherè, it 'Il bedwful ". Soyour quality standards hqve got io be'• qbsolutélyfirst classa (•'•• 
./ think ilidt asfar as.grocery goes, \my sort of bible WqsWWi^V^0t^^ didhdd tobeiop 
quality, ôtherwise. don 'i bôthër: "• '• • ' 
: ; ; [Lord MacLauriri of Knéb worth Dfi] 
A further factor causing escalation in the level of services and facilities was compétition between 
operators to respond to consumer demand more effectively than other operators: 
' "Whaiwère ' the factors; driving ; increased lëyeis{ \. pfi servicefahd facilities ?•: ; li -;\ Was 
compétition, and the compétition was on ly in whàt y au are irying to do; which is serve your 
. custôiher bei ter than your competitori So it Wdk gï°>ving l because; the. custorhefs were 
' rèspohdihgand expectingïà widér [range as the y pars wenidn; it yvds;;.customer: expert^ 
; and compétition :: '•• And: the récognition of: thé;, locai planning quthprities1 ïhài; thèse, typés ôf 
shôpsfyére- vety poptdar, dhd the économies wëre.ôf coursé ; ihai. biggérshûps riere marié 
profitable, at every lëveli 
: : i [Lord Sairisbury of Preston Èahdpyer KG] 
This escalation of services and facilities was particularly apparent from the early-1980s when inter-
superstore compétition drove retailers' upmarket (6-3. p.229). Further, as large, out-of-town stores 
began to contribute significantly to the profits of major multiple operators, the profits required 
'grounding' in order to avoid becoming a cash-rich takeover target (6.4. p.240). In other words, UK 
food retailers were generating strong cashflow, which was available for and encouraged investment 
in stores and Systems. Thèse updated stores and Systems theoretically pay dividends again once 
established, catalysing further investment: and suggesting that investment breeds investment 
";:^as they didgrow rapidlythë.shëer volumes, ihai they were handlingje 
the m. to plough back into improvements, further imprpyëments in. distribution, in thé quality 
of things in the shops; in the services they offeréd, dhd so on " . . [Denis Cassi dy] / 
lncreasing quality in UK food retailing therefore results from continuous investment by major 
players, which tends to be financed from strong positive cashflow [Jennifer Tanbum], As previous 
investments begin to pay dividends, further positive cashflow is produced, encouraging further 
investment while discouraging price-cutting activity and protecting agamst predators: 
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"Superstore development requires a strong cash flow to finance site acquisition, as good 
sites are becoming increasingly scarce. The major multiples are not Willing to enter into 
another priée war, as ii could jeopardise their chances of obtaining access to thèse limited 
sites. Smaller Operators seem for the moment to be quite Willing to accept this lead and to 
take the relatively high margins white they can. " 
[Killen and Pattison, 1987; p.79] 
Retailers invest in improved facilities, whether new or updated, because sales are generally increased 
sufficiently to fund the investment. Priées, however, must not rise significantly, gain has to come 
from increased patronage and turnover: 
Roger Clough: "Say you've got an old store] and y ou refurbish.it - will that géner älfy get 
enqugh extra people to spend enough extra money to. cover the cpsts ofrefurbìshmen^ 
David Malpas: "The short answer is yes, tfie slightly longer ans wer. is ihcitjifdoesn't 
alyvays work. li nearly does always work, because we're pretty careful to plah; whdt the 
market opportunities are in.the area wjiefe were going io exténdor refurblshïhë store.:., 
people wôh'tpay extra.for having tovety stores:and nice staff, :they just won 't do ti; so. what 
yóu bave io do as well istò. seil them móre^im^q-sefl ti to more people, and ti redilyisias 
simple as that... " •. 
[David Malpas] 
The move towards quality in UK food retailing that began in the early-1980s was also a defensive 
reaction to the intense price compétition of the late-1970s. Price wars tend to 'reduce headroom' and 
squeeze profits, which in turn can precipitate takeover attempts [Mike Groves], largely because of 
depressed share priées [Tony de Angeli]. Pursuing a quality approach was seen as a means of 
escaping the problems brought on by price wars, meaning that intense price compétition can induce 
retailers' to move up-market and to compete over quality, supporting Allvine's [1968] 'fear of direct 
price compétition' as a cause of trading up (7.1.1. p.265-266): 
"Food : retailers; went inió \ high, gui-wrehćhihg, heaà-butting : confrontation with . price 
cutting in thè 1960s and 197Os, with a.pehny off: this, a penhy of that, two perìce,•'.thréé 
pence- and so on. Their shares weren't wórth d dime! And süddehly they wokëùp, thèy 
realised.that they had to offer quality products and services, inśiead of just price cutting'' 
[Tony de Angeli] 
Also there is a tendency for retailers to invest excessively in formats, eventually resulting in over-
capacity. Under such circumstances, new stores tend not to meet their original turnover expectations, 
tempting Operators to raise margins in order to make up the shortfall in profit that would have been 
achieved through a higher turnover. High margins, however, invite new entrants or existing 
competitors to build market share by undercutting prices: 
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"Retail always òvershoots, always. You will go through a përiodwhen gròwth is very gòòd, 
demand is vety stróng, and they have found a new formula that works, so they ali put down 
as many ofthese thirigs as they can, until the planners stop them or they run out of money. 
But becauSe evetybody else has dótte the same ihing, the returnS dreh't quitëas. good.as 
they expected. At that point, to try and service ali this càp^ 
cind. gross_ margins up, to ùyànd cut back that gap - ' 'what , we cqn't get in turnover,. we 'Il 
gei in margin ', and that créâtes a gap in pricing, àgàinst whcd you could trddd di and 
someone jike Aldi or-Netto or someone says 'we can make a lot of money in this', and: in 
they come, and the wheel starts to spin.again, so you have. a low priced ojfer... " . 
;
 '•
 :
 ' '
 :
'
:
 •
 :
'
:
 '
; ;:' ::y :" • ' fr. .': :"--' v [David Stòudart]: 
In effect there is évidence of a polarisation of competitive focus, whereby price compétition tends to 
induce a quality approach, and vice-versa. Price wars of the 1970s drove the quality approach front 
the 1980s, and excessive investment during the 1980s and high margins enticed continental 
discounters' UK-entry in the early-1990s (4.5. p.109-111), basing their appeal on low prices, which 
they were able to achieve because of their international buying strength, and by concentrating on key 
high-volume lines and low-cost premises. By the mid to late-1990s, margins of leading UK operators 
had risen to reasonably high levels compared to other countries, despite the présence of discounters, 
the industry was the subject of a Compétition Commission inquiry, and also a fréquent subject of 
press 'investigations' into UK grocery prices compared to other countries. Although much of the 
press treatment was unfair and over-simplified, with higher margins necessary to cover the higher 
costs of transportation, labour and property in the UK, such high margins attracted Wal-Mart to enter 
the UK, through their 1999 purchase of Asda. High margins, resulting from moves upmarket and 
prolongea investment, can therefore induce price compétition, which in this case was catalysed by 
the sudden introduction of an extremely large international competitor, renowned for low prices. 
Again, this is an example of polarisation of pricing strategy, with movement too far towards one 
extrême inducing activity at the opposite pole, supportìng the Wheel of Retailing's central thème that 
moving up-market créâtes a gap for a potential new entrant (7.1.1. p.259). 
Retailers have an inhérent fear of being harmed by the innovations of competitors, which contributed 
to the near industry-wide adoption of loyalty schemes in the mid-1990s [David Stoddart], and to the 
spread of in-store restaurants, bakeries and other facilities. In effect, an improvement to the retail 
offering can be adopted near industry-wide, despite having unproven benefits, suggesting 'trading 
up' through fear of being harmed by competitors' innovations (7.1.1. p.266): 
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Roger Clough; : '.'Do ideas spread because consumers really want something - in-, 
store bakeriés, say - or becaitse compeütprs copy èàch other'sTdè 
Sir Dennis Landau: : "Wëlll thinkubit of botti, if somehody puisisomething-ipthaifc 
success föthers will fol low.. Jt is like in-stö ré restaurants; and : wìfeihèr üsihgfheJspäce -: & 
sensible ècohom ically, but by and large; mos t of the; large stores, nöw have restaurants.'' 
; ; [Sir Dennis Landau] 
There is also évidence of 'copying' in private label, with many Operators following the high quality 
private label stance initiated by Sainsbury's ( Z U , p.283). This drove up the overall quality of 
private label (5.4.Ü. p.182), which was a particularly important factor driving trading up of the retail 
offe-ring as a whole as private label accounts for 40% of total grocery expenditure f5.4.ii. p.183): 
" ...we devélopèd private label in quite a différentjway from other peoplefyöü knowflie 
quality thiiig;- With grècit success, which other coihpanies have]howfòUo^èàf bui niqhy. 
years after we startea\\ Our stqrtihg poinfwqsfhat wevverejiirmng io label 
tìiat was]as.goqcl as the leqdïng brand, orbëtter, asyvell àscliéapef So-ithadio;have;tifi, 
advantage r to be better than the leädihg brand; and also to b.e cheòper/Ananever lèH 
gooil than the. leading brand. This was very différent froinötlißs W^ 
brand t(fgêtâijgi^-M 
•;; W ' i f -'. i '0 :''•••;:•:: [Lord; Sàirt5Duiy ; of Brcs^ ; Caiidoyer .KCj] : 
Food retailers also 'adapf manufacture^' branded products in a similar way, producing a private 
label équivalent within a matter of months of the launch of a new brand (5.4.Ü. p.181). Over the 
years, private label has moved away from simple products such as flour and butter to rivai the quality 
of brands, representing substantial trading up of the retail offering (7.1.1. p.261-262). 
The introduction of new technology or trading techniques can reduce operational costs, savings 
which tend to be re-invested in improved customer service and facilities, rather than in lower prices, 
which is possible because the new Systems initially enter into compétition with established practices 
and formats. Until the practice becomes common and compétition brings lower prices, profiteering 
can therefore be achieved, and the proceeds used to improve the shopping expérience. This was the 
case with the introduction of self-service, and central distribution, although the introduction of 
superstores, which catalysed national price compétition contradicts this, suggesting that this is a 
disposition rather than a universal rule. In short, when introducing cost-saving new practices, 
retailers tend to retain cost savings in order to fund improvements to the shopping expérience, 
instead of lowering prices, supporting Allvine's [1968] fear of direct price compétition as a cause of 
trading up (7.1.1, p.265-266): 
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"... self-service means y ou don i. have to provide staff io serve, self-scänhihg njédns thè 
custòmer is dciually doing the fingi ng tip, so ali ihey afe doing isfnaläng^ 
all the work. Having said that customèrs want heiter service, so whät y ou thèh start io dois] 
you end tip with rear-service, doing ihings that are traditional, cutting peóple back in bui 
maybe in différent ways... I suppose whät you're döing is bèing more efficient at the baste 
fundamentalst ahdthen investingyouf staff ih; givmg^beiier ciistqiher 
custòmer service-" ; .• ]']B \ \ '; • • - o 
"...central distribution was a huge shift .....producing margin behefits, which you didn't 
give back io the custòmer in the shape of price dt thai stage. You gave it back to them iti the 
shapë. of imprqvedfacilities. ; '• l'm nói afgïuhg thai priées: vïerë •. baci, priéesfyere.. quiMikëën;. 
but the priées • were qui te keen by a tötally irrelevant yardsticko 
the corner shop,. which •• was satisfying. a lot of criteria which ihitially ithe. supermarket 
didn "t. But it wdsn 'ta bout price, it. was a bout the quai ftp ofthé ehvirohmënt,: ihe quàlityof 
the produci, thè range, the access, the location... "' '[ff]]f;: 
.': : [Déni s C a s s i d a • 
It was noted above that consumers' poor recollection of prices enables retailers to push up margins 
on low volume products. Retailers also employ 'pricewatch' techniques, which supposedly assure 
the consumer that prices are not undercut by locai competitors, but tend to stop short of guaranteeing 
to beat prices. It is suggested that the net result is that nobody will set prices lower than competitors, 
prices stabilise, and the key beneficiaries are the retailers: 
"Petra l is the classic èxamplè of false ^compétition fi say that • bëçaïàe :dt this moment; oìl 
prices are at a tenyear low, yéi.Säihsbury's', Teseo; Esso have credted;ibis 'pricewatch', 
;W]hichmeänSxthdt:t^y . 
ihey won 't put thé priée:lower than. their competitors
 {: Priées have poi [p^i&iäo^nf^nßi^ß-
with piiprices,• aithehìomehtihere seéms to bënôe^licdMë reasqn; i.ifhey-sqyfffyèttfwe 
are building stations, investihg; wéfidve gol tbpUfhiòhey info slorèsfdna;so;\bn^drfdìsò 
forth': We;have;èbjiïpetiiiQ%^ 
bring profits down i think ihere] was always a: téhdëhcy for ibis, butflhihk hòw it ismUèh 
more developed. and. much çlearer... So, all ihe stores;; ]who cfdirti; io] fé; effective dn% 
competitive are ih cbniï^ of.lt. They die. nofàllòwed toi sellât prices which 
will.givè them a lower nei profit; cpmpared; with ïM^i^yï ilf 
not. n ecessarily ; a great th ing for the- consumer. Thea rgiiment that .compétition is'kéepfhg 
prices down is not as clear as it shöiild be. " 
[Tony de Angeli] 
To resumé, changes in the price/service relationship have been determined profoundly by factors 
both exogenous and endogenous to the industry. The key exogenous factor discouraging price 
compétition until 1964 was RPM, which drove compétition over service and location, and therefore 
favoured the local, counter-service store. Its 1964 abolition drove price compétition for the first time, 
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favouring Operators of low-cost formats such as self-service, supermarkets and then superstores. The 
1970s oil crisis created a highly price sensitive consumer, which drove retailers to engage in 
unprecedented price compétition. 
From the early-1980s, the changing exogenous environment began to drive UK food retailers to 
compete over levéis of service, facilities and the shopping expérience, rather than price alone. 
Recovery from the oil crisis, rising incomes, increasing female employment and lack of time for 
shopping drove demand for £one-stop shopping', to which retailers responded with the development 
of large, purpose-built, out-of-town superstores, packed with facilities. Consumers' 'taste for 
quality', which tends to move upmarket, drove continuous improvements to the retail offering and 
the shopping expérience, as did rising household incomes. 
Consumers tend to associate quality of retail environment with quality of offering, encouraging 
retailers to invest in their environment and image, which, theoretically at least, enables them to seil 
more expensive producís, or even to charge more for the same producís. Consumers recali few retail 
prices, enabling Operators to profiteer on a large proportion of the range, and driving promotional 
activity in favour of consistent low pricing stralegies, alihough compétition tends to control this 
through polarisation of competitive approach. Finally on exogenous forces, high taxation on certain 
producís reduces consumer price sensitivity, making price compétition less worthwhile for íhe 
relailer, while planning aulhorities' reluclance lo grant planing permission to Operators perceived as 
'cheap and cheerful' drove retailers to abandon such approaches and move upmarket. 
The key endogenous issue driving the development of compétition over quality of shopping 
expérience and services was retailers' moves into larger Stores. These have provided the space 
necessary to provide facilities such as car parking and in-store restaurants, yet also brought the 
capacity to diversify the product offering into higher margin producís such as delicatessen and fresh 
foods. Diversification of product has tended to be high quality for fear of upselting and losing 
existing customers. Retailer compétition to respond most effeclively to consumer demand has also 
driven increasing levéis of services and facilities, particularly in superstores from the early-1980s. 
Retailers have actively invested in store improvements, whether in new stores or refurbishment of 
existing ones, as thèse investments have generally produced good returns, achieved through 
2 5 4 
increased patronage and larger purchases rather than higher priées. As improvements begin to pay 
dividends, cashflow becomes stronger, encouraging further investment, while further discouraging 
priée compétition for fear that it could slow investment. Food retailers also tend to be reluctant to 
enter into price compétition because of their 1970s expérience of it, which harmed many operators 
and precipitated a shake-up resulting in the disappearance of many high Street names. The quality 
approach is therefore partly an escape route from intense price compétition. A tendency to avoid 
price compétition, which has led to compétition to be primarily over quality, however, créâtes 
opportunity for new entrants to undercut existing players, and a polarisation of approach can occur, 
whereby price compétition drives the quality approach, which in turn attracts new entrants to the 
market who believe that they can build market share through competitive pricing. 
Innovation in the industry, in tenus of new facilities and services, tends to be copied by competitors 
because they fear that they could be harmed by the innovation if they do not adopt it themselves. 
This protective mechanism was also witnessed in private label development, when the quality-
approach of Sainsbury's private label was seen to bring benefîts, and was therefore widely adopted 
by competitors. Similarly, new branded products are widely copied in an attempt to neutralise their 
threat. 
Finally, operators have a tendency to invest cost savings in better services and facilities, rather than 
in price cuts, which has driven up the quality of the grocery shopping expérience. Widely employed 
'pricewatch' policies tend not to undercut competitors' priées, often leading instead to development 
of a local pricing status quo. 
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Figure 6.5a. Forces driving the changing price-service relationship: 
ENDOGENOÏJS FORCES 
Late 1970s o n . M o v e s to purpose -
buil t superstores p rov ide bet ter qual i ty 
facilities than original industriai 
convers ions . Nicer retati envi ronment . 
1980s on . M o v e to compét i t ion over 
quali ty of p roduc ts & service was a 
defensive reaction to pr içe war s o f late 
1970s, wh ich drove a shakeout . 
1980s on . M o v e s to larger stores 
p rpv ided space for bet ter quali ty, 
ofrering. Deli & fish counters for 
example , dr iven b y higher margins . 
1980s o n . A n y extension to the retail 
offering had to b e h igh quali ty for fear 
of upset t ing loyal cus tomers . 
Early 1980s on . Inter-superstore 
compét i t ion tended to be over qual i ty 
rather than pure priée. 
1980s on . ï m p r o v e m è n t s genèra l ly 
pa id off, encouraging more inves tment 
Ga ins due to h igher pa t ronage & 
spending , not h igher pr ices . 
1980s on . Retai ler compét i t ion to 
respond most effectively to c o n s u m e r 
d e m a n d for better qual i ty services & 
facilities. 
1980s o n . Teudéncy to copy 
compet i to re ' innovat ions for fear of. 
the h a r m that c o u l d b ë done .by them. 
EXOGENOUS FORCES 
THE CHANGING 
PRICE-SERVICE 
RELATIONSHIP 
RESULTEDIN: A 
gap at the low-cost end of 
thé market, fiïled b y 
; European hard 
discounters from early 
1990s . Also, high margins 
attract overseàs entrants , 
Wal -Mart for example . 
Early 1950s . Pr ices w e r e control led 
by the g o v e r n m e n t u n t i l ra t ioning 
ended in 1954, meanir ig m a t pr ice 
compét i t ion was imposs ib le / , ; . 
1960s . R P M preven ted m u c h pr iée 
compét i t ion prior to 1964; t h e n i t s " 
abol i t ion d rove pr ice compét i t ion änd 
the spread o f low-overhead : formats: i : : 
L a t e 1970s . Pr ice wars dr iven by b a d 
é c o n o m i e env i ronment , falling real ~ 
inepmes ,
 : and the excessive, addi t ion o f 
sales area in p roceed ing yeàrs . •= > 
Early 1980s o n . Risrhg reàr i f icomesi . 
drove. den iand for qual i ty p r o d u c t s and 
i rnpròved retai l envirbnruehts with 
better facilities.. ' " • 
1980s o n . Cönsumer s b e c o m e 
accus torhed to quali ty, rie ver 
re l inquish it, & a r c l e s s pr içe sensi t ive 
in qua l i t y re t à i l énv i ronments . 
1980s on; Inf luencé o f p lann ing 1 ; 
authori t iés.forces u p the cos t ,& quali ty 
o f n e w stores, as they den iand m o r e -
from retailers.. , . .\ 
256 
Figure 6.5b Summary of key t rend s identifier! by interview subjects: 
I n t e r v i e w é e a b c d e f S h i j k 1 m n 0 P q r s 
Rise o f mul t ip les , décline of co-ops , / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
independents & special is ts 
Concent ra t ion into b ig five & takeovers / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Chang ing retai 1er-manufacturer relationship / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Retail format évolu t ion / / / / / / / / S / / / / / / / / 
Géograph ie expans ion - domest ic / / / / / / / / / / 
Géograph ie expans ion - international / / / / / 
Product diversif icat ion: range extension / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Product diversif ïcation:t ion-food retail formats / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Chang ing pr ice/service/qual i ty emphas is / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Rat ioning / / / / / / / 
Resale Pr ice Ma in t enance / / S / / / / / / / 
Planning restr ict ions / / / / / / / S / 
Compét i t ion Pol icy / / / / / / / 
Work ing w o m e n & dua l - income households / / / / / / / / / 
Rising incomes / / / / / / / 
Chang ing c o n s u m e r taste J / / / / / S / S / / / 
C o n s u m e r adopt ion of domest ic technology / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Retai ler adop t ion of commerc ia l technology • / / / / / / / / / 
Delivered grocer ies / S / / / / 
Central Dis t r ibut ion / / S / / / / S / / / / / / 
Jus t - in-Time / / • / / • S / 
Efficient C o n s u m e r Rcsponse (ECR) / / / 
Trading S tamps / S / / / / S / 
Loyal ty S c h e m e s / / / / / / / / S / / / / / / S 
Private Label / / • / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Increas ing qual i ty of pr ivate label / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
Extended open ing hours & Sunday trading / / / / / / / y / y / 
Emergence of the retailer as a brand / / / / / / S / / / s 
Discountcrs / / / / S • / / / / 
One-s top shopp ing & decl inïng frequency / / / • / / / 
Chang ing househo ld sizes / / / 
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Chapter 7 
Evaluation and application of the théories of retail change 
This chapter uses a technique based on grounded theory (3.1.ii. p.74-75), applying the 
changes identifled in chapters 4, 5 and 6 to evaluate the models and théories of retail 
change (2.1). Section 7.1 relates the changes and driving forces to the théories of retail 
change and their underlying causes, while section 7.2 illustrâtes this in a tabular format. 
Section 7.3 applies the theoretical underpinnings most relevant to UK food retail change 
post-1950 to forecast likely developments to 2010, and sections 7.4 and 7.5 summarise 
thèse and address the likely impact. 
7.1 Application of changes in UK food retailing since 1950 to models and 
théories of retail change 
7.1.1. WHEEL OF RETAILING: 
There is significant évidence of 'trading up' in UK food retailing post-1950, as suggested 
by Hollander's Wheel of Retailing [1960], and of low-priced innovators seeing this as an 
opportunity to enter the market, normally using new technology, Systems or trading 
techniques to achieve lower costs than established operators. Prior to the 1964 abolition 
of resale price maintenance (RPM), however, retailers were unable to discount the priées 
of proprietary branded groceries, as thèse were fixed by manufacturera (5.1 .fi. p. 119), 
stifling price compétition and discouraging low-cost entrants. Prior to 1964, efficient, 
low-overhead food retailers introduced trading stamps as a means of discounting branded 
products (5.1.ii. p. 119-120) and developed private label, which they could price as they 
wished (5.4.ii, p. 180-181), while counter-service grocers tended to compete over quality 
of service and convenience of location (63 , p.223-224), meaning that although low-price 
entrants were effectively barred from entering the market, as suggested by the Wheel of 
Retailing. In fact the Wheel contorted and there was revolution ali the same, with private 
label and trading stamps providing an alternative to pure price compétition. 
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The 1964 abolition of RPM (5.1.ÌL p. 121) meant that low-overhead operators could 
attract custom by lowering priées (theoretically possible because of their lower operating 
costs), driving fùrther restructuring of the industry into self-service, supermarkets and 
superstores, each of which had cost advantages over earlier, more established retail 
formats (6.3. p.221-222). Lower priées could be offered by the operators of these new 
low-cost formats, with self-service and supermarkets being developed by existing 
independent, co-operative but mainly multiple operators (4,3. p.96-97), while early 
superstore development was exclusively by new entrants, such as Asda and Morrison, as 
suggested by the Wheel of Retailing. The superstore itself grew from humble beginnings 
in converted mills and cinémas into all-service, facility-packed stores, taking operators 
upmarket with it, particularly during the 1980s (6.3. p.228-230). In-store restaurants, 
delicatessens, fresh fish counters and salad bars are ali examples of facilities that have 
become the norm over time (6.3. p.228), supporting the trading up suggested by the 
Wheel of Retailing. 
By the late-1990s, the media and govemment were charging UK food retailers of being 
an accessory to 'rip off Britain', with higher prices than other European countries. 
Although many charges against operators were unfair (6.5. p.248), and the Compétition 
Commission found no évidence of over-pricing (5.1 .ìv. p.131), these charges followed a 
long period of intense capital investment in stores, facilities and services and steadily 
increasing margìns across the industry as a whole. In support of the Wheel of Retailing 
hypothesis, which suggests that excessive investment in the retail structure tends to create 
top-heavy industry leaders, leaving a gap in the market for a new player to grow through 
low pricing, this was the point at Wal-Mart entered the market, through their 1999 
acquisition of Asda (6,5, p.251). In this case, therefore, entry into the UK food retail 
market was effected in the low-overhead, low-price form, with Wal-Mart being renowned 
for offering low prices, often cited as achievable because of their large stores, 
sophisticated Systems and buying power, although paying £6.7 billion for the chain will 
not have brought such low overheads as they may have in other countries. 
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Trading up is also evident within individual UK food retail chains, particularly Asda, who 
left behind converted cinemas and mills, Teseo, who traded up from a market barrow 
through high street shops to superstores, and Kwik Save, who traded up their offering and 
margins, creating a gap in the market which European discounters were quick to fill in the 
early-1990s, ultimately driving Kwik Save's demise. 
In the mid-1990s, UK food retailers rushed to adopt 'loyalty schemes', which if widely 
adopted bring scant incremental sales (5.4.iii. p.191-192), meaning that they then become 
a cost burden if the information gained is not used effectively (5.4.iii. p. 192). Similarly, 
trading stamps had become a cost burden to Teseo by the mid-1970s, primarily because 
they had ceased to excite the customer, therefore reducing the incremental sales gain 
attributable to them (5.4.i. p.178-179). The example of Teseo pulling out of stamp trading 
in 1977 and reinvesting the savings achieved in price-cutting (5.2.Ü, p. 147-148) is 
important, as this strongly reinforces the idea that additional services lead to higher 
margins, because when abolished, prices and margins can be lowered, as they were in 
1977. Similarly, Safeway dropped its ABC loyalty card in June 2000, and announced that 
the savings would go on reducing prices (5.4.iii. p.184-185). 
Reaction of established retailers to low-cost entrants 
When superstores were first developed in the mid-1960s, established food retailers 
reacted through price cutting (6.3. p.227). This was largely unsuccessful in slowing 
consumer demand for superstore shopping, as consumers were equally attracted by 'one-
stop shopping' (5.2.Ü. p. 150). After a number of years, established operators changed 
their reaction to the superstore threat by developing superstores themselves (6.3, p.227-
228), thus it is not only new entrants who can take advantage of low-overhead retailing, 
existing companies can sometimes re-invent themselves in order to benefit from new 
techniques. 
To summarise, The Wlieel of Retailing, as suggested by Hollander [1960] was contorted 
by the regulatory environment until 1964, with trading stamps and private label being 
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developed as an alternative to price compétition over branded products. Despite this, new 
lower-cost formats replaced older ones, with self-service superseding counter-service, and 
larger stores replacing early self-service conversions. A mixture of existing and new 
Operators drove thèse changes, suggesting that food retailers can reinvent themselves in 
response to, or in anticipation of, the threat of a new format. Existing Operators response 
to the superstore threat was slow due to lack of development capital, allowing the 
development of two major new players, Asda and Morrison, who hold considérable 
market share to this day. There is évidence of trading up within store formats, particularly 
of the superstore, and of retail chains as a whole. Equally, there is évidence that 
additional services and facilities lead to higher priées and higher margins, as when trading 
stamps and loyalty schemes have been abandoned, the savings have been invested in 
lower priées. 
Causes of trading up 
The causes of trading up in UK food retailing are largely supportive of previous académie 
work, while several previously unidentified forces are also found to have driven trading 
up in UK food retailing post-1950. The following section examining the causes of trading 
up in UK food retailing is therefore separated into two parts - trading up following the 
pattern of the existing académie body of knowledge, and causes of trading up which 
appear to be undocumented at présent. 
Evidence of the validity of existing causes of trading up 
Scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up suggests that overall rising margins are 
caused by range extension into higher margin products, while the margins of the original 
range of products remains static. In UK. food retailing post-1950 this is undoubtedly the 
case, as the margins on branded dry groceries, which formed the bulk of the offering in 
1950, are the lowest in the store, meaning that almost ail new lines introduced have 
enhanced margins p.236-237). For example, the fresh, chilled and prepared foods 
sector, which carries higher margins than most grocery sectors because of the complex 
nature of the products, and is also dominated by private-label, which provides a second 
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boost to margins, as private label carries higher margins than branded products (5.4.Ü. 
p. 181). Private label dominâtes this sector because retailers' central distribution Systems 
effectively enabled its extensive development (5.3.iii. p. 170), meaning that there were 
few branded products to compete with, and general trading up of private label bas driven 
revolution of the Wheel of Retailing (6,5, p.252). 
Central distribution also reduced the requirement for Storage space both in-store and 
behind the scènes, liberating space which was filled with further high margin extensions 
to the range (5.3.iii. p.170), as did the development of fork-lift trucks and caging Systems 
(5.3.Ü. p.164). In brief, the development of central distribution not only allowed retailers 
to handle more sophisticated, higher margin products, and therefore to trade up, it also 
made more efficient use of store areas, prompting further 'scrambled merchandising'. 
Retailers themselves were keen to expand private label because of the higher margins 
available, to such an extent that larger stores were created partly in order to accommodate 
private label lines (6.3. p.222), and today, product innovation tends to be in the private 
label sector (6.2. p.215-216), suggesting that margin improvement may continue. 
The development of UK food retailers into strong brands (6.3. p.230-231) facilitated 
range extension, meaning that scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up became 
more important. As consumer trust in food retailers grew, they became more likely to try 
new products and services, and more likely to favour private label, while larger stores 
aided this transition by provìding the space necessary for range extension (6.4. p.235). 
Expansion of the 'money rieh, time poor' sybaritic society drove demand for 'time 
saving' foods (5.2-ii. p. 150) and therefore drove range extension as a response, while 
retailers' range extensions have been high quality because of their fear of losing 
customers through disappointment with new products (<L5, p.248-249), and because of 
consumers' rising expectations of quality (5,2.iii. p. 155). Diversification of offering into 
non-foods was also driven by the static or slow-moving UK grocery market, with non-
foods offering the prospect of real growth (6,4, p.237) 
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Established UK food retailers sometimes use unsustainable low priées in order to build 
market share when diversifying into new produci areas, which was the case when they 
entered petrol retailing and the financial services market (6.4. p.237-238). This is possible 
largely because they are able to leverage existing overheads and take low margins, and as 
an acceptable level of market share is attained, prices and margins tend to creep up, 
giving the impression of trading up, although this is not in fact the case. 
Sunday trading brought increased demand for non-foods (5.1.v. p.137-138), and the 
limited number of prices recalled by consumers enables food retailers to 'profiteer' by 
pricing low volume products at a high level, while pushing good deals and prices on more 
prominent, high sales volume products (6^ , p.247), supporting the scrambled 
merchandising hypothesis. 
Figure 7.1.1a. Forces driving scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up: 
Slow growth in food 
market drove retai lers ' 
extens ion into non-foods , 
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To summarise, scrambled merchandising as a cause of trading up in UK food retailing 
was driven by the opportunities presented by high consumer traffic in grocery stores, 
retailers' technological advances, consumers' technological advances, new products, 
space efficient trading techniques, rising store sizes, slow growth in the UK food market, 
the development of consumer trust in the retail brand, and the deregulation of trading 
hours. In addition, it is said to have postponed the point of 'superstore saturation' (see 
retail 'accordion' below). 
Secular trends as a cause of trading up argues that rising incomes drive improvements to 
the retail expérience, and is best illustrated by falling real incomes in the mid-1970s, 
which provoked price cutting in the following years. Although this is the inverse of the 
relationship suggested by 'secular trends', it does demónstrate the close bond between 
changes in income and price sensitivity. In effect, falling real incomes create price 
sensitivity to which retailers respond, and rising real incomes resuit in less price sensitive, 
sybaritic consumers, more likely to prioritise 'one stop shopping' facilities, although 
price always remains an élément in their décision (6.5. p.246). The secular trends theory 
is well founded, with changes in the affluence of society affecting both consumers' 
choice of store and choice of product (see expansion of the money rich, time poor society, 
above). Because real incomes generally rise, food retailers have generally responded by 
providing better shopping facilities and products. In times of particular price sensitivity, 
the late-1970s and early-1990s, for example, UK food retailers extended their use of 'no 
frills' style private label products, in an attempt to stop price-conscious consumers 
shopping elsewhere (5.4.Ü. p.183). 
Consumers tend to have rising expectations, and are reluctant to retinquish quality once 
they have experienced it (5.2.iii. p.155). Retailers profit from answering this consumer 
demand, which has driven an inexorable rise in the quality of retail offerings. The quality 
of the retail environment is also driven upwards by the consumer, who tends to correlate a 
quality retail environment with quality of product (6.5. p.246). In short, the consumer, 
fuelled by rising incomes, has indirectly driven the retail offering and the retail 
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environment upmarket, by making such stratégies profitable for retailers. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the importance of secular trends as a cause of trading up 
is Teseo Chief Executive Terry Leahy's quote that Un many ways the change in Teseo 
has mirrored the change in society'' (5.2.Ü. p. 149), with Teseo having undertaken a 
remarkable transformation during the last two decades of the 20 t h Century. In addition, as 
Asda expanded from its original trading area in the north of England, to the more 
prosperous south of the country, store environments were upgraded to gain acceptance of 
consumers with higher disposable incomes (ÍL2, p.228-229), suggesting that trading up of 
the store environment is closely related to levéis of consumer income. 
Figure 7.1.1b. Forces driving secular trends as a cause of trading up: 
Fear of direct price compétition was suggested as a cause of trading up by Allvine [1968], 
whereby retailers prefer to compete over quality of services, facilities and producís rather 
than on price alone. This is supported by superslores, which began io compete over 
facilities and services rather than price once they faced losing their local monopolies (6.3. 
p.229). Adopting a quality approach from the early-1980s was also seen as an antidote to 
the severe price wars of the late-1970s, suggesting significant fear of price compétition, 
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based on past expérience (6.5. p.250). Food retailers' préférence for passing on cost 
savings in the form of improved services and facilities rather than lower priées further 
supports the idea that they have a fear of price compétition (6.5. p.252-253). 
Figure 7.1.1c. Forces driving fear of price compétition as a cause of trading up: 
Reduced vigilance over costs [Hollander, 1960] as a cause of trading up is partially 
supported by the problem of escalating priées of superstore sites. While this does not 
suggest a lack of vigilance over costs, it does demonstrate that rising costs must be passed 
on to consumers in the form of higher prices and margins (6.3. p.229). 
Previously undocumented causes of trading up 
While the above findings support existing causes of trading up, in UTC food retailing post-
1950 it is found to be driven by other, original, undocumented forces. This section 
introduces new explanations causing trading up, which do not fit within the existing 
hypothetical framework: 
'Blind' copving by retailers occurs because retailers fear being harmed by the innovations 
of a competitor. This drives widespread adoption of retail innovations (see 'dialectic' 
below), meaning that innovations can quickly become near industry-wide, at which point 
the incrementai benefits of the 'innovation' decrease due to falling differentiation, and it 
can become a cost, feeding the drive for higher margins (£5 , p.251-252). 
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The problern of high taxation on some products, particularly petroleum and tobacco, 
makes intense priée compétition between retailers scarcely noticeable to the consumer at 
the point of sale (6.5. p.247-248). Thus high levels of excise effectively discourage 
retailers from entering into price compétition, driving higher prices and margins. 
The increasing demands of planning authorities. which became more exacting in their 
requirements for new food retail outlets over time (6.5. p.248), effectively forced food 
retailers to propose upmarket facilities in order to obtain planning permission, forcing up 
costs, and therefore margins. Planning gain, whereby planners expect retailers to 
contribute to the costs of locai schemes when building new stores (5.1.ili, p.127-128), is 
also a major factor forcing up the costs of retail development, and hence margins and 
prices. 
The benefits of investing in store improvements are reasonably clear, and this generally 
proves worthwhile because the turnover of the store increases sufficiently to provide a 
good return on the investment (6.5. p.249-250). Thus retailers bave been driven to 
improve their retail facilities because of the likelihood of improving profits, which in turn 
is possible because consumers respond well to such improvements and make them 
successful fìnancially. 
The impact of risine taxes on businesses can be severe, and drives up prices and margins. 
For example, escalating duties on diesel forced up the costs of the products on sale 
(5.1 .vi. p.149), driving up margins as suggested by the Wheel of Retailing. 
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Figure 7.1.ld. Previously undocumented causes of trading up: 
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7.1.2. RETAIL ACCORDION: 
UK food retailers have consistently enlarged their retail offerings sirice 1950, which is 
largely explained under 'scrambled merchandising' above. Increasing store sizes and 
sophisticated Systems provided space for more products (5.3.iii, p.170), while the move 
back into town centres and residential areas from the late-1990s necessitated smaller 
ranges once again, as did limited-line discounting introduced by European discount 
chains in the early-1990s. 
What are the kev forces driving expansion and contraction of the retail accordion? 
One of the primary forces driving expansion of the retail accordion is that retailers want 
to improve profit margins, as basic branded groceries carry very low profit margins (6.4. 
p.236-237). Almost any expansion of the retail accordion brings margin improvements, 
particularly if it is into chilled, prepared foods or private label products, driving retailers 
to focus on thèse areas. Retailers' desire to develop private label was a factor driving 
moves into larger stores (6.3. p.222), while moves into chilled, prepared foods would 
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have been extremely difficult on a national scale without technological development in 
food préservation, packaging and distribution (6A, p.242). Re-availability of foods after 
post-war shortages also drove expansion of the retail accordion in the late-1950s, 
although this was an extraordinary event related to the exogenous environment (6.4. 
p.234), and manufacturers' product launches and the development of frozen foods also 
left retailers with little option but to expand the retail accordion (6.4. p.234). The high 
consumer traffic in grocery stores also meant that expansion of the grocery retail 
accordion was relatively straightforward (6.4. p.235). 
Expansion of the retai! accordion was facilitated by consumers' development of trust in 
food retailers over the years (6.3. p.230-231). Equally, the 'money rieh, time poor' 
society drove demand for ready-prepared foods (5.2.iii, p.l 53) , provoking further 
expansion of the retail accordion, while Sunday trading drove demand for non-foods 
(5.l.v. p.137-138). The development of central distribution, fork-lift trucks and Systems 
such as caging reduced the need for Storage space, which was converted to sales area, 
permitting further extension of the retail accordion (5.3.Ü. p. 164; 5.3.iii, p.170). Retailers' 
tendency to 'blindly' copy product innovations of their competitors through fear of being 
harmed by them (5.4.Ü. p.181) also forced expansion of the retail accordion. A key factor 
enabling food retailers to move into new markets, and therefore to expand the retail 
accordion, is their ability to leverage existing overheads, and to undercut the established 
compétition until sufficient market share is achieved (see 'wheel' above). The over-riding 
key factor driving expansion and contraction of the retail accordion, however, is store 
sizes. Larger stores have provided space for more producís (6.4. p.241), and moves into 
smaller stores from the lale-1990s necessilated smaller product ranges (5.1.iii. p. 127), as 
did limited-line discounting from the early-1990s. 
The retail accordion has generally expanded, despite difficulties such as the existing retail 
structure, planning difficulties and escalating superstore development costs, yet the only 
Iwo marked factors driving its contraction are the expansion of discounters and the 
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regulatory environment. Discount food retailers, particularly continental-based ones that 
entered the UK in the early-1990s, concentrate on selling fast-moving items at Iow prices 
from small, low-cost stores. Their entry and spread, therefore, represented a move into 
smaller stores and a contraction of the retail accordion (4.5. p. 109-111). The regulatory 
environment drove contraction of the retail accordion from 1996, by terminating the 
large-scale development of out-of-town superstores (5.1.iii, p. 126-127). This drove 
retailers to find alternative avenues of growth, the primary one being the development of 
small, local stores, which brought a significant contraction of the retail accordion, with 
the range being focused on convenience and top-up shopping. While consumer demand is 
necessary for a retail format to succeed, the primary factor driving operators back into 
small stores was the hostile planning attitude towards large out-of-town stores. 
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Figure 7.1.2a. Forces causing movement of the retail accordion: 
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Effects of expansion of the retail accordion: 
The key effects ofthe significant expansion of the retail accordion since 1950 include an 
increase in retail margins (above), and the 'natural' development of private label (6.4. 
p.241). The addition of non-foods brought access to rapidly expanding markets compared 
to the static food market (6.4. p.237), as well as putting upwards pressure on store sizes. 
Expansion of the retail accordion delayed the point of 'superstore saturation' by 
maintaining retail performance (6.3. p.230), and drove the life cycles of specialist food 
retailers into decline (&4, p.241). 
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Expansión of the retail accordion and the sheer number of producís on offer presented the 
opportunity for operators to 'profiteer' on infrequently purchased lines, while promoting 
offers and prices on more frequently purchased products (6.5. p.247). Retailers* insistence 
on high quality when expanding the retail accordion, for fear of upsetting loyal customers 
trying new products, drove the industry upmarket (6.5. p.248-249), while the retail 
accordion has at times been constrained because of supply difficulties, with distributors 
refusing to supply food retailers for fear of upsetting existing retail clients, although these 
problems have normally been resolved over time (6.2. p.214-215). 
7.1.3. POLARTSATION PRINCIPIE: 
The negative impact of superstore development tends to be focused on médium sized 
stores, or rather stores that were large before the evolution of superstores, while the effect 
on small independent retailers appears to be relatively minor (6.1. p. 199-200). This 
effectively supports the polarisation principie, which suggests that as larger stores are 
developed, the market for small, local stores remains, while the market for médium sized 
stores falls into decline. In addition, changes in planning attitude due to PPG6 (5.1.iii. 
p.126-127) have driven further polarisation as the major múltiple food retailers have 
turned their attention to small local stores as a means of continued growth (5.1 .ni. p. 127). 
Why does polarisation occur? 
Price and choice are not consumers* only requirement, at times convenience of location, 
ease of shopping and opening hours become key influences, in particular for 'top up 
shopping' and for those reliant on public transport, henee much of the independent and 
co-operative sectors' move to focus on convenience rather than price alone (6.1. p.205). 
The development of symbol groups drove further polarisation by supporting small stores, 
aiding them with supply, marketing, distribution and retail expertise (6J,, p.203). The 
exogenous influence of the government, through regulation on shopping hours, has driven 
polarisation (6.1. p.199), although this influence is in decline due to general deregulation 
of trading hours (S.l.v). 
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Figure 7.1.3a. Forces driving polarisation of store sizes: 
\ 
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7-1.4. MTJLTI-POLARISATION MODEL: 
As Brown's [1987a] multi-polarisation model is a combination of the core thèmes of the 
wheel of retailing, the retail accordion and the polarisation principle, it is not appropriate 
to repeat the analysis of thèse thèmes here. To summarise, though, there is reasonable 
évidence that each of the three thèmes of the multi-polar model tend to occur in UK food 
retailing post-1950. Trading-up is a frequently observed strategy over the period, and 
there are cases when trading up to a service-orientated level has led to the entrance of 
price-orientated Operators (7.1.1). Larger ranges of merchandise have accompanied this 
trading up, indeed new products have been the source of much trading-up (7.1.2). and 
larger stores have been built to house larger offerings (7.1.3). Yet food retailers trading 
limited ranges have proliferated in both the discount and convenience sectors, particularly 
post-1990. Such limited range retailers tend to have either a price or locational advantage 
to compensate for the reduced choice. As for size of establishment, this has polarised as 
medium-sized supermarkets have been cannibalised by out-of-town superstores, creating 
opportunity for local convenience stores as the primary shopping destination has become 
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more displaced from consumers' homes, henee multiple and co-operative retailers' return 
to small, local stores from the late-1990s. 
Extension to the multi-polarisation model 
New examples of polarisation tendencies were uncovered in UK food retailing post-1950, 
see below, and the following incorporâtes thèse into Brown's [1987a] multi-polarisation 
model: 
Figure 7.1.3a. Extension to Brown's [1987a] multi-polarisation model: 
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Polarisation of organisational size: 
Polarisation of organisational size bas occurred in UK food retailing post-1950 for several 
reasons. Economies of organisational scale have increased, driving the quest for size, 
because of positive factors such as the development of buying power (62, p.212), the 
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ability to absorb fìxed costs over a larger turnover (6.2. p.212), the suitability of large 
organisations to large store development and opération (6.3. p.226), and other cost saving 
factors. These advantages prompted intense takeover activity, particularly during the 
1980s, which polarised organisational size further still by removing the bulk of medium 
sized and regional players from the market (6.2. p.210). Failure of government agencies 
to intervene in retailer-manufacturer relations [MMC, 1981; OFT, 1985] allowed and 
drove further growth of the larger organisations and therefore polarisation, as did 
stockmarket and institutional shareholder influence which tend to encourage takeovers 
(6.2. p.208-209). Government planning restrictions such as PPG6 (&2, p.208) 
exacerbated the situation by making takeover one of the few avenues to obtain large 
stores, and government-sponsored bureaucracy such as the introduction of VAT bears 
down harder on smalïer Operators, driving further polarisation (5.1 .vi, p.139-140). 
On the other hand, OFT reluctance to allow further merger between major UK food retail 
players f6.2. p.211-212; 5.1.vi. p.140-141) has resulted in the cancellation of merger 
negotiations that would have led to further polarisation. 
Polarisation of pricing strategy: 
There is évidence that the widespread adoption of 'multibuy' and other temporary 
promotions in UK food retailing créâtes an opportunity for an operator to differentiate 
themselves by adopting permanent low-pricing stratégies instead (6.5. p.247). Récent 
returns to 'permanent' price cuts (1999) are indicative of this tendency, as they follow a 
period of intense short-term promotional activity. Movement too far to one extreme (i.e. 
too many Operators adopting one strategy) créâtes opportunity at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, which could be filled by a new entrant (£J>, p.251). 
There is also a danger of being caught away from the pôles of pricing strategy, for 
example when European discounters entered the UK in the early-1990s, Kwik Save found 
that they no longer occupied the most extreme 'low-price' position, and subsequently 
foundered: 
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; Then you had Lidi ;ând Aldi comingih • and completely siealihg• Kxvik '-Sdvë's 
; clpthes tri ; tlie. discount, brdcket, asthéy are propèrly .Siriiçturèd for, discoünting, : 
in every sensé. And that is quite important, becdùsë whai it lias left is a bïgger 
gap-
[Tony Campbell] 
Polarisation of incrémental sales tools: 
This thème is effectively self-destructive, and argues that a tool to increase sales, however 
successful at launch, can become inefïective if adopted by too many competitors, which 
can in turn lead to its withdrawal. In the case of trading stamps, there is évidence that 
after initially Splitting the industry into two camps, pro-stamps and anti-stamps, trading 
stamps became the victim of their own success - as more retailers adopted them, the 
incrementai sales achievable from the schemes diminished, unti! the point was reached at 
which they became a cost bürden (5Ai. p.178) and were abandoned. Allvine [1968] 
found that US chains' adoption of stamps was beneficiai at first, then late adopters merely 
neutralised the advantages enjoyed by early adopters. Widespread adoption of stamps 
eventually created an opportunity for discounters to offer lower priées through the 
élimination of stamps [ibid.] 
Loyalty schemes, introduced in the mid-1990s, have spawned many imitations, and also 
initially created two camps (5.4.iii. p. 184-185). There is the distinct possibility that 
incrémental sales gains will fail to cover the cost of thèse schemes, although in this case 
retailers will be Willing to accept a certain level of cost-burden in exchange for valuable 
customer data (5AUL p. 185-186). 
7.1.5. RETATI, LIFE CYCLE 
Without doubt, différent types and forms of retailing have grown and declincd in the UK 
food retail industry post-1950. Specialist food retailers have suffered a general decline, 
with certain product specialists declining sooner than others (4.1. p.89-90), as has the 
counter-service grocery store and then the high Street supermarket ( 6 3 , p.218). 
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Causes of accélération in the phases of the retail life cycle 
Accélération in the growth phase of self-service and early supermarkets was driven by 
many factors such as the abolition of rationing, the abolition of RPM, overseas influence, 
UK govemment influence, technological advances in packaging, réfrigération and 
distribution, and consumer demand for modernised shopping facilities (6,3. p.218-220). 
This accélération in the growth of self-service and early supermarkets, however, was the 
key influence causing the retail life cycle of the counter-servi ce grocery store to enter the 
décline phase. 
The growth of self-service and early supermarkets proved to be rapid, yet short lived, as 
such stores were pushed into the décline phase by the growth of larger supermarkets and 
superstores, again made possible by several factors such as technological advance, the 
abolition of RPM, consumer demand for one stop shopping, retailer désire to capitalise on 
earlier gains achieved from modernisation, and eventually from the deregulation of 
trading hours (63, p.217-220). 
In short, there are many exogenous factors that contribute to the émergence of a new 
trading technique, such as those mentioned above and forces like consumer adoption of 
technology (5.3.i. p. 161 -162), retailer adoption of technology (5.3.ii. p. 162-163) 
including central distribution (5.3.ii. p.163). However, it is in fact the émergence and 
rapid growth of new trading techniques that tends to throw established retail techniques 
into the décline phase of the retail life cycle. 
Other factors impact upon the retail life cycles of différent retail formats, particularly 
product diversification within the major food retailers, which has driven the retail life 
cycle of numerous retail specialists into décline (6.4. p.240-24l). Geographical 
diversification has aided the rise of the 'big five', while pushing the retail life cycle of co­
opérative, independent and regionally-based multiple organisations into décline (6.4, 
p.243). Government décisions also play an important rôle, with the abolition of RPM 
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driving self-service and early supermarkets into the rapid growth phase at the expense of 
counter-service grocers (6.1. p.197-198), and the eventual deregulation of trading hours 
aiding the growth of superstores at the expense of small and medium sized stores (5.1.v. 
p.135-138). Dialectic-like behavìour (see below) has also affected the retail life cycles of 
différent formats, particularly when established multiples moved into superstores in the 
mid-1970s, throwing this sector, until then dominated by specialist superstore innovators, 
into rapid growth, at the expense of medium sized supermarkets in particular (6.3. p.228). 
Forces slowing the retail life cycle 
There are certain forces that can slow the phases of the retail life cycle, whether 
negatively by delaying growth, or positively by delaying decline. The positive growth 
phase of the self-service grocery store, and hence the decline phase of the counter-service 
store, were delayed by consumer, staff and retailer résistance to change, rationing until 
1954, and RPM until 1964 (63, p.224-226). Similarly, RPM, the existing retail structure, 
lack of access to capital and planning constraints delayed the slowdown in first 
generation self-service conversions by delaying the positive growth phase of 
supermarkets and superstores (6.3. p.225-226), although superstore innovators normally 
found a way to get around thèse problems anyway (5.1 .ni. p.124-126). 
278 
Figure 7.1.5a. Forces driving/delaying retail life cycles of food retail formats: 
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Developments overseas 
encouragea U K food retailers 
to adopt self-service & 
early supermarkets 
Consumer , staff and 
retailer résis tance to change 
de layed adopt ion o f self-service 
techniques 
, G o v e r n m e n t pol icy a iming
 N 
to improve food retail efficiency 
sencouraged self-service & ear lv , 
supermarkets 
Rat ioning 
in p lace until 1954 s lowed 
self-service d u e to 
adminis t ra t ive bü rden 
R E T A I L L I F E 
C Y C L E O F 
C O U N T E R - S E R V I C E , 
S E L F - S E R V I C E & 
E A R L Y 
S U P E R M A R K E T S 
End ing o f ra t ioning (1954) 
d rove g rowth of self-service & 
early supermarke t s 
R P M in p lace until 
1964 r emoved incentives to adopt 
self -service/supermarkets , as there, 
was little pr ice compét i t ion 
Abol i t ion of R P M (1964) 
accelerated g rowth phase of self-
service & early supermarke t s 
Technologica l advances 
packaging , réfrigération & 
distribution d rove self-service 8c) 
early supermarke t s 
Consumer demand for 
' m o d e m i s e d shopping facilit ies > 
drove self-service & early 
s u p e r m a r k e t s ^ . 
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Figure 7.1.5b. Forces driving/delaying retail life cycles of food retail formats: 
F A C T O R S D E L A Y I N G T H E A D V A N C E O F 
L A R G E R S U P E R M A R K E T S & 
S U P E R S T O R E S , A N D T H E D E C L I N E O F 
S E L F - S E R V I C E C O N V E R S I O N S & E A R L Y 
S U P E R M A R K E T S 
F A C T O R S D R I V I N G T H E A D V A N C E O F 
L A R G E R S U P E R M A R K E T S & 
S U P E R S T O R E S , A N D T H E D E C L I N E O F 
S E L F - S E R V I C E C O N V E R S I O N S & E A R L Y 
S U P E R M A R K E T S 
The exist ing 
"retai] structure rarely al lowed fo?" 
extension of existing stores, so larger 
stores normally had to be 
new stores 
Aboli t ion of R P M 
( 1964) drove g rowth of larger 
supermarkets & superstores 
>M ïn place 
1964 r emoved incentives to 
adopt larger s tores, as there was 
little pr ice compét i t ion 
D e m a n d for one-stop 
(shopping g rew as consumers gainée 
j n c o m e , consumer durables & cars, 
& shopped less frequently 
Lack of 
investment in new stores b] 
independents & co-operat ives 
s lowed deve lopment , as 
mul t ip les were the only major/ 
driver 
R E T A I L L I F E 
C Y C L E O F 
r
 S E L F - S E R V I C E , E A R L Y 1 
S U P E R M A R K E T S , 
L A R G E R 
S U P E R M A R K E T S & 
. S U P E R S T O R E S . 
Retailers 
pursued larger s tores once"' 
they had gained from earlier 
s tore modernisa t ions , built 
on earlier gains 
Di f f icu l tés obtaining^ 
planning permiss ion for 
large s tores s lowed 
their deve lopmen t 
Technologica l advance 
within retailers, a ided the g rowth 
of large stores. Centra l d t s t , 
pallets, cages , fork-lifts, etc. 
Unti l deregulat ion 
in 1994, législation suppor ted 
smal l shops by al lowing them to 
open for longer than 
larger stores 
Sunday t rading 
' d rove demand for large stores N 
with space for extensive non-
food offerings 
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7.1.6. DARWINIAN EVOLUTTON 
Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' is well observed in UK food retailing post-1950, with 
the independent and co-operative sectors in particular having lost enormous volumes of 
trade to the multiple sector (4 J , p.85). The disappearance or contraction of such weaker 
food retailers has meant that trade has had to be won from stronger competitors, thus 
heightening compétition (S.l.iv. p.131-132), suggesting that 'survival of the fittest' has 
been a key issue in UK food retailing post-1950, and has resulted in a lean, highly 
competitive industry, where the compétition is much tougher (§2, p.212). As 'survival of 
the fittest' wiped out much of the independent and co-operative trade, it went on to 
eliminate weaker multiple Operators as the leading retailers contracted into the 'big five' 
through takeover and organic growth (6,2. p.209-210). 
Size of organisation became a key factor affecting the fitness of Operators, precipitating 
unprecedented takeover activity during the 1980s as retail conglomérâtes were built up 
through the takeover of many smaller Operators (6.2. p.210-2ll) . Geographical 
diversification was well under way as the larger Operators expanded beyond their regional 
heartlands, bringing them into direct compétition with regional players, which were 
typically weak in comparison, and the majority of which have now been absorbed by 
larger players (6.2. p.210). Thus by expanding geographically and being the surviving 
'fittest' the major UK food retailers grew substantially in size, making size of 
organisation a criticai issue. Large Operators are able to obtain favourable buying terms 
(6.2. p.212), although retail expertise and negotiation skills remain an important élément 
in this area. 
Large Operators also have the advantage of being able to spread the cost of introducing 
new Systems and technologies over a larger turnover, meaning that the cost per £ of 
turnover is lower. Investments in areas such as head office and distribution are therefore 
more viable for larger retailers (5.3.ii. p. 166), reducing further the viability of smaller 
Operators. The introduction of central distribution was an example of a system that large 
players were able to introduce, bringing excellent cost savings (5.3.iii. p. 172) and 
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enabling the handling of more sophisticated, higher margin products (5.3.iii. p. 172), 
making adopters 'fitter' than non-adopters (5.3.iii. p. 172). The introduction of central 
distribution also allowed food retailers to obtain more favourable buying tenus from 
suppliers, providing a double cost saving as the adopters of central distribution also 
tended to be the larger organisations who were already getting better buying tenus than 
smaller operators. In short, size of organisation became a critical déterminant in fitness of 
organisation (6.2. p.210). 
Exogenous factors also affect the 'fitness' of retailers. For example, the introduction of 
the minimum wage had a financial impact on players who were previously paying poorly, 
and little effect on the better payers in the industry (5.1.vi. p.141). Assuming that the poor 
players were the weaker players, the introduction of the minimum wage will have made 
them weaker still, driving further Darwinian évolution. The abolition of RPM was also 
entirely négative for small operators, making them weak in comparison to larger 
operators (5.1.iii. p.122). Likewise, OFT reluctance to allow further merger within the 
industry must effectivety prolong the life cycle of weak retailers (6.2. p.212), with break 
up of organisation or sale to overseas operators remaining the only viable alternatives as a 
means of disposai. 
Internationalisation in UK food retailing is underway, with Wal-Mart1 s purchase of Asda 
in 1999, and Tesco and Sainsbury's expansion overseas. In future, therefore, retail 
organisations will have to be fit compared to international, rather than domestic, 
competitors, suggesting that the importance of fitness will increase (6.4. p.239). 
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Figure 7.1.6a. Forces driving Darwinian survival of the fittest: 
i rowth & survival of multiples 
at the expense of independents & 
co-operat ives brought heightened 
compet i t ion, as remaining players 
tougher to gain from 
O F T reluctance to al low 
further merger a m o n g large p layers is 
J ike ly to have p ro longed the exis tence of/ 
some weaker players 
Concent ra t ion o f 
power into the B ig F ive 
he ightened compet i t ion further, 
& d rove the re la t ionship with 
manufac turers in favour of 
retailers. Organisa t iona l scale 
^brought lower input p r ices , 
F O R C E S D R I V I N G 
DARWINIAN S U R V I V A L 1 
O F T H E F I T T E S T 
L S organisat ional 
scale b e c a m e critical from the 
1980s, it d rove takeover & regional 
expans ion . Regional operators were 
absorbed b y major players, 
concent ra t ing power 
Exogenous factors, 
such as the m i n i m u m w a g e & 
aboli t ion of R P M , tend to impact 
^rnore severely on smaller opera tors , 
p lacing them at further 
d i sadvantage 
Organisa t ional scale 
al lows operators to spread the cost of" 
n e w sys tems & technologies over a larger) 
turnover , reducing further the viabil i ty
 y 
of smaller operators 
Internationalisation of thé i r idus t ry suggests 
that retail organisat ions wiîl incrëas ingly 
have to b e fit by international , father than 
domest ic , s tandards . 
7.1.7. DIALECTIC THEORY 
Examples of UK food retailers adopting their competitors' advantages are numerous, and 
these do tend to have the effect of reducing the differences between operators. They 
include the adoption of superstores by mainstream operators after innovators pioneered 
the format (6.3. p.227-228), although contractual obligations to existing development 
plans led to a delay of several years. Incidentally, this 'dialectic-style* behaviour also 
drove the superstore format into the rapid growth phase of the retail life cycle (see 
above). Sainsbury's and M&S's high quality focus on private label has also been widely 
adopted by competitors (fLi, p.252), and Tesco's drive to be as good as M&S, but 
cheaper, (5.2.Ü, p.151) is credited with driving Tesco's good results and M&S and 
Sainsbury's poor results in the Iate-I990s (5.2.Ü. p.151). Similarly, innovations in 
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facilities such as in-store restaurants, delicatessens, fish counters, etc., have been so 
widely copied that it is hard to say who the innovators were (6.5. p.251-252), while also 
forcing increased costs onto the consumer through higher margins as the industry has 
been driven upmarket (see 7.1.1). Loyalty schemes in particular were widely adopted 
(5.4.iii. p. 184-185), despite well-publicised initial dismissals of their benefits. 
Why does ^dialectic-style' adoption of ideas take place? 
Such behaviour is found to occur for several reasons. Loyalty schemes were found to 
have been widely adopted for fear of the damage that competitors could do with their new 
weapon, the loyalty scheme (5.4.iii. p. 184-185). Adoption by non-innovators is therefore 
doubtless a means of negating a possible threat, although in the case of loyalty schemes 
widespread adoption can also negate many of the advantages in the field of incrémental 
sales, threatening to turn the schemes into cost burdens (5.4.iii. p.191-192). 
Food retailers also behave 'dialecticaHy' in the product development arena. 
Manufacturer or retailers who launch a new product must expect retailers to quickly 
imitate the product in private label. One of the key reasons driving retailers to act in this 
way is that they can, very easily, work out the likely manufacturer of the product, its 
composition, and through their partnerships with manufacturer are easily able to get it 
copied (k2,p.215-216). 
When faced with new, low-cost competitors, food retailers have a tendency to attempt to 
negate their price advantages. It was noted above that in order to negate the advantages of 
superstore innovators, established UK food retailers moved into the format themselves. 
Prior to this, however, they reacted dialectically by significantly lowering their priées 
(6.3. p.227) in order to negate the innovator' price advantages. Similarly, when appearing 
to be under attack from discounters in the early-1990s, established operators extended 
their ranges of 'no friUs' basic private label dramatically, in a reasonably successful 
attempt to negate the price advantages of the discounters (5.4.ii. p. 183). 
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Effects of 'dialectic-style' behaviour 
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Some threats have been 'neutralised' or lessened. The threat of discount ers in the early-
1990s is one which can be said to have diminished. Other threats, however, have 
developed successfully and become mainstream, for example, superstores. The dialectic 
behaviour of the established food retailers when faced with superstore innovation 
effectively ensured that they were at least involved in this format, having cannibalised 
much of their existing business which is préférable to having someone else destroy it. 
New products and services have been widely adopted, sometimes without thorough 
évaluation of their benefits, through fear of being harmed by competitors' innovations. 
This has driven the industry upmarket as most extensions to the range bring higher 
margins than the core grocery offering (6.4. p.236-237), and most additional facilities 
bring higher Staffing costs than self-service grocery retailing p.248-249). Dialectic-
like movement between oil companies and food retailers has brought them into 
compétition with each other in both petrol and food retailing (&4, p.236). The widespread 
move upmarket in private label pioneered by Sainsbury's has necessarily brought closer 
relations between retailers and manufacturers (5.4.Ü. p.183-184). Finally, the number of 
lines has increased because of 'dialectic-style' behaviour, as have margins. For example, 
Sainsbury's blatantly copied M&S chilled fresh chickens {6A, p.242), driving both the 
number of products on offer and margins upwards. 
Figure 7.1.7a. Forces driving Dialectic behaviour: 
Loya l ty schemes were widcly 
adop ted in the m i d 1990s, a l though many 
Operators subsequent ly dropped them 
N e w b randed & 
private label p roduc ts are 
yrapidly copted by r e t a i l e r s , 
pr ivate labels 
Innovat ions in facilities 
such as in-store restaurants, 
fish-counters dclicatessens, 
etc. , were wide ly adopted, 
N o w a lmost universal 
Lower ing of pr iées and ranges 
when under threat from low-cost innovatorV" 
(réaction to bo th supers tores & hard 
discounters was lower priées & basic 
pr ivate label) 
F O R C E S D R I V I N G 
DIALECTIC 
B E H A V I O U R 
Establ ished mul t ip les 
adopted supers tores after 
innovators p ioneered the format, 
\to protect against potent ial damage / 
from the format 
Sa insbury ' s & M & S ' s 
h igh quali ty focus on private label was 
widely adopted by compet i tors 
Dialectic behaviour tends.to occur. for fear 
tìiat retailers have of compet i tors ga in ing 
••'
;
 th rough doing someth ing différent. 
Copying therefore occurs to nega te threats . 
7.2 Tabular représentation of key fîndings of section 7.1 
C A U S E S O F T R A D I N G U P 
Scrambled merchandis ing 
Mid 1950s on Near ly any extension of range carries h igher marg ins than the original , core b randed dry 
groceries . 
Early 1970s on Slow growth in food market drove re ta i lers ' extension into non-foods , wh ich general ly carry 
h igher margins . 
Ear ly 1970s on Larger stores have provided the space to extend the range into h igher marg in lines. 
Early 1970s on T h e more products on sale, the less likcly consumers are to recali pr iées , present ing 
oppor tuni ty to profiteer & increase marg ins on s low-moving l ines. 
Mid 1970s on Centra l distribution aided range extension into more complex , fresh p roduc t s carrying 
h igher margins . 
M i d 1970s o n Centra l distribution al lowed some in-store warehouse space to be conver ted to sales area. 
Early 1980s o n Growth in sybaritic society drove demand for h igh quali ty, p repared foods (h igh marg in ) . 
Ear ly 1980s o n Reta i le rs ' range extensions tend to be high quali ty for fear o f d isappoin t ing & losing 
cus tomers . 
M i d 1980s on Range extension facilitated by consumer trust in the retailer as a brand. 
Secular t r e n d s 
Mid 1960s on Consumer s have rising expectat ions o f quali ty, and are re luctant to go back on quali ty once 
they have exper ienced it. 
Mid 1960s on Consumer s associate the retai! env i ronment with qual i ty o f p roduc ts purchased , dr iving 
reta i lers ' investment in stores. 
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M i d 1970s o n Fal l ing real incomes in m i d 1970s p rovoked intense price wars . Inverse also ho lds , r ising 
real incomes drive focus on service & quality. 
Ear ly 1980s on lin many ways the change in Teseo has mirrored the change in society' - Terry Leahy 
(5,2,11, p . 149). 
Fear of direct price compét i t ion 
Mid 1970s on Food retailers have a tendency to pass on cost savings in the form of improved services & 
facilities, rather than lower priées. 
Ear ly 1980s on Retai lers tend to pursue a quality approach as a means of avoiding harmful pr ice wars . 
Ear ly 1980s on Inter-superstore compét i t ion was primarily over quality of the retail envi ronment , service 
and products , rather than price. 
Previous ly undocumented causes of trading up 
Mid 1950s on High taxation on certain products c louds price competi t ion, m a k i n g it less wor thwhi le . 
Instead, retailers tend to aeeept higher margins . 
M i d 1950s o n Food retailers ' tendency to blindly copy compet i to rs ' innovat ions, for fear be ing ha rmed , 
dr ives up costs, put t ing pressure on margins & prices. 
Mid 1960s on Inves tment in improvements to the retail env i ronment general ly increase profits d u e to 
favourable consumer response. 
Ear ly 1970s o n Flanning Gain has driven u p the costs of new developments , put t ing upwards pressure o n 
margins & prices. 
Early 1980s on Increasing demands of p lanning authorities over the years have forced n e w deve lopments 
upmarket . 
Ear ly 1980s on Rising taxes can force up operational costs, forcing up pr ices & margins . For example r is ing 
taxes on diesel have dr iven up the cost of distribution. 
F O R C E S CATJSING M O V E M E N T O F T H E R E T A I L A C C O R D I O N 
M i d 1950s on Re-availabil i ty o f foods following WWII-re la ted shortages drove r ange extension. 
Mid 1950s on Range extension increases margins , as a lmost all products carry h igher marg ins than core 
b randed dry groceries. 
M i d 1950s on Range extension is relatively easy in grocery retail ing, due to the high consumer traffic in 
Stores. 
M i d 1950s on F o o d retai lers ' t endency to blindly copy compet i to rs ' innovat ions , for fear be ing ha rmed , 
has dr iven up the number o f products o n offer. 
Mid 1960s on Manufacturers increased their ranges o f products , which consumers demanded . N e w sectors 
developed, such as frozen foods. 
Mid 1960s on Leverag ing of exist ing overheads al lows food retailers to undercu t t radit ional retai lers o f 
products . 
Early 1970s on Large r stores b rought the space necessary to expand range . 
M i d 1970s o n Advances in technology a l lowed warehouse space to b e conver ted to sales area, d r iv ing 
expans ion of range. 
Early 1980s on Chang ing society drove demand for new products , e.g. ready mea l s were d e m a n d e d b y the 
'money- r ich , t ime-poor ' sybarit ic society. 
Mid 1980s on Range extension facilitated by the deve lopment of consumer trust in the retailer as a brand. 
Mid 1980s on 
(1994 legally) 
Sunday trading d rove demand for non-foods, as grocery shopping m o v e d towards b e c o m i n g 
a leisure activity. 
Early 1990s on Limited-l ine discounters (early 90s) and smaller mul t ip le stores (late 90s, d r iven by 
p lann ing constraints) necessi tated smaller ranges . 
F O R C E S D R 1 V I N G P O L A R I S A T I O N O F S T O R E SÏ7.RS 
1950 on Unti l deregulat ion in 1994, législation supported smal l shops by a l lowing them to open for 
longer than larger stores. 
M i d 1950s on T h e deve lopmen t of symbol groups supported small shops , dr iv ing further polar isat ion as 
medium-s ized supermarkets suffered. 
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Early 1970s on The impact of superstores was feit more acutcly by med ium-s i zed supermarkets than smal l 
g roce ry shops , driving polarisat ion. 
Ear ly 1970s on D e m a n d for l t o p - u p ! and emergency shopping increased as shops m o v e d out-of- town and 
got larger. Less fréquent shopping trips drove more top-up & emergency shopping . 
Early 1970s on D e m a n d remained for local shopping for those wi thout access to t ransport and for the 
immobi l e . 
Mid 1990s on Planning guidel ines can drive polarisation. PPG6 (1996) d rove expans ion o f smaller, 
convenience-s ty le stores. 
F O R C E S A F F E C T Î N G T H E R E T A I L U F F . C Y C L E S O F S E L F - S E R V I C E . E A R L Y 
S U P E R M A R K E T S . L A R G E R S U P E R M A R K E T S $ S U P E R S T O R E S 
Accelerat ing f a c t o r s 
1950 on Techno log ie al advances in packaging, réfrigération & distr ibution drove self-service & 
early supermarkets . 
1950 on C o n s u m e r demand for modernised shopping facilities drove self-service & early 
supermarke ts . 
1950s & 1960s Deve lopmen t s overseas encouraged U K food retailers to adopt self-service & early 
supermarkets . 
Mid 1950s G o v e r n m e n t pol icy aiming to improve food retail effïciency encouraged adopt ion of self-
service & early supermarkets . 
Mid 1950s on Ending of rat ioning (1954) accelerated g rowth phase of self-service & early supermarkets . 
Mid 1960s on Abol i t ion of R P M (1964) accelerated growth phase of efficient stores (self-service, 
increasing size). 
Early 1970s on D e m a n d for one-stop shopping g rew as consumerà ga ined income, c o n s u m e r durables & 
cars , and had less t ime for daily shopping, driving the deve lopment of larger supermarkets 
& supers tores . 
Mid 1970s o n Retai lers pursued larger stores once they had gained from earlier s tore modern isa t ions , 
bui lding on earlier gains to create larger supermarkets & supers tores . 
M i d 1970s on Techno log ica l advance within retailers a ided the g rowth of large s tores . Cent ra l distr ibution, 
pallets , cages, fork-lifts, etc., drove the deve lopment of larger supermarke t s & supers tores . 
Mid 1990s on Deregula t ion of trading hours in 1994 drove demand for large s tores wi th space for 
extensive non-food offerings. 
D e l a y i n g factors 
Early 1950s The rat ioning system in place until 1954 s lowed self-service due to adminis t ra t ive bürden . 
1950s C o n s u m e r , staff and retailer résistance to change de layed adopt ion of self-service 
techniques . 
1950s & early 
1960s 
R P M in p lace until 1964 removed incentives to adopt se l f -service/supermarkets & 
supers tores , as there was little price compét i t ion. 
1950 to mid 
1990s 
Unti l deregulat ion in 1994, législation suppor ted smal l shops by a l lowing them to open for 
longer than larger stores. 
Early 1960s on Lack of inves tment in new stores by independents Se co-opera t ives s lowed deve lopmen t o f 
larger supermarkets & superstores, as mult iples were the only major driver. 
Mid 1960s on The exis t ing retail structure rarely a l lowed for extension of exis t ing stores, so larger 
supermarke t s & superstores normal ly had to be new stores . 
1960s & 70s. 
Late 1990s 
Difficulties obtaining planning permiss ion for larger supermarke t s & supers tores s lowed 
their deve lopment . 
F O R C E S D R I V I N G D A R W I N I A N S U R V I V A L O F T H E F I T T E S T 
1950 on E x o g e n o u s factors, such as the introduction of the m i n i m u m wage & the abol i t ion of R P M , 
tend to impact more severely on smaller Operators, p lac ing them at further d isadvantage . 
Early 1960s on G r o w t h & survival of mult iples at the expense of independents & co-opera t ives b rought 
he igh tened compéti t ion, as remaining players tougher to gain from. 
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Ear ly 1980s on As organisat ional scale became critical from the 1980s, it d rove takeover & régional 
expansion. There was concentrat ion of power as régional operators were absorbed by major 
players . 
Early 1980s on Organisat ional scale al lows operators to spread the cost of new Systems & technologies over 
a larger turnover, reducing further the viability of smaller operators . 
Late 1980s on Concentra t ion of p o w e r into the Big Five heightened compét i t ion further, and drove the 
relat ionship with manufacturers in favour of retailers. Organisat ional scale b rough t lower 
input prices. 
Mid 1990s on O F T reluctance to allow further merger a m o n g large players is likely to have p ro longed the 
exis tence of some weaker p layers . 
Mid 1990s on Internationalisat ion of the industry suggests that retail organisat ions will increasingly have 
to be fit by international, rather than domest ic , s tandards. 
F O R C E S D R I V I N G D I A L E C T I C B E H A V I O U R 
1950 on Sa insbury ' s & M & S ' s high quality focus on private label was widely adopted by 
compet i tors . 
1950 on Dialectic behaviour tends to occur for fear that retailers have of compet i tors ga in ing through 
do ing something différent. Copying therefore occurs to nega te threats . 
M i d 1950s on N e w branded & private label products are rapidly copied by retai lers ' pr ivate labels. 
Mid 1960s & 
early 1990s 
Lower ing o f prices and ranges when under threat f rom low-cost innovators ( react ion to both 
supers tores & hard discounters was lower prices & basic pr ivate label) . 
Early 1970s Established mult iples adopted superstores after innovators p ioneered the format, to protect 
against potential damage from the format. 
Mid 1970s on Innovat ions in facilities such as in-store restaurants , fish-counters del icatessens, etc. , were 
wide ly adopted. N o w almost universal . 
M i d 1990s Loyal ty schemes were widely adopted in the mid 1990s, a l though m a n y opera tors 
subsequent ly dropped them. 
7.3 Application of théories in order to forecast 
This section applies the most relevant thèmes of the théories of retail change, identified in 
section 7.1, to produce a theory-based forecast of likely UK food retail developments to 
2010. 
The first key thème that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future is operators 
'trading up' the quality of their stores, products, facilities and services. Changes to the 
retail offering will be the primary driver of this, as in the recent past. Continued growth in 
quality private label, fresh prepared foods and non-foods will be driven by rising 
consumer incomes, and retailer desire to stimulate growth in a static food market with 
limited expansion prospects. Increases in the number of products stocked will be 
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constrained by the current hostile planning environment for large Stores, although 
extensions to existing stores and more efficient use of warehousing may enable 
conversion of additional sales area, providing at least some growth in sales area. Recent 
diversification into categories requiring little or no sales area, such as financial Services, 
will continue due to limited growth in sales space, and will be facilitated by consumers' 
trust in the leading retailers as brands. 
Trading up will also continue to be driven by other factors. Planners' high expectations 
will continue to force up the costs of developments, although the hostile planning 
environment since 1996 has neutralised much of this effect, and will continue to do so for 
the foreseeable future. The success of störe refurbishment is a primary driver of trading 
up of the retail environment, and this will continue as long as consumer reaction is 
positive, and the effect on profits remains good. The tax bürden on motoring is unlikely 
to decline significantly, despite government concessions to hauliers l , so the cost of 
distribution in the UK will remain high by international Standards, putting upwards 
pressure on UK retail costs, margins and prices. 
Retailers' 'blind' copying of competitors' initiatives, driven by fear of the härm they 
could do, will continue to drive trading up. From time to time, however, initiatives 
adopted in haste will be abandoned as their true cost to overheads, margins and prices is 
realised, driving Polarisation in the industry. 
Polarisation will remain a key trend in UK food retailing to 2010. Polarisation of 
organisational size is currently constrained by the regulatory State, namely the OFT's 
reluctance to allow mergers between leading domestic Operators, although this could 
change. Organie growth, however, will continue to drive Polarisation of organisational 
size, albeit at a slower rate than leading Operators would like. Conversely, Polarisation in 
the size of stores is currently being hastened by the regulatory environment, because the 
1
 Economist (US) , N o v e m b e r 11, 2000 ; "Farewell Coherence" , p .25 
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1996 change in planning guidelines for large stores drove mainstream multiple Operators 
to develop smaller, conveniently located stores. As development of such stores gathers 
pace, polarisation of store size will accelerate. Polarisation of loyalty schemes appears set 
to continue, and follows 'blind copying' of mid-1990s initiatives. More Operators will 
drop the schemes if they can not turn them to their advantage, driving further polarisation. 
Polarisation in pricing strategy, between permanent low prices and temporary 
promotional and multibuy activity, is occurring, as Wal-Mart Asda focus on permanent 
low prices. Polarisation in the quality/price focus will increase, as Sainsbury's, for 
example, are pursuing quality as an alternative to outright price compétition with Wal-
Mart Asda and Teseo 2. 
Retail life cycles are long-term trends, and the period to 2010 is unlikely to see 
significant déviation from current trends. The market share of independent, co-operative 
and specialist food retailers will therefore continue to decline, as that of multiple 
Operators continues to grow. Similarly, power will increasingly be in the hands of leading 
multiple Operators, as weaker multiples suffer. Growth in superstores will be slow due to 
the constrained organic growth of the format, and the bulk of growth will come from 
exploiting existing superstores more effectively, assuming the planning environment 
remains constant. Multiples' smaller stores will continue to gain market share, as will 
delivered grocery services, with these retail Channels representing the new engines of 
multiple growth. 
Survival of the fìttesi will continue to be fundamental to the UK food retail industry, and 
indeed most industries. The lifetimes of domestic Operators will be prolonged, however, 
due to the OFT's reluctance to allow merger within the industry, although break up of the 
failing Operator, sell-off of selected stores, or takeover by a foreign predator would 
overeóme this. The internationalisation of retailing means that fitness will increasingly be 
determined on an international, rather than domestic, basis, effectively making 
2
 Super Marketing, June 2, 2000 ; "Davis admits defeat in race for top spot", p . 1 
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organisational fitness more critically important. 
Retailers' mutuai fear of competitors' innovations will continue to drive dialectic 
behaviour in UK food retailing to 2010, and therefore convergence within the industry. It 
will also drive polarisation, however, when fear is superseded by the opportunity to 
differentiate, thus has conflicting effects. This was the case with loyalty schemes, which 
were adopted dialectically in the mid-1990s, to be abandoned by some Operators just a 
few years later, in order to differentiate themselves through lower pricing. Dialectic 
tendencies will continue in product development, and in the addition of facilities and 
services. Spending on improvements to the retail environment and the retail offering will 
continue to put upwards pressure on margins and prices. 
7.4 Results of the forecast 
Trading up of stores, products. facilities and services will continue to 2010: 
• Range extension will be a major driver of trading up to 2010. Better quality private 
label, fresh, prepared foods, and non-foods for some players, will all increase market 
share, and their uptake among consumers will be driven by rising real incomes. 
• Retailers will pursue range extension to combat continued slow growth in the 
food market coupled with limited store expansion prospects. 
• Range extension will be constrained by slow growth in store sizes, a resuit of 
the hostile planning environment for large stores, which seems unlikely to change. 
• Growth in sales area of existing stores will be pursued more vigorously 
because of the hostile planning environment for large stores, and will be achieved 
through store extensions and more efficient use of space, which allows conversion 
of backroom area to sales space. 
• The hostile planning environment to large stores will drive retailers to pursue 
new catégories requiring little or no sales space, which is facilitated by consumer 
trust in the leading Operators. 
• Trading up will continue to be driven by the heightening demands of planners, 
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including planning gain, although the hostile planning environment to large stores 
makes this less criticai than in the past. 
• Store refurbi s hments and improvements will continue to drive trading up, as long as 
the consumer reaction to this remains positive and such investments continue to be 
successoli. 
• The high cost ofUK distribution is unlikely to change significantly, and will therefore 
continue to put upwards pressure on costs, margins and priées. 
• 'Blind', dialectic-style copying of competitors' innovations will continue to drive the 
industry upmarket to 2010 (see below). 
Trading up will allow growth in a static food market, and boost performance in a period 
of slow growth in retail floorspace. It will also put upwards pressure on costs, margins 
and priées, and create opportunity for retai! differentiation through low-cost operating. 
Polarisation will continue to be a major trend in UK food retailing to 2010: 
• Polarisation of store sizes will accelerate as multiple Operators' development of small, 
local stores gather pace. This development is occurring a resuit of the hostile planning 
environment to large store development. 
• Polarisation of organisational size will continue due to organic growth of leading 
Operators, but will be slower than in the recent past due to OFT reluctance to allow 
further merger. 
• Polarisation in the use of loyalty schemes is a current feature of the industry, and 
polarisation in the adoption of other services and facilities will occur. This is largely 
driven by retailers' 'blind' adoption of competitors' initiatives through fear of the 
harm they could do, and later considering them a cost bürden in the cold light of day. 
• Further polarisation between price-focused and quality-focused retailing will occur as 
Teseo and Wal-Mart Asda compete over price, while other Operators rush to 
differentiate themselves by pursuing quality. 
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The retail life cycles of retail types and retail formats will continue their long-term trends: 
• Independent, co-operative and specialist food retailers will décline further, although 
this will be slower than in the past due to the shake-out that has already occurred, and 
their smali remaining market shares. 
• Multiple food retailers will continue their growth at the expense of independent, co-
opérative and specialist operators. 
• Within the multiple sector, however, larger multiples will continue to grow at 
the expense of weaker, smaller multiples, although OFT influence means that this 
will be slower than in récent history. 
• The retail life cycle of the superstore is effectively in suspense due to the hostile 
planning environment to such stores, which is unlikely to change. Better exploitation 
of superstores will provide some growth in the format, but the regulatory system is a 
major brake. 
• Major multiples' development of smaller stores, forecourt opérations, and delivered 
grocery shopping will drive forward the life cycles of thèse formats. The major 
impact of their small store programmes will be on independent stores and 
convenience multiples, while that of delivered shopping will be on superstores. 
Survival of the fittest will continue, as it always has: 
• OFT reluctance to allow further merger between domestic operators will prolong the 
life of weak operators. Despite this, truly weak operators will disappear eventually, 
either through break-up of the organisation, with stores being sold off individually, or 
through takeover by an overseas operators. 
• Fitness will increasingly be determined on an international basis, as overseas 
operators eye up or enter the UK, and domestic operators pursue expansion overseas. 
Dialectic-style hehaviour will continue: 
• Fear of the harm that could be inflicted will continue to drive retailers' 'blind' 
adoption of competitors' initiatives. 
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• This will continue to drive the industry upmarket. 
• It will also drive polarisation when Operators weigh up the value of their 
'blind' investments and begin to see them as a cost bürden, tempting them to 
abandon the initiative in order to improve their competitiveness. 
7.5 Implications and recommandations for the UKfood retail industry 
Growth in real incomes will continue to power consumer demand for better quality 
products, services and facilities in UK food retailing. Retailers responding effectively to 
this will be able to counter the problems of slow growth in the market for food coupled 
with likely slow growth in retail floorspace. Investment in improvements to the retail 
environment will continue to 2010, provided that such investments continue to produce 
good returns, and the quality of the retail environment will therefore remain an important 
élément of compétition, suggesting trouble ahead for Operators of substandard or outdated 
stores. 
Significant trading up has occurred historically due to évolution of the retail offering, but 
range extension to 2010 will be more difficult than in the past because of the brake on 
increasing store sizes imposed by the hostile planning environment, assuming that this 
remains unchanged. Increases in retail sales area will not come from the addition of larger 
stores, as they did in the past, and will have to be gained through the more efficient use of 
space, which enables conversion of backroom space to sales area, and extensions to 
existing stores. Retailers must also attempt to counter the slow growth in retail sales area 
by diversifying into catégories requiring little or no shelf space. 
When seeking planning permission for large stores, retailers must be wary of excessive 
demands frora planners. Although in reality they have little choice but to satisfy planners, 
negotiation in this area will be the key to minimising additional costs. 
Upwards pressure on margins will continue to be applied by the high cost of 
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transportation in the UK, and by retailers' copying of competitors' initiatives (see below), 
presenting opportunity to differentiate through non-adoption, or by cutting out poor 
performing initiatives. 
Polarisation will continue to be a feature of UK food retailing, and polarisation of store 
size will accelerate as multiple Operators' development of small, local stores gathers 
momentum. The key effect of this will be heightened compétition with independent food 
retailers, who must react appropriately or face further érosion of market share. 
Polarisation of organisational size will continue, but this will be at a slower rate than in 
the recent past due to the influence of the OFT. Weaker multiple organisations will not be 
saved indefinitely by the OFT's stance, however, as break-up of organisations and foreign 
takeover are realistic alternatives to domestic merger, and their OFT may change their 
opinions. 
Polarisation of marketing tools, and other initiatives, is well established in UK food 
retailing. Trading up, and the constant addition of services and facilities présents the 
opportunity for one or more Operators to either shun an initiative at launch, or to drop it 
later. If the scheme in question incurs costs to the business, dropping it or shunning it 
effectively allows the retailer to operate at lower margins than competitors adopting the 
initiative. In short, retailers must thoroughly evaluate the potential value and cost of 
initiatives before adopting them, rather than blindly adopting them for fear of the harm 
they could do, because this can put unnecessary upwards pressure on margins. 
Polarisation of focus between quality and price is a key trend at présent, as certain 
Operators are marketing themselves as high quality propositions, and others are becoming 
increasingly involved in price-cutting. Retailers should be wary of being caught in the 
middle ground, as this is a very difficult position to occupy. 
Study of retail life cycles suggests that independent, co-operative and specialist food 
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retailers will continue to lose market share, although thèse losses will be shght in the 
historical context due to their small residuai market share. Further shop closures will 
occur in thèse sectors, particularly as multiples move into small, local shops (see above). 
Multiple food retailers, as a sector, will not grow as rapidly as they have done in the past, 
although the growth of individual companies will remain relatively strong as there are 
fewer remaining players. Multiple market share will also continue to concentrate into the 
hands of the few largest operators, at the expense of smaller weaker multiples, who will 
struggle to compete. The influence of the OFT, if it remains unchanged, means that 
domestic takeover is unlikely, and break-up remains the more likely means of exit for 
second division multiples. 
The superstore format will expérience slower growth, due to the brake on expansion of 
the format imposed by planning policy, which appears unlikely to change. In this 
environment of slow addition of superstore space, retailers must exploit their existing 
superstores as much as possible in order to grow their profitability through diversification 
of product offering and operating efficiencies. 
Growth in UK food retailing to 2010 will corne primarily from the development of 
smaller stores, forecourt opérations and delivered grocery shopping, as thèse are the 
formats in which major operators are currently investing. Growth of smaller multiple 
stores will impact on independent operators (see above), while rapid uptake of delivered 
grocery shopping will harm the superstore business, as this is currently the primary 
destination for the weekly shopping trip. 
Fitness of organisation is increasingly being determined on an international basis, 
reinforcing the need for UK retail organisations to streamline themselves as much as 
possible. The UK already has one major overseas player in Wal-Mart, and further 
internationalisation is possible, particularly as the OFT is unlikely to allow merger 
between major domestic operators, making them more vulnerable to international 
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predators. Further internationalisation of operators, however, carries the threat of them 
becoming more cumbersome and losing sight of the détail of the UK market, which 
would be likely to benefit smaller multiples and independents able to innovate and adapt 
to local demand rapidly and effectively. 
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Chapter 8 
Forecast of likely developments in UK food retailing using the Delphi technique 
The results of the Delphi survey conducted between July and November 1999 appear in full in 
appendix 1, and the technique and precise methodology employed are explained in section 3.Lui. 
Section 8.1 interprets and analyses the results, white section 8.2 follows this up with an assessment 
of the implications. Section 8.3 summarises the key éléments of the theory-based (chapter 7) and 
expert-based (this chapter) forecasts, essentially comparing and contrasting the results of the two 
forecasting techniques. 
8.1 Interpretation of the Delphi results 
The Delphi results (appendix 1 ) forecast that growth in the market share of multiple food retailers 
will continue to 2010, although at a slower rate than has been the case to date, rising from 85.6% in 
1997 to 90% in 2005 and 92% in 2010. This growth will occur at the expense of independent 
Operators, and to a lesser extent, co-operative societies, both of which will suffer a resulting decline 
in market share. Slowing in the growth of multiple Operators is said to b e largely a resuit of the 
physical size of the United Kingdom, changing shopping habits, planning restrictions, transport 
policy, and the likelihood of negative Compétition Commission fmdings. Co-operative food retail 
market share is forecast to fall from 7.4% in 1997 to 5.5% in 2005 and 5% in 2010, and it is also 
suggested that the co-operative sector will find a niche and maintain market share after 2005. It is 
speculated that an inability to revitalise could lead to the takeover or acquisition of co-operative 
societies. Independent Operators' market share will decline further still, from 7% in 1997 to 5% in 
2005 and 4% in 2010, although a basic minimum of independent trading should be supported by 
'social exclusion type policies', and the growth of electronic commerce could either adversely or 
positively affect this sector (see below). 
Although growth of the multiple sector as a whole will slow, the dominance of the leading players is 
expected to increase; the market share of the leading five multiples will rise from 48.4% in June 1998 
to 60% in 2005 and 65% in 2010, while that of the leading three will rise from 36.9% in June 1998 to 
43% in 2005 and 48% in 2010. This growth will be achieved through the addition of a variety of 
retail formats and may be fuelled by the entry of overseas O p e r a t o r s which is likely to catalyse price 
wars, shaking out weaker players or leading to takeovers. Increasing sales of non-foods will also 
contribute to sales of key players. These estimâtes are highly dépendent on extemal factors such as 
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governrnent législation, regulatory control, compétition policy, and planning restraints, which have 
already contributed to the slowing of store opening programmes. This slump in store openings, 
particularly of superstores, will resuit directly in slower growth, and may induce takeover activity. 
Takeover activity itself is largely governed by UK and European law, although respondents 
suggested that one of the top five operators may have to be 'rescued' by being broken up and sold to 
other operators, with the UK governrnent unable to counter the move. 
This growth of the leading multiple food retailers will be achieved 50% through acquisition and 50% 
through organie expansion, although panellists see this as almost entirely subject to regulatory forces. 
Regulatory control and concems over the dominance of large multiples will slow (domestic) 
acquisition, and planning policy will drive naturai expansion into the smali store and e-commerce 
sectors. 
Panellists found individuai market shares of différent types of convenience operator difficult to 
forecast because of the highly fragmented nature of the market, with the sector split between 
multiple, convenience multiple and independent ownership. Substantial takeover activity will occur 
in the sector, which will grow to account for 20% of the total UK grocery market in 2005, compared 
to 18% in 1998, stabilising post-2005. Mergers between convenience multiples and co-operative 
societies are a possibility, and convenience multiples will continue to buy up independent outlets. 
Symbol groups will suffer from the co-operative sector's concentration on convenience and the 
growth of major multiples in the sector, and may be taken over by or become franchises of major 
multiples, as may co-operative outlets. 
The market share of discount food retailers will stabilise at 8% by 2005, falling from 8.5% in 1998, 
although there will be strong locational discrepancies, with the format being stronger in inner city 
areas. The entry of Wal-Mart will drive a diminishing differential between discount and other food 
retail operators. 
The market share of groceries delivered to the home will reach 5% in 2005 and 10% in 2010, with 
respondents emphasising that 5% is a large market share, larger than that previously held by Kwik 
Save. Low figures were supported by suggestions that delivered groceries are stili not big in USA, 
and that we are rive years behind in internet usage, and by the fact that online shopping tends to be 
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restricted to a fixed amount of shoppers per store. Higher estimâtes were supported by claims that 
consumers are Willing to pay the delivery fee due to a cost/time trade-off, and that growth may be 
achieved through the development of 'collection points'. Doubt was expressed as to whether the cost 
structures of existing businesses can be changed this way: if not, delivery facilities are an additional 
cost bürden for the business to bear. 
By 2010, 60% of delivered groceries will be despatched from specialised despatch dépôts, rather than 
existing stores, although there was an extremely high level of variation in the responses to this 
question. Despatch dépôts are not expected to be economical in servicing a 5% market share, yet 
store based picking is also uneconomical, with depot based picking the 'only way' to make it 
profitable. Ultimately, it will dépend on the take-up of delivered grocery shopping, although 'current 
developments suggest dépôts will be common*. 
The likely impact of 10% and 25% of groceries being delivered by 2010 was investigated and the 
médians of the responses suggest that a 10% pénétration of delivered groceries will bave little or no 
effect on out-of-town superstores or locai convenience Operators, while a 25% pénétration would 
decrease the trade of both formats. Although few participants believed that delivered groceries would 
reach 25% of grocery sales by 2010, an analysis of the interquartile range of responses is more 
enlightening. 10% of groceries being delivered will have no effect or will lead to slight 
improvements in the trade of locai, convenience retailers, while 25% will harm them reasonably 
significantly. As for out-of-town superstores, a 10% delivered market share will have no effect or 
will lead to a slight decrease in their trade, while 25% would decrease their trade more severely than 
it would that of locai, convenience retailers. This more positive outlook for local, convenience 
retailers is said to arise because deliveries will be of bulk commodities, not all groceries, so there will 
be a top up need, which will tend to be fulfilled closer to the home. Superstores are expected to suffer 
because people would not need to go to them so often, although there would be strong urban-rural 
différences in impact. 
The means of ordering delivered groceries will be primarily by telephone/fax (40%o) in 2005, and 
primarily via digitai television by 2010 (42.5%), although it is stressed that the uptake of digitai 
television remains an unknown. Digital television will overtake internet ordering as the domianant 
ordering Channel soon after 2005, as it is less costly and less awkward to operate than computers, 
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although one commentator expects the internet to be the dominant Channel until 2010, vvhen digital 
television will overtake it. Other possible formats suggested are in-store ordering, telesales, and 
devices that nave yet to be invented. 
Finally on delivered groceries, the delivery charge is expected to be widely abolished around 2005, 
although there was widespread disagreement about whether and when this could happen. Some 
respondents suggested that the delivery charge is most likely to be incorporated into the priées. It was 
also suggested that compétition will ensure that the charge is abolished, and that it would have to be 
loyalty or volume based if there were no charge, as the free delivery services of Iceland and Asda are 
at présent (£40 and £99 minimum purchase respectively). It was also suggested that abolishing the 
delivery cost would be too big a cost to absorb long term while giving reasonable price/quality 
parity. 
24 hour opening of superstores will become the norm around 2004, although there was confusion 
over the définition of 'norm'. 24 hour opening will vary by location, and will be driven by consumer 
demand locally. 
Priée consciousness among consumers as a whole will remain relatively stable to 2010, although it 
will vary according to customer lifestyles and groupings. Price consciousness is dictated by the 
economie cycle of the time, and is considered to be demonstrated more through the search for value 
for money than sheer price appeal. Consumers will be more aware of priées because of increasing 
compétition and because of the increasing amount of information available to them, 'aided and 
abetted by increasing media attention on the industry\ Rising incomes will fuel demand for service 
and quality rather than purely price, while value for money will remain important. 
Price variations according to the time of day or day of the week are seen as more unlikely than likely, 
and if they were to happen it would be around 2005. Better Systems would be required, as would 
further understanding of individuai customer behaviour. It is made unlikely by the mature static 
market, with a relatively static volume of food sales, and the fact that market share can only be 
increased by taking it from a close competitor. In addition Compétition Commission findings will 
have a bearing, and "extra loyalty points" are seen as a more likely means of incentivising shopping 
on quiet days. Price variations were also considered 'politically incorrect' and a "suicidaipolicy*. 
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Competition in UK food retailing will increase significantly, largely as a result of international 
operators acquiring UK retailers. UK food retailers will attempt to differentiate their offerings 
significantly more than at present, which to a certain extent reflects the expected increase in 
competition. 
Expendíture on the collection and use of customer data will increase significantly, continuing an 
existing upwards trend. The main element of this will be in the exploitation, or 'use 1 , of the data 
gathered, which will require further investment in management and information technology beyond 
current facilities as it becomes more sophisticated. A possibility that Hoyalty fatigue' among 
consumers may set in by 2010 was also expressed, which would partly offset these rising costs. 
The amount of data shared between retailer and manufacturer will increase significantly, as will 
partnerships between the two parties. The primary cause of this is that strategic alliances, 
partnerships and networks are becoming more important than "out and out" competition, and that 
through information sharing, manufacturers can take the lead role in store replenishment. 
Partnerships are also created through global trading understandings, national supply chain 
integration, shared media and customer Communications, and are facilitated by internet technology. 
With increasingly deep partnerships developing, vertical integration could be an easy step. 
UK food retailer investment in overseas operations will increase by 2010, although it was stressed 
that this is likely to be concentrated mainly through Tesco and perhaps one other operator, as other 
operators are either expected to have been taken over or to have 'missed the boat' of international 
expansión. In effect, the degree of UK operator overseas investment will depend on the number of 
acquisitions by American and European retailers. International i sation will not be an optional extra, it 
will increasingly be essential for survival, which should also drive similar increases in overseas 
retailer investment in UK operations. However, this may be limited as one panellist senses that fewer 
overseas operators are large enough or interested enough in UK food retailers than was previously 
thought to be the case. 
Investment in technology in 2010 will have increased significantly, and will focus largely on 
customer relationship marketing (CRM), and the efficient and profitable meeting of customer 
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requirements. Home shopping and developments to facilitate the shopping expérience will also 
require IT investment. Advancing technology will ensure that IT investment has to step up, as will 
the acceleratingpace of change. 
Private label groceries will account for around 45% of grocery expenditure in 2005 and 47% in 2010, 
rising from 40% in 1996. Thèse increases will largely be driven by the increasing market share of the 
major multiples, and through operators seeking 'points of differentiation'. Further rises are 
considered unlikely as lSainsbury 's has shown a leve! over 50% is unsustainable\ 
The market share of ready meals will increase by 20% in the period to 2010, following developments 
in the USA, and largely driven by increasing disposable incomes and the increasingly 'time poor' 
consumer demanding convenience. 
The quality of the shopping expérience in 2010 (in terms of levels of service and facilities) will 
improve, driven by retailer efforts to differentiate themselves in a competitive market, and the 
requirement to invest more in order to retain customers. However, conflicting trends are seen, one 
towards cost-cutting, no frills opérations, and one towards increasing levels of service. One 
participant added that ' Wal-Mart is not a high quality shopping expérience*. 
UK food retailers will become more innovative by 2010, and although one commentator finds it hard 
to see what the innovations could be, another suggests that it will be imperative in order to maintain 
profitability and retums to shareholders. UK food retailers will continue to adopt one another's ideas 
at a similar rate as they do at présent. Respondents suggest that 'imitation will continue'' and that 
lthere are no new ideas, just variations'. 
Convergence between rounds 
A fall in the size of the interquartile range of responses for a certain question as rounds progress is 
indicative of convergence of opinion. Likewise, if the sum of the upper quartiles of ail responses 
minus the sum of the lower quartiles for the same responses decreases between rounds, there is 
convergence of opinion. 
While the two round Delphi forecast does not offer much scope for comparative studies of rates of 
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convergence, it is possible to quantify the différence between initial and final levels of convergence, 
and to give a percentage value of progress towards complete convergence, when the sum of the 
interquartile ranges would equal zero. In this survey, the sum of the upper quartiles minus that of the 
lower quartiles in round one was 348.4, falling to 273.6 in round 2. This denotes a 21.5% move 
towards complete convergence, as discussed above. 
Values relating to responses to questions 12b, 13 and 15b were excluded from thèse convergence 
calculations as the upper quartiles involved iater ' or 'never' statements in either or both rounds, 
which as non-numeric values are impossible to manipulate in this way without making vague 
estimations. 
Limitations 
The general limitations of the Delphi forecasting technique are considered fully in section 3.1.iii and 
appendix 5, although there are two limitations spécifie to this forecast that are addressed here. First, 
the sample of respondents is not as large as would ideally have been the case. Senior industry figures 
tended to be unwilling to take part in the exercise, and despite more than 40 invitations to take part in 
the exercise, the final sample was only 11. Martino [1983] found that as long as a panel was actually 
'expert', 15 would be sufficient to produce an accurate resuit, so a small panel should not affect the 
process too negatively. A second limitation arose when two panellists failed to return their second 
round responses. In thèse cases, a letter was sent to the panellists, and eventually their first round 
responses were carried through to the second round. 
8.2 Implications of the Delphi forecast and recommendations for the UK food retail 
industry 
Growth in the market share of multiple operators will slow dramatically, particularly between 2005 
and 2010, and independent and co-operative operators will expérience a corresponding slowdown in 
érosion of market share, although decline will continue. This slowing of the rate of market share 
change is dépendent on many factors (7.31. and represents a period of fortheoming relative stability 
for independent and co-operative operators, although the competitive environment will remain tough. 
While multiple growth as a whole will slow, leading players' growth will be maintained through 
érosion of the market share of weaker multiples. This will be driven by leading operators' addition of 
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new retail forrnats, and may be aided by intensive price competition shaking out weaker players. 
Again, this is dependent on many factors and will be driven in eąual proportions by organie growth 
and acquisition, which in tum is also highly dependent on the regulatory environment. Second 
division multiple operators, therefore, do not have a particularly bright futurę, and some will have 
disappeared by 2010. 
Superstore growth will be slow due to the restrictive planning policy, which may provoke takeover 
activity within the sector, as a means of growth. This is most likely be in the form of a 'top five' 
operator being 'rescued' - broken up and the stores sold off individually, because of govemment 
resistance to further merger within the industry. Operators, even large ones, must continue to seek 
growth from existing outlets, and altemative forrnats to the superstore, and must also seize the 
chance to buy competitors' suitable stores, if and when they become available. Those operators that 
do not maintain growth are likely to be those that disappear. 
The highly fragmented convenience storę market will be the subject of substantial merger activity, 
and will grow slightly in comparison to the overall food market to 2005, when it is expected to 
stabilise. The entrance of major multiples and co-operative retailers to this sector will adversely 
affect symbol retailers; alliances may be formed and mergers are likely. This sector of the industry 
will be less fragmented in 2010, and it is a sector presenting opportunity for multiple operators to 
grow their market share. 
The importance of the discount market will decrease slightly to 2005, when it will stabilise. This is 
attributed to a diminishing differential between discounters and price-focused major multiples, but 
inner cities will continue to be a strong market for discount operators. Discount operators, therefore, 
will struggle to grow at any great pace, bar merger within the sector, and must work hard to 
differentiate themselves from Wal-Mart Asda, while focusing their development in areas with 
growing demand for discount food retailing. 
Delivered groceries will grow steadily to reach 10% market share by 2010, which is a significant 
market share, but is considered a level at which additional costs will be incurred by retailers offering 
deliveries. This level of penetration would have little or no effect on existing retail forrnats, although 
25% market share, which is seen as highly unlikely by 2010, would impact on convenience stores 
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and particularly on superstores, with convenience stores forecast to suffer less due to the likelihood 
of increased demand for top up shopping. The effect of the growth of delivered shopping on the 
leading multiple Operators will be relatively small, as they are the primary drivers of it. Multiples 
moving into convenience retailing are less exposed to the negative competitive effects of growth in 
delivered shopping, as are those moving into delivered shopping, while those concentrating on 
superstores will be hardest hit if there is rapid growth in delivered shopping. 
Specialised despatch dépôts to fulfil home deliveries will grow because store based picking of orders 
is uneconomical, but this dépends on the uptake of delivered shopping. Moves into specialised 
dépôts appear inévitable, particularly in areas with a high concentration of people, and will underline 
the negative effect of delivered shopping on existing superstores, as thèse will no longer be involved 
in the process of delivering groceries. 
The growth of digital television will be a major driver of delivered shopping, and this will become 
the primary means of ordering soon after 2005. The growth of delivered grocery shopping is 
therefore highly dépendent on the rate of uptake of digital television, which in tum is dépendent on 
the consumer, the govemment and the pricing and marketing of digital television. The delivery 
charge for delivered shopping is likely to be abolished by 2005, or will increasingly be waived for 
larger orders, putting upwards pressure on costs and margins for delivered groceries. 
Superstores will open increasingly for 24 hours, and this will be determined by local demand. 
Compétition plays a rôle in this, and retailers will have to carefully assess local demand, likely costs, 
and the likely actions of local competitors before deciding whether to extend trading hours. 
Price consciousness among consumers will remain relatively stable to 2010, although this is 
dépendent on economic conditions. Price consciousness will be demonstrated through consumers 
seeking value for money, rather than shopping purely on price, and rising incomes will drive a focus 
on quality and service rather than just price. The quality of the shopping expérience is expected to 
improve in the years to 2010, particularly as retailers seek differentiation in a competitive market, 
and polarisation of approach is expected, with Wal-Mart Asda representing the price-focused retailer. 
The opportunity for trading up is therefore clear, although this must not be to such an extent that 
price competitiveness is lost, as consumers will be more aware of priées due to increased compétition 
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and significan! media interest. Rising incomes and increasing numbers o f time poor' consumers will 
drive up the market share of ready meáis, for example, and such consumer changes présent 
opportunités for retailers. 
Compétition in the industry will intensify due to internationalisation, with serious implications for 
weaker operators, who may be forced from the market. Heightened compétition will drive 
differentiation within the industry, and is likely to cause trading up. 
Expenditure on using the data captured by loyalty schemes will increase, as retailers seek to make 
their investments in the schemes pay dividends. There is a danger that customers may tire of loyalty 
schemes by 2010, meaning that they will become a cost burden if efficient use of the data is not 
achieved. 
Relations between food retailers and their suppliers will become closer as they share more 
information to make the supply chain more effective and efficient, and form stratégie alliances and 
partnerships. This has implications for smaller retailers who may not bave the necessary scale to 
form alliances, and could possibly drive vertical intégration in the long run. 
Internationalisation will continue, with Tesco being the primary UK-based international player. 
Other domestic operators are unlikely to succeed in international expansion, and are more likely to be 
taken over by overseas operators. Internationalisation will drive heightened compétition, discussed 
above, although the number of foreign operators interested in UK retailers now appears fewer than 
previously thought. 
Retailers' investment in technology will increase significantly, and will be focused in the areas of 
customer relationship marketing and home shopping. Investment will be driven primarily by 
advancing technology, as old technology becomes obsolète. 
Prívate label will continue to grow in importance, although it will begin to stabilise post-2010. This 
growth will be driven by the increasing market share of multiple operators and by retailers efforts to 
differentiate their retail offering from that of their competitors. 
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Innovation will accelerate to 2010, driven by retailers seeking to improve profitability. This trend 
will continue to be amplified by retailers' adoption of competitors' initiatives, which will continue at 
a similar pace. 
8.3 Key éléments of the theory-based and expert-based forecasts 
Theorv-based forecast (section 7.41 Exoert-based forecast (section 8.2Ì 
Tradinp u p Qf stores, products . facilities & services will 
cont inue to 2 0 1 0 : 
- d r iven b y better quali ty private label, more prepared 
foods, and extension o f non-foods (selected Operators). 
Price consciousness will r emain relat ively stable to 2 0 1 0 , 
and will be demons t ra ted b y consumers seeking value for 
money , rather than pure pr ice-appeal . Ris ing incomes will 
dr ive a focus on quali ty and service rather than jus t pr ice . 
- h igher qual i ty retail env i ronment dr iven b y high 
d e m a n d s o f p lanning authori t ies, and by posit ive 
c o n s u m e r react ion to refurbishments . 
The quality of the shopp ing expér ience will improve to 
2010 , as retailers seek to differentiate themselves . 
- s tore extens ions and more efficient use of space will 
a l low s o m e extension o f range, bu t hosti le p lanning 
guide l ines will const ra in it. 
Polarisat ion of approach will be a key feature as Operators 
seek to distance themse lves from the p u r e pr ice-focused 
approach, part icularly Asda Wal-Mart . 
- t ough p lanning guidel ines will drive range extension 
into catégories requir ing little or no space. 
Trad ing up therefore présents oppor tuni ty , bu t mus t not be 
to such an extent that p r ice compet i t iveness is lost, as 
consumers will increas ingly b e aware o f pr iées due to 
media interest and increased compét i t ion: 
- accep tance a m o n g consumers dr iven by rising real 
incomes . 
- r ising incomes & increasing n u m b e r s o f ' t ime -poor' 
consumers will dr ive d e m a n d for ready mea l s , for 
example . 
- pursued by retailers to grow profits despite a slow 
g rowing food market and l imited new store openings . 
Superstores will increas ingly open for 24 hours , 
determined by local d e m a n d and local compét i t ion . 
- retailers tendencies to bl indly copy compet i to rs ' 
innovat ions will dr ive t rading up, as will rising costs . 
Retai lers Investments in t echnology will increase 
significantly, par t icular ly in C R M & h o m e shopping . 
Dr iven primarily b y advanc ing technology m a k i n g exist ing 
Systems obsolete. 
Private label market share will con t inue to g row, a l though 
it wil l stabilise pos t -2010 . Dr iven b y the increasing marke t 
share of mult iples, and b y retai lers ' a t tempts to 
differentiate their retail offerings. 
Polarisat ion will occur in: 
- s tore sizes, as the host i le p lanning envi ronment forces 
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the deve lopment o f m o r e smaller stores. 
- organisat ional size, due to organic growth of leading 
players , but will be s lowed by O F T ant i -merger stance. 
- services , facilities & tools, following re-appraisal of 
initiatives adopted ' b l ind ly ' in haste, as was the case 
wi th loyalty schemes . 
L i k e l i h o o d o f ' loyal ty fat igue ' a m o n g consumers . Such 
schemes would then b e c o m e a cost burden . Spend ing o n 
use of the data captured will increase as retailers seek to 
make their ùrvestments in the schemes pay . 
- pr ice/service focus, as compét i t ion increasingly over 
e ì ther low pricing or h igh quality expérience. 
Retai l life cvcles will cont inue current & pas t t r ends : 
- independent , co-operat ive & specialist food retailers 
will cont inue to decl ine , al though slower than in past. 
Independents & co-operat ives decl ining marke t share will 
s low down , bu t decline will cont inue nonetheless . 
- mult iples will cont inue to grow, a l though the larger 
opera tors will be the p r imary beneficiaries, despite 
O F T anti-merger s tance . 
Growth in the marke t share of mul t ip les will s low 
dramatical ly , part icularly pos t -2005 , a l though leading 
mult iples will cont inue at expense of w e a k e r mul t ip les : 
- superstore growth will b e slower than in past due to 
p lanning guidelines, a l though better exploitation of 
exist ing outlets may al low some growth. 
- this will b e dr iven b y their expans ion into n e w 
formats, and intense pr ice compét i t ion is l ikely to 
shake out weaker p layers . 
- mul t ip les 1 investment in smaller stores, forecourt 
opéra t ions & del ivered services will dr ive expansion of 
thèse channels , impact ing on independents , 
convenience mult iples & their o w n superstores . 
Convenience store marke t will be the subject of 
consolidation, as major mult iples & co-operat ives enter the 
sector. Symbol retailers will suffer, and al l iances & 
mergers are likely. T h e conven ience sector will g r o w in 
impor tance slightly to 2 0 0 5 , when it will stabil ise. 
The discount marke t will decl ine slightly to 2 0 0 5 , w h e n it 
will stabilise. Decl ine will be due to a d imin i sh ing 
differential be tween discounters & pr ice- led mult iples . 
Inner cities will remain a s trong marke t for d iscounters , bu t 
g rowth will b e s low, bar merger in the sector. 
Del ivered groceries will g row steadily to r each 1 0 % 
marke t share by 2010, a l though at this level, opera to rs 1 
costs will be forced up and the effect on exis t ing retail 
formats would be negl igible . Supers tores are mos t 
sensitive to g rowth in de l ivered shopping, bu t as mult iples 
are the pr imary drivers, the key result wil l b e h igher costs: 
- specialised despatch dépôts for del ivered grocer ies 
will grow in impor tance , part icularly in areas o f urban 
concentrat ion, due to the h igh costs of s tore-based 
picking. Del ivery charges likely to b e abol i shed soon 
310 
after 2005 , earlier for large orders . 
- the advance of technology, part icularly digital T V , 
will affect del ivered shopp ing uptake , & digital T V 
will become the ma in order ing channel soon after 
2005 . 
Survival of the fìttesi will continue-
- a l though O F T ant i -merger stance will prolong the life 
of weak opera tors . Eventual ly , they will disappear by 
being b roken up to b e sold, or via a takeover by an 
overseas operator . 
Supers tore g rowth will be s low due to the p lanning 
environment , which m a y p rovoke takeover . M o s t likely to 
be achieved via the ' b r e a k - u p ' of an organisa t ion due to 
O F T reluctance to a l low further merger . 
- fitness will increas ingly be on an international basis 
as c ross-border expans ion & acquisit ions take effect. 
Compét i t ion in the industry will increase due to 
internationalisation, and w e a k e r p layers will suffer. 
He igh tened compét i t ion is l ikely to dr ive t rading up as 
opera tors seek to differentiate themselves . 
Internat ional isat ion will cont inue , a l though s lower than 
previously thought due to l imited overseas interest in the 
U K . Teseo will be the key UK-based international player, 
and other operators are more l ikely to b e abso rbed b y 
overseas operators than succeed overseas themselves . 
Relat ions wi th suppliers will b e c o m e closer as more 
information is shared to increase supply chain efficiency, 
& strategie par tnerships are formed. Smal ler retailers 
wi thout the scale to form wor thwhi le al l iances m a y suffer, 
and vertical integration m a y occur in the long- term. 
Dialectic-stvle behaviour : 
- food retailers wil l cont inue to 'b l indly ' adopt 
compe t i to r s ' init iat ives for fear of the ha rm they could 
do, w h i c h will dr ive the industry upmarke t & force 
polar isat ion o f services , facilities & tools (see above) . 
Innovat ion will accelerate to 2010 , d r iven b y at tempts to 
improve profitability. Th i s will b e amplif ied b y reta i lers ' 
adopt ion of compet i to r s ' initiatives, wh ich will cont inue at 
a similar pace . 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Section 9.1 présents a summary of likely UK food retail developments to 2010, amalgamating the 
results of the theory-based forecast (7.4). the Delphi forecast (8.1). and likely socio-economic trends 
(appendix 10). Section 9.2 relates the findings of the thesis to the existing body of knowledge, which is 
critically evaluated in the light of the findings (9.4). Finally, the limitations of the study are outlined 
(9.5). as is scope for further research (9.61. 
9.1 Summary of likely developments 
The industry will continue to move upmarket. The addition of new products will be a key driver of 
this, as retailers extend into better quality private label, fresh and prepared foods, and non-foods. Thèse 
sectors are set for faster growth than the overall food market, driven by rising consumer incomes (7.3) 
and retailers' efforts to maintain growth despite limited new store openings and the slow growing core 
food market. Restricted growth in large new stores, however, will constrain this range extension (7.3). 
assuming government planning policy remains broadly consistent, and space for additional products 
must come primarily from the extension of existing stores and the more efficient use of retail space 
(7.3). Gains in sales area will be sufficiently limited to force retailers to focus range extension on 
sectors requiring little or no sales area, such as financial products and services, which, for major 
players, will be aided by consumers' development of trust in the retailer as a brand (7.3). Private label 
will continue to drive the multiple industry upmarket (8.1). as its market share grows and retailers use 
it to differentiate their retail offerings. 
Increasing real incomes will generate further opportunity for retailers to move upmarket. Declming 
unemployment and increasing real incomes will increase the size of the 'money-rich, time-poor', 
sybaritic shopping population (appendix 10). in turn increasing demand for complex, time-saving 
products, such as ready meals (8.1) as well as for better shopping facilities and services. However, 
current unemployment and eamings trends are not guaranteed to continue, and increasing 
unemployment or falling real incomes would have the opposite effect, driving up the size of the 
'money-poor, time-rich', frontier shopping population, in turn increasing demand for good value, basic 
foodstuffs and discount retailers, as consumers focus increasingly on price. 
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Food retailers will continue to be driven upmarket by forces specific to the UK food retail industry 
(7.1.1). such as the growing demands of planners, which will drive new developments upmarket, and 
retailers' continuing investments in store improvements, which will continue as long as favourable 
consumer reaction makes this remain profitable (7.1.1). In addition, retailers will continue to adopt 
competitors' initiatives, largely as a defensive manoeuvre, driving the industry further upmarket 
OLI). 
Compétition in UK food retailing will increase due to the influence of large international retailers in 
the UK market, and will be demonstrated by price compétition between Wal-Mart Asda and Teseo in 
particular, while other retailers will seek to differentiate themselves by moving upmarket, 
concentrating on areas other than price. This suggests that polarisation of approach is likely, with one 
group of Operators marketing themselves as low-priced and another pursuing the quality retail 
expérience (8.1). 
The cost base in UK food retailing will increase due to improved services, longer opening hours and 
increasingly sophistìcated Systems, all of which are driven by the industry's moves upmarket. 24 hour 
opening, for example, will increase due to local demand for out-of-hours shopping, in which case it is 
a profitable and sensible strategy (8.1), but will also be driven by pressure of compétition, in which 
case it can drive up costs. Similarly, retailers' continued spending on sorting and analysing loyalty 
scheme data (8.1), will drive up the costs of retailers failing to use the data effectively. Finally, 
delivered groceries will attain 10% market share by 2010 (8.1). a level at which it will not cover its 
costs. In short, the cost base will rise due to improved services as retailers trade up, putting upwards 
pressure on priées and margins. 
Polarisation will be a feature of food retailing to 2010. It will occur in store sizes, as multiple retailers 
move increasingly into small stores in the face of a hostile large store planning environment (7.3). 
Polarisation of organisational size will continue, despite the brake of current UK compétition policy, 
which limits merger opportunities for large players. Polarisation is evident in loyalty schemes, with 
many players dropping them, and similar patterns will emerge in other services and facilities, driven 
by polarisation of the price-service competitive positioning (above), and retailers' tendencies to adopt 
competitors' initiatives in defensive haste. 
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The mature, saturateci market place means that rapid growth in any one format or operator will 
continue to impact upon competing formats and operators. Multiple operators will continue to gain 
market share from independent, co-operative and specialist operators, although this will be slower than 
it has been in the past due to the small residuai market share left to attack, particularly post-2005 (7.3). 
The fittest, leading multiple operators will also continue to gain market share from smaller, weaker 
multiple organisations, but this will be constrained to a certain degree by anti-merger compétition 
policy (7.3). which will prolong the life of some weak operators. These will not be protected 
indefinitely, however, as weak players are stili vulnérable to takeover by overseas operators, or being 
broken up and sold to a consortium of domestic players (7.3), which is made more attractive by the 
difficulties gaining planning permission for new superstores (8.1). 
The planning environment for large stores is unlikely to change significantly, severely constraining 
growth of the superstore format. Moderate growth in the market share of superstores will be achieved 
ali the same, through the extension of existing stores, the more efficient use of space (see above), and 
those superstore planning applications that do receive approvai. 
The market share of smaller Stores, forecourt opérations, and delivered grocery services will be driven 
up by multiples' investments in them. Significant growth in multiples' small stores and forecourt 
opérations will impact most profoundly on convenience multiples, independents (including voluntary 
groups) and co-operative societies, while significant uptake of delivered shopping would have a 
particularly negative effect on superstores (8.1. also see below). 
If further internationalisation of the industry were to occur, compétition would be heightened, 
increasing the importance of organisational fitness (8.1). because compétition and organisational 
fitness would increasingly be determined on an international, rather than a domestic, basis (7.31. It 
would also drive intensification of price compétition, shaking out weaker players in the process (8.2). 
but the number of foreign operators interested in acquiring UK retailers is seemingly fewer than was 
previously estimated (8.1). 
The activity of major multiples in the convenience store sector will make fitness of organisation more 
criticai, increasing the likelihood of merger in the sector. Major multiples' activity in this sector will 
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impact upon symbol retailers (8.1). although this will be partly offset by a slight growth in the 
importance of convenience retailing in comparison to the overall food market (8.1). 
The discount sector is faced with a falling market to 2005, and discounters' price advantages will be 
eroded somewhat due to lower pricing among mainstream multiples (8.1). In such a situation, survival 
of the fìttest will occur, and struggling operators are likely to be absorbed by fitter ones, although the 
international dimension makes many of the key operators more secure, and conversion of Kwik Save 
outlets to the Somerfield fascia will allow competing discount operators to increase their store base. 
Retailers continuing drives to improve profitability while differentiating themselves (8.1) will drive 
accélération in the rate of innovation to 2010 (8.1). which will be 'amplified' by their défensive 
adoption of competitors' initiatives, which will continue at a steady pace (8.1). 
Démographie change présents opportunity for retailers, with a key trend in this area being the 
increasing size of the elderly population. This sector of society controls a disproportionate amount of 
the country's total wealth, presenting significant opportunity from meeting its needs. The ageing 
population is also one of the drivers of the increasing number of single-person households (appendix 
10). and of the growing number of couples without dépendent children, who have higher household 
incomes than those with dépendants (appendix 10). suggesting opportunity for 'trading u p \ Such 
démographie changes must be grasped by retailers, as there are implications in many areas such as 
ranging, pricing, pack sizes, and the facilities and services demanded by consumers. 
The UK is becoming more cosmopolitan due to increased tourism and travet, and rising numbers of 
overseas settlers, presenting opportunity for further moves into more exotic foods as consumers 
become more adventurous in their eating (appendix 10). Internai migration is a further factor, and is 
driving increasing concentration of the population in the south-east, which is where growth in the 
market for food will therefore be greatest (appendix 10). 
Increasing real incomes, falling information technology prices, and new means of accessing internet 
services will drive significant growth in the potential size of the market for delivered groceries 
(appendix 10), forecast to reach 10% market share by 2010 (8.1), which would have little or no effect 
on existing retail formats. If delivered groceries were to reach 25% market share, however, which is 
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highly uniikely by 2010, the impact on convenience stores would be significant, and that on 
superstores would be major (8.1). In any case, the impact of delivered groceries on leading multiples 
will be minimal because they are the key drivers of the service, although it will drive some transfer of 
market share within this group. 
The proportion of delivered groceries processed by specialised despatch dépôts, as opposed to existing 
stores, will grow, particularly in areas with a concentrated population, although this is dépendent on 
the growth of delivered shopping itself (8.1). Soon after 2005, digital television will become the 
primary means of ordering delivered groceries, and will be a major factor determining the success of 
the service. 
Finally, consumer price consciousness will remain relatively constant to 2010, although this is 
dépendent on economic conditions (8.1). and will be demonstrated by a continuation of current trends 
to prioritise value for money, rather price alone. 
9.2 Relationship of Undings to the existing body of knowledge 
The existing body of knowledge of relevance to the Undings is in two areas - that pertaining to the 
théories of retail change, and that explaining UK food retail development. 
In the first field, the théories of retail change, the findings support existing knowledge, and also 
advance a significant body of new understanding of the théories, while extending Brown's [1987a] 
m ulti-polarisation model to encompass more dimensions of retail change. 
New driving forces are advanced for the Wheel of Retailing (7.1.1. p.266-268), expansion and 
contraction of the retail accordion (7.1.2. p.268-270), the polarisation principle (7.1.3. p.270), the retail 
life cycle (7.1.5. p.277-278), and Darwinian (7.1.6. p.281-282) and Dialectic (7.1.7. p.283-284) 
évolution. The most significant new understanding, however, is advanced in the causes of trading-up 
(7.1.1. p.261-268) and extension of polarisation tendencies (7.1.4. p.273-276). 
The existing body of retail change theory focuses excessively on US retail development; by focusing 
on the UK this study goes some way to redress the balance. The approach taken, based on the 
grounded theory technique (3.I.Ü. p.74-75), is appropriate in a setting with a lack of historical data, 
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and in a concentrated retail industry driven by a limited number of retail executives, many of whom 
were Willing to tell their stories. In short, mis work is a relatively major contribution to the body of 
retai! change theory, but there is always scope for further research (9.6. p.323-324), whether into the 
same field, to confimi or reject past works, or into alternative fields, to broaden knowledge. 
In the second field, the body of knowledge on UK food retail development, it is not unrealistic to claim 
that the work is of major importance, filling a gap in the literature (22, p.67-68) with a retail history 
based on a large-scale consultation with key food retail executives of the post-war period. This area of 
the study is concentrated in chapters 4 to 6, and the work goes a long way to filling the void between 
company and personal biographies, on the one hand, and issue-specific literature on the other, bringing 
together a rather fragmented body of knowledge. 
Finally, this work is appropriate in that it takes up UK food retail development where the last major 
chronicle of the sector, Jefferys [1954], left off. 
9.3 Implications and recommendations for the UK food retail industry 
• Margin improvement will be driven by the addition of higher margin Unes. Operators must keep up 
with this trend or their margins will fall behind those of their competitors. 
• this range extension will allow growth in a static food market, but will be difficult to 
achieve because of limited growth in large new stores. Instead it must be achieved by 
extending existing stores, using space more efficiently, and moving into products requiring 
little of no shelf space. 
• The standard of living of UK consumers is likely to improve, presenting an opportunity for 
retailers to improve the quality of their offerings, facilities, services and the general retail 
environment. Increasing standards of living will drive demand for products such as ready meals, 
suited to 'money-rich, time-poor' sybaritic shoppers. 
• such an improvement in the standard of living will reduce the number of 'money-poor, 
time-rich' frontier shoppers, with negative ramifications for the discount sector, which is 
already static in terms of market share, and is facing increased compétition from leading 
multiples' renewed interest in price compétition. 
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• economic forecasting is notoriously risky, however, and an economic downturn may lead to 
decreasing standards of living and falling real incomes, increasing the number of frontier 
shoppers, increasing demand for discounters and reducing demand for sybaritic shopping, 
effectively reversing the situation. Any trading up, therefore, must not subject Operators to 
undue risk from a possible recession. 
• Improvements to the retail environment will continue due to planning authorities' demands and 
retailers' investments in store refurbishment. Retailers bave little control over planners, and the 
refurbishment of stores will continue as long as it is profitable. It is important, therefore, for 
retailers to maintain the appeal of their stores, as this will remain an important élément of 
compétition, and this is generally a profitable strategy anyway. 
• Retailers will continue to adopt competitore' initiatives, again driving the industry upmarket. Fear 
is the root of this défensive behaviour, and initiatives would be more effective if considered 
thoroughly before adoption, which would also limit the amount of money wasted on ineffective 
initiatives. 
• Internationalisation of the industry is driving polarisation between price and service-focused 
multiple retailers, as certain players seek to protect themselves from the worst price compétition by 
differentiating themselves in tenus of quality. Retailers must be conscious of avoiding the middle 
ground, as it is important to have marketable points of différence. 
• Rising costs are likely to be incurred in the areas of 24 hour store opening, loyalty scheme data 
processing, and delivered grocery services. A limited amount of cost is obviously acceptable in any 
of thèse areas, but retailers must be careful to keep costs under control. 24 hour opening of stores 
can be forced by the local competitive environment, but costs should be minimised by closing 
departments that are expensive to operate, such as delicatessen, at off-peak times. Loyalty scheme 
data is of little use if it is not turned into a usable form, and it is important for Operators to decide 
exactly what they require of the data. Delivered groceries are a growth market, but one incurring 
large costs, which is acceptable to a certain degree, but retailers must continue to balance the likely 
future benefits against the current and projected costs. 
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• thèse rising costs will drive trading up of the range, as a means of compensating for higher 
costs through larger margins. 
Polarisation is likely in many areas, including store sizes, organisation al size, adoption of 
marketing tools, such as loyalty schemes, and the price-service approach. 
• it is important for retailers not to allow themselves to occupy the middle ground as 
polarisation occurs in thèse areas. Retailers must carefully consider their position, at 
fréquent intervais - losing what was previously an exclusive position has brought problems 
for Kwik Save, Sainsbury's and M&S, among others. 
Growth of any one type of format or organisation will continue to impact negatively on the 
fortunes of other types. Large multiples will continue to erode the market of independent, co-
operative, specialist and weak multiple operators, although this will be at a slower rate than in the 
past. Thèse competing retailers must ensure that they take advantage of their locai knowledge, 
manoeuvrable size, and any other strengths in order to compete effectively with larger competitors. 
Operators of superstores should investigate alternative means of growth, as growth in the number 
of superstores is suppressed by the hostile planning environment, which seems unlikely to change. 
They should also seek to extend stores and use space more efficiently, so as to obtain growth 
through improved performance rather than additional stores. Sustained growth of delivered grocery 
shopping would impact severely on superstores in the long-term, so those operators most exposed 
to this risk should be those most actively pursuing delivered shopping, as a protective mechanism 
and a source of future growth. 
Growth of multiple operators in the small, convenience store format will have an impact on 
independent, voluntary and co-operative operators, although this will be partly offset by increased 
demand for top-up shopping generated by growth of delivered shopping. The impact of multiple 
activity in the small store sector, however, will be profound, and will drive consolidation in the 
sector. 
Mergers involving major domestic operators are unlikely due to the regulatory environment. This 
will encourage internationalisation of the industry by making purchase by a foreign operator one of 
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only two means of a struggling retailer leaving the industry, the other being the break-up and sale 
of assets to competitors. Retailers should be on the look out for opportunities to purchase elements 
of competitors' operations, as this will be one of only a few avenues of real domestic growth. 
• further internationalisation of the industry would drive heightened competition between 
players, and weak operators would be likely to be shaken out. The likelihood of this is 
receding, however, as fewer international players are interested in breaking into the UK 
market than was previously thought. 
• Consolidation is likely in the discount and convenience sectors. The former is a static market, 
faced with declining consumer attraction as mainstream multiple operators compete increasingly 
on price, which effectively reduces the benefit of discount store shopping. Discount operators must 
ensure that they remain extremely streamlined so as to be able to create maximum perception of 
price advantage, and may be able to grow through acquisition as competitors struggle, although the 
international nature of the sector means that it may prove more resilient. The latter is facing 
increased competition due to the entrance of mainstream multiple operators, which enjoy 
considerable efficiencies of operation. Competing operators must make the best of their strong 
points, but this is unlikely to stop consolidation in the sector if multiples are truly committed to it. 
• Retailers should adapt their strategies to profit from demographic change. Rapid perception of the 
changing consumer provided M&S with a distinct advantage in ready meals in the 1980s, for 
example. In the period to 2010, the population will age, the number of single-person and single-
parent households will increase, and the number of couples without dependants will grow, all of 
which present significant opportunity for retailers providing that the range, quality of offering, size 
of pack, store portfolio and other factors are adjusted to suit the changing consumer profile. 
Likewise, the increasingly cosmopolitan UK outlook presents opportunities to diversify into more 
adventurous, higher-margin foods. 
• Delivered groceries will account for 10% of the UK food retail market in 2010, although this is 
dependent on many factors, particularly consumer uptake of internet technology. The impact of 
this on the existing retail hierarchy will be major, but further growth post-2010 may begin to have 
a major effect, particularly on superstores, and retailers must remain aware of this threat and take 
appropriate counter measures. 
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• Consumers will continue to prioritise value for money rather than priée alone, with price 
consciousness remaining relatively stable to 2010. Retailers should avoid trading up the retail 
expérience to such an extent that they are no longer able to respond to consumer demand for value, 
although retail surroundings do contribute to consumers' price-value perception, 
9.4 Criticai évaluation of the validity of the existing body of retail change theory 
The existing body of retail change theory is of a signifïcant size (2.1). but it is not addressed in a 
balanced way. First and foremost, it is rarely focused on the UK, or even European, retail change. 
Second, the nature of historical research has forced a major chunk of the literature to be based on 
secondary sources, and many seemingly important works merely re-iterate previous research. 
The literature does, however, illustrate many cases of application in the developed world, particularly 
the USA. Granted, there are failures, notably in lower-level économies, but the success rate in the USA 
is reasonably high. Driving forces and effects are identified in détail, although extensions to the 
domain of application are generally disappointing. 
The WheeI of Retailing, despite its often cited shortcomings, must be identified as the leading theory 
of retail change. It has the most cases of application, consequently the most cases of non-application, 
and is the best known and most keenly debated of the théories. Alternative théories are a 
disappointment because they have generated less académie debate, partìy because this has been 
focused primarily on the Wheel of Retailing. 
In short, the existing body of retail change theory suffers from over-emphasis on cases of non-
application, pre-occupation with American retailing, the dominance of the Wheel of Retailing, and 
reliance on un-original, secondary sources. This study goes some way towards redressing this balance, 
and générâtes new and better understanding of the théories of retail change, based on UK food retail 
change in the second half of the 20th century, the key points of which are summarised briefiy below. 
The Wheel of Retailing, trading up in particular, is well suited to the analysis of food retail change 
over the period, with trading up being driven by scrambled merchandising, secular trends, fear of price 
compétition, and previously undocumented factors such as retailers' tendencies to emulate their 
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competitors, high taxation clouding price competition, generał rising taxation, planning authorities' 
heightened expectations, and the positive correlation between improvements to the retail environment 
and increased profits. 
The key forces acting upon the Retail Accordion were identified, and include increasing storę sizes, 
high consumer traffic, new product launches, the changing consumer, changing shopping pattems and 
technological advance. Again, a significant number of new ideas were advanced, contributing to the 
body of knowledge. 
Forces driving polarisation of storę sizes were highlighted, an area which is heavily influenced by the 
regulatory and competitive environment. Importantly, the multi-polarisation model has been extended, 
for the first time sińce its elaboration [Brown, 1987a], to include organisational size, pricing strategy, 
and use of incremental sales tools such as loyalty cards, with polarisation occurring in all these new 
dimensions, representing an exciting contribution to the body of retail change theory. 
There is widespread evidence of Retail Life Cycles in UK food retailing, and the forces driving and 
constraining these are identified. This area is dependent on the regulatory environment, consumer 
change and technological development, but the main cause of acceleration in a retail format's life cycle 
is a competing retail format's movement into rapid growth. 
Darwinian lsurvival of the fittest' is also widely evident in UK food retailing, and is becoming more 
critical as the field takes on an increasingly international flavour. This is constrained somewhat, 
however, by the current regulatory environment, which inhibits domestic takeover. 
Dialectic behaviour is also widespread and common, and is driven largely by fear of competitors' 
innovations. Fuli synthesis is difficult to prove, but retail chains that bear remarkable similarities in 
modern times have evolved from distinctly differing origins. 
To conclude, no theory of retail change is entirely satisfactory, but this empirical research goes some 
way towards increasing understanding of them, proposes new forces that act upon them, and suggests 
extensions to improve their domain of application. This is a worthwhile contribution to the body of 
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knowledge, which results directly from original research into the key personalities driving retail 
change. 
9.5 Limitations of study 
This study, like any, has limitations, which simultaneously présent opportunity for further research. It 
addresses only UK food retail change, creating an opportunity for similar research on other retail 
sectors and in other countries. Country-specific studies would be of particular interest due to the 
possibilities arising from cross-border comparisons. 
The period covered was limited by the time of the researcher, availability of information, and access to 
key personalities. Although addressing a period of time up to and including récent history, time will 
move on creating further history to be documented and explained. The length of the study is a further 
limiting factor, particularly as the interview phase yielded excellent information that has been 
precluded from inclusion by space constraints. There are further stories to be told, in other words, and 
in the interests of clarity and focus thèse will have to be told elsewhere. 
Delphi forecasting is a powerful tool, but dépends heavily on the sample for accuracy. In this case, the 
Delphi panel was small, because requests to potential participants failed to solicit a good response. 
Only time will reveal whether this has affected accuracy, and even forecasts drawing on a huge panel 
are liable to signifïcant déviation from actual events. 
Finally, like any qualitative study, an élément of bias is introduced by the researcher, the researcher's 
sélection of interview subjects, the subjects themselves, and the researcher's interprétation of the 
subjects' stories. Much effort went into minimising the introduction of bias, however, in the hope that 
the final resuit would be an accurate, truthful représentation of UK food retail change between 1950 
and 2000. 
9.6 Scope for future research 
The théories of retail change, although originally intended to apply at institutional (format) level, are 
nonetheless an appropriate tool for application to individuai retail companies. This became 
increasingly apparent as this study progressed, and the théories have been applied to retail institutions 
and retail companies alike. While many would criticise their application with regard to companies, 
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others call for further research of this nature [Brown, 1988a, 1988b], a call to which one voice is added 
nere. 
The quest for a universal theory of retail change is seemingly an unwise, time-consuming quest for the 
impossible, as is universal application of the existing théories. Future researchers should remain aware 
of the enormous différences between différent retail Systems, and concentrate on the generation of 
theoretical underpinnings that aptly describe certain retail évolution in defined markets, allowing 
applicability to be evaluated in detail later. In short, the théories of retail change describe common 
retail evolutionary tendencies in developed économies, they are by no means universal, and as 
universality approaches, clarity of explanation recèdes. 
Having concentrated on food retail change over a limited period in one country, the possibilities for 
similar future research are constrained primarily by the imagination. Other time periods, alternative 
retail markets, and non-LTK countries are ali likely to generate rewarding research outcomes, 
depending on access to key personalities associated with retail development. The development of UK 
food wholesaling and manufacturing over the same period would be an excellent corresponding work, 
and although such a study was originally planned to coincide with the publication of the présent one, 
this project sadly failed to matérialise, presenting a promising avenue of future research into a field 
that is subject to many of the same forces as the food retail industry. 
To conclude, there is significant scope for future research info the théories of retail change. Work to 
date has been concentrated on US retail development, and much of this draws on a limited number of 
secondary sources. Although this is a key weakness of the body of retail change theory, it opens up 
encouraging avenues for future research. 
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Appendix One 
i 
Results from the Delphi forecast 
Structure of Retai! Sys tem: 
Year 1980 1990 1997 2005 2010 
Mult ip les 6 0 . 9 % 7 5 , 8 % 8 5 . 6 % 90 .0% 9 2 . 0 % 
IQR 8 9 - 9 0 : : 90-92 
Co-opera t ives 14 .2% 1 0 . 3 % 7 . 4 % 5 . 5 % 5 .0% 
IQR 5-6 .:. 4-5:25 
Independents 2 4 . 9 % 13.9% 7 .0% 5.0% 4 . 0 % 
IQR 5-5.5 3.25-5 
[source of 1980, 1990 and 1997 figures: Nielsen Market Research] 
Conf idence level: 3.1 
2. The percentage of the total U K grocery market accounted for by the 5 largest U K food retai lers in 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 9 3 
and 1998 and forecasts for 2005 and 2010 . 
% of U K food retail marke t passing through the leading five U K food retailers: 
Year: 1988 
3 4 . 4 % 
1993 
4 1 . 9 % 
1998 (June) 
4 8 . 4 % 
2 0 0 5 
6 0 . 0 % 
NB: Figures for thc 5 largest UK food 
retailers at June 1998 include Somerfield, 
but not Kwik Save. Kwik Save market share 
a tJune 1998 = 3.4% 
IQR: 55.5-60^ 
2 0 1 0 
6 5 . 0 % 
60-65 
[source of 1988, 1993 and 1998 figures: IGD Research Services.] 
{Shares based on retailers where food related sales exceed 50%, small ne ighbourhood stores w h e r e food related sales 
exceed 3 5 % , includes chemis ts , M & S food sales and VAT, excludes petrol and non-food sales} 
Confidence level: 2.9 
3 . The percentage of the total U K grocery market accounted for by the 3 largest U K f o o d retailers in 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 9 3 
and 1998 and forecasts for 2005 and 2010 . 
% of U K food retail marke t pass ing through the leading three U K food retailers: 
Year: 1988 1993 1998 (June) 2005 2 0 1 0 
2 4 . 0 % 3 0 . 8 % 3 6 . 9 % 4 3 . 0 % 4 8 . 0 % 
IQR: 42 -46 .5 45 .5 -52 ~ 
[source of 1988, 1993 and 1998 figures: I G D Research Services.] 
{Shares based on retailers where food related sales exceed 5 0 % , smal l ne ighbourhood stores where food related sales 
exceed 3 5 % , includes chemists , M & S food sales and VAT, excludes petrol and non-food sales} 
Conf idence level: 3.0 
1. The market share of U K food retail types in 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 9 0 and 1997 and forecasts for 2005 and 2 0 1 0 : 
4. H o w the a b o v e growth will be generateci, organical ly or through acquisit ion: 
100% natural 7 5 % nat. 50 % natural 2 5 % nat. 0 % natural no g rowth 
0 % acquisi t ion 2 5 % acq. 5 0 % acquisit ion 7 5 % acq. 100% acquisi t ion expec ted 
IQR: 3-6.5 
Conf idence level : 2.9 
5. T h e s h a r e of each type of convenience retailer and the percentage of the U K grocery retai] market accounted 
for by the conven ience store sector (<3000 sq.ft. but not specialista such as bakers and chemists , sel l ing 
. . .predominant ly food and drink, with long opening hours) in 1997 and 1998 and forecasts for 2 0 0 5 a n d 2010 
Trade sector: ghare of total convenience sector 
1997 1998 TOR 2005 2005 2Q10 IQR 2010 
Non-affi liatcd Independents 41 .3% 38.6% 30-33.5 31-0% 27.0% 24-32.75, . 
Symbol Groups (c,g., Spar, Londis) 23.4% 24.0% 23-25.5 24.6% 24.0% 21.5-25:5' 
Forccourts (of oil companies only) 20.2% 18.4% 15-20 ~ • 17.4% 16.4% 14.5-19.5 
Convenience Multiples (e.g., Alldays) 8.6% 11.0% 13-14.5' 14.0% 15.0% 14.5-16: 
Co-opcratives (e.g-, CWS, CRS) 5.6% 5.8% 5-7.5 6.5% 6.5% 5 - 1 0 ' • ' ^ 
Major Multiples (inc. their forecourts) n/a 1.2% 3.7-6.5 y 5.5% 9.0% 6.5-11.75' 
Off-liccnce based Convenience Stores 1.0% 0-9% 0.5-10 1.0% 1.0% Ö.5-1.0 : 
100% 100% 
% o f total UK g r o c e r y s a l e s a c c o u n t e d 
for b y c o n v e n i e n c e S t o r e s : 17.7% i 8.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
IQR: 1875-20 . I Q R : 20-22 ; 
[ source o f 1997 and 1998 figures: adapted from IGD Research 1999/ Wi l l iam R e e d K n o w l e d g e Store] 
Conf idence level: 2.8 
6. T h e U K m a r k e t share of discount food retaìlers in 1994 and 1998 and forecasts for 2 0 0 5 and 2 0 1 0 (not 
individuai retai ler shares) : 
Retai ler 1994 1998 
Aldi 0 .6% 1.0% 
Net to 0 .6% 0 .9% 
Lidi 
-
0 . 8 % 
Kwik Save 6 . 5 % 5 . 3 % 
Food Giant 1.5% 0 . 5 % 
T o t a l d i s c o u n t e r s 9 . 2 % 8 .5% 
2005 2010 
8 . 0 % 8 . 0 % 
IQR: 7.25-9 IQR: 7-9.5. 
[source of 1994 and 1998 figures: I G D Research Services. I 
{Shares based on rctailers where food related sales exceed 50%, small ne ighbourhood stores where food related sales 
exceed 3 5 % , includes chemists , M & S food sales and V A T , excludes petrol and non- food sales} 
Conf idence level: 3.3 
ili 
Retail Formats & non,-store retailìng: 
8. In 2010, it is forecast that 6 0 % of delivered groceries will be despatched from special ised despatch depots (depots 
devoted solely to h o m e d e l i v e r ^ s , rather than home deliveries picked from an existing food store open to the publ ic ) 
IQR: 15-67.5 
Confidence level: 2.4 
9a. If del ivered grocery shopping ordered remotely (for example by internet, phone , fax) captures a 1 0 % share of 
the market by 2010 , it is forecast to have the fol lowing effect on locai, convenience retai lers: 
decrease 
their trade 
dramatical ly 
I 
0 1 
decrease 
their 
trade 
same trade 
as at 
present 
inerease 
their 
trade 
inerease 
their t rade 
dramat ica l ly 
[ 
9 10 
IQR: 5-7 
9b. If del ivered grocery shopp ing ordered remotely (for example by internet, p h o n e , fax) captures a 2 5 % share of 
the market by 2010 , it is forecast to have the following effect on locai, convenience retai lers: 
decrease 
their trade 
dramatical ly 
I 
0 
decrease 
their 
t rade 
same trade 
as at 
present 
l 
5 6 
IQR: 3-4.75 
Confidence level: 2.6 
inerease 
their 
trade 
7 8 
inerease 
their t rade 
dramat ica l ly 
1 
9 10 
10a. If del ivered grocery shopping ordered remotely (for example by internet, phone , fax) captures a 1 0 % share 
of the market by 2010 , it is forecast to have the following effect on out-of - town supers tores : 
decrease 
their trade 
dramatical ly 
I 
0 1 
decrease 
their 
trade 
same trade 
as at 
present 
inerease 
their 
trade 
1 
7 
inerease 
their trade 
dramat ica l ly 
1 
9 10 
IQR: 4-5 
10b. If del ivered grocery shopp ing ordered remotely (for example by internet , p h o n e , fax) captures a 2 5 % share 
of the market by 2010 , it is forecast to have the fol lowing effect on out-of - town supers tores : 
decrease 
their trade 
dramatical ly 
I 
0 
decrease 
their 
trade 
Confidence level: 2.6 
same trade 
as at 
present 
I Q R : 2.5-4 
inerease 
their 
trade 
7 
inerease 
their trade 
dramat ica l ly 
I 
10 
7. The marke t share of grocer ies del ivered to the h o m e is forecast to b e 5JÌ% in 2005 and 1 0 . 0 % in 2010 
IQR; 4 .5-5.5 I Q R : 6.75-ÌT~ 
Confidence level: 2.7 
11. O f the del ivered grocery market shares in 2005 and 2010 forecast in quest ion 7, the proport ion ordered by 
format is forecast to be: 
Telephone/ fax : 
Internet (or intranet) : 
Via digi ta l télévision: 
Other formats (please state): 
I O R 2005 2005 2010 I O R 2 0 1 0 
4 0 : 4 8 . 7 5 4 0 % 2 2 . 5 % 20-28.75.. . 
21.25-35 2 5 % 27.5% 21:25-30 
21 .25-30 2 5 % 4 2 . 5 % 3 L 2 5 - 4 8 . 7 5 
0-5 0 0 0-10 .;• " • 
Conf idence level: 2.7 
12. Forecas t that the del ivery charge for delivered groceries will be widely abol ished: 
strongly 
agrée 
I 
9 10 
IQR: 4-7 
Year this is forecast to happen: — . 
2000 2 0 0 1 2002 2003 2004 f2005ï 2006 2007 2008 2009 2 0 1 0 later never n/a 
Conf idence level: 3.0 
IQR: 2002-2006 or latef/never 
strongly neither agrée 
disagree disagree nor disagrec agrée 
13. 24 h o u r opening of superstores is forecast to b e c o m e the norm in year: 
2000 2001 2002 2003 fm>4\ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2 0 1 0 later never n/a 
Conf idence level: 3.1 
IQR: 2002-2010 b r l a t e r /neve r 
C o n s u m e r Behav iour & Pric ing: 
14. In 2 0 1 0 , price consciousness among consumers is forecast to be: 
price far price less 
less important impor tant than 
than at présent at présent 
I I 
0 1 2 3 
Conf idence level: 3 .0 
price price more pr ice far 
neither less or important than m o r e impor tant 
more important at présent than at présent 
4 f 5 ^ 6 7 8 9 10 
IQR: 5-5.5 
15. T h e probabil i ty of the use of price variations, according to the t ime of day or week , w h e r e prices are highest 
during busy periods , and lowcr at other t imes, is forecast to be: 
highly 
unl ikely 
I 
0 1 
fairly 
unl ikeiy 
neither unlikely 
nor likely 
fairly 
likely 
IQR: 2 .25-6 
Year this is forecast to be the norm: 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 f 2005) 2006 2007 
h ighly 
l ikely 
I 
10 
2008 2 0 0 9 2010 later never n/a 
Confidence level: 3.0 
IQR: 2005-2010 
Compét i t ion: 
16. C o m p a r e d with today , compét i t ion in U K food retail ing in 2010 is forecast to be: 
far less 
intense 
than today 
I 
0 
s o m e w h a t less 
intense 
than today 
1 2 3 
Confidence level: 3.4 
same intensity 
as today 
1 
4 5 6 
somewha t more 
intense 
than today 
I 
7 ( 8 
far m o r e 
intense 
than today 
I 
10 
IQR: 7-8 
17. In 2 0 1 0 , U K food retailers are forecast to differcntiate their offerings by a t tempt ing to create unique sell ing 
points: 
dramatically 
less than 
at présent 
I 
0 
less 
than 
at présent 
I 
2 3 
same 
as at 
présent 
Confidence level: 3.6 
dramatical ly 
m o r e than 
at présent 
I 
10 
Use of cus tomer data and retai ler-manufacturer relations: 
18 . In 2 0 1 0 , U K food retai ler expenditure on the collection and use of customer data to be ( includes cost of loyalty 
schemes in m o n e y off vouchers , administrat ion of the loyalty schemes , cost of h a r d w a r e and software, and the cost 
of turning raw cus tomer data ìnto data suitable for use in business décisions) is forecast to be: 
dramatically 
less than 
at présent 
I 
0 
less 
than 
at présent 
Confidence level: 3.3 
same 
as at 
présent 
more 
than 
at présent 
7 ' ( 8 
IQR: 7.5-8 
dramatical ly 
more than 
at présent 
1 
10 
vi 
19. By 2 0 1 0 , the amount of data s h a r e d between retailer and manufacturer is forecast to be: 
dramatically 
less than 
at présent 
I 
0 
less 
than 
at présent 
I 
2 3 
Conf idence level : 3.5 
same 
as at 
présent 
I 
4 5 
more 
than 
at présent 
I 
7 
dramatical ly 
more than 
at présent 
I 
9 10 
IQR: 8-9 
20 . By 2 0 1 0 , partnerships between retailer and manufacturer will increase in n u m b e r and in importance , is 
forecast to b e : 
highly fairly 
unlikely unlikely 
I I 
0 1 2 3 
Conf idence level: 3.7 
neither unlikely 
nor likely 
fairly 
likely 
ÏQR: 8-8 
highly 
likely 
I 
10 
Inves tment and technology 
2 1 . In 2 0 1 0 , U K food retailer investment in overseas Operations is forecast to be: 
dramatical ly dramatical ly 
less than less than s ame as more than m o r e than 
at present at present at present at present at present 
I 1 I ^ 1 I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Conf idence level : 3.6 IQR: 6-8 
22 . In 2 0 1 0 , overseas food retailer investment in U K opérat ions is forecast to be: 
dramatical ly 
less than less than 
at present at present 
I I 
0 1 2 3 
Conf idence level : 3.4 
same as 
at present 
more than 
at present 
IQR: 7-8 
dramat ica l ly 
m o r e than 
at present 
1 
10 
2 3 . Inves tment in technology. I n 2010 this investment is forecast to be: 
dramatically 
less than 
at present 
1 
0 
less than 
at present 
I 
2 3 
Conf idence level : 3.9 
same as 
at present 
I 
5 
more than 
at present 
7 
IQR: 8-8 
dramat ica l ly 
more than 
at present 
I 
10 
Ranging: 
24 . T h e share of total grocery expenditure spent on own-tabel groceries in 1993 and 1996 and forecast shares for 
2005 and 2 0 1 0 . 
1993 1996 2005 2010 
3 7 % 4 0 % 4 5 % 4 7 % 
1QR: 42 .5 -46 IQR: 44-50 
[source of 1993 and 1996 figures: Taylor Nelson A G B ] 
Conf idence level: 2.9 
25 . By 2 0 1 0 , the market share of ready meals and prepared foods is forecast to have increased by 2 0 % compared to 
current levels 
Conf idence level: 2.9 
IQR: 17.5-30 
Assessment of theories of retail change 
26 . The qual i ty of the shopping experience (in terms of levels of service and störe facilities) in 2010 is forecast to 
be: 
m u c h lower 
quali ty than 
at present 
I 
0 
somewha t lower 
quali ty than 
at p resen t 
Conf idence level: 3.6 
same 
quality as 
at present 
somewha t better 
quali ty than 
at present 
IQR: 6^8 
m u c h bet ter 
quali ty than 
at present 
I 
10 
27. In 2 0 1 0 , TJK food retailers are forecast to be: 
far less 
innovative 
than at present 
0 1 
Confidence level: 
s o m e w h a t less 
innovat ive 
than at present 
I 
2 3 
3.4 
same as 
at present 
I 
5 
somewha t more 
innovative 
than at present 
I 
7 ^ 
IQR: 6-7.5 
far m o r e 
innovat ive than 
at present 
I 
9 10 
28. In 2 0 1 0 , TJK food retailers are forecast to adopt one another's ideas 
dramatical ly 
less than 
at present 
I 
0 1 
less than 
at present 
same as 
at present 
more than 
at present 
Confidence level: 
3 
3.3 
dramatical ly 
more than 
at present 
I 
10 
IQR: 5-6.5 
viii 

Appendix Three 
x 
Market researcb and site assessment techniques 
Market researcb. is a tool to aid managerial décision making, and its uses have been concentrated in 
the three areas of price comparison, site assessment and consumer perception. It provides valuable 
information on consumer behaviour, consumer demand, the business itself, or any other areas that 
may seem relevant. Market research provides business information, aiding management in décision 
making, can identify emerging opportunities and help to secure the présent business. As a 
compétitive weapon, the information obtained through market research provides insights and 
présents opportunities to exploit the findings. Market research in UK food retailing has evolved over 
time, the various phases of winch are considered below. 
Early market research was driven by the expansion of régional grocers in the early-1970s, who 
required information on why people chose to shop with them rainer than with competitors in order to 
correctly identify opportunities for diversification - whether geographically or of product (4.4. p. 100-
105). Initially it aimed to forecast the probability of success in planned store locations, although there 
was initially no analysis of possible spending levels, with estimâtes being based on potential footfall 
instead: 
: "Some of thé initial : rèseqf&ijihai was donc was fèdlly\ àlohg thé fines of y du., know, Wë'fè 
inlendirig to moyeinto thisïpariicularfown;haveyou hèafdofftsifïrst\of ail, andsecondly, 
' ^ •^^ .^^ i^ >^Ht<?^ ^^ (JiiÉt fi'ï&^ f^i ^ ^ .^ ^^ vS^ Htf'^ W^ : Jàiàyi>- \abôùi;uWis:M 
àfè)fhëï0ân&0^ 
'obviôusly q^p^f^irnpdfidn0He and prie, ^ thëfihih^^kdt Sdins.buiy 'sfotirid, -for ëxdmpfe, \ 
as\theystowly vfoved hprth through thé couhtryfwas',thaithei.r:[réputation-\went bëfpre. 
iheinf-f • Le-::-:•:-:>^ ;;;,.;'::;:;:::::5:;4::;:h; 
l fi ff f IMîMËBf % ff'f::i $\l : Wf^f ï :: l ; '•; \l \ fWf U \ ^ i c f e l Wà^ #îvÉ>éë| 
With the UK food retail industry in a phase of rapid expansion and change, such simplistic 
techniques developed shortfalls, and there was a récognition that "projections become very diffïcult 
with that sort of research" [Michael Hague-Moss]. By the mid-1970s, site assessment exercises 
became more sophisticated, initially basing the size of the planned store on the projected turnover 
achievable: 
' 'Supermarket compani es thaï I hâve, worked wiih, : back proba bly \ in the m id-1970s, '-their. 
çriiicaiissue.wds hów big they shòuld build this particidar store, because they were abiëiq. 
gel sites at ihqt Urne.. That was their criticai issue, because the site of the store and the 
capital investment involyéd had tö hdve a.pay-back fairly rapidly, and that; yvas 
determined by. how. much turnover .they could achievë and how much profit; they coula 
achievë once they started trading." 
[Michael Hague-Moss] 
By the late-1970s, the assessment of sites for food retail outlets developed further sophistication, and 
market research based techniques were superseded by techniques basing estimâtes on the 
performance of existing stores. Many factors were taken into account, whether internal such as the 
design of the store, or external like the catchment population and transport routes: 
".. things rapidly movèd ori; and because they had eqch built Up a sort ofpórtfólif)f)f stores;, 
which : were of différent sues, ' diffèrent configurations, ; différent, types of heighböurhöqds, ; 
différent amounts of car parking, or no\ car parking, diffèrent situations, they: hdda truck 
record of the :ta(dngs,:by-'day ófthè• week, week ofthëyedf,- tfrneof[ddy, \ and sdpn. So. thèy-
s tqrt ed fb; build-models thernselvës; ; not wiih. research, dsirïg all] theyafiqbiesâhqiea^^ 
performance; ;Somë.f>f\ihein '• •: drè-\upérnqlyqridbléS{:M fckecWuïSy 
huiiiberof staff 
or trains; taxis];Whatever:ihe variable mightö :- '^M^0È^0^9^^MMÎ^^^W^S^h 
righi down io : thè • manager wc hd\>e:\ And they • reafly • iried: ali thè : variables thqi iliey couid 
pòSsibly thinkof an as a feffahguìùr sipre, w 
. prètty>:obvipus;fut Whenyoü'vegöt 200,qddstàres\dhdypu i ^ ^ ^ § ? t ì / ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ i ^ ^ 
models, y ou- cansee whdt combinàtion .òf internai dhd&tefnaiéMt gfoes y öü the 
best performance. Thdt èxpldins cipyent performance; fhèhimdinhgforw 
forexample,you've golä.preity;oleaiIdèi^pfjifiièffegfè^s^ 
Wffic^ffa 
ihdihds got'• diieast-45%, thdt WeABGl;fbf;yóMpafiw .nptfqf dny störe,i buffof 
your particular störe; M yoit fidvé: a thöusdtä car parking Sp hdve di lèast 
two bus stops withinSOyardS; : musi y ou hâve/dis les cönfigiired ih. ihispàrtiçuldf way^ : dnd 
so ; on find so. fórth: Ori thqibdsis, they ihensdy, we rr.é löökihgfbr. sites'öf this; size,\ ih-thèsè. 
typès-ofloçpfffje^ ''u&ëithaiftfioàëf.to 
locations, dnd also io détermine what sizé they should bé. " 
. [Michael Hagüe : fcfoss] 
Market research, however, retained a key rôle in assessing consumers1 interprétation of the corporate 
brand, and defining the catchment area in terms of its social status and size, for example. While 
models had become reasonably advanced, there remained room for further improvement, and such 
models are constantly refined [Michael Hague-Moss]. In cash and carry site assessment, further 
refinement was enabled by the data held on business clients, and demand models were built up using 
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customer information, a possibility that may now be opened up for mainstream food retailers with 
access to customer information from loyalty schemes: 
"Our first client was Booker cash and carry', where we were bidlding.retail models for a. 
business to business market place,, so we were sourcing.data on smallbusinesses, retailihg, 
restaurants, staff catéring, and. thèn building dèmand models; Cash and carry dt\ that lime 
had customer: information; becausé ithas aiways hacfthëidea/ofregisteru^ the customer;. 
glvingyou your membership càrd, été: "'- : 
:.: [Clive Humby] 
To summarise, market research and site assessment techniques have been and remain an important 
competitive tool. Their rôles have developed and evolved as alternative techniques have emerged, yet 
the importance of understanding the forces driving the behaviour, perceptions and desires of 
consumers ensure that they remain important. The key rôles of market research are "...to understand 
the customer and the customer 's requirements..., to get an idea of what the customer wants, what the 
trends are, what sort of areas you ought to be developing... ", while research into new products bas 
tended to be supported by direct trials of the products as part of the retail offering [Bob Fee]. In 
competitive terms, market research aids understanding of what attracts the customer, how they 
behave in-store, identification of retailers' strengths and weaknesses, and understanding of the cross-
over of shopping between rival stores [Michael Hague-Moss]. It enables retailers to build satisfaction 
among customers, which should in-turn build loyalty, although the important factors to consumers 
tend to change with economie conditions [Michael Hague-Moss], necessitating the constant 
adjustment of the retail expérience. The development of loyalty schemes and the resulting data does 
not render market research redundant, instead the two sources of information compliment each other, 
generating more accurate estimations of consumer behaviour: 
"Research was never pariiculdrly;igöod at measuring exactly/whât;peqple böiight... thé. 
loyalty card, tells the. retäüer what. any indivi has;böughi,;f)ut it ddeSn't tell. 
thenv/arjytfn%g;äb ^dh-f büy;.and it doésn't. tell thêrh any.bfithe. rëasons w)iy-.\: 
That's why competitive analysis is still important, and the attitudihai mëasurements. are stili 
quite criticai '. But, in ' terms of.m eaSuring behaviour, : they are doing it ; themselves, qrid that.is 
by fui thé best and móstac^^ ".::" 
;: : : : : [Mi çhael Hague-Moss] ; 
xu 
Appendix Four. 
Phases of superstore deve lopment 
M u c h academic attention has focused on attributing phases to U K food superstore 
development . The first example of this arose when Mills [1974; p .49] no t ed that the 
convers ion o f old buildings gave way to the construct ion o f purpose-bui l t supers tores . T h e 
convers ion phase was later labelled opportunistic [Guy, 1988, p .44] 
M o r e recently, phases of superstore development have been defined in more c o m p l e x ways . 
Jones [1982] suggests that a pioneer phase is followed by a speculative phase, a co-operative 
phase and an opportunist phase. D a w s o n ' s [1984] s tudy of European supers tore deve lopmen t 
suggests that an origin and innovation phase proceeds a diffusion and establishment phase, a 
rapid growth phase and a public policy control phase. Davies and Sparks [ 1989] contend that 
an innovatory phase of deve lopment be tween 1962 and 1969 was fo l lowed by a consolidation 
phase be tween 1970 and 1972, a period of resistance be tween 1972 and 1980 and a per iod of 
renewed development be tween 1981 and 1986. 
These three studies have m u c h in common, one o f the key points be ing that all three works 
found that their stages tended to over lap, rather than following a c lear-cut chronologica l path. 
A further factor that they have in c o m m o n is that their per iod o f coverage ends where this 
s tudy begins , the mid-1980s . 
Superstore deve lopment as a function of the economy? 
In general , the phases of deve lopment referred to have no t b e e n at tr ibuted to the economic 
backdrop . Thus , the effect of the economic wel l -being o f the U K at any one g iven poin t has 
not been considered an important factor in the deve lopment of supers tores . T h e sole no tab le 
except ion to this suggests that the 1990 fall in the number o f superstores wi th p lann ing 
pe rmiss ion for development is due to the economic downturn of the per iod [URPÏ , 1990] , A 
counter a rgument to this idea is put forward by Wrig ley [1988, p . 1 3 ] , w h o argues that 
recess ion hit local authorities are more welcoming of superstore deve lopmen t because of the 
e m p l o y m e n t benefits that it br ings. 
Whi le academic works have recognised that the bui lding of supers tores has lagged beh ind 
c o m p a n i e s 1 interest in the format because o f the t ime needed for purchase o f sites and 
const ruct ion o f stores, as well as delays incurred in obtaining p lanning pe rmiss ion[Guy , 1994, 
p. 130], the durat ion of this lag remains unquantif ied, and the increasing dependence of 
superstore openings on economic conditions is undocumented . 
Th i s paper sets out to illustrate the strong correlation be tween e c o n o m i c activity and 
superstore openings , and to determine the most l ikely lag be tween the two. Th i s is achieved 
by calculat ing the correlation be tween U K G D P growth and U K supers tore openings , wi th a 3 
to 5 year lag built in to the calculat ions. This means that G D P g rowth is c o m p a r e d to the 
n u m b e r o f superstore openings three, four and five years later, and the results showing the 
Factors affecting the deve lopment of IJK food superstores open ing between 1986 and 
i m 
Background 
The deve lopment of the Superstore is one of the most discussed and emotionaily chargea 
subjects on the British retail front [Tanburn, 1972, p l ] . At the start o f 1972 only 33 food 
superstores were in opérat ion in the United K ingdom, compared to 1052 in 1996 (see table 2) . 
It follows that the importance of understanding the forces dr iv ing this superstore deve lopmen t 
bas a lso increased - this paper demonstrates the importance of the domest ic e c o n o m y as a 
factor in the rate of g rowth of the U K superstore, and suggests a typical lag t ime be tween 
économie output and superstore openings . 
highest level of corrélat ion are deemed to be the most Hkely reflection of the lag be tween the 
two sets of data. 
Studies into phases of superstore development have been crit icised for failing to take 
geographica! location into account [Thorpe, 1991, p .363] . Whi le it is t rue that the situation o f 
a superstore is of pa ramoun t importance, i.e., where it is located in relation to the town-cent re , 
this is more likely to be affected by government and retailer policy than b y e c o n o m i c trends. 
The following analysis assesses the extent to which superstore deve lopmen t in general is 
affected b y the U K economy, and seeks to quantify the lag be tween economic activity and 
superstore openings, and cannot as such consider the geographica l locat ion o f superstores 
because of a lack o f data and a lack of available space. 
Presentation of data 
The data on which this s tudy is based is presented in tables 1 and 2, and graphica l ly in figures 
1 and 2 . 
Table One . UK Gross Domest ic Product . 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 9 5 1 
Year G D P g r o w t h Year G D P growth Year G D P growth 
1959 3 .5% 1972 2 . 6 % 1984 1.8% 
1960 4 .9% 1973 5 .8% 1985 3 . 8 % 
1961 3 .8% 1974 (0 .1%) 1986 4 . 0 % 
1962 0 .8% 1975 (2 .0%) 1987 4 . 6 % 
1963 4 . 0 % 1976 3 . 8 % 1988 5 .0% 
1964 5.8% 1977 1.1% 1989 2 . 2 % 
¡965 2 .6% 1978 2 . 9 % 1990 0 . 6 % 
1966 1.9% 1979 2 .1% 1991 (2 .1%) 
1967 2.1% 1980 (2 .1%) 1992 (0 .5%) 
1968 4 .0% 1981 (1 .1%) 1993 2 . 3 % 
1969 2 .1% 1982 1.0% 1994 3 . 9 % 
1970 1.9% 1983 3 .9% 1995 2 . 5 % 
1971 1.7% 
Table T w o . Superstore openings. 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 9 6 1 
Year Superstore openings Year Superstore openings Y e a r Supers tore openings 
1964 2 1975 16 1986 36 
1965 2 1976 22 1987 25 
1966 2 1977 27 1988 4 3 
1967 1 1978 27 1989 73 
1968 3 1979 35 1990 64 
1969 3 1980 27 1991 89 
1970 6 1981 41 1992 102 
1971 14 1982 38 1993 27 
1972 13 1983 30 1994 128 
1973 16 1984 29 1995 27 
1974 23 1985 26 1996 35 
1
 F igures adapted from Annual Abstract of Statistics, Central Statistical Office. Edi t ions used: 1966, table 3 1 1 , p .264 ; 
1976, table 3 5 1 , p .340 ; 1987, table 14.9, p .249; 1997, table 14.13, p .295 . 
2
 Figures for 1964-1991 from Airey and Bresse, 1993. 
Figures for 1992-1996 from Barnes et al., 1997 
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Figure One. Percentage Annual G D P C ha ng e (UrO. 1959-1995 
6.0% 
(3.0%) X 
Year 
Figure T w o . Annual U K Superstore Open ings . 1964-1996 
140 
Year 
Manipulat ion of the data 
While superstore openings show no év idence of corrélat ion with economie activity in the 
1960s and 1970s, the degree o f corrélat ion appears to increase pos t 1985. There follows an 
analysis which has the a im of de termining whether corrélat ion be tween economie activity and 
superstore openings increased in the decade to 1996. This analysis also détermines the length 
of the delay be tween economie activity and supers tore openings . 
T h e data presented in tables 1 and 2 is ana lysed to p roduce a corréla t ion coefficient for 
différent per iods be tween 1986 and 1996. Lags o f three, four and five years are appl ied to the 
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data in order to détermine the most likely delay be tween e c o n o m i c activity and superstore 
opening , and to assess whether this delay is in flux, see tables 3 to 6 below. 
Table 3 . Three year lag. 
Y e a r of Supers tore 
Open ing 
Y e a r of G D P 
Change 
Corré lat ion 
Coefficient 
1966-1996 1963-1993 -0.143 
1976-1996 1973-1993 0.181 
1986-1996 1983-1993 0.037 
1988-1996 1985-1993 -0.073 
1990-1996 1987-1993 0.225 
1992-1996 1989-1993 0.603 
1994-1996 1991-1993 0.839 
Table 4 . Four year lag. 
Year of Superstore 
Opening 
Year of G D P 
Change 
Corré lat ion 
Coefficient 
1966-1996 1962-1992 -0 .002 
1976-1996 1972-1992 0.418 
1986-1996 1982-1992 0.537 
1988-1996 1984-1992 0.328 
1990-1996 1986-1992 0.597 
1992-1996 1988-1992 0.794 
1994-1996 1990-1992 0.933 
Table 5. Five year lag. 
Y e a r of Supers tore 
Open ing 
Y e a r of G D P 
Change 
Corrélat ion 
Coefficient 
1966-1996 1961-1991 0.061 
1976-1996 1971-1991 0.586 
1986-1996 1981-1991 0.837 
1988-1996 1983-1991 0.674 
1990-1996 1985-1991 0.596 
1992-1996 1987-1991 0.687 
1994-1996 1989-1991 0.710 
Table 6, H o w long is the lag? 
Y e a r of Supers tore 
Open ing 
3 y e a r l a g 4 y e a r l a g 5 year lag 
1986-1996 worst fit 2 n d best fit best fit (0.837) 
1988-1996 worst fit 2nd best fit best fit (0 .674) 
1990-1996 wors t fit best fit (0 .597) 2 n d best fit 
1992-1996 worst fit best fit (0 .794) 2 n d best fit 
1994-1996 2nd best fit best fit (0 .933) worst fit 
Resul t s 
Table 6 présents a summary of the corrélation coefficients, and demons t ra tes a reasonable 
degree of corrélat ion be tween G D P change and superstore open ings 4 to 5 years later. It also 
suggests that the length o f the delay be tween economie activity and superstore open ing is 
becorning shorter with t ime. Since 1990, this lag has typically b e e n four years , pr ior to this it 
was five years . It is also important to note that the degree of corrélat ion be tween the t w o sets 
o f data tends to increase over t ime, thus it is fair to propose that U K superstore open ings 
b e t w e e n 1986 and 1996 have increasingly been dépendent on the heal th of the economy. 
Findings in relation to previous works 
This contradicts convent ional logie which a rgues that the h igh degree of federai or local 
gove rnmen t control over retail p lanning deve lopments [see G u y , 1994, p90] w o u l d be the key 
influence on the pace of superstore development . Whi l e accept ing that g o v e m m e n t at t i tude 
has p layed a key rôle in U K food superstore deve lopment , this po in t is hard to p rove , g iven 
the failure of available data to define a d e v e l o p m e n t ' s location in respect to the es tabl ished 
town-centre [Thorpe, 1991, p .363] . I wou ld argue, therefore, that g o v e m m e n t guide l ines have 
no t affected the deve lopment o f the U K food supers tore as such. Rather , they have inf luenced 
the size and location of thèse deve lopments , a s sugges ted by D a w s o n [1984, p l 7 8 ] b u t not the 
actual n u m b e r of superstores be ing opened. Tab le 7, be low, outl ines the key changes in 
gove rnmen t attitude towards large scale retail p lanning deve lopment : 
Table 7. G o v e r n m e n t guidel ines on large scale retail deve lopments . 
Year S u m m a r y of change Reference 
1972 Secretary of State became responsible for p lanning D e v e l o p m e n t Pol icy 
applicat ions for stores in excess of 50 ,000 ft 2 outs ide Cont ro l N o . 1 3 
existing towns or districts. 
1977 Secretary of State became responsible for p lanning D e v e l o p m e n t Pol icy 
applications for stores in excess of 100,000 ft 2 outs ide Cont ro l N o . 13 (revised) 
existing towns or districts. 
July 1985 T h e impact of a proposed deve lopmen t on other retailers D e p a r t m e n t of the 
no longer a considération, except in the case where a Env i ronment , 1988; 
nearby town centre as a whole cou ld be affected. Paragraph 7 
1988 Green bel t land, open countryside and industriai areas Depa r tmen t of the 
reserved for other uses Env i ronment , 1988 
1993 N e w retail deve lopments to be located in areas accessible D e p a r t m e n t o f the 
by a choice of means of transport, and to encourage Env i ronmen t , 1993; 
e c o n o m y in fuel consumpt ion pa ragraph 3 6 
Reference to table 7 illustrâtes the p rob lem of superstore pénét ra t ion analysis . Whi l e the data 
used in this study is based on the Institute o f Groce ry Distr ibut ion définit ion of a supers tore , 
the key cri teria of which is to have a sales area of at least 25 000 ft2, the changes in t roduced in 
1972 and 1977 relate to proposais rather larger than this, and are widely credi ted wi th hav ing 
increased the size of planning applications to jus t be low the n e w limit for sales area [Gayler, 
1984, p . 7 5 ; Wrigley , 1988, p i 1]. July 1985 marked a change in p lann ing direct ion, effectively 
reversed by 1993 législation. Be tween thèse per iods , the p lann ing sys tem effectively 
encouraged out-of- town developments [see Guy , 1984; pp78-79] . The 1988 législat ion, also, 
can be cons idered to have merc ly changed the locat ion of subséquent deve lopments . T h e data 
used in this s tudy, however , fails to make a dist inct ion be tween the changing size criteria 
result ing from Deve lopmen t Policy Control N o t e N o . 1 3 . In addi t ion, the data does not 
differentiate be tween in-town or out-of- town supers tores , thus the data is effectively i m m u n e 
to major p lanning pol icy changes . 
In s u m m a r y , this work has demonstra ted that p lann ing pol icies do no t have a major effect o n 
the pace o f U K grocery superstore development as a whole . P lanning policies have inf luenced 
the size and location of new developments , bu t have not sìgnificantty al tered the pace of 
deve lopmen t of the format in its entirety. A key force affecting the recent deve lopmen t of the 
XVÜ 
U K food superstore is the economic state of the country, a force which is also b e c o m i n g more 
important . In addit ion, the delay between economic health and superstore open ings is 
becoming shorter, in 1996 this lag s tood at four years. 
Appendix Five 
xix 
The Delphi Forecasting Technique 
The first step is to establish the panel of experts. Some studies have found the expertise of the panel 
to have little bearing on the outcome of the forecast [Welty, 1974]. Other studies, however, 
emphasise the importance of the sélection of the panel as being critical to the accuracy of the 
forecast[Helmer, 1967; Turoff, 1970; Martino, 1983]. A higher rate of participation will be obtained 
if the members of the panel agrée to participate in the exercise [Johnson, 1976; Martino, 1983], rather 
than being sent a questionnaire 'out of the blue', thus panellists were initially approached by letter. 
The more panellists taking part in a Delphi exercise, the greater the supposed accuracy. However, it 
is suggested that too many panellists can make the data analysis too great a task for the investigator 
[Martino, 1983]. Research has shown that if a panel is acrually 'expert*, 15 panellists will produce an 
accurate forecast [Martino, 1983]. A panel should be made up from experts with a wide variety of 
backgrounds and positions in the subject area [Johnson, 1976]. The sélection of panellists, however, 
should be carried out in a methodological way. The population of individuals most likely to affect 
change should be calculated, and a représentative sample of panellists selected from this population 
[Parenté and Anderson-Parenté, 1987]. In practice, a population of individuals was selected, and ail 
of those willing to participate became the panellists. 
While the panel is being selected, and the consent of members is being sought, the initial 
questionnaire is formulated. Research has provided many recommendations for the formulation of 
questionnaires. The Delphi procédure should be explained completely in the document [Martino, 
1983], especially when many rounds will be taking place [Parenté and Anderson-Parenté, 1987]. This 
will alert the panel to the length of the process and outline the opportunity for them to further their 
knowledge. The questionnaire should be well designed, so as to make efficient use of the 
respondents' time [Turoff, 1970]. U should be easy to answer, with ample room for comments, and 
should rarely exceed 25 questions [Martino, 1983]. It is also suggested that a trial of the 
questionnaire is undertaken before its despatch, in a search for ambiguities [Johnson, 1976]. This 
seems a good idea, especially as questionnaire design and définitions have been highlighted as weak 
spots in the process [Parker, 1969], 
Each question is supported by an 'event statement', which expiains the phenomenon. Although this 
concept is simple, studies have emphasised the importance of the statements. Familiar ideas should 
be accompanied by a concise statement so as not to confuse the issue, while complicated issues 
should be supported by longer statements to help clarify them [Salancik et al, 1971; Martino, 1983]. 
General guidelines have been proposed where it is suggested that each event statement should be 
between 20 and 25 words long, although it is emphasised that there will be exceptions [Salancik et al, 
1971]. At an early stage it became clear that the wording of event statements could 'lead' panellists 
[Dalkey and Helmer, 1963]. Thus, great care must be taken when writing event statements, so as to 
avoid the introduction of bias. 
The formulation of the questionnaire is a particularly important stage in the Delphi process. The 
ability of the poli to adequately sample the issues has been found to be as important as the sélection 
of the panel [Parenté and Anderson-Parenté, 1987]. 
Having decided upon the final format of the initial questionnaire, the wording of the event 
statements, and obtained the consent of the members to participate, round one can begin. The 
questionnaires are sent out to the members, who are requested to answer each question. Once ail of 
the completed questionnaires have been received or the allocated time has elapsed, whichever is the 
sooner, the investigator computes the médian and interquartile range for each question. The 
interquartile range serves as a tool to illustrate differing opinions, being the range in which the 
middle 50% of responses fall. 
The above statistics are added to the questionnaire, and round two can begin. The updated 
questionnaire is sent out to the panellists, who are asked to reconsider their responses. If the panellist 
supplies an answer outside the interquartile range, they are asked to give their reasons for their 
'extrême' response. Once again, the investigator calculâtes the médian and interquartile range for 
each question. 
The revised statistics replace those used in round two. In addition, a summary of reasons given in 
support of 'extrême' responses is added to the questionnaire. Thèse reasons will normally have to be 
edited for brevity. Great care must be taken during the editing process in order to avoid the 
introduction of bias [Kruus, 1983]. The updated questionnaire is used as round three. It is distributed 
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to the experts, who are asked to consider the reasons given for extreme responses, and revise their 
response if they so wish. Participants supplying a response remaining outside the interquartile range 
are requested to give reasons why they have not been persuaded by the opposing arguments. 
Once again, the investigator compiles the median and interquartile range values for each question. 
An updated questionnaire is formulated using the new statistics, to which the criticisms of the 
reasons given for extreme answers are added. In other words, the panel is supplied with the counter-
arguments for extreme responses. This new questionnaire constitutes round four, and is the 
panellists' last chance to revise their responses. The median returned back from round four is taken to 
represent the group response [Brown, 1968]. 
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Problems Défia in g Theory 
The word 'theory* does not have a clear-cut définition, and suffers from being inter-changed with the 
words hypothesis and law. It is possible to produce définitions meaning that the 'théories of retail 
change' do not technically qualify as théories, although numerous alternative définitions do accept 
their status as théories. The purpose of appendix 6 is to establish a working définition of the terms 
hypothesis, theory and law, and to classify what are known collectively as the 'théories of retail 
change'. 
A hypothesis is defmed as 'a supposition or conjecture put forth to account for known facts... a 
provisionai supposition which accounts for known facts, and serves as a starting point for further 
investigation by which it may be proved or disproved' '. Equally, it is 'a tentative explanation that 
accounts for a set of facts and can be tested by further investigation* 2, 'a tentative theory or 
supposition provisionally adopted to explain certain facts, and to guide in the investigation ofothers* 
3
,
 l
a concept that is notyet verified but that if true would explain certain facts or phenomena' 4 , and 
'implies insufficient évidence to provide more than a tentative explanation' 5. The définition adopted 
here is that a hypothesis is a tentative, unproven explanation of a phenomenon. 
A theory is defined as 'a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or 
experiment, and is propounded or accepîed as accounting for the known facts*6, la scheme or system 
of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group offacts or phenomena' 7, and la 
statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles, or causes of something known or 
observed* 8 . Equally, it is ''an organised system of accepted knowledge that applies in a variety of 
circumstances to explain a specific set of phenomena' 9, la concept that is not yet verified but that if 
true would explain certain facts or phenomena' 10, 'systematically organised knowledge applicable in 
a relatively wide variety of circumstances, especially a system of assumptions, accepted principles, 
and rules of procedure devïsed to analyse, predici, or otherwise explain the nature or behaviour of a 
specified set of phenomend ", 'a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of 
principles offered to explain phénoménal 1 2, and 'implies a greater range of évidence and greater 
likelihood of truth' 12. 
The meaning of the terni 'theory', therefore, is debatable, and depending on the définition adopted, a 
concept can be labelled a theory or a hypothesis. Similarly, the 'théories of retail change' are either 
théories or merely a séries of hypothèses, depending on the définition chosen. 
According to Baker et al. [1983], a hypothesis differs from a theory in that it has not been 
demonstrated to yield prédictions with an accuracy greater than that which could be achieved if 
prédictions were made by some random évidence. Once a hypothesis has been shown to be able to 
yield prédictions with greater accuracy than would arise from such a random process, Baker et al. 
[1983] term it a theory, and in turn, if a theory can be demonstrated to yield perfectly accurate 
prédictions every time it is used, then that theory takes on the status of a 'law'. 
A law is defined as la généralisation based on consistent expérience or results' u , 'a theoretical 
principle deduced from particular facts, expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon 
always occurs if certain conditions be présent' I S, 'a rule of being, opération, or change, so certain 
and constant that it is conceived of as imposed by the will of God or by some controlling authority' 
' \ a 'généralisation based on recurring facts or events' a 'statement of an order or relation of 
phenomena that so far as is known is invariable under the given conditions' ' \ and 'implies a 
statement of order and relation in nature thaï has been found to be invariable under the same 
conditions' ]9. 
11
 American Heritage Dictionary, The, 3 r f edition, 1996, H o u g h t o n Miffin Company . Avai lable at www,d ic t iona ry . com 
12
 Merriam-Webster's (Collegiate) Dictionary. Available at: www.yourd ic t ionary .com 
Merriam-Webster's (Collegiate) Dictionary. Available at: www.yourd ic t ionary .com 
14
 American Heritage Dictionary, The, 3 r d edition, 1996, Hough ton Miffin Company . Avai lable at www.d ic t iona ry . com 
15
 Oxford (Englìsh) Dictionary, The Shorter, 3 r d edition, 1992, London , Book Club Associates . 
16
 Webster's (Revised Unabridged) Dictionary, 1998, M I C R A Inc. Avai lable at www.d ic t ionary .com 
17
 Wordnet / .6, Pr inceton Univers i ty . Available at www.d ic t ionary .com 
18
 Merriam-Webster 's (Collegiate) Dictionary. Avai lable at: www.yourd ic t ionary .com 
19
 Merriam-Webster 's (Collegiate) Dictionary. Avai lable at: www.yourd ic t ionary .com 
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The term law is clearly not applicable to the 'theories of retail change', Adopting Einstein's 
definition, for example, that theories are 'free creations of the human mind'. Any speculative fantasy 
may thus be regarded as a theory of some sort. ' [Harvey, 1969; p.87], firmly places the 'theories of 
retail change' in the theory category. 
Theories do not lose their validity merely because there are cases of non-application. At some point, 
most theories have failed to explain phenomena in their field, leading Kuhn [1962, p.145] to remark 
that 'if any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected 
at all times '. The field of application also affects the definition of the term theory, as studies 
involving behaviour of human decision makers can never have the underlying regularity of the 
physical sciences [Roth and Klein, 1993], largely explaining why the expectation of universality is 
"one of the more elusive of the criteria for theory in marketing writings" [Bartels, 1981]. In addition, 
addressing the relevance of theories and explanations is difficult, as 'the criteria set up to judge 
whether or not a particular explanation is reasonable and satisfying are highly subjective, and there 
can be no denial of this fact' [Harvey, 1969; p.15]. 
At this point it would seem reasonable to claim that the 'theories of retail change' qualify as theories, 
as many definitions accept their drawbacks, and cases of non-application have been shown to be 
common to many theories. Extreme views of the definition of the term 'theory', however, would 
preclude this. Popper [1974], for example, argues that no laws of historical development or of 
biological evolution exist, accepting only that casual laws may be at work [see Roth and Klein, 
1993], while Hirschman and Stampfl [1980] consider the theories of retail change to be descriptive 
reasonings failing to meet the criteria for formal theory, seemingly by reason of their adoption of 
strict criteria of the term 'theory'. 
Less extreme definitions, however, are more commonly adopted, and the 'theories of retail change' 
are generally accepted as theories, despite their shortcomings. Bartels [1981], for example, states that 
"a theory to some people is a hypothesis; to others it is a cohesive body of principles concerning a 
given subject". For many years, the 'theories of retail change' have been termed theories. This study 
follows the example of Brown [1988a], who acknowledged their failure to meet the formal criteria 
for theory, but retained the "theoretical" descriptor all the same, seemingly in order to conform to 
previous academic works. 
xxiv 
The term theory, applied to retail institutional change, 'implies broadly based statements that explain 
or predict répétitive retail behaviour or that help describe retailing in new or more meaningful ways', 
contends Hollander [1981], implying that rejecting the 'théories of retail change' as true théories is 
overly zealous. This study accepts that thèse qualify as théories, in their context, albeit with certain 
réservations, and continues to use the term theory in Une with the bulk of existing académie 
literature. 
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The Wheel of Retailing and less developed countries 
There is widespread évidence that the Wheel of Retailing fails to describe retail évolution in less 
developed countries (LDCs). Retail institutions have entered the market at a level catering to minority 
middle and upper income groups rather than to low income groups, directly contradicting the Wheel 
hypothesis, in Persia, Venezuela, Brazil, Puerto Rico [Hollander, 1960], 'some parts of Latin America', 
Asia (ex. Japan) [Bucklin, 1977], Turkey [Kaynak, 1979], Israel [Goldman, 1982], Saudi Arabia [Alawi, 
1986; Yavas and Tuncalp, 1984], Guatemala [Ortiz-Buono fina, 1987], Hong Kong [Ho and Lau, 1988], 
China [Mun, 1988] and Malaysia [Zain and Rejab, 1989]. 
Early self-service food retailing in Saudi Arabia, an LDC, catered to medium and high-income 
consumers [Alawi, 1986; Yavas and Tuncalp, 1984], before 'trading-down' to compete with grocery 
shops and public markets [Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1982], a trend specific to LDCs also noted on other 
occasions [Hollander, 1970; Bucklin, 1976]. Supermarkets were introduced to Hong Kong to meet the 
needs of high-income foreigners [Ho and Lau, 1988] representing only 2% of the population [Lau and 
Lee, 1988], their offering being downgraded repeatedly over time, to target the Westernised-Chinese, the 
younger generation and the general public in turn [Ho and Lau, 1988], driven partly by price wars 
between Operators [Lau and Lee, 1988]. Similarly, Singaporean department stores initially catered to the 
upper-income group, and traded down as the middle-income segment grew [Tan and Teoh, 1988], while 
early Singaporean supermarkets also catered to upper-income consumers, but were followed by 
supermarket co-operatives, formed in order to offer price appeal to a wider audience, particularly for 
staple goods [ibid.]. 
In short, there is little doubt of the Wheel of Retailing's inability to account for LDC retail development, 
and the opposite often occurs. Reasons given to explain non-application tend to be based on consumer 
characteristics and the economie level of the LDC (demand side), or the differing cost structure of LDC 
retail innovation compared to that of developed économies (supply side): 
Supply side 
The key 'supply side' problems inhibiting the spread of LDC retail institutions are a lack of growth-
orientated retailers, inadequate supply and distribution arrangements, limited access to capital [Goldman, 
1974], municipal 'subsidisation' of traditional markets through unrealistically low rents [Bucklin, 1976], 
and higher costs resulting from the need to undertake additional functions, such as retailers having to 
grade produce and perishables, pre-package goods themselves, or manufacture/ import pre-packaged 
goods [Goldman, 1981; Kacker, 1988a], which traditional outlets do not have to do. For example, 
processing and packaging costs, coupled with lack of buying economies, added 5% to the prices of 
Chinese supermarkets, compared to traditional outlets [Mun, 1988]. 
The fragmented supply system for produce and meats, the bad grading of agricultural products, the 
necessity to compete for supplies in central wholesale markets, high relative overhead costs, laws 
limiting hours and modes of operation, and the likelihood of having to bear disproportionately higher 
taxes than small food stores, in short, tend to wipe out the possible cost-savings of LDC supermarkets, 
claims Goldman [1982]. In LDCs, supermarket transactions take longer, as the lack of strong brands 
necessitates customer advice, driving up labour costs through both the extra time spent per purchase and 
the extra skill-level required [Goldman, 1981], while economies of buying scale are unlikely to be 
attained [ibid.; Mun, 1988]. 
In short, there are numerous issues causing difficulty in the operation of modern retail institutions in 
LDCs. Although they can generally be overcome, this comes at the cost of driving up costs relative to 
traditional operators, making low-cost, low-price entry extremely unlikely. 
Demand side 
A society has to be at a certain critical point to be able to support retail institutions [Hollander, 1963], 
and a certain increase in the standard of living is necessary to drive trading-up and to leave a gap for 
low-cost, low-price operators to fill [Agergard et al., 1970; Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1982], Similarly, 
Amdt [1972] demonstrated that the structure of retail systems was a function of selected socio-economic 
characteristics of the societies they serve, even within developed economies, Michel and Vander Eycken 
[1974] highlighted a direct relationship between economic development and the importance of multiple 
retailers, who are so often instrumental in the evolution of new retail institutions, and retail structure is 
dependent upon the prevailing economic, technological, social and cultural characteristics of a country 
[Kaynak, 1979; Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1982; Kaynak and Rice, 1988; Kacker, 1988a]. 
Because they depend on retailing packaged and processed foods, which form only a small part of the diet 
of low-income LDC consumers, LDC supermarkets are effectively forced into focusing on high-income 
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consumers [Bucklin, 1977]. Extension into fresh foods is problematic because of LDC consumers' 
reluctance to buy meat and produce from supermarkets, which is often perceived as offering more 
expensive, less fresh food than bazaars and other traditional outlets, which retain a strong lure, carry a 
wider variety and offer social interaction [Bucklin, 1977; Lau and Lee, 1988; Zain and Rejab, 1989]. 
Alternatively, retail formats are "transplanted" into LDCs at roughly the same level at which they exist 
in the "exporting country", contends Kaynak [1979], a strategy often planned by governments as well as 
retailers [Kacker, 1988a], explaining, to a degree, why early LDC supermarkets and department stores 
tend to be high-service, high-priced institutions [Izraeli, 1973]. 
Supermarket shopping is not widely adopted in LDCs because consumers' pattern of daily fragmented 
shopping remains largely unbroken [Goldman, 1974, 1981; Bucklin, 1976], due to a lack of in-home 
refrigeration and personal transportation, which prevents the majority of consumers from changing their 
shopping patterns [Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1982]. For example, Brazilians were found to shop for food 
four times a week, 90% of Bolivian's shop at least once a day, and many Moroccans buy staples such as 
bread every meal time [Yavas and Tuncalp, 1986]. Because consumers buy small quantities on a 
frequent basis, they are more loyal to nearby stores and traditional outlets, which therefore have a very 
small trading area [Goldman, 1974, 1982]. Travelling further to a supermarket can mean that the cost of 
getting there erodes much of the price advantage, if indeed the consumer is able to make the journey and 
there is a price advantage [Goldman, 1981]. 
In short, the level of economic, technological, social and cultural development of a country can inhibit 
low-price supermarket and department store retailing. There must be demand for their packaged 
products, and consumers must be able and willing to change their shopping patterns. In addition, loyalty 
to traditional outlets is strong, particularly among low-income consumers, inhibiting the spread of 
modern retail institutions, forcing them to target the small, high-income segments of society that do wish 
to, and are able to change their shopping habits. 
To conclude, a combination of consumer-related and supplier-related difficulties conspire to force 
innovating LDC retail institutions to enter the market at a high-status, high-overhead, high-price 
position, in direct contradiction to the Wheel of Retailing, buckling its possibilities of universal 
application. 
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Competitive reaction to low-overhead. low-price entrants is to take on their advantages 
Nineteenth Century multiple grocers entering an English town offered lower prices, to which 
estabüshed local Operators responded [Pennance and Yamey, 1955], sometimes forming local buying 
and advertising groups to counter multiples' économies of scale [ibid.]. Similarly, when barrow-
traders began to undercut grocers between the rwo world wars, grocers responded through price-
cutting [ibid.], suggesting the long-term existence of a tendency for established retailers to react to 
low-overhead, low-price entrants by taking on some of their characteristics. The late 19 t h Century, for 
example, saw UK private traders adopt a system similar to that of co-operative dividends, and large 
department stores copy the practices of 'civil-service co-operative societies', to such an extent that 
the two forms became indistinguishable [ibid.]. 
This reaction is effectively Dialectic, brought on by conflict with Operators entering as the Wheel of 
Retailing suggests. Nieshlag [1959], see Gibbs [1987], first claimed that a process of mutuai 
adaptation of new and old reduces the conflict between innovators and retailers under attack trom an 
innovation, to which Brand [1963] added that the response of established retailers to the threat of 
innovators was to become more like them. US supermarket Operators, for example, countered 
growing discount department store compétition by opening large discount stores themselves [ibid.], 
the US discount-house and discount store became more similar [Regan, 1964], and US supermarkets 
'traded-up' into fast-foods and extended their opening hours in response to the growth of 
convenience stores [Kotler, 1988]. 
While Bucklin [1976] advised conservative firms to capitulate and adopt new trading methods, or be 
faced with problems in the coming years, McNair and May [1978] contend that the initial 
competitive reaction to retail innovations is to ignore them, then to attack them with legai and 
politicai efforts, before beginning to compete by lowering costs and priées. Finally, if this is 
unsuccessful, established retailers may adapt their business to become more like the attacking 
institution. Similarly, Berens [1980] contends that established retailers tend to begin by 
experimenting with the innovative idea, then acquire one of the fledgling Operators, or enter into a 
joint venture with them. 
The initial reaction of established US retailers to the rapid expansion of outlet/off-price innovatore 
was to pressure manufacturer into not supplying them [Lord, 1984]. Several established Operators 
subsequently moved into off-price retailing [ibid.], supporting McNair and May's [1978] hypothesis. 
Established retailers also held more sales in response to the off-price threat [Kaikati, 1985], and 
turned to private label, before beginning to pressure manufacturer, while a minority of established 
Operators did nothing, preferring instead to wait and see what would occur, accepting a smaller 
market in the meantime [ibid.]. 
When appearing to be threatened by discounters, Kresge Stores experimented with the discount 
format [Shaffer, 1973], eventually closing down their original Stores and concentrating on the K-Mart 
discount format [Dickinson, 1981; Omura, 1986; Hollander and Omura, 1989], although such an 
extreme response is rare, and was aided by the acquisition of discount innovators [Sampson and 
Tigert, 1994]. Similarly, Wal-Mart launched Sam's Club, a warehouse membership club, after seeing 
Price Club, the innovator of the format, develop successfully for over five years [Sampson and 
Tigert, 1994]. 
In the same vein, the reaction of UK supermarket chains to discounter Kwik Save's growth was to 
recognise the threat and establish discount chains of their own (Key Markets, International, Fine 
Fare, Argyll and Teseo all did this) [Lord et al., 1988]. In New Zealand, Kwik Save's main 
competitor, Progressive Enterprises, initially attempted to differentiate itself through the quality of its 
produets, service and shopping environment, before tacitly stepping up price-competition through 
promotional activity, and then permanently lowering prices. Finally, Progressive Enterprises 
acquired Kwik Save's 3 Guys New Zealand subsidiary, running them in parallel to their original 
opération [ibid.]. Irish Operators' initial reaction to the Kwik Save - 3 Guys threat was to successfully 
apply politicai pressure to slow its spread. As this hurdle was overcome and growth resumed, 
established Operators lowered prices, before some established Operators opened discount chains 
themselves [ibid.]. Established US retailers also applied politicai and legal pressure to stop the spread 
of chain stores in the 1930s [Hollander and Omura, 1989], and about 50% of US states levied anti-
chain taxes as a resuit, although thèse were fazed out over the years. 
More common, but less noticeable, however, is for innovating and established types of retailing to 
gradually be assimilated as innovators trade-up and established retailers adopt the Innovators' best 
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features and methods [Kaynak, 1988]. By the early 1990s, there was évidence of limited assimilation 
between US supermarkets and warehouse membership clubs [Sampson and Tigert, 1994], as 
supermarkets introduced large pack sizes at low priées, moved into WMCs specialising in food 
themselves, and took legal steps to slow WMC growth [ibid.], while WMCs began to open to all 
sectors of the public and improved their ambience [Sampson and Tigert, 1994], each effectively 
taking on the advantages of the other. 
Similarly, Piggy Wiggly, the first US 'supermarket ' attracted many imitators [Hollander and Omura, 
1989], and established grocery chains moved into supermarkets when they realised that they had to 
change [ibid.]. Venezuelan smali store Operators neutralised a degree of the threat of overseas 
supermarket entrants by becoming more like them [Kacker, 1988b], leading to the émergence of 
three domestic supermarket chains [ibid.]. Conversion to self-service is a tactic that is widely used by 
traditional LDC Operators pressured by the émergence of large retail outlets [Kaynak, 1988]. 
To conclude, there are a large number of cases where the entrance of innovative, Tow-price retailers 
has provoked a reaction from established Operators that has been Dialectic in nature. This can be 
through the trading-up of innovators, or through established Operators' adoption of innovators ' 
characteristics (by means of lowering prices or copying buying practices and promotional tools), or 
even through established Operators' moves into the format, by openìng their own stores or acquiring 
fledgling Operators. 
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Acceleration of the Retail Life Cvcle 
Retail Ufe cycles are shortening, or accelerating, a trend first noted in the fíelds of the US department 
store, variety store and supermarket [Davidson, 1970]. Others agree that the length of retail Ufe 
cycles is contracting, in common with the product life cycle [McCammon, 1975 and Davidson et al., 
1976], and successive formats are reaching maturity faster than ever - it took 80 years for the 
department store to reach maturity, 45 years for the variety store, 35 years for the supermarket, 20 
years for the discount department store and an estimated 15 years for the home ímprovement centre 
[Davidson et al., 1976]. Similarly, department stores took at least 50 years to reach maturity, 
supermarkets about 25 years, franchising and discount houses less than 20 years, and hypermarkets 
barely a decade [Dawson, 1979]. 
European hypermarkets added more sales área in less than 20 years than department stores did in 
more than 120 years [Knee and Walters, 1985], while US warehouse clubs, home shopping televisión 
networks and category killers have gone from birth to maturity in just a few years [Lewison, 1997]. 
The Retail Life Cycle is accelerating only in developed countries, however, while progress in 
developing economies remains slow [Kaynak, 1988]. 
There are many forces causing acceleration of the Retail Life Cycle, including a growing number of 
entrepreneurs and managers with inter-organisational administran ve skills, and ready availability of 
stock market funding for promising new concepts [Davidson, 1970]. Advertising caused the Product 
Life Cycle to shorten [Cherington, 1924], and is likely to have done the same for its Retail Life Cycle 
counterpart, and while planners can speed or slow the spread of an innovatory form of retailing 
[Gibbs, 1987], they can not realistically lkiU* it [ibid.]. Finally, the shortened life cycle is 
attributable, in part, to the increased pace and affluence of society [Dickinson, 1981]. 
The time scale of the Retail Life Cycle model is variable [Davidson et al., 1976; Holmes and 
Hoskins, 1977; Davidson and Smallwood, 1980], with the total time scale and the duration of each 
stage being a function of changes in the market área, competition and management responses 
[Holmes and Hoskins, 1977], implying that management has a certain degree of control over retail 
life cycles, although this is rarely exercised successfully [Knee and Walters, 1985]. To conclude, 
while the causes of accelerating retail life cycles are multiple, the impact is clear and profound - the 
physical life of retail structures will be longer than their économie Uves [Dawson, 1979], spatial 
diffusion of a concept will oceur more rapidly [ibid.], leaving management a shortened response time 
in which to act [McCammon, 1975], and the profitability prospects for future stratégie innovations 
will be dramaticatly reduced [Bates, 1979]. 
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Appendix 10 
In this appendix, the rate of economic activity of the UK population is addressed first, by 
gender, followed by unemployrnent rates, also by gender. Trends in real income growth 
are analysed, and consumer adoption of technology is considered. Growth in the size of 
the UK population, and changes in its structure are investigated, as are the effects of 
international and inter-regional migration. Finally, the changing structure of UK 
households is considered, before the section concludes by summarising the likely 
implications of current socio-economic trends. 
The rate of economic activity of the UK population is relatively stable, suggesting that 
significant increases in economic activity are unlikely to occur before 2010. While 
overall economic activity is stable, this masks a décline in the percentage of 
economically-active working-age men, and an increase in that of women (figure a): 
Appendix 10, figure a: Percentage of working-aged persons economically active: 
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The likely impact of future socio-economic and technological changes. 
adults increased by 2.3% to £411 exceeding the inflation rate of 1.9%, excluding 
mortgage interest payments 2,real income growth is therefore continuing. The government 
considers average annual wage inflation of up to 4.5% compatible with their inflation 
target of 2.5% [Blake and Young, 2000], suggesting that real incomes may increase by an 
average of up to 2% per annum before attracting government attention, and that real 
income growth will continue. Likely increases in real income are supported by 
Euromonitor, who forecast that inflation between 2000 and 2010 will average 1.9% per 
annum, compared to average wage growth of 2.8% per annum 3 . Falling unemployment 
and increasing real incomes are beneficiai to retailers, although food retailers stand to 
gain less from this than other retail sectors because of the inelastic demand for food 
(5.2.iii. p. 153), and compétition for consumer spending from activities such as leisure 
activities, and particularly from eating out. They do, however, présent opportunities for 
food retailers to grow through diversification of the product offering, into catégories 
likely to take an increasing share of a rising consumer income, such as take-away foods, 
ready meals and non-foods (6.4. p.235-236). 
Increasing real incomes drive adoption of consumer durables and motor cars (5.3.i. p.158-
159), and further real income growth could be expected to drive continued uptake of 
existing products such as réfrigérât ors, freezers and microwaves, although this will be 
constrained by their already high pénétration. Penetration of motor cars may receive a 
boost from rising incomes and price réductions, which in the second half of 2000 were 
widespread following a damning Compétition Commission report and warnings from the 
Department of Trade and Industry that manufacturers engaged in anti-competitive 
practices would be fined under the Fair Trading Act 4 . This growth will also be 
constrained by the existing high pénétration of cars (72%) and the high tax bürden on 
motorists. Growth in home computers is likely to increase rapìdly as incomes rise and the 
price of computer technology falls. In particular, consumer access to the internet is 
1
 Labour Market Trends, 108(11), N o v e m b e r 2000 ; " N e w Eamings Survey" , p . 4 7 9 . 
2
 Monthly Digest of Statistics, 658 , October 2000 ; table 18.1, p . 116. 
^ h t tp : / /www.euromoni to r .com 
4
 Financial Times, Sep tember 1, 2000 ; " B M W jo ins in s h o w r o o m price-cut t ing", p .4 . 
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expected to grow rapidly, due to increased pénétration of home computers, and of new 
generation internet technology, such as WAP mobile phones, digital television and other 
appliances. Again, falls in the real priées of these should also stimulate growth, with this 
trend being of particular importance to the growth of delivered grocery shopping services 
( 5 J i , p.160-161). 
Growth in the UK population is slow in comparison to historie rates - growth in the first 
half of the 20th century amounted to 31.4%, compared to only 19.4% for the second half 
5
. In 1998, the UK population stood at 59.2 million, and is expected to grow to 61.8 
million by 2011 6 , continuing its slow rate of growth. This apparently stagnant picture of 
the population disguises major changes to the âge profile of the population, illustrated in 
figure c: 
Appendix 10, figure c: UK population structure, 1951-1991, forecasts for 2001-2011: 
Source: adapted from Annual Abstract ofStatistics, 2000 édition, 136, London, H M S O ; table 5 .3 , p.28 
The fundamental change to the âge structure of the UK population, like that of most 
developed countries, is that it is ageing. In 1951, only 10.8% of the population was over 
65, and this is forecast to increase to 16.6% by 2011. More dramatically, the percentage 
derived from: Annual Abstract ofStatistics, 2000 édition, 136, London , H M S O ; table 5.5, p .33 . 
Annual Abstract ofStatistics, 2000 édition, 136, London, H M S O ; table 5.3, p .28 
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of over 85s has risen from just 0.4% in 1951 and is expected to reach 2.2% by 2011 1 . 
Thèse increases are driven by numerous factors, notably record low fertility rates, 
continued falis in death rates and increased life expectancy, and the post-World War II 
baby boom génération beginning to reach retirement â g e 8 . 
Retailers that successfully adapt to the ageing population structure will improve their 
chances of success. Advertising is currently aimed predominantly at the young, although 
the over-55s control 80% of the UK's wealth and account for 40% of spending 9 . Older 
people are more conceraed with the nutritional and health implications of food, so are 
more demanding in thèse areas 1 0 . There are disparities within the 'grey population', with 
the 50-64 âge group identified as healthier and more active than ever before, while the 
over-70s tend to suffer from loss of taste and smell, loss of teeth, dementia, and strokes as 
well as being poorer 1 0 . In short, there are numerous opportunities for retailers to adapt to 
a changing society. 
The structure of the population is also affected by international migration. In gênerai, the 
net effect of this is to increase the UK population, although there are occasional periods 
when outflow exceeds inflow (figure d): 
1
 Annual AbstractofStatistics, 2000 édition, 136, London , H M S O ; table 5 .3 , p .28 
8
 Financial Times, June 17, 2000 ; "Problem of ageing 'underes t imatcd ' " , p . 7 . 
q
 Marketing, July 15, 1999; " W h y grey is golden", p .24 
, D
 The Grocer, June 10, 2000 ; " N o t just our seniors - also our future selves", p.52 
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Appendix 10, figure d: Migration into and out of the UK 
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Source : Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2000 édition, 136, London , H M S O ; table 5.7, p .35 
Migration into the UK has been used to avoid labour shortages. In particular, Jamaicans 
were encouraged to emigrate to the UK when post-war reconstruction required extra 
workers and more recently a skills shortage in the I T industry has led to Indian 
* 12 
nationals being accepted into the UK . Migration is suggested as a possible solution to 
the problems presented by the ageing population, primarily because it could avert 
possible labour shortages [Mason, 1991; p.16]. Refugees and asylum seekers are also an 
important factor in UK migration, with over 46,000 applications for asylum received in 
1998, excluding dépendants, compared to 26,205 in 1990 ' 3 . In short, the UK is becoming 
more cosmopolitan, and UK résidents are increasingly travelling overseas (5.2.iii). 
demonstrated by the number of UK résidents taking a holiday abroad rising from 30% in 
1988 to 38% in 1998 1 4 , and the number of international passengers using UK airports 
increasing by over 75% to 125.5 million between 1988 and 1998 l 5 . 
Immigration and increased foreign travel have influenced the UK palate, more exotic 
foods have been demanded by consumers, and supplied by food retailers (5.2.iii. p. 154). 
" Financial Times, M a y 30, 1998; "The ship that becamc an icon of black history". 
12
 People Management, 6(17) , August 24, 2000, "Recrui ters turn to India for I T exper t ise as skills crisis 
bi tes" , p .12 . 
13
 Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2000 édition, London , H M S O ; table 5.10, p .39 . 
14
 Annual Abstract ofStatistics, 2000 édition, London , H M S O ; table 12.5, p . 191 
15
 Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2000 édition, London , H M S O ; table 14.22, p . 2 2 6 
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Continuation of tliis trend seems inevitable as the population becomes increasingly 
cosmopolitan and subject to overseas travel, presenting further opportunity for UK food 
retailers to adapt their offering. 
The UK also has significant movement of population within the country, demonstrated by 
table e: 
Appendix 10, table e: Inter-regional migration 
Year 1971 1981 1991 1998 
England: Nor th East 4 . 8 % 4 . 7 % 4 . 5 % 4 . 4 % 
England : Nor th Wes t 9 . 7 % 9.6% 9 .4% 9 . 3 % 
Eng land : Merseyside 3 . 0 % 2 .7% 2 . 5 % 2 . 4 % 
England : Yorkshire and The H u m b e r 8 .8% 8.7% 8.6% 8 .5% 
England: East Midlands 6 . 5 % 6 .8% 7.0% 7 .0% 
England: West Midlands 9 . 2 % 9 .2% 9 . 1 % 9 .0% 
England : South Wes t 7 .4% 7 .8% 8.2% 8 . 3 % 
England: Eastern 8 .0% 8.6% 8.9% 9 . 1 % 
England : Greater L o n d o n 1 3 . 5 % 1 2 . 1 % 11.9% 1 2 . 1 % 
England: South East 12.2% 12.9% 1 3 . 3 % 13 .5% 
W a l e s 4 . 9 % 5 .0% 5 .0% 5.0% 
Scot land 9 .4% 9 .2% 8 .8% 8.6% 
Nor the rn Ireland 2 . 8 % 2 .7% 2 . 8 % 2 . 9 % 
Source : Annua! Abstract of Statistics, 2000 edilion, 136, London , H M S O ; table 5.5, p .33 
Between 1971 and 1998, Greater London, Scotland, Merseyside, the north-east and 
north-west of England, Yorkshire/Humberside and the west Midlands suffered falls in the 
percentage of the UK population living there. Similarly, the percentage of the UK 
population living in the south-east, east, and south-west of England, the east Midlands, 
Wales and Northern Ireland increased. The net effect of internal migration is 
concentration of the UK population in the south of England. The north has higher levels 
of unemployment and redundancies 1 6 , and trails the south in incomes, driving migration 
from the north to the south , 7 . 
16
 Guardian, June 6, 2000 ; " U K : Nor th -Sou th divide in labour market" , p . l 1 
17
 Financial Times, D e c e m b e r 7, 1999; "Nor th-south divide remains in sickness and in wea l th ' " p .2 . 
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It is forecast that economic growth in the south will exceed that of the north by an 
average of 0.6% per annum between 2000 and 2005, and that growth in employment in 
the south will exceed that of the north by 0.4% per annum between 2002 and 2005 . The 
govemment expects continued concentration of the population into the south-east, and 
forecasts that the région will require a million new houses by 2015 1 9 . 
The size and composition of households continues to change significantly, with long-term 
growth in the number of lone-person households, single parent households, and in 
households comprised of couples without children, illustrated in figure f: 
Appendix 10, figure f: Size and composition of households 
1999 
Y e a r 
Source: Social Trends 2000, London, HMSO; table 2 .3 , p.35 
Increases in the number of single-person households are driven by people choosing to 
20 
live alone, divorce, bereavement, children leaving home, and the ageing population 
The government expects 36% of all English households to be one-person households by 
2016 21. Divorce is the primary driver of single-parent households, being responsible for 
18
 The Guardian, Oc tober 20, 2000; "UK: Growth in north-south divide expected"; p . 2 7 . 
19
 Economist (US) , 354( i8161) , March 11, 2000 ; "The South-East : Manage and moni tor" , p .62. 
2 0
 Guardian, February l, 1997; " N o w w e are one" , p . T W l . 
21
 Guardian, J anuary 20 , 1998; " H o m e Alone" , p. 13. 
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two-thirds of such cases . As the divorce rate rose by a factor of six between 1961 and 
1991 2 3 , it is reasonable to assume that growth in the number of single-parent households 
will continue. Other factors such as the increasing number of births out-of-wedlock also 
drive single-parent households, although around 55% of these are to cohabiting parents 
[Murray, 1995]. 
Increasing numbers of households are comprised of couples without dependent children, 
and 45% of such households have both partners in full-time employment, compared to 
only 24% for couples with dependent children 2 4 . This type of household is one of the 
highest spending household groups [Poyner, 1987; p.108], presenting a challenge to 
retailers that would generate healthy profits if successfully met. 
Conclusion 
The economic activity rate, at the time of writing, is relatively stable, and is therefore 
unlikely to bring substantial gains in household income as it has done in the past (5.2.ii. 
p.146-153). The rate of economic participation of women continues to rise, while that of 
men is declining, although this appears to be voluntary as it is not accompanied by an 
increase in male unemployment. Factors such as early retirement are causing the fall in 
male economic activity, which has a less severe impact on income than unemployment. 
As more women become economically active, this is likely to intensify demand for 'one-
stop' and delivered shopping, although the impact of the economic activity rate is 
unlikely to be major in the years to 2010. 
Unemployment is falling, which should drive up real incomes and reduce the size of the 
disadvantaged sector in society. This presents opportunity to trade up the retail offering, 
as the number of people prioritising price should fall. Real income looks set to continue 
its general trend of slow, steady growth, although this is by no means guaranteed, again 
Guardian, October 13, 1993; "The new war on women" , p.22 
New Statesman (1996), February 14, 1997, 126(4321); p.7 
Labour Market Trends, January 1999; "Labour Marke t Spotl ight", p . 15-19. 
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providing opportunity for trading up. 
Real income growth should power significant growth in internet access, as should falling 
IT priées and alternative internet technology. Increased pénétration of the internet will 
increase the size of the market for delivered groceries, although retailers should be aware 
of the impact of the internet in other areas such as advertising, and as a price comparison 
tool. Growth in other consumer durables such as domestic réfrigération, microwaves, 
télévisions and cars is likely to continue to be slow due to their high existing pénétration. 
Population growth will continue to be slow, although the population is ageing 
considerably. As the older âge groups control so much of the country*s wealth, this 
présents opportunity for retailers to profit from the 'grey economy'. Older people are the 
primary source of the increase in single-person households 2 5 , although it would be wrong 
to assume that single-living is the norm among older people. Older people are enjoying 
better health until at least the age of 70. 
Internai migration is concentrating the population in the south of the country, particularly 
the south-east, and there will be a corresponding increase in consumer demand in the 
south and south-east, and a réduction in the north. Applications for asylum are increasing, 
and the country is becoming more cosmopolitan due to UK résidents' increased tourism 
and trave-I, suggesting that recent trends towards more exotic eating will continue. 
Finally, there is significant opportunity for retailers to satisfy growing segments of the 
population, in particular single-person households, single-parent households, and 
households of couples without dependent children. Single-person households require 
small portions and small packets, while relatively wealthy childless couples may be 
tempted to trade up to high quality products, for example. 
15
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